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SUMMARY 
 
It is widely acknowledged that the organised wildlife and hunting industry in South 
Africa contributes significantly to the country’s economy, as well as to the effective 
management and conservation of wildlife on privately owned land.  Despite this, 
hunting has come under increasing attack by anti-hunting proponents who wish to 
bring a ban on hunting.  A number of broad shifts across society at large and 
lobbying against hunting by anti-hunting proponents have given rise to legitimate 
concerns regarding the social acceptability of hunting.  To maintain the social 
legitimacy of hunting, it is imperative to put strategies in place to actively broaden the 
base of public acceptance of hunting.  Towards this aim, this study is an empirical 
investigation of the causal determinants of the public’s attitudes towards hunting and 
of the implications it holds for improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  The study 
commenced by building a sound theoretical foundation from the available literature 
on the measurement of attitudes, the structure and formation of attitudes, the 
instrumental and experiential aspects of attitudes, attitudinal ambivalence, the 
psychology of strong attitudes, as well as the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance.  
Thereafter, the study turned to identify an adequate and empirically valid research 
approach for investigating attitudes and its causal determinants.  A popular attitude 
theory in social psychology, namely the theory of reasoned action, was identified as 
a suitable conceptual framework for conducting this study.  According to the 
reasoned action model, the salient behavioural beliefs people associate with a 
particular behaviour form the informational foundation (or cognitive foundation) on 
which their attitudes towards the behaviour are based.  More specifically, the model 
suggests that peoples’ overall attitude towards a behaviour is a function of their 
xx 
 
perceived probability that a behaviour will produce certain outcomes (belief strength), 
as well as the degree to which they judge the perceived outcomes of the behaviour 
as positive or negative (outcome evaluation).   
 
The methodological design of the study’s empirical component was strictly based on 
the standard procedures prescribed by the theory of reasoned action.  Two 
consecutive and methodologically interrelated surveys were conducted amongst 
members of the public to collect the study’s primary data.  The main salient 
behavioural beliefs on which different attitudes towards hunting are based were 
identified and further investigated.  The results were analysed from the perspective 
of the theory of reasoned action and a clear understanding of the causal 
determinants of different attitudes towards hunting were attained.  Based on the 
findings of the study, a number of conclusions and recommendations were made 
that may guide the development of future strategies to improve the social legitimacy 
of hunting.  Amongst other things, it was suggested that public education 
programmes should be developed to address the public’s misconceptions of hunting; 
that public relation campaigns be undertaken to improve the public’s negative image 
of hunters; and that hunter education programmes be put in place to make hunters 
aware of the role they could play at community level to improve the social 
acceptability of hunting.  Detailed guidelines regarding the contents of such 
education programmes and public relation campaigns were provided. 
 
Key words:  hunting; public; social legitimacy; theory of reasoned action; attitudes; 
changing attitudes; wildlife management. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY 
 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Conventional hunting, as we knew it, has been transformed completely over 
the years.  By the end of the 20th Century, game farming and hunting were 
commercialised and is currently considered to be one of the important 
agricultural industries in South Africa (Van Niekerk, 2002, p.1 & pp.98 – 105).  
Today, hunting not only contributes significantly to the South African economy 
but also contributes significantly to the conservation of South Africa’s natural 
resources through sustainable utilisation practices.   
 
The income generated by the hunting industry could be viewed as an 
indication of the importance of the industry to the economy of South Africa.  
According to Eloff (2001, p.83) the gross income for trophy and biltong hunting 
in South Africa was estimated to amount to R603 million in the year 2000.  
Since then the industry has grown even larger and by the year 2009 Bothma, 
Suich and Spenceley (2009, p.154) stated that the local hunting sector alone 
is worth around R2.9 billion.  More recent estimates indicate that the South 
African trophy and biltong hunting industry has an annual gross income of 
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about R7.7 billion (Bezuidenhout, 2012, p.49).  Furthermore, hunting is by far 
the most important income-generating activity in the game industry (Van 
Niekerk, 2002, p.104).  Bothma et al. (2009, p.151) estimated that 54% of the 
direct gross income of wildlife ranchers are derived from local hunters and 
18% from foreign trophy hunters, whereas the remaining 28% are derived 
from live animal sales, ecotourism and wildlife meat production.  Clearly, 
hunting is the largest income generating activity within the game industry and 
is therefore the primary economic driving force behind the game industry.  In 
addition to the latter, an estimated 6000 jobs are provided directly by the 
hunting industry in South Africa while a further 60 000 jobs are provided by 
secondary industries such as taxidermy, professional hunters and skinners 
(Bothma et al., 2009, p.154). 
 
Wildlife ranching on private land has had a broadly positive impact on 
biodiversity (Aylward & Lutz, as cited in Bothma et al., 2009, p.150).  As a 
result of sustainable hunting practices, wildlife numbers have increased 
dramatically, and it is currently estimated that about 60% of South Africa’s 
wildlife occur on private land outside of officially declared protected areas 
such as national and provincial parks (Bezuidenhout, 2012, p.49).  Not only 
have game numbers increased dramatically, but also the total land area used 
for wildlife production.  In 2007 wildlife ranches were estimated to cover 
16.8% of South Africa, compared to a mere 6.1% for officially declared 
provincial and national protected areas (Bothma & Von Bach, 2009, p.149).  
Thomson (2006, p.110) points out that the game industry plays an extremely 
significant role in conserving habitats not only for the bigger game animals, 
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but also for smaller mammals, birds, reptiles and many other species.  If the 
above is considered in the light of the fact that the greatest threat to all wildlife 
on our planet is habitat loss (Knezevic, 2009, p.13), it is clear that the game 
industry (of which the hunting industry is the primary segment) contributes 
significantly to the conservation of natural habitats and thereby ensures a 
future for wildlife in South Africa.   
 
In the above discussion it was pointed out that the hunting industry contributes 
significantly to the country’s economy, as well as to effective wildlife 
management and conservation.  Strangely, however, economic realities and 
ecological facts do not necessarily dictate how a nation will manage its 
wildlife.  Its wildlife culture – which supports only those practices that are 
socio-politically acceptable to its people – is a very much stronger motivating 
force (Thomson, 2006, p.xv).  Ordinary people in society are encouraged to 
become involved in the decision-making processes of government (Thomson, 
2006, p.iii).  The game industry in South Africa, and hunting itself, is regulated 
by rules laid down by government legislation and regulations.  Government is 
concerned with what is socially acceptable to its people and what is not, and 
they formulate legislation and regulations within these boundaries.  Thus, the 
nature of government legislation and regulations regarding the hunting 
industry depends to a large extent on public acceptance of hunting.  Clearly 
then, the hunting industry needs the public’s acceptance in order to ensure a 
favourable and supportive legislative environment. 
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Concerns regarding the public’s attitude towards hunting have also developed 
in response to a variety of broad shifts across society at large.  Urbanisation 
has contributed to important social trends as fewer people are connected to 
the land, leading to reduced exposure to wildlife and hunting as part of a rural 
lifestyle (Campbell & Mackay, 2009, p.21).  As a consequence, the public is 
incognisant about matters affecting wildlife and hunting.  They fail to 
understand the basic principles of wildlife management and are often unable 
to comprehend the importance of hunting to wildlife management and 
conservation.  Furthermore, there has been an increased romanticised view of 
nature in balance amongst society at large and even amongst new wildlife 
management professionals (Campbell & Mackay, 2009, p.21).  As a 
consequence, hunting may often be perceived to upset the balance of nature 
and to be environmentally disastrous.  Moreover, death associated with 
hunting results in hunting being perceived as a practice that perpetuates the 
ideology of human domination over nature (Knezevic, 2009, p.15).  This 
perception of hunting is increasingly in conflict with society’s romanticised 
view of nature and, as a result, negative attitudes towards hunting are formed. 
 
In addition to these broad shifts across society, perhaps the greatest concern 
regarding the public’s attitude towards hunting have developed in response to 
the operations of the animal-rights movements.  Successful lobbying against 
hunting by animal-welfare and animal-rights movements have given rise to 
legitimate concerns regarding the future of both hunting and the nature of 
wildlife management itself (Peterson, 2004, p.310).  The animal rightists’ 
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destruction of South Africa’s wildlife industry is progressing slowly but surely 
(Thomson, 2006, p.110) as the public is overwhelmed with images of hunting 
as unethical, immoral, and environmentally disastrous (DiCamillo, 1995, 
p.616).  Animal rightists, the world over, are intent on stopping hunting in all its 
forms (Thomson, 2006, p.104).  In addition to banning hunting, the animal-
rights movements want the South African government to eliminate the wildlife 
industry altogether because they disapprove of man using wild animals for 
financial gain (Thomson, 2006, p.109).  To achieve this, they strive to gain 
public support for their cause and to provoke public protest against hunting, 
thereby exerting pressure on governments to ban hunting.  According to Swan 
(as cited in Peterson, 2004, p.311), “public protest can be seen as a social 
reaction to conditions deemed unethical by the public”.  He further states that 
“only those minorities sharing an ethical foundation with the public at large 
maintain social legitimacy.  As a minority group, hunters must therefore forge 
a coherent ethical stance shared at least in part with society because the 
future of practices in liberal democracies depends on their social legitimacy”.   
 
It should now be clear that negative attitudes towards hunting amongst the 
public have become a potential social threat to the hunting industry, which in 
turn may jeopardise the future of wildlife in South Africa.  Not only will a ban 
on hunting jeopardise the effective management of wildlife on game ranches 
(which may consequently lead to overpopulation of game species, habitat 
damage and ultimately a loss of biodiversity), but it will also have a substantial 
negative impact on the financial viability of game ranching.  The latter, in 
effect, will most likely have a detrimental impact on the extent and growth of 
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the game industry as a whole, as well as on the countless contributions it 
makes towards the conservation of wildlife and natural habitats. 
 
In light of the above discussion, this chapter will introduce the main research 
problem and sub-problems of the study, followed by a discussion on the 
objectives of the study.  The critical assumptions and delimitations of this 
study will then be specified to ensure that the limitations of the study are 
understood and that the study’s focus is clearly defined.  The significance of 
the research will be pointed out, followed by a definition of the concepts and 
terminology that appear in the study and a brief summary of the chapter. 
 
1.2 PROBLEM STATEMENT 
 
The conservational and economic value of the hunting industry emphasises 
the importance of hunting to South Africa.  The future of hunting in South 
Africa depends on its social legitimacy and on the extent to which its social 
legitimacy can be maintained in the future.   
 
To date very little research has been conducted on the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting in South Africa and, consequently, little concrete information 
regarding this issue is available.  Due to this lack of information, the morality 
and social acceptability of hunting is often brought into question by various 
interest groups who oppose hunting (Campbell & Mackay, 2009, p.21; Muth & 
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Jamison, 2000, p.21).  This, of course, complicates the task of the organised 
hunting industry to maintain a favourable and supportive legislative 
environment for the hunting industry and, as a consequence, the 
conservational and economical value of the hunting industry is jeopardised.  
Furthermore, the lack of concrete information regarding the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting makes it almost impossible to form an understanding of how 
these attitudes are formed and how it can be influenced.  As a consequence, 
it becomes an increasingly difficult task to promote or maintain the social 
legitimacy of hunting.  Woolf and Roseberry, as well as Brown, Decker, Riley, 
Enck, Laubner, Curtis and Mattfeld (as cited in Holsman, 2000, p.809) are in 
agreement that traditional justifications for allowing regulated hunting (e.g., 
population regulation) are increasingly ringing hollow amongst the non-hunting 
public and even amongst some wildlife professionals.  It is thus likely that 
more concrete persuasive rationales than traditional justifications will be 
needed to maintain the social legitimacy of hunting in the future (Holsman, 
2000, p.809).  Therefore, taking the abovementioned into account, the main 
research question is: 
  
What are the primary causal determinants of the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting and what implications do those causal determinants 
hold for improving the social legitimacy of hunting? 
  
From the main research question, it should be clear that this study has two 
main goals.  The first is to identify the main causal determinants of the public’s 
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attitudes towards hunting and to form an understanding of the cognitive 
foundations on which their different attitudes towards hunting are based.  The 
second main goal of this study is to explore the implications that the causal 
determinants of attitudes towards hunting hold for broadening the base of 
public acceptance of hunting. 
 
1.3 SUB-PROBLEMS 
 
This study will be aimed at solving the following sub-problems, which will 
jointly solve the main research problem: 
1.3.1 What systematic and empirically validated conceptual framework or research 
approach would be adequate for investigating, understanding and potentially 
influencing the cognitive foundation on which people base their attitudes 
towards hunting? 
1.3.2 What are the main causal determinants of members of the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting? 
1.3.3 How do these main causal determinants discriminate between members of 
the public with positive, negative and neutral attitudes towards hunting? 
1.3.4 Which particular causal determinants of members of the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting are likely to have the most significant potential in terms of 
broadening the base of public acceptance of hunting? 
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1.3.5 What impact or effect do various demographical and social variables of 
interest have on attitudes towards hunting and its underlying causal 
determinants? 
1.3.6 What implications do the causal determinants of the public’s attitudes towards 
hunting hold in terms of guiding the development of future strategies to 
improve the social legitimacy of hunting? 
 
1.4 OBJECTIVES OF THE RESEARCH 
 
From the problem statement it is clear that this study has two main objectives: 
firstly to understand how members of the public attain their attitudes towards 
hunting; and secondly to specify the implications that the causal determinants 
of their attitudes towards hunting hold for improving the social acceptability of 
hunting.  These two main objectives can be divided into the following specific 
sub-objectives, namely to: 
 Form a detailed understanding of the psychology of attitudes, the cognitive 
structure of attitudes, and how attitudes are formed. 
 Identify a systematic and empirically valid conceptual framework that would 
be adequate for investigating and understanding members of the public’s 
various attitudes towards hunting and for making inferences with respect to 
improving the social legitimacy of hunting. 
 Identify the main underlying causal determinants of members of the public’s 
attitudes towards hunting. 
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 Understand how these causal determinants form members of the public’s 
positive, negative, and neutral attitudes towards hunting. 
 Specify the particular causal determinants of attitudes towards hunting that 
are likely to have the most significant potential with respect to improving the 
social legitimacy of hunting. 
 Explore the overall implications that the causal determinants of the public’s 
positive, negative, and neutral attitudes have for guiding the development 
of future strategies aimed at broadening the base of public acceptance of 
hunting. 
 Identify important demographical and social differences that may influence 
members of the public’s attitudes towards hunting. 
 Investigate how these demographical and social differences influence 
attitudes towards hunting and its underlying causal determinants. 
 Provide general information and guidelines pertaining to the development 
of effective strategies to improve the social legitimacy of hunting. 
 
1.5 ASSUMPTIONS 
 
This study is firstly based on the assumption that the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting are a reflection of the social acceptability of hunting.  It is 
argued that an individual’s attitude towards hunting is an overall reflection of 
their own personal opinion, feelings, values and beliefs regarding hunting.  
However, unlike the attitude of an individual, the public’s attitudes towards 
hunting reflect the acceptability or appropriateness of hunting within a larger, 
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socially constructed system of norms, values, value orientations, beliefs, and 
ideologies.  Based on this argument, it is thus assumed that the public’s 
attitudes towards hunting are a reflection of the social legitimacy of hunting. 
 
Secondly, the assumption is made that a change in the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting will ultimately result in a corresponding change in the social 
legitimacy of hunting.  In other words, this study assumes that the social 
legitimacy of hunting may be improved by effectuating a positive change in the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting. 
 
The third assumption of this study is that an investigation into the causal 
determinants of members of the public’s attitudes towards hunting would 
provide information that may guide the development of effective strategies 
aimed at broadening the base of public acceptance of hunting. 
 
In the fourth and final place, the research in this study was based on a 
conceptual framework which is, in itself, based on certain assumptions.  
Consequently, the study is thus subjected to those particular assumptions of 
the conceptual framework on which it is based.  Since a detailed 
understanding of the implicated conceptual framework is necessary to fully 
understand the assumptions on which it is based, the particular assumptions 
could not be discussed under this section.  Instead, the conceptual framework 
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of interest as well as the assumptions on which it is based will be discussed 
throughout chapter 2 of this study. 
 
1.6 DELIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
 
All research is inevitably subject to limitations of some kind.  This study will be 
limited in a number of ways.  A discussion of these limitations will now follow. 
 
Firstly, the study is subject to some theoretical constraints and limitations.  
Sub-problem 1.3.1 of this study stipulates that a systematic and empirically 
validated conceptual framework or research approach be identified that will be 
able to meet the objectives of this study.  Clearly then, this study will be 
conducted from the perspective of some existing conceptual framework.  Any 
given conceptual framework is always subject to limitations of some kind and, 
as a result, the information produced by research that is conducted within 
such a framework will inevitably be subjected to the same limitations.  Thus, 
the information produced by this study will inevitably be subject to the specific 
theoretical constraints and limitations as that of the particular conceptual 
framework in which the research will be conducted.  The selection of an 
adequate and valid conceptual framework for this study, along with a 
discussion of its relevant limitations, will follow in chapter 2 of this study. 
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Secondly, the study is limited to specific geographical boundaries.  The study 
is strictly limited to South Africa.  No attempt will be made to investigate any 
attitudes towards hunting outside of this geographical boundary, nor will any 
attempt be made to investigate the implications this research has in terms of 
improving the social legitimacy of hunting beyond this geographical boundary. 
 
Thirdly, the study did not aim to produce information that may be regarded as 
representative of any particular sub-population amongst the public of South 
Africa.  Instead, the study was based on a non-probability sampling design 
and was subjective in nature.  The research thus relied on non-representative 
samples that consisted of members of the public in South Africa.  As a result, 
the utilisation of the results is limited in the sense that it does not produce 
conclusive results that could be generalised to the research population at 
large. 
 
Fourthly, in order to comply with the guidelines laid down by the Research 
Ethics Committee at Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University, the study had to 
be limited to participants from 18 years of age and older.  No persons under 
the age of 18 were allowed to participate in the study.  Despite this necessary 
age limitation, the research population of this study were still comprised of 
individuals across a wide spectrum of demographical and social 
characteristics. 
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Fifthly, this study provides only a snapshot of the present situation.  Research 
in the United States indicates that people’s attitudes towards hunting do not 
change rapidly.  It is rather subject to very slow, gradual and constant 
changes over time (Duda & Jones, 2008, p.2 & p.10; Heberlein & Willebrand, 
1998, pp.1072 – 1073; Responsive Management, 1995, p.6).  Thus, the 
results from the research are limited to the particular point in time when the 
research was conducted, and it must be kept in mind that it may be subject to 
change over time. 
 
Finally, this research study was specifically aimed at collecting information 
regarding attitudes towards hunting.  The study was not meant to investigate 
attitudes towards any other activities or segments of the game industry, such 
as cropping of game (culling), tourism-related activities, or the capture or live 
sales of game. 
 
1.7 SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH 
 
It is believed that this research could be significant in four main areas.  To 
date very little research has been done on attitudes of members of South 
Africa’s public towards hunting and, consequently, very limited information 
regarding this issue is available.  This study will thus firstly contribute towards 
the existing body of knowledge on public attitudes towards hunting. 
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It was stated earlier that the South African government is concerned with what 
is socially acceptable to its people and what is not, and they tend to formulate 
legislation and regulations within these boundaries.  As a consequence, it is 
essential that the social legitimacy of hunting be maintained or improved.  
However, with a lack of concrete information regarding the public’s attitudes 
towards hunting, it is virtually impossible to form an understanding of how 
these attitudes are attained and how it can be influenced.  Thus, in the second 
place, this research will provide valuable insight into the underlying causal 
determinants of the public’s various attitudes towards hunting and provide 
guidance with respect to formulating strategies aimed at improving the social 
legitimacy of hunting.  Information of this nature would, of course, enable the 
hunting industry to develop strategies to maintain or improve its social 
legitimacy.  This, in effect, will also increase the hunting industry’s ability to 
maintain a favourable and supportive legislative environment for the hunting 
industry. 
 
Following from the discussion in the paragraph above, this study will, in the 
third place, most likely have a substantial positive impact on the overall growth 
and development of the game and hunting industry.  This, in effect, may lead 
to an overall increase in the economic benefits provided by the game and 
hunting industry, as well as the conservation of even more wildlife and natural 
habitats on private land. 
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Fourthly, this study will hopefully highlight the shortcomings of the existing 
knowledge with regard to the public’s attitudes towards hunting, identify the 
areas where future research is necessary, and serve as a starting point for 
similar research projects in the future.   
 
1.8 DEFINITION OF CONCEPTS 
 
Throughout this study, some general concepts and terminology are used.  In 
this section, the most crucial concepts and terminology that appear in the 
study are defined. 
 
1.8.1 Public 
 
For the purpose of this study the public is defined as members of the general 
population of South Africa that are 18 years of age and older.  It is worth 
noting that, in this study, the term public is often used to refer to the broader 
population from which the non-probability samples were drawn for the 
purpose of the research. 
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1.8.2 Hunting 
 
Van Niekerk (2002, p.14) explains that hunting does not merely refer to the 
shooting of game animals, but it also refers to other tangible and intangible 
benefits like being in nature, socialising with friends, and the opportunity to 
view game.  Van Niekerk (2002, pp.14 – 15) state that, “from the perspective 
of the hunter, the total experience associated with hunting is important”.  It 
should be noted, however, that this study does not focus on hunting from the 
perspective of the hunter, but rather from the perspective of the general public 
– irrespective of how much or how little they may know about hunting.  It is 
thus necessary to further investigate the concept of hunting in order to supply 
a definition of the term hunting that would be adequate for the purpose of this 
study. 
 
According to Heberlein and Willebrand (1998, p.1071), hunting alone is too 
broad an object to define.  They are of the opinion that hunting could be 
divided into three broad segments based on the motivation for hunting, 
namely hunting for recreation and meat (most local hunters or biltong 
hunting), hunting for recreation or sport (trophy hunting), and 
traditional/subsistence hunting (people who are dependent on hunting for 
food).  Radder and Bech-Larsen (2008, pp.252 – 253) explain that while 
biltong hunters combine the experience of hunting with the desire to obtain 
meat, trophy hunters combine the experience of hunting with the desire to bag 
trophy animals.  Biltong hunting and trophy hunting differs from 
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traditional/subsistence hunting, which is typically non-commercialised, non-
regulated and outlawed, aimed at supplementing protein intake and/or ritual, 
ceremonial, or medicinal purposes (Report to the Minister of Environmental 
Affairs and Tourism, as cited in Radder & Bench-Larsen, 2008, p.252 – 253).  
Furthermore, research has found that people generally hold significantly 
different attitudes towards legal hunting practices than towards illegal hunting 
practices.  Since traditional/subsistence hunting practices are typically 
outlawed, and since there is evidence of significant differences between the 
public’s attitudes towards legal hunting practices and illegal hunting practices 
(Duda & Jones, 2008, p.2), it is clearly necessary to make a very clear 
distinction between these two practices in defining the term hunting. 
 
For the purpose of this study, hunting does not only refer to the killing of wild 
game animals, but also to be in nature and enjoying the total experience while 
pursuing wild game animals with the intent to kill.  Furthermore, it refers to 
hunting in general terms and thus includes all types of legal hunting (bow 
hunting, rifle hunting etc.) and general motivations for hunting (recreational 
hunting, hunting for meat, and trophy hunting).  The term hunting also 
includes the hunting of all types of game animals that are generally hunted 
and no distinction will be made between the hunting of various game species.  
However, it should be noted that for the purpose of this study the definition 
does not include traditional/subsistence hunting or any illegal hunting 
practices, nor does it include the professional cropping of wild animals 
(otherwise known as culling). 
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1.8.3 Attitudes towards hunting 
 
It will be seen later in chapter 2 that there is general consensus amongst 
investigators in contemporary social psychology that an attitude is best 
considered to be “a person’s latent disposition or tendency to respond with 
some degree of favourableness or unfavourableness to a psychological 
object” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.76).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.76) 
explain that “the attitude object can be any discriminable aspect of an 
individual’s world, including a behaviour”.  For the purpose of this study the 
concept of attitudes towards hunting is in line with Fishbein and Ajzen’s 
abovementioned definition of attitude.  Thus, for the purpose of this study, 
attitudes towards hunting refer to the public’s latent disposition or tendency to 
respond with some degree of favourableness or unfavourableness to hunting.  
Clearly, in terms of this definition the attitude object refers to the behaviour of 
hunting. 
 
1.8.4 Social legitimacy 
 
Earlier in section 1.1, it was said that public protest can be seen as a social 
reaction to conditions deemed unethical by the public (Swan, as cited in 
Peterson, 2004, p.311).  Swan (as cited in Peterson, 2004, p.311) states that 
“only those minorities sharing an ethical foundation with the public at large 
maintain social legitimacy.  As a minority group, hunters must therefore forge 
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a coherent ethical stance shared at least in part with society because the 
future of practices in liberal democracies depends on their social legitimacy”.  
Suchman (1995, p.575) explains that “legitimacy”, or social legitimacy for that 
matter, “can be regarded as an operational resource”.  Social legitimacy is an 
intangible resource that an organisation, industry (e.g., hunting industry, game 
industry) or practice (e.g., hunting) requires in order to operate.  Certain 
actions or events may increase that social legitimacy, while others may 
decrease it.  Low social legitimacy could have particularly severe 
consequences for an organisation, which may ultimately lead to the forfeiture 
of their right to operate (Tilling, 2004, p.4).  
 
According to Suchman (1995, p.574), social legitimacy is “a generalised 
perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or 
appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, 
and definitions”.  Kaplan and Ruland (1991, p.370) regard social legitimacy as 
“a process by which an entity seeks approval (or avoidance of sanction) from 
groups in society”.  For the purpose of this study then, social legitimacy refers 
to the generalised perception or assumption that the actions of an entity (such 
as hunting) are desirable, appropriate, and acceptable within the general 
public’s (society at large) socially constructed system of norms, values, 
beliefs, definitions, and ideologies. 
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1.8.5 Hunting industry 
 
Van Niekerk (2002, p.15) states that “the hunting industry does not only refer 
to hunting of animals, but also to related activities like accommodation of 
hunters, products on offer for non-hunting companions, taxidermy, products 
sold to hunting parties, professional hunting services (guides, trackers, 
professional hunters), and other activities directly related to the hunting 
experience”.  Consistent with this view, for the purpose of this study the 
hunting industry is defined as all activities that are closely related to offering 
clients the opportunity to shoot game animals. 
 
1.8.6 Game industry 
 
The game industry covers a wider field than only the hunting industry.  Van 
Niekerk (2002, p.15) explains that the game industry includes the hunting 
industry and all activities related to the management and utilisation of game.  
It includes activities such as management of game ranches and game herds, 
capture and live sales of game, non-consumptive utilisation practises (such as 
tourist-related activities), as well as consumptive utilisation practises (such as 
cropping of game, hunting and venison sales).  For the purpose of this study 
the game industry will be defined as by Van Niekerk (2002, p.15), as “all 
activities associated with the management and utilization of game”. 
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1.9 SUMMARY 
 
Chapter one commenced with a brief introduction to the study.  It was 
explained that hunting is the primary economical driving force behind the 
game industry.  In addition, it was explained that the game and hunting 
industry contributes significantly to the country’s economy, as well as to the 
conservation and effective management of wildlife.  It was seen that despite 
the importance of the hunting industry, government is often more concerned 
with what is socially acceptable to its people and what is not.  It was said that 
the future of practices in liberal democracies depends on their social 
legitimacy.  Thereafter, it was explained that a variety of broad shifts across 
society at large, as well as successful lobbying against hunting by animal-
rights movements have given rise to legitimate concerns regarding the social 
acceptability of hunting.  It was pointed out that traditional justifications for 
allowing regulated hunting are increasingly ringing hollow amongst the public, 
and that more concrete persuasive rationales will be needed to maintain the 
social legitimacy of hunting in the future.   
 
The introduction to the study was followed by identifying the main research 
problem, the sub-problems and objectives of the study.  In sum, it was 
explained that this study has two main goals.  Firstly, this study will provide a 
clear understanding of the causal determinants of the public’s various 
attitudes towards hunting and how these attitudes are formed.  This will be 
done by obtaining and analysing information regarding the causal 
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determinants of the public’s attitudes towards hunting.  Secondly, this study 
will provide guidelines for improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  This will 
be done by exploring the implications that the causal determinants of the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting hold in terms of developing effective 
strategies to influence attitudes towards hunting and broaden the base of 
public acceptance of hunting. 
 
The assumptions made in the study were then discussed.  It was said that the 
study is firstly based on the assumption that the public’s attitudes towards 
hunting are a reflection of the social legitimacy of hunting.  Secondly, this 
study assumes that an investigation into the cognitive structures of the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting may provide information that could give 
some guidance for the development of strategies to improve the public’s 
attitudes towards hunting.  The third assumption of this study is that a change 
in the public’s attitudes towards hunting will ultimately result in a 
corresponding change in the social legitimacy of hunting.  In the fourth and 
final place, this study is subjected to those particular assumptions of the 
conceptual framework on which it is based.   
 
Following the discussion of the assumptions made in this study, an 
explanation of the delimitation of the research was provided.  It was explained 
that the study will be subject to some theoretical limitations.  Furthermore, it 
was explained that the study will be limited to the geographical area of South 
Africa, as well as to all members of the general public within this geographical 
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area who is 18 years of age or older.  In addition, the study is limited in the 
sense that it does not produce conclusive results that could be generalised to 
the research population at large.  Moreover, it was explained that the results 
from the research will be limited to the particular point in time when the 
research was conducted, and that the results of the study will be applicable to 
no segments of the game industry other than the hunting industry. 
 
The significance of this research study was then discussed and it was pointed 
out that this study will, firstly, contribute towards the existing body of 
knowledge of the game and hunting industry; secondly, be of strategic 
importance to the leaders in the game and hunting industry and assist them in 
maintaining a favourable and supportive legislative environment for the 
hunting industry; thirdly, contribute to the growth and development of the 
hunting and game industry, as well as to conservation and the economy; 
fourthly, highlight the shortcomings of the existing knowledge with regard to 
the public’s attitudes towards hunting, identify the areas where future research 
is necessary, and serve as a starting point for similar research projects in the 
future; and finally, it was pointed out that this study will produce information 
that may be used for comparison purposes with similar research in the future. 
 
The discussion of the significance of the research was then followed by 
defining and explaining the major concepts and important terms used in the 
study.  In conclusion of this chapter, the major aspects that were addressed in 
this study were then summarised. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES: A CONCEPTUAL ORIENTATION TO 
UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING ATTITUDES 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
Amongst those who care about wildlife and nature, few activities arouse such 
disparate attitudes and feelings as hunting (Clark, 2007, p.3).  Some people 
feel just as passionate about hunting as others are enraged by it (Thomson, 
2006, p.105).  Clearly, hunting has become a controversial issue amongst 
some.  The ongoing debate over hunting has been and will continue to be 
influenced by perception (Campbell & Mackay, 2009, pp.21 – 22). 
 
In chapter 1 it was demonstrated that negative attitudes towards hunting have 
become a social threat facing the hunting industry and, consequently, 
jeopardise the future of wildlife and conservation on privately owned land in 
South Africa.  It is thus essential to maintain the social legitimacy of hunting.  
However, effective interventions to address this social threat cannot be 
designed without a thorough understanding of the factors determining 
peoples’ attitudes towards hunting.  Only by understanding how people come 
to hold their attitudes towards hunting is it possible to facilitate a change in 
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those attitudes and alleviate this social threat.  In light of the latter, this study 
thus sets out to form an understanding of the public’s attitudes towards 
hunting, as well as to investigate the implications this information has in terms 
of effectuating a positive change in the public’s attitudes towards hunting.  
Towards this aim, the chapter will commence with a discussion of some 
general concepts in contemporary social psychology that are of relevance to 
this particular study.  Thereafter, this chapter sets out to select a conceptual 
framework in social psychology that provides an adequate and valid research 
approach to the study’s main research goals.  A detailed discussion of the 
chosen conceptual framework then follows, and provides an understanding of 
the research approach and how the conceptual framework will be used to 
achieve the main research goals of the study.  This chapter is thus aimed 
mainly at solving sub-question 1.3.1 (see section 1.3 of chapter 1).  Lastly, the 
chapter will be concluded with a summary of the most important aspects that 
were addressed in the chapter. 
 
2.2 THE PSYCHOLOGY OF ATTITUDES 
 
In this section, some important concepts in contemporary social psychology 
that are of relevance to this study will be discussed.  The section commences 
by defining the term attitude, followed by a brief overview of how attitudes are 
measured in contemporary social psychology.  Thereafter, the most popular 
models of attitude formation and structure are introduced, followed by an 
overview of the major components of attitude.  This section then explains the 
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concept of attitudinal ambivalence and its relevance to understanding and 
changing attitudes.  This is followed by a brief overview of the psychology of 
strong attitudes, its effect on behaviour, and its implications for attitude 
change.  Finally, this section considers the suitability of standard attitude 
scales for assessing attitudes and understanding its underlying causal 
determinants. 
 
2.2.1 Defining and measuring attitude 
 
Many social psychologists, theorists and researchers devoted a great deal of 
effort to the definition and measurement of attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
pp.75 – 76; Kiesler, Collins & Miller, 1969, p.1).  Initially great difficulty was 
encountered in attempts to identify the essential characteristics of attitudes 
and therefore early definitions of attitude were often broad, complex and all-
encompassing views of attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.76).  Allport 
(1935, pp.784 & 810) for example defined attitude as “a mental and neural 
state of readiness, organised through experience, exerting a directive or 
dynamic influence upon the individual’s response to all objects and situations 
with which it is related”.  A similarly complex definition was supplied by Krech 
and Crutchfield (1948, p.152) who defined attitude as “an enduring 
organisation of motivational, emotional, perceptual, cognitive processes with 
respect to some aspect of the individual’s world”.  Such complex views of 
attitude were often shared amongst theorists.  However, many researchers 
interested in the measurement of attitudes (although acknowledging the 
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complexity of attitudes) realised that such multi-dimensional definitions were 
unworkable and unpractical (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.76 – 77).  Campbell 
(1950, pp.31 – 32) and Triandis (1967, p.228) also acknowledged the gap 
between those who are primarily concerned with the measurement of attitudes 
and those who have written theoretically about it.   
 
From a historical perspective, Thurstone (1928, 1931) made the major 
breakthrough in defining and measuring attitudes and was the first to apply 
psychometric methods to the measurement of attitudes.  He argued that when 
measuring attitudes it is necessary to restrict the definition of attitude in such a 
way that its evaluative dimension is emphasised, instead of its complexity.  In 
other words, Thurstone was of the opinion that, when measuring attitudes, it is 
necessary to have a uni-dimensional definition of attitude where the evaluative 
dimension is regarded as the critical continuum along which the measurement 
is to take place.  Consequently, Thurstone (1931, p.261; 1946, p.39) defined 
attitude as “the intensity of positive or negative affect for or against a 
psychological object”.  On the basis of this definition, Thurstone developed a 
scaling procedure, namely the equal-appearing interval scale, which resulted 
in a single attitude score indicating the respondent’s degree of favourableness 
or unfavourableness towards a given attitude object.  According to Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.77) as well as Perloff (2010, p.107), Thurstone’s 
groundbreaking work stimulated the development of several other standard 
attitudinal scaling techniques which are commonly used in contemporary 
research, namely Likert’s (1932) method of summated ratings, Guttman’s 
(1944) cumulative scaling method, and Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum’s 
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(1957) semantic differential scale.  These standard attitude scales are widely 
accepted and most frequently used in contemporary attitudinal research 
(Manfredo, 2008, p.79).  For specific descriptions of the development and use 
of these scales, see Miller (2002). 
 
 Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.77) assert that previous discrepancies between 
the theory and measurement of attitudes is no longer an issue in basic 
research on attitudes, because theory and measurement have to a large 
extent converged on an uni-dimensional conception of attitude.  Although 
there is no single definition of attitude that is acceptable to all who do 
attitudinal research, there is widespread consensus amongst contemporary 
theorists and investigators engaged in basic research on attitudes that an 
attitude’s essential characteristic is its bipolar evaluative dimension 
(Albarracín, Johnson, Zana & Kumkale, 2005, p.4; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 
pp.1 – 3; Krosnick, Judd & Wittenbrink, 2005, pp.22 – 24; Maio & Haddock, 
2009, pp.4 & 24; Manfredo, 2008, pp.78 – 79; Perloff, 2010, p.44).  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.76) also agree with the latter and explain that “attitudes 
are evaluative in nature, ascribing to individuals a position on an unitary 
evaluative dimension with respect to an object” – that is, a bipolar evaluative 
dimension that ranges from negative to positive through a neutral point.  
There seems to be general agreement that attitude is best considered to be a 
person’s “latent disposition or tendency to respond with some degree of 
favourableness or unfavourableness to a psychological object” (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, pp.76 – 77).  This view of attitudes is generally shared amongst 
contemporary investigators (see Albarracín et al., 2005, p.4; Eagly & Chaiken, 
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1993, p.1; Edward, 1957, p.2; Krosnick et al., 2005, pp.22 – 24; Maio & 
Haddock, 2009, p.4; Manfredo, 2008, pp.78 – 79). 
 
 In sum, it should be clear that for the purposes of this study, a suitable 
definition for attitude is a person’s latent disposition or tendency to 
respond with some degree of favourableness or unfavourableness to a 
psychological object.  The essential problem of attitude measurement is 
thus to obtain a single score that represents a person’s position on a bipolar 
evaluative dimension with respect to the attitude object.  Such attitudinal 
scores can be obtained in a reliable and valid fashion through most standard 
attitudinal scaling techniques, such as Likert’s (1932) method of summated 
ratings, Guttman’s (1944) cumulative scaling method, and Osgood et al., 
(1957) semantic differential scale.   
 
2.2.2 Structure of attitudes 
 
 The concept of attitude structure has to do with one’s conceptualisation of 
attitude (Fabrigar, MacDonald & Wegener, 2005, p.80) and the way in which 
the major cognitive components of attitudes are organised (Perloff, 2010, 
p.50).  The structure of attitude is important because it explains how attitudes 
are formed and it holds important implications for persuasion and attitude 
change (Perloff, 2010, p.54).  This section highlights the major cognitive and 
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affective components of attitude and briefly introduces the most popular model 
of attitude formation and structure. 
 
Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.103) assert that the assumption is common 
amongst attitude theorists that people have beliefs about attitude objects or 
behaviours, and that those beliefs are in some sense the primary building 
blocks or causal determinants of attitudes.  One of the most popular and 
influential models of attitude formation and structure is the expectancy-value 
model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.97 & 126; Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005, 
p.328).  The expectancy-value approach to attitude structure provides an 
explanation of how beliefs are combined to form attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993, p.231).  The model contains insight about the underlying structure and 
dynamics of people’s attitudes and is of interest to investigators who hope to 
understand and change attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, pp.109 & 231; 
Perloff, 2010, p.54). 
 
According to the expectancy-value approach, attitudes have two components.  
The first component is of a cognitive nature and has to do with the strength of 
beliefs that an object or behaviour has certain attributes or outcomes, for 
example, the strength with which a person believes that hunting (the 
behaviour) leads to the conservation of wildlife (the outcome).  The second 
component of attitude is of an affective nature and has to do with the feelings 
associated with the beliefs about the attributes or outcomes of the object or 
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behaviour, for example, a person may hold positive evaluations (feelings) 
towards conserving wildlife (the outcome of the behaviour).   
 
Simply put, the expectancy-value model postulates that attitude is a 
combination of what a person believes or expect of a certain object or 
behaviour and how that person feels about these expectations (Perloff, 2010, 
p.50).  Attitude is thus considered to be a multiplicative combination of the 
strength of beliefs that an object or behaviour has certain attributes or 
outcomes, and the positive and negative evaluations of these attributes or 
outcomes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.97).  For example, if a person believes 
that hunting is beneficial to wildlife populations, contributes towards the 
conservation of wildlife, and is a dangerous activity, these outcomes would be 
represented by the subjective probability that hunting has each outcome (for 
example, a high probability that hunting is beneficial to wildlife populations, 
contributes to conservation, and that it is a dangerous activity) as well as by 
the evaluation of each outcome (i.e., a positive evaluation of wildlife 
populations benefitting and that wildlife are conserved, and a negative 
evaluation of dangerous activities).  A detailed discussion of the expectancy-
value model is provided in section 2.4.6 of this chapter. 
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2.2.3 Instrumental versus experiential aspects of attitudes 
 
As mentioned earlier, it is possible to distinguish between two components of 
attitudes, one cognitive and the other affective in nature.  Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010, p.82) explain that this distinction can be traced back to the multi-
component model of attitude (see Rosenberg, 1956), which holds that 
attitudes are composed of cognitive, affective, and behavioural components.  
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.82 & 126), the cognitive and 
affective components are more appropriately termed instrumental and 
experiential aspects of attitude, respectively.  The instrumental aspects of 
attitude reflect the beliefs people hold about the positive or negative 
consequences associated with the performance of the behaviour, whereas the 
experiential aspects of attitude reflects the beliefs people hold about the 
positive or negative feelings or emotions associated with the performance of 
the behaviour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.10; Fabrigar et al., 2005, p.82; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.82 – 84; Maio & Haddock, 2009, pp.25 & 27; 
Sutton, French, Hennings, Mitchell, Wareham, Griffin, Hardeman & Kinmonth, 
2003, pp.234 – 237).  From a measurement perspective, instrumental aspects 
of attitude are featured in such adjective dimensions as beneficial–harmful, 
useful–useless, valuable–worthless, perfect–imperfect, healthy–unhealthy, 
and wise–foolish, whereas experiential aspects are reflected in such adjective 
dimensions as love–hate, pleasant–unpleasant, interesting–boring, like–
dislike, calm–tense, joy–sorrow, acceptance–disgusted, and enjoy–heartache 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.82; Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.27; Sutton et al., 
2003, pp.234 – 237). 
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Clearly, instrumental and experiential components differ from one another in 
that they capture different aspects of an attitude (Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.26; 
Sutton et al., 2003, pp.235 – 237).  It is important to understand that both the 
instrumental and experiential components may have an influence on the 
overall attitude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.85).  Fabrigar et al. (2005, p.82) 
explain that an attitude does not consist of these two elements, but is instead 
a general evaluative summary of the information derived from these bases.  
Consider, for example, the differences in the instrumental and experiential 
beliefs that Manstead and Parker (1995) identified in their study on attitudes 
towards driving violations such as speeding.  They report that respondents 
variously indicated that speeding reduces journey times, can cause an 
accident, might result in being stopped by the police, and so on (instrumental 
beliefs).  Respondents also indicated that speeding made them feel 
exhilarated, or nervous, or powerful, or frightened, and so on (experiential 
beliefs).  Clearly, the instrumental component captures the beliefs about the 
consequences of speeding, whereas the experiential component captures the 
feelings or emotions associated with speeding.  Together, these instrumental 
and experiential beliefs may form a general positive or negative evaluative 
summary (in other words, an attitude) towards driving violations such as 
speeding. 
 
While the instrumental and experiential components both capture different 
aspects of an attitude, this does not mean that they are completely 
independent of each other (Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.26).  Sutton et al. (2003, 
p.235) explain that in some cases there may be some overlap between 
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instrumental and experiential beliefs.  Consider, for example, the overlap 
between instrumental and experiential beliefs that Ajzen and Driver (1991) 
noticed in their study on participation in recreational activities such as 
mountain climbing, biking, and boating.  They found that beliefs such as 
experiencing a sense of accomplishment and feeling tired or exhausted 
appeared in both sets of instrumental and experiential beliefs regarding 
mountain climbing.  Beliefs with respect to boating, on the other hand, showed 
no overlap. 
 
It is important to realise that an attitude is not necessarily always comprised of 
both instrumental and experiential elements.  Instead, an attitude can be 
formed primarily or exclusively on the basis of any one of these two aspects, 
or by a combination of these two aspects (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.16; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.82).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.85) explain that 
while some attitudes may be largely based on instrumental beliefs, the 
underlying beliefs of other attitudes may be primarily experiential in nature.  In 
most instances, however, attitudes are composed of both instrumental and 
experiential items.  For example, Sutton et al. (2003, p.237) – who conducted 
an analysis of the beliefs people hold about being more physically active – 
speculated that physical activity may be a domain in which experiential 
outcomes (e.g., the pleasure of breathing fresh air or the discomfort of being 
hot and sweaty) may be expected to be as, or more, important influences on 
attitudes than instrumental outcomes such as weight reduction or reduction in 
cardiovascular risk. 
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There may also be discrepancies or inconsistencies between the evaluative 
implications of the instrumental and experiential components of an attitude 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.83 – 85; Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.26).  Thus, 
many behaviours may, for example, be judged favourably in terms of their 
instrumentality, but more negatively in terms of the experience of engaging in 
the behaviours (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.84).  To demonstrate, a person 
may believe that physical exercise may improve his general health – thus 
implying a positive instrumental evaluation towards physical exercise.  At the 
same time, however, the person may believe that physical exercise will cause 
him to feel exhausted and the discomfort of being hot and sweaty – thus 
implying a negative experiential evaluation towards physical exercise.  
Clearly, a single attitude may contain many positive and many negative 
elements, leading to attitudinal ambivalence (see section 2.2.4). 
 
2.2.4 Attitudinal ambivalence 
 
It is often incorrectly assumed that the existence of positive beliefs and 
feelings inhibits the occurrence of negative beliefs and feelings (Maio & 
Haddock, 2009, p.34).  This would mean, for example, that an individual with 
positive beliefs and feelings about hunting is unlikely to also have negative 
beliefs and feelings about it.  Clearly, this would imply that there is some form 
of evaluative consistency between the beliefs and feelings underlying an 
individual’s attitude towards an object or behaviour.  In actuality, however, an 
individual’s attitude may simultaneously contain many positive and many 
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negative beliefs and feelings (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.123; Maio & Haddock, 
2009, p.34).  This coexistence of positive and negative reactions to an attitude 
object or behaviour is known as attitudinal ambivalence (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.118; Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005, p.331).  Attitudinal ambivalence is 
thus a state of conflict that exists when an individual simultaneously possess 
positive and negative evaluations of a single attitude object or behaviour 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.123; Fabrigar et al., 2005, p.84; Kruglanski & 
Stroebe, 2005, p.332; Maio & Haddock, 2009, pp.36 – 37; Manfredo, 2008, 
p.95).   
 
As could be seen in the example of physical exercise that was given in section 
2.2.3, while many people realise the health benefits of engaging in physical 
exercise (positive instrumental beliefs), they may also at the same time 
believe that performing physical exercise would be unpleasant (negative 
experiential beliefs).  Clearly then, there may be evaluative inconsistencies or 
conflict between how individuals think (instrumental beliefs) and feel 
(experiential beliefs).  This pattern may be labelled as instrumental–
experiential ambivalence (Maio & Haddock, 2009, pp.36 – 37).  In addition, 
evaluative discrepancies or conflict may also exist within the instrumental 
beliefs (instrumental ambivalence) and within the experiential beliefs 
(experiential ambivalence) about an attitude object or behaviour (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, p.124).  For example, a person may simultaneously believe 
that hunting contributes to the conservation of wildlife (positive instrumental 
belief) and that hunting is a dangerous activity (negative instrumental belief).  
In a similar fashion, a person may simultaneously hold the belief that hunting 
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is a way of enjoying nature (positive experiential belief) and that the killing of a 
wild animal makes them feel sad (negative experiential belief).  
 
From the above discussion it should be clear that attitudinal ambivalence is a 
state of conflict that exists when an individual simultaneously possess positive 
and negative evaluations of an attitude object or behaviour.  It is possible to 
calculate the amount of conflict between people’s positive and negative 
evaluations of an attitude object or behaviour.  Although several different 
mathematical formulas have been developed to compute an index of 
attitudinal ambivalence (see Priester & Petty, 1996; Riketta, 2000; Thompson, 
Zanna & Griffin, 1995), Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.119) explain that they 
tend to produce very similar results.  According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 
p.119), the most popular method of computation in contemporary use was 
developed by Griffin (see Thompson et al., 1995).  In this model, attitudinal 
ambivalence is estimated by adding the positive ( ) and negative ( ) 
evaluations of the object or behaviour, dividing the sum by two, and 
subtracting the absolute value of the difference between   and  .  This 
computation is shown in Equation 3.1: 
     
         
 
(Equation 3.1) 
 
Alternatively, it is also possible to measure attitudinal ambivalence in a fairly 
direct manner by simply asking respondents to rate the extent to which their 
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beliefs or feelings are conflicted, mixed, and indecisive (Kruglanski & Stroebe, 
2005, p.331; Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.37).  However, Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010, p.119) explain that this direct approach to measuring attitudinal 
ambivalence provides relatively little information about the reason for 
conflicted valence, and is thus of limited value. 
 
Attitudinal ambivalence is an important property of attitudes, because it has 
the potential to explain why people sometimes react in polarised ways to 
controversial issues (Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.37).  The degree to which an 
attitude is ambivalent is assumed to have important implications for its 
function and predictive validity.  Specifically, Armitage and Conner (2000, 
pp.1421 – 1430) report that compared to non-ambivalent attitudes, ambivalent 
attitudes are said to be more likely to change over time, to be less resistant to 
persuasive appeals, to be less likely to bias processing of attitude-relevant 
information, and to be less likely to influence or guide behaviour.  
Furthermore, according to Muth and Jamison (2000, p.842), the public is often 
ambivalent about wildlife issues.  Thus, since attitudinal ambivalence towards 
wildlife issues are generally present amongst the public, and since attitudinal 
ambivalence clearly has important implications for attitude change and 
persuasion, it is argued that the concept of attitudinal ambivalence may be of 
some importance to this particular study. 
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2.2.5 The psychology of strong attitudes 
 
Amongst those who care about wildlife and conservation, few activities arouse 
such disparate feelings as hunting (Clark, 2007, p.3).  “For many, hunting is 
associated with strong positive sentiments, such as connecting with nature, 
spending time with friends or family, conserving habitats and wildlife, and 
wildlife management.  For others, hunting evokes strong negative thoughts of 
endangered species, the international bush-meat crisis and poaching, the risk 
of injuries from firearms, gun violence, and ethical issues with regard to killing 
animals” (Clark, 2007, p.3).  Hunting is a controversial issue that has come 
under increasing scrutiny by various interest groups (Campbell & Mackay, 
2009, pp.21 – 22).  It is a topic that often arouses strong emotions and 
attitudes amongst those who care about wildlife and conservation, and 
perhaps more specifically amongst hunting and animal rights communities.  
For this reason, the dynamics of strong attitudes may be of some relevance to 
this particular study.  In this section, the major characteristics and implications 
of dealing with strong attitudes will be summarised. 
 
Strong attitudes are generally involving, emotional, and invariably complex 
(Perloff, 2010, p.60), and are generally assumed to involve issues of personal 
relevance and are held with great conviction or certainty (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.261).  Consequently, strong attitudes are particularly likely to persist 
over time, affect judgements, guide behaviour, and prove resistant to change 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.261; Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.42; Manfredo, 
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2008, pp.94 – 95; Perloff, 2010, p.60).  Wang, Erber, Hodges and Wilson (as 
cited in Perloff, 2010, pp.60 – 61) explain that strong attitudes are generally 
stable, firstly because they are most likely anchored by other beliefs and 
values, thus making them more resistant to change.  Thus, if a person were to 
change his basic religious beliefs, for example, many other attitudes and 
values linked to these beliefs would have to be changed as well.  Secondly, 
people are likely to know more about issues they feel strongly about, making 
them more resistant to counterarguments and persuasive messages.  Thirdly, 
people are likely to associate with others who feel similarly on issues they 
consider important.  Social associations such as these are thought to help 
maintain and reinforce peoples’ attitudes.  Fourthly, strong attitudes are often 
more elaborated and salient, making it more likely that people will simply 
recall their attitude when confronted with the attitude object or behaviour on 
different occasions.  Lastly, people with strong attitudes are likely to attend to 
and seek out information relevant to the topic, thereby reinforcing their 
strongly held attitudes and arming them with even more arguments with which 
to resist attempts to change their attitudes.  The fact that strong attitudes are 
generally persistent over time and resistant to change may hold some 
important implications for this particular study. 
 
Strong attitudes also influence how people process and evaluate attitude-
relevant information.  People tend to process information in a way that is 
consistent with their existing attitudes, and strong attitudes are more influential 
in this regard (Manfredo, 2008, p.94).  Manfredo (2008, p.94) explains that 
even though there may be balanced information in a persuasive message, 
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people will focus on arguments that are consistent with their existing attitudes.  
Thus, a person who holds a strong attitude in opposition to hunting wild 
animals may be expected to process information about this issue in a biased 
manner – such a person is likely to automatically reject the credibility of 
information that supports the need for hunting wild animals, and to accept 
information consistent with their existing negative attitude towards hunting.  
Given their stability over time and the influence they have on processing 
information, strong attitudes are enduring and resistant to attempts at 
persuasion or attitude change. 
 
Strong attitudes have profound influences on thoughts and behaviours 
(Manfredo, 2008, p.95; Perloff, 2010, p.59).  Consider, for example, the 
continuous conflict between hunters and anti-hunting movements (Knezevic, 
2009, p.13).  Because of their strong attitudes, animal rights activists often 
engage in extreme actions, such as acts of violence or terrorism perpetrated 
against those who hunt or support hunting.  Not only do strong attitudes 
influence thoughts and behaviours, but it also affects the intensity of 
behavioural response and the consistency of one’s attitude and action over 
time (Manfredo, 2008, p.94). 
 
Social psychologists who study strong attitudes suggest that attitude strength 
is a multifaceted concept and that there are a variety of elements that 
differentiate strong attitudes from weak ones (see Holbrook, Berent, Krosnick, 
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Visser & Boninger, 2005; Krosnick, Boninger, Chuang, Berent & Carnot, 1993; 
Petrocelli, Tormala & Rucker, 2007).  Strong attitudes are characterised by: 
 Importance – a deep concern about an issue; 
 Ego involvement – the attitude is linked to core values or the self concept of 
a person; 
 Attitude extremity – this refers to how favourable or unfavourable a person 
evaluates an attitude object.  A strongly held attitude deviates significantly 
from neutrality; 
 Attitude certainty – a strong conviction that the attitude is correct; 
 Attitude accessibility – the attitude comes quickly to mind without much 
cognitive effort; 
 Knowledge – highly informed about the topic;  
 Hierarchical organisation – the attitude is internally consistent (thus, not 
ambivalent) and deeply embedded in an elaborate attitudinal structure; and 
 Attitude ambivalence – strong attitudes involve either mostly positive or 
mostly negative beliefs about an attitude object or behaviour.  Thus, with 
strong attitudes there is very little conflict between a person’s positive or 
negative evaluative components of a single attitude object or behaviour 
(low in ambivalence). 
Note, however, that any particular strong attitude may not necessarily possess 
all of these characteristics. 
 
Consistent with the abovementioned information pertaining to the psychology 
of strong attitudes, previous research has shown that staunch opponents to 
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hunting are very resistant to changing their attitudes, and that those with 
moderate attitudes towards hunting are the most promising audience for 
strengthening support for hunting (Campbell & MacKay, 2003; Herzog, 1993; 
Shaw, 1977).  This suggests that efforts to broaden the base of public 
acceptance of hunting should be directed at the segment of the public which is 
presently not strongly committed for or against hunting.  
 
2.2.6 Cognitive dissonance theory 
  
 Festinger’s (1957) theory of cognitive dissonance is one of the most widely 
discussed theories in social psychology.  According to McCool and 
Braithwaite (1992, p.301) as well as Perloff (2010, p.238), the phenomenon of 
cognitive dissonance may be formally defined as “a negative, unpleasant 
state that occurs whenever a person holds two cognitions that are 
psychologically inconsistent”.  Two cognitions are in a dissonant relationship 
when the opposite of one cognitive element follows from the other.  Cognitive 
dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable and result in feelings of discord.  
This, in turn, motivates people to take steps to reduce psychologically 
inconsistent cognitions that are the cause of dissonance.  
 
Researchers have identified several techniques people employ to reduce 
dissonance.  Many of these techniques are beyond the scope of this study, 
but are discussed in Perloff (2010, p.240).  However, it is important to take 
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note of two of the techniques people employ to reduce dissonance, since it 
holds important implications for promoting and maintaining the social 
acceptability of hunting.  Perloff (2010, p.239) explains that steps to reduce 
cognitive dissonance very often involve people changing their attitudes on a 
topic.  Therefore, under certain circumstances, if a persuasive message is 
effectively designed to induce cognitive dissonance it could result in people 
changing their attitudes towards a topic in an attempt to reduce the 
dissonance in their cognitions.  Thus, when people experience cognitive 
dissonance, they often persuade themselves to adopt a new attitude on a 
topic in an attempt to reduce dissonance.  According to Perloff (2010, p.239), 
“the cognitive dissonance theory thus assigns central importance to the power 
of self-persuasion”.  It is important to note, however, that people do not always 
reduce dissonance by altering their attitudes.  Instead, people may also 
reduce dissonance by rejecting information or new cognitions that are in 
dissonance with their existing cognitions.  This is most likely to happen when 
the newly formed cognitions are in dissonance with any existing cognitions 
that are held with great certainty.  If people’s existing cognitions are strongly 
held, they would in all likelihood reject information that would cause cognitive 
dissonance. 
 
 Shay (1977, pp.130 – 131) suggests one way in which the cognitive 
dissonance theory may be employed to maintain the social legitimacy of 
wildlife management practices such as hunting.  Shay (1977, pp.130 – 131) 
suggests that if a wildlife agency builds a strong enough image as the 
protector of all species in the minds of the non-hunting public, what the 
46 
agency says about hunting (or other issues) will automatically take on more 
strength.  If the agency’s image is strong enough, the non-hunter will tend to 
reject the discrediting proclamations of anti-hunters because they create 
dissonance.  If the agency responds to the plight of all species and every 
problem of wildlife, it will become a known, accepted friend and benefactor of 
all wildlife, and the validity of game management programs may not be 
seriously questioned by the largest segment of the public.  Hence, 
propaganda of hunting antagonists will become self defeating.   
  
2.2.7 Suitability of standard attitude scales for assessing attitudes and 
understanding its causal determinants 
  
In section 2.2.1 it was explained that attitudes can be assessed in a reliable 
and valid fashion through most standard attitudinal scaling techniques, and 
that these techniques are widely accepted and commonly used in 
contemporary attitudinal research.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.96) note that 
although items on standardised attitude scales might be good indicators of the 
underlying attitude, they do not necessarily provide any valid information 
about the causal determinants of the attitude.  In fact, the item selection 
criteria and procedures inherent in standard attitude scaling methods virtually 
guarantee that some of the most important causal determinants of an attitude 
are eliminated from consideration (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.93).  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, pp.85 – 96) gives a clear and comprehensive explanation in 
support of this argument.  To summarise, Fishbein and Ajzen explain that 
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investigators who use standard attitudinal scaling techniques to measure 
attitude, usually bring to the task an assumption that the items on the scale 
will provide information from which they can infer the causal beliefs, feelings, 
and intentions people hold with respect to the attitude object.  On the contrary, 
however, the researcher designs questionnaires containing scale items (e.g., 
belief statements) which he thinks could perhaps explain the attitude a person 
might hold about a particular attitude object or behaviour.  Clearly then, this 
procedure relies purely on the researcher’s intuition and completely ignores 
the notion of accessibility in memory (see section 2.4.5).  As a consequence, 
many of the attitude scale items that appear on an attitude questionnaire may 
never have been considered by the respondents prior to receiving the 
questionnaire.  Therefore, the information that is derived from standard 
attitude scales will not be able to provide valid information about the causal 
determinants of an attitude.  Furthermore, the item selection criteria inherent 
in standard attitudinal scaling techniques entail that items are included on the 
scale only because they are found to be good indicators of the underlying 
attitude, and not because they provide information about the causal 
determinants of an attitude.  For this reason, standard attitudinal scaling 
techniques may very well be valid indicators of an attitude under investigation, 
but it does not offer a good or valid basis for learning about the causal 
determinants of a particular attitude.  Moreover, the item selection criterion 
inherent in standard attitude scaling methods, place limits on the nature of the 
items that may be included on the scale.  Specifically, belief statement items 
that represent a well know fact will not meet the standard item selection 
criterion and will therefore be excluded from the scale.  This is because 
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virtually everybody will either agree or disagree with the belief statements that 
represent a well known fact.  Clearly, if people with different attitudes are 
equally likely to agree or disagree with a statement, their agreement or 
disagreement cannot be used to infer their attitudes.  For this reason, belief 
statements that represent a well know fact will fail to correlate with the total 
attitude score and, as a result, these belief statements will not meet the 
standard item selection criterion and will thus be incorrectly assumed to be 
irrelevant items.  In a similar manner, belief items are also often eliminated 
from consideration because they are evaluatively ambiguous.  Thus, if for 
some individuals agreement with an item implies a positive attitude whereas 
for others it implies a negative attitude, knowing that a given individual agrees 
with the item does not enable one to infer that person’s attitude or any of the 
determinants of the attitude.   
 
In the above paragraph it was pointed out that while standard attitude scaling 
techniques may be valid indicators of an underlying attitude, they cannot 
provide a valid basis for investigating the causal determinants of an attitude.  
Thus, in conclusion, while standard attitude scaling techniques may be 
adequate for addressing the first part of the main research question (namely, 
to assess the public’s attitudes towards hunting), it is inadequate for 
addressing the second part of the main research question (namely, to explore 
the implications that the causal determinants of the public’s attitudes towards 
hunting hold for improving the social legitimacy of hunting).  It was explained 
that the reason for the latter is, firstly, because the procedure for selecting 
scale items that are included in standard attitude scales are largely based on 
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the intuition of the researcher and clearly ignores the notion of accessibility in 
memory.  Secondly, the item selection criteria inherent in standard attitudinal 
scaling techniques entail that items are included on the scale only because 
they are found to be good indicators of the underlying attitude, and not 
because they are able to shed light on the causal determinants of the attitude.  
Thirdly, it was explained that standard attitude scaling methods cannot 
provide a valid basis for investigating the causal determinants of an attitude 
because the item selection criterion inherent in standard attitude scaling 
methods eliminate factual and ambivalent items which may be important 
determinants of an attitude.  Since standard attitude scales cannot provide a 
valid basis for investigating and understanding the causal determinants of an 
attitude, it will consequently be inadequate for addressing the second part of 
the main research question (namely, to explore the implications that the 
causal determinants of the public’s attitudes towards hunting hold for 
effectuating a positive change in their attitudes towards hunting). 
  
2.3 SELECTING AN ADEQUATE AND VALID RESEARCH APPROACH FOR 
ASSESSING, UNDERSTANDING AND CHANGING ATTITUDES TOWARDS 
HUNTING 
  
In light of the discussion in the previous section, it is clear that standard 
attitude scaling techniques alone will not be able to provide a suitable and 
valid research approach that will completely meet the needs of this particular 
study.  This section will therefore focus on selecting an adequate and valid 
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research approach for the study.  It stands to reason that when selecting a 
valid research approach that would be most adequate for a specific study, the 
choice must ultimately be guided by the study’s main research purpose (see 
section 1.2 of chapter 1).   
  
According to Daigle, Hrubes and Ajzen (2002, p.2) and Manfredo (2008, pp.89 
– 91), attitude studies related to human dimensions of wildlife generally follow 
two different approaches, namely a descriptive approach or a theoretical 
approach.  Both descriptive and theoretical approaches will now be 
considered with regard to their adequacy as a research approach to this 
particular study. 
  
2.3.1 Descriptive approaches versus theoretical approaches 
  
Over the past 25 years, research has furnished a great deal of descriptive 
information about people’s attitudes towards hunting and other wildlife-related 
activities (Hrubes, Ajzen & Daigle, 2001, p.2).  The majority of research 
concerning human dimensions of wildlife follows descriptive, non-theoretical 
approaches.  Due to the ease of conducting and interpreting these studies, 
they have become a common approach for studying human dimensions of 
wildlife or any other natural resources (Manfredo, 2008, pp.89 – 90).  Despite 
the popularity of descriptive approaches, they cannot be generalised and their 
utility is typically quite restricted, and in some cases, their validity is 
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questionable (Manfredo, 2008, p.90).  Descriptive approaches to studying 
attitudes generally make use of standard attitudinal scaling techniques 
because it provides a reliable measure of attitude and produces information 
that is generally of a descriptive nature (it was established earlier in section 
2.2.6 that standard attitude scales will not be adequate for the purpose of this 
particular study).  Aside from producing descriptive information, studies 
following descriptive approaches typically also explore the association of a 
particular issue with available descriptive variables (e.g., do results vary by 
high- versus low-income respondents, rural versus urban respondents, males 
versus females, etc.).  Based on these associations, attempts are then made 
to infer or explain why attitudes are held (Manfredo, 2008, p.90).  Clearly, 
such explanations of why attitudes are held, and consequently any 
suggestions on how to effectuate a change in these attitudes, would depend 
on the researcher’s intuition rather than on the basis of a systematic and 
empirically validated approach (also see section 2.2.6).  Hence, descriptive 
approaches of this nature will not be suitable for this study. 
 
Another popular descriptive approach is to identify broad values related to 
hunting or other wildlife-related activities (Hrubes et al., 2001, p.2; Manfredo, 
2008, p.90).  A number of studies have demonstrated that values are capable 
of influencing behaviours, attitudes and beliefs (i.e., Homer & Kahle, 1988).  
While these approaches are useful in exploring basic and enduring patterns of 
thoughts amongst people (i.e., their values), Manfredo (2008, p.90) explains 
that it inadequately captures the process by which people attend to 
information or retrieve information in forming an attitude.  Consequently, 
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descriptive approaches of this nature cannot serve as a valid basis for 
understanding or changing attitudes.  Moreover, Manfredo (2008, p.90) also 
explains that much of the information represented by items on these type of 
surveys is unlikely to occur to the person without prompting (thus, it ignores 
the notion of saliency or accessibility in memory – see section 2.4.5) and the 
instrument itself actually influences the attitude that is reported.  Hence, 
findings from such a survey may not accurately reflect the attitudes of the 
population of interest.  Manfredo (2008, p.90) warns that the latter issue would 
be of particular concern when studying attitudes on topics with which the 
population of interest have little information or experience.  Manfredo (2008, 
p.90) points out that this is generally a common situation when conducting 
research on wildlife-related topics amongst the general public.  In light of the 
shortcomings discussed in this paragraph, it should be clear that descriptive 
approaches based on value-attitude relationships will also not be suitable for 
this study. 
 
In sum, due to the apparent shortcomings of descriptive approaches, it is 
unable to provide a valid approach to understand and potentially change 
attitudes and its causal determinants.  Hence, descriptive approaches would 
be of little value to this particular study.  This, however, is not to discredit 
studies which have followed descriptive approaches.  On the contrary, 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.25) recognise the importance of descriptive 
studies, and explain that such studies have provided a valuable and detailed 
account of descriptive information (such as demographical, social, and other 
variables) that are specific to a given attitudinal or behavioural domain.  
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Although many studies have produced valuable and detailed descriptive 
information on attitudes, beliefs and values associated with wildlife-related 
activities such as hunting, the effort to build a cumulative body of knowledge 
has been hampered by lack of a sound theoretical foundation (Hrubes et al., 
2001, p.2).  Hrubes et al. (2001, p.2) explain that a theoretical foundation is 
essential to help integrate the diverse research findings and to provide a 
framework for the prediction and explanation of wildlife-related attitudes and 
actions.  Campbell and Mackay (2003, p.184) and Manfredo (2008, pp.89 – 
91) also recognise the need for more theory-based research with regard to 
human dimensions of wildlife and natural resources.  Therefore, in light of the 
need for more theory-based research and because of the inadequacies of 
descriptive approaches with regard to this particular study, it is thus necessary 
to consider the possibility of approaching it from a theoretical point of view. 
 
Despite the obvious need for more theory-based research, Manfredo (2008, 
p.89) explains that relatively few theoretical approaches have been applied in 
the domain of human dimensions of wildlife or natural resources.  Aside from 
isolated cases where attitude theories have been applied, the most frequently 
applied attitude theory in the area of human dimensions of wildlife and natural 
resources are Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action (Manfredo, 
2008, p.90).  Rossi and Armstrong (1999, p.41) agree and state that the 
theory of reasoned action is a commonly used basis for methodologies in 
human dimensions of natural resources research.  The theory of reasoned 
action is frequently used for a number of reasons: it offers a simple 
explanation of the structure and formation of attitude with practical 
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implications for changing attitudes or behaviour; its methods are described 
clearly (Manfredo, 2008, p.92); and it is well supported by empirical evidence 
across various disciplines (Ajzen, 1991, p.179; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.175; 
Maio & Haddock, 2009, p.69).  Eagly and Chaiken (1993, pp.231, 236 & 239) 
explain that no other attitude theories provide such a unique and appealing 
approach to investigating, understanding and changing attitudes and 
behaviours as the theory of reasoned action.  Consistent with the latter, Petty 
and Cacioppo (1981, p.204) state that the theory of reasoned action provides 
“the most complete informational analysis of attitudes, and a coherent and 
highly useful model of the relationship amongst beliefs, attitudes, and 
behaviours”.  Stiff and Mongeau (2003, p.63), as well as Sutton et al. (2003, 
p.234) also agree and explain that the theory of reasoned action has proven 
to be excellent for predicting, investigating and understanding attitudes and 
behaviours across a wide variety of situations.  According to Perloff (2010, 
pp.99 – 100), the theory of reasoned action has an excellent reputation in 
attitudinal and behavioural research.  Moreover, according to Armitage and 
Conner (2001, p.471), as well as Eagly and Chaiken (1993, pp.231 & 236), 
the theory of reasoned action is arguably the most popular and most widely 
researched attitude theory.  Manfredo (2008, pp.85 & 92), Rossi and 
Armstrong (1999, p.41), as well as Whittaker, Manfredo, Fix, Sinnott, Miller 
and Vaske (2001, p.1115) regard the theory of reasoned action as one of the 
most influential theoretical approaches to understanding and changing attitude 
and behaviour over the past four decades.  Furthermore, Rossi and 
Armstrong (1999, p.41) suggest that the reasoned action model provides a 
basis for identifying where and how to target strategies for changing attitudes 
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and behaviours.  According to Manfredo (2008, p.92) the theory of reasoned 
action predominates in applied fields of attitudinal and behavioural research 
and, because of its utility and empirical validity, it is likely to subsist. 
 
From the above discussion it is clear that the reasoned action approach is 
widely recognised amongst contemporary researchers and theorists as a valid 
and adequate approach for studying attitudes and behaviours.  It is also 
evident that the theory of reasoned action is generally recognised as an 
approach that provides a popular explanation of the structure and formation of 
attitudes.  Furthermore, it can be seen that the reasoned action perspective of 
attitude structure and formation contains insight about the underlying causal 
determinants of people’s attitudes and provides a basis for developing 
strategies to change attitudes.  Clearly then, the reasoned action approach 
would be able to meet all the needs of this study’s main research purpose.  
Therefore, since the theory of reasoned action is widely recognised as a 
popular approach, and because it is in line with the main research purpose of 
this study, it stands to reason that the theory of reasoned action may be 
considered as a possible theoretical approach for this study.  In the next 
section, the empirical validity of the theory of reasoned action, as well as its 
adequacy as a conceptual framework for conducting research in the area of 
human dimensions of wildlife and natural resources, will be considered. 
 
 
 
56 
2.3.2 Empirical validity of the reasoned action approach and its adequacy as a 
conceptual framework for research pertaining to human dimensions of wildlife 
and natural resources 
 
Over the past 30 years the theory of reasoned action stimulated a great deal 
of empirical research and well over 1000 empirical papers based on the 
reasoned action approach have appeared in professional scientific journals 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.xvii).  It is an enduring theory that has been tested 
extensively across a variety of attitudinal and behavioural situations (Rossi & 
Armstrong, 1999, p.42; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003, p.63; Whittaker et al., 2001, 
p.1116), and is well supported by empirical evidence across various 
disciplines ranging from blood donation, strategy choices, church attendance, 
family planning, eating at fast-food restaurants, smoking marijuana, dental 
hygiene issues, having an abortion, purchasing various consumer products, 
sexual behaviour, a variety of health-related issues, political voting choices 
and many more (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.175).  In addition to individual 
studies, a number of meta-analyses have also provided considerable 
empirical support for the theory of reasoned action (e.g., Ajzen, 1991; 
Albarracín, Johnson, Fishbein & Muellerleile, 2001; Armitage & Conner, 2001; 
Godin & Kok, 1996; Hausenblas, Carron & Mack, 1997; Sheppard, Hartwick & 
Warshaw, 1988). 
 
A considerable number of studies have also provided strong empirical support 
for the theory of reasoned action as a conceptual framework in research 
pertaining to the discipline of human dimensions of wildlife and natural 
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resources in particular.  To demonstrate, the theory of reasoned action has 
been extensively used in human dimensions research pertaining to the 
management of wildlife and other natural resources (Rossi & Armstrong, 
1999, p.41).  For example, Bright, Manfredo, Fishbein and Bath (1993), as 
well as Manfredo, Fishbein, Haas and Watson (1990) applied the theory of 
reasoned action to investigate and understand attitudes towards the National 
Park Service’s controlled burning policy; Wittmann and Vaske (as cited in 
Campbell & Mackay, 2003, p.181) used the theory to predict support for 
wildlife management actions; Pate, Manfredo, Bright and Tischbein (1996) 
applied the reasoned action model to investigate and understand residents’ 
attitudes towards wolf reintroduction in Colorado; and Zinn, Manfredo, Vaske 
and Wittmann (1998) employed the reasoned action approach to determine 
the acceptability of various wildlife management actions.  Furthermore, the 
theory of reasoned action has also been successfully used to investigate 
attitudes and behaviours with regard to a variety of outdoor recreation and 
leisure activities.  For example, Daigle et al. (2002) employed the theory of 
reasoned action to compare beliefs, attitudes and values amongst hunters, 
wildlife viewers, and other outdoor recreationists; Fulton, Manfredo and 
Lipscomb (1996) employed the theory to identify value orientations and 
attitudes influencing the decision to hunt or fish in Colorado; Hrubes et al. 
(2001) used the theory as a basis to predict and understand hunting intentions 
and behaviour; Young and Kent (1985) used the theory of reasoned action to 
understand outdoor recreational behaviour such as camping participation; and 
Whittaker et al. (2001) employed the theory of reasoned action to understand 
public attitudes towards a proposed urban moose hunt near Anchorage in 
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Alaska.  All of these studies not only provide further empirical support for the 
reasoned action approach, but it also demonstrates its effectiveness as a 
conceptual framework in research pertaining to human dimensions of wildlife 
and natural resources. 
 
Given the large amount of empirical evidence supporting the theory of 
reasoned action across various disciplines, and the fact that it has 
successfully served as a conceptual framework for numerous empirical 
studies in the human dimensions of wildlife and natural resources discipline, it 
stands to reason that the reasoned action approach may also serve as an 
empirical valid and adequate approach for this particular study.  The 
theoretical framework of the reasoned action approach will now be discussed 
as a conceptual framework for assessing and understanding attitudes towards 
hunting. 
 
2.4 THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION AS A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
FOR INVESTIGATING ATTITUDES TOWARDS HUNTING AND ITS 
CAUSAL DETERMINANTS 
 
The theory of reasoned action is an attitude and behaviour theory in social 
psychology that was developed by Ajzen and Fishbein (1980).  This theory not 
only allows the assessment of attitudes and behaviours, but also provides 
information about its causal determinants and holds practical implications for 
changing attitudes and behaviour.  Fishbein and Ajzen have been working on 
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the reasoned action approach both jointly and individually for more than 45 
years, modifying and refining its theoretical constructs and measures 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.17).  Over the years the theory of reasoned action 
has been improved and a standard set of instructions were developed for 
implementing the theory in attitudinal and behavioural research across a wide 
variety of domains (Manfredo, 2008, p.92; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003, p.63).  In 
the subsequent sections, a basic outline of the theory of reasoned action in its 
most current form will be provided, followed by a detailed discussion of each 
construct of the theory that is of importance to this particular study.  
 
2.4.1 Basic outline of the theory of reasoned action 
 
Figure 2.1 presents a schematic presentation of the conceptual framework of 
the theory of reasoned action.  In its simplest form, the reasoned action 
approach assumes that human social behaviour follows reasonably and often 
spontaneously from the beliefs people possess about performing the 
behaviour under consideration.  The beliefs people hold originate from 
information people acquire from a variety of sources, and are subject to 
various social and individual differences.  These differences not only influence 
the experiences people have and the sources of information to which they are 
exposed, but also the way in which they interpret and remember this 
information (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.20).  The potential influences of these 
factors on the beliefs people hold are recognised by the theory of reasoned 
action as background factors.  The origins of beliefs and the role of 
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background factors will be discussed later in this chapter.  Once a set of 
beliefs is formed it provides the cognitive foundation from which a person’s 
attitudes and behaviours ultimately follow in a consistent, spontaneous and 
often automatic fashion.  This does not mean that people are assumed to 
always be logical or rational.  The beliefs they hold need not be veridical; 
instead it may be inaccurate, biased, or even irrational.  Irrespective of their 
nature, people’s beliefs ultimately determine their attitudes and guide their 
behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.20 & 24).  According to the theory of 
reasoned action, human behaviour is guided by three kinds of beliefs, namely 
behavioural beliefs, normative beliefs and control beliefs (Ajzen, 1991, 
p.189; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.20).   
 
Behavioural beliefs refer to the beliefs a person may have about the likely 
positive or negative consequences or outcomes if the behaviour of interest 
were to be performed (Ajzen, 2011a, online).  These behavioural beliefs or 
outcome expectancies are assumed to determine people’s attitude towards 
the behaviour – that is, the degree to which performance of the behaviour is 
positively or negatively valued (Ajzen, 2011b, online; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.20).  In general, to the extent that performance of the behaviour is perceived 
to result in more positive than negative outcomes, the attitude towards the 
behaviour will be favourable (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.20).  Thus, for 
example, one is more likely to have a positive attitude towards hunting if one 
believes that hunting will lead to positive outcomes or prevent negative 
outcomes. 
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Normative beliefs refer to a person’s perception of social pressure or social 
expectations to behave in a specific manner.  In other words, people form 
beliefs that important individuals or social groups in their lives would approve 
or disapprove of the behaviour (injunctive normative beliefs), as well as beliefs 
that these referents themselves perform or don’t perform the behaviour in 
question (descriptive normative beliefs) (Ajzen, 2011c, online; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.20).  In their totality, these injunctive and descriptive normative 
beliefs produce a perceived norm – that is, the perceived social pressure to 
engage or not engage in the behaviour (Ajzen, 2011d, online; Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.20).  In general, if more important others are believed to 
approve than disapprove of the behaviour, and if the majority of important 
others perform the behaviour, people are likely to perceive social pressure to 
also engage in the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.20).  Thus, for 
example, if a person believes that important referents would approve of him 
going hunting, or that these referents participate in hunting activities 
themselves, he would be likely to perceive social pressure to approve of 
hunting and to participate in hunting activities himself. 
 
Control beliefs have to do with the perceived presence of factors that may 
facilitate or impede performance of the behaviour.  It is assumed that these 
control beliefs result in a sense of high or low control over performance of the 
behaviour.  This sense of high or low control over performance of a given 
behaviour is called perceived behavioural control, and refers to people's 
perceptions of their ability to perform the behaviour (Ajzen, 2011e, online; 
Ajzen, 2011f, online; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.21).  In general, if a person 
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believes that there are more facilitating than inhibiting factors with regard to 
performing the behaviour, his perceived behavioural control should be high 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.21).  Thus, for example, if a person believes that 
there is nothing preventing him from going on a hunt, he would perceive his 
control over going on a hunt to be high.  Conversely, if a person beliefs that he 
lacks the required skills, knowledge, equipment, money, hunting destination, 
or any other inhibiting factor, he would perceive his control over going on a 
hunt to be low. 
 
It should now be clear that, in their respective aggregates, behavioural beliefs 
produce a favourable or unfavourable attitude towards the behaviour; 
normative beliefs result in perceived norm; and control beliefs give rise to 
perceived behavioural control.  In combination, attitude towards the 
behaviour, perceived norm, and perception of behavioural control lead to the 
formation of a behavioural intention (Daigle et al., 2002, p.3) and are 
considered to be conceptually independent determinants of behavioural 
intention (Ajzen, 1991, p.188).  Intention refers to a person’s readiness to 
perform a specific behaviour.  In general, the more favourable the attitude and 
perceived norm with respect to the behaviour, and the greater the perceived 
behavioural control over performing the behaviour, the stronger should be a 
person’s intention to perform the behaviour under consideration (Ajzen, 1991, 
p.188; Daigle et al., 2002, p.3).  The stronger the intention, the more likely it is 
that the behaviour will be carried out.  Intention is thus assumed to be the 
immediate antecedent of behaviour (Hrubes et al., 2001, p.167).  It is well 
recognised, however, that lack of required skill and abilities, or the presence 
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of environmental constraints, may limit volitional control and can thus prevent 
people from acting on their intentions (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.21).  Thus, 
successful performance of the behaviour depends not only on a favourable 
intention but also on a sufficient level of actual control over performance of 
the behaviour (Ajzen, 2011g, online). 
 
The theory of reasoned action postulates that attitude towards the behaviour, 
perceived norm, and perceived behavioural control is conceptually 
independent determinants of behavioural intention (Ajzen, 1991, p.188).  
Therefore, each one of these three determinants of intentions can take on 
different weights – that is, the relative importance of attitudes, perceived norm 
and perceived behavioural control in the prediction of intention is expected to 
vary across behaviours and situations.  Thus, in some applications it may be 
found that only the attitude construct has a significant impact on intentions, in 
others that any two of the constructs are sufficient to account for intentions, 
and in still others that all three constructs are required to account for 
intentions (Ajzen, 1991, pp.188 – 189).  The relative importance or weight of 
the different constructs is expected to vary from one population to another, 
from one person to another, and from one situation or behaviour to another 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.22 – 23). 
 
As explained earlier, once a set of beliefs (behavioural, normative, or control 
beliefs) is formed it provides the cognitive foundation from which attitudes, 
perceived norms, and perceptions of control – and ultimately intentions and 
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behaviours – are assumed to follow (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.24).  
Therefore, it is at the level of beliefs that most of the concrete information 
unique to a given attitude or behaviour is obtained.  At this level, one is able to 
learn about the substantive considerations that ultimately guide people’s 
decisions to perform or not to perform the behaviour of interest.  This level of 
analysis offers insight into the ways people think about the behaviour: about 
its likely positive or negative consequences, the demands placed on them by 
others, as well as the required resources, possible barriers, and other issues 
of control.  Analysing behaviour or any of its underlying constructs (attitude 
towards the behaviour, perceived norm and perceived behavioural control) at 
the level of beliefs, thus provides information that can be used to effectively 
change behaviour (or any of its underlying constructs).  By identifying 
behavioural, normative, and control beliefs that discriminate between 
individuals who perform the behaviour of interest and individuals who do not, it 
is possible to design properly targeted messages or interventions that are 
aimed at changing their attitude, perceived norm, perceived control, and thus 
ultimately changing their intention and behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.23).   
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Figure 2.1. SCHEMATIC PRESENTATION OF THE REASONED ACTION 
MODEL 
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Source:  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.22). 
 
This section served as a basic introduction to the theory of reasoned action, 
followed by a brief explanation of how the reasoned action approach may 
serve as a basis for designing attitude or behaviour change interventions.  
Having formed a basic understanding of the theory of reasoned action, it is 
now necessary to align the reasoned action approach with the problem 
statement and goals of this particular study. 
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2.4.2 Aligning the reasoned action approach with the research purpose of this 
particular study 
 
 So far, the basic concept of the theory of reasoned action has been 
discussed.  Before an in-depth discussion of the empirical and methodological 
aspects of the theory of reasoned action commence, it is first necessary to 
clarify which of the various constructs of the theory’s framework will be used 
as a conceptual framework for conducting the research in this study.   
 
 From the problem statement in chapter 1 it is clear that this study has two 
main goals: firstly, to understand attitudes and its causal determinants; and 
secondly, to explore the implications this has for potentially changing the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting.  It should be recalled that the theory of 
reasoned action provides a conceptual framework which ultimately enables 
one to predict, investigate, understand, explain, and change behaviours.  
Since this study is primarily concerned with attitudes towards a behaviour 
(namely, the behaviour of hunting) and not necessarily with the performance 
of the behaviour itself, not all of the theory’s constructs may be relevant to this 
study.  Instead, only the constructs that are directly related to the attitude 
elements of human behaviour may be considered to be of relevance to the 
study.  Specifically then, since this study does not set out to predict or explain 
any behaviour or its behavioural intentions, these two constructs of the 
reasoned action framework is not of any significance to this study.  
Furthermore, at a conceptual level none of the control constructs (actual 
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control, perceived behavioural control and control beliefs) are believed to have 
any significant influence on the attitudinal constructs (Ajzen, 1991, p.188; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.153 – 178).  Therefore, none of the control 
constructs are of any value to the study.  The normative constructs are also 
conceptually independent from the attitudinal construct (Ajzen, 1991, p.188), 
and are therefore not relevant to this study.  Note, however, that there is some 
evidence which suggests that the normative constructs may have an indirect 
effect on attitudes to some extent (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.132).  Finally, 
since the focus of this study is exclusively on attitudes towards hunting, the 
attitudinal construct and its underlying cognitive structure of behavioural 
beliefs will be the only conceptual constructs of the reasoned action 
framework that is of interest to this study. 
 
 It should be recalled that the reasoned action approach assumes that beliefs 
provide the cognitive foundation from which attitudes follow.  More specifically, 
it was said that behavioural beliefs produce an attitude towards the behaviour.  
Thus, in order to understand the causal determinants of an attitude, it is 
necessary to analyse the substantive considerations which, together, 
determine the attitude.  These substantive considerations must be analysed at 
their most basic level, namely at the level of beliefs.  It is at the level of beliefs 
that most of the concrete information unique to a given attitude can be 
obtained.  Analysing attitudes at this level will thus produce information that 
may have implications for designing appropriate interventions that is aimed at 
changing attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.20 – 24). 
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 Following the introduction to the basic concept of the reasoned action 
approach, this section explained which of the constructs of the theory of 
reasoned action are of relevance to this particular study.  In sum, it was 
pointed out that only the theory’s attitudinal construct is of relevance to this 
study.  For this reason, the discussion in this chapter will from this point on 
focus exclusively on the theory of reasoned action’s attitudinal component, 
because within the conceptual framework of the theory, this component is of 
greatest relevance for investigating attitudes towards behaviours and its 
causal determinants.   
 
 The subsequent sections of this chapter will briefly explain the procedure for 
using the reasoned action approach in attitudinal research, followed by a 
discussion of the relevant empirical and methodological considerations 
concerning the attitudinal construct of the reasoned action approach and its 
application in attitudinal research. 
 
2.4.3 Standard procedure for applying the theory of reasoned action 
 
Over the years, Fishbein and Ajzen have developed a standard set of 
instructions and procedures that should be followed when using their theory 
as a conceptual framework in attitudinal and behavioural research (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010; Manfredo, 2008 p.92; Stiff & Mongeau, 2003, p.63).  These 
instructions and procedures must be strictly adhered to because it ensures the 
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validity and reliability of the research results.  A brief overview of these 
procedures will now follow. 
 
The first step when applying the theory of reasoned action is to clearly define 
the behaviour of interest in terms of its action, target, context, and time 
elements.  The issue of defining the behaviour of interest is addressed in 
section 2.4.4.  The second step is to specify the research population under 
investigation in the study.  It should be recalled that this particular study is 
interested in studying members of the public’s attitudes towards hunting.  The 
next step is to conduct formative research that is related to the defined 
behaviour of interest.  The formative research largely entails that an elicitation 
survey be conducted amongst a small sample of the research population.  
The elicitation survey typically consists of a series of open-ended questions 
that are designed to elicit and identify those salient beliefs about the 
behaviour of interest that are commonly held in the research population (those 
beliefs which are assumed to determine attitudes – see section 2.4.5).  A 
content analysis of participants’ open-ended responses to the questions 
should then be undertaken in order to identify a modal set of salient beliefs 
which are assumed to represent the research population’s salient beliefs.  
These salient beliefs are then used to construct a questionnaire that is to be 
administered in the primary survey of this study. 
 
The purpose of this section is only to give a broad description of the 
procedure that should be followed when applying the reasoned action 
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approach.  A detailed discussion of these procedures will follow in the 
subsequent sections of this chapter. 
 
2.4.4 Defining the behaviour of interest and the principle of compatibility 
 
 Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.29) explain that the first and in some ways the 
most crucial step when applying the theory of reasoned action is to clearly 
define the behaviour of interest.  Defining the behaviour of interest is of utmost 
importance to ensure that the theory’s constructs are measured with respect 
to exactly the same behavior – that is, to ensure that strict compatibility is 
maintained amongst the different measures (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.29 – 
32).  Although this study’s concern is not with understanding behaviour, it is, 
however, concerned with understanding people’s attitudes towards a specific 
behaviour, namely the behaviour of hunting.  For the purpose of this study it is 
therefore still essential that the behaviour of interest be clearly defined in 
order to ensure that the attitude construct and its related measures are 
measured with respect to exactly the same behaviour.  In this section, the 
relevant aspects of defining the behavior of interest will be discussed and a 
clear definition of hunting (the behaviour of interest in this particular study) will 
be formulated for the purpose of this study.  This section will then discuss the 
relevant aspects of the principle of compatibility and explain its implications for 
the study.   
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Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.29) explain that behaviours are observable 
events that must take place in a certain context, be directed at some target 
and are usually performed at a given point in time.  Therefore, it is useful to 
think of a behaviour as composed of four elements: the action performed, the 
target at which the action is directed, the context in which it is performed, 
and the time at which it is performed.  A simple example could be: hunting 
(action element) eland (target) on foot with a skilled bushman tracker in a 
remote part of Namibia (context) during the next week (time).  Fishbein and 
Ajzen (2010, p.29) explain that sometimes there is more ambiguity in defining 
a behaviour’s elements.  Thus, alternatively one may also be able to identify 
hunting eland as the action element, on foot with a skilled bushman tracker as 
the context, in a remote part of Namibia as the target, and during the next 
week as the time element.  A third alternative may not specify a target 
element at all, in which case hunting eland would be the action, on foot with a 
skilled bushman tracker in a remote part of Namibia would be the context, and 
the time element would remain the same.  Clearly, how the behavior is parsed 
into action, target, context and time is somewhat arbitrary.  It is up to the 
investigator to define the behavioural criterion as it best fits the research 
purpose (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.29 – 30). 
 
Once the behaviour’s elements (action, target, context, time) are specified, the 
behavior is defined (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.30).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 
p.30) explain that a change in any one of the elements constitutes a change in 
the behaviour under consideration.  Consider the original example of hunting 
(action) eland (target) on foot with a skilled bushman tracker in a remote part 
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of Namibia (context) during the next week (time).  It is self-evident that hunting 
eland is not the same behaviour as viewing or taking pictures of eland 
(change in action element).  It is also obvious that hunting eland and hunting 
lion (a change in target element) are not the same behaviours.  Similarly, 
hunting eland on foot with a skilled bushman tracker in a remote part of 
Namibia is a different behaviour from hunting eland from a blind on a small 
game ranch in South Africa (change in context element).  Finally, and perhaps 
less obvious, a modification of the time element would also alter the behavior 
in question.  In other words, performing a similar behaviour at a different point 
in time would still constitute a different behaviour. 
 
It is clear that according to Fishbein and Ajzen’s definition of behaviour, a 
change in any one of the behaviour’s four elements constitutes a change in 
the behaviour itself (Fishbein & Ajzen’s, 2010, p.30).  From the theoretical 
perspective of the reasoned action framework, it is evident that every 
behaviour constitutes a different set of explanatory constructs – that is, the 
attitudinal, normative, and control influences (Fishbein & Ajzen’s, 2010, pp.20 
– 25).  In other words, a change in any one of the four elements of a 
behaviour would result in a different behaviour, which in turn would result in 
different attitudinal, normative and control influences.  It was already 
explained that this study is mainly interested in the attitudinal construct of the 
theory of reasoned action.  Thus, for the purpose of this study it can be said 
that, according to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.20 – 25), a change in any one 
of the four elements of a behaviour would result in a different behaviour, which 
in turn would result in different attitudes and attitudinal influences towards it.  
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Consistent with Fishbein and Ajzen’s approach to defining behaviour in terms 
of its action, target, context and time elements, a review of literature on 
attitudes towards hunting also seems to suggest that a change in these four 
elements of a behaviour will ultimately result in a change in attitudes.  More 
specifically, the available research on attitudes towards hunting seems to 
suggest that the context elements of a behaviour is particularly important 
when assessing attitudes towards hunting.  From the literature it is apparent 
that people hold much more favourable attitudes towards hunting if it is 
performed in an ecological context (for example, using hunting to reduce 
wildlife populations to benefit wildlife, habitat, or the environment) than when it 
is performed in the context of recreation or sport (Bossenmaier, 1976, pp.127 
– 128; Duda & Jones, 2008, p.5).  The literature on attitudes towards hunting 
also revealed that people hold significantly different attitudes towards 
traditional native subsistence hunting, hunting for recreation and meat, and 
hunting for recreation and sport (trophy hunting) (Heberlein & Willebrand, 
1998, pp.1076 – 1077).  Because traditional native subsistence hunting, 
hunting for recreation and meat, and hunting for recreation and sport (trophy 
hunting) have obvious differences in the context in which the action of hunting 
is performed, they constitute different behaviours, which consequently result 
in people having different attitudes towards them.  Depending on how the 
elements of this behaviour is parsed, traditional native subsistence hunting, 
hunting for recreation and meat, and hunting for recreation and sport (trophy 
hunting) may also be viewed as different action elements of the same 
behaviour.  Furthermore, people also have significantly different attitudes 
towards legal hunting practices than towards illegal hunting practices such as 
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poaching (Duda & Jones, 2008, p.2).  This difference in attitude is arguably 
the result of a change in the context in which hunting is performed (legal or 
illegal context) or by a change in the action element (hunting constitute a 
different action element than poaching), depending on how the elements of 
this behaviour is parsed.  The literature also reveals that attitudes towards 
hunting have been observed to vary according to the species being hunted.  
For example, research shows that the hunting of ungulate species is generally 
more acceptable than is the hunting of predator species (Duda & Jones, 2008, 
pp.8 – 9).  This change in attitude is brought about by the change in the target 
element of the behaviour (where hunting is the action element and ungulates 
or predators the target element).  Finally, the literature review on attitudes 
towards hunting also revealed that a change in the time element of the 
behaviour of hunting may result in different attitudes towards hunting.  For 
example, one study found that many people who support hunting in general, 
oppose hunting on Sundays because of religion-based reasons (Duda & 
Jones, 2008, p.1).  Clearly then, a change in any one of the four elements of a 
behaviour would result in a different behaviour, which in turn would result in 
different attitudes and attitudinal influences towards it.  
 
Each of a behaviour’s four elements – action, target, context, and time – can 
be defined at various levels of generality or specificity (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.30).  Consider the example of hunting eland (action) on foot with a 
skilled bushman tracker (context) in a remote part of Namibia (target) during 
the next week (time).  At its most specific level, the behaviour may be defined 
as a single action (hunting eland), directed at a specific target (in a remote 
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part of Namibia), performed in a given context (on foot with a skilled bushman 
tracker) and at a specified point in time (during the next week).  By altering the 
levels of specificity with which the behaviour’s elements are defined, it is 
possible to define the behaviour at various levels of generality (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, pp.30 – 31).  For example, the action element can be broadened 
from specifically hunting eland, to hunting any antelope species, to hunting 
any wild mammalian species and, at its most general level the action element 
can be defined as a broad category of behaviour, such as hunting wild 
animals.  The target element may also be broadened from a specific remote 
part of Namibia, to any remote part of Namibia, to Namibia in general, to 
southern-Africa, or at its most general level the target element may be left 
completely unspecified.  Similar, the context element may be broadened from 
specifically on foot with a skilled bushman tracker, to just on foot, or at its 
most general level the context element may also be left completely 
unspecified.  Similarly, the time element could be broadened from a very 
specific point in time, to any desired point in time or, at its most general level 
be left completely unspecified.  It should be noted that it is possible to 
generalise or broaden the target, context and time elements of a behaviour to 
the point where these elements can be left completely unspecified.  However, 
a behaviour cannot be defined without specifying the action element at some 
level of generality or specificity.  In other words, a behavioural criterion always 
involves an action element (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.38). 
 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.31) warn that a behaviour can be defined so 
narrowly as to be of little theoretical or practical significance.  Consider, again, 
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the example of hunting eland on foot with a skilled bushman tracker in a 
remote part of Namibia during the next week.  No matter how we parse the 
elements of this behaviour, it is so narrowly defined that understanding 
peoples’ attitudes towards this particular behaviour would be of little value to 
anybody.  Clearly then, “when a behaviour is defined very narrowly, it may 
limit the utility of the information that is obtained” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.31).  To move towards a more general and more meaningful behavioural 
criterion, the action, target, context and time elements may be broadened 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.32).  It is often more meaningful to broaden the 
elements of a behaviour to such an extent that the definition moves to a broad 
behavioural category, instead of a single or very particular behaviour.  
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.29 – 30) explain that “it is up to the investigator 
to define the behavioural criterion at a level of generality or specificity that 
best fits the purpose of the particular research”. 
 
In the previous paragraph it was explained that when defining the behaviour of 
interest, it is sometimes more meaningful to focus on a behavioural category 
instead of a particular behaviour.  However, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.33) 
warn that it must be realised that people may differ in their understanding of a 
behavioural category.  As an example, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.33) state 
that “whereas there is general agreement about what it means to attend an 
aerobics class (a particular behaviour), this may not always be the case with a 
broad behavioural category, such as exercising”.  Whereas one person may 
interpret exercising as jogging, another person may interpret it as lifting 
weights, and yet another may interpret it as doing aerobics, cycling, or simply 
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going for a walk.  If respondents’ understanding of the behavioural category 
differs, it may pose problems for accurately measuring respondents’ attitudes 
towards the behaviour.  Therefore, when assessing attitudes towards a 
category of behaviour, the investigator should ensure that all participants have 
the same definition and understanding of the behavioural category, and that 
their definition matches that of the investigator.  This can be achieved by 
providing respondents beforehand with a clear definition of the behavioural 
category in question (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.33).  Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010, p.33) explain that, for instance, “the investigator might tell respondents 
that by exercising he means participating in active sports or vigorous physical 
activities long enough to get sweaty at least twice a week.  With this definition 
in mind, the investigator can then ask respondents about their attitude towards 
exercising”.  Alternatively, the definition of the behaviour may also be included 
in the question, in which case the investigator will ask respondents about their 
“attitude towards participating in active sports or vigorous physical activities 
long enough to get sweaty at least twice a week” (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.33).  Another alternative may be to list the specific activities that define the 
category.  Thus, the investigator could make it clear that by exercising he 
refers to jogging, lifting weights, aerobics, and cycling.  The investigator can 
then measure respondents’ attitudes towards engaging in each of the four 
exercising activities (jogging, lifting weights, aerobics, cycling) and, as a 
measure of attitude towards the exercising behaviour, simply average the 
responses (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.33 & 47).  In sum, it is evident that 
developing good attitudes measures towards behavioural categories could 
become a complex task that may be much more difficult than to assess 
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performance of a single or particular behaviour.  The challenge is to ensure 
that all respondents have the same definition and understanding of the 
behavioural category, and that their definition matches that of the investigator 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.33).   
 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.38) point out that one should carefully distinguish 
between behaviours and goals when specifying the action element of a 
behaviour.  According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.38), a goal is something 
that can be achieved by performing specific behaviours.  To illustrate what 
they mean, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.38) use the two examples of losing 
weight and getting a high grade on an exam.  They explain that “losing weight 
is not a behaviour but a goal that can perhaps be achieved by performing 
behaviours associated with dieting or exercising.  Similarly, getting a high 
grade on an exam is a goal students can set for themselves and that they can 
try to achieve by performing behaviours such as attending classes regularly 
and reading assigned materials.  It may appear that goals differ from 
behaviours in that they depend on performing one or more preceding actions”.  
However, most human social behaviour involves a sequence of actions, not a 
single act.  For example, performing a behaviour such as going on a hunting 
trip, is also preceded by, and dependent upon, other activities that includes 
finding a place the species of interest can be hunted, purchasing hunting gear, 
preparing for the hunt, driving to the hunting ranch on time, etc.  However, in 
the case of a behavioural sequence, the ultimate step is in itself an action, 
whereas in the case of a goal, the final step in the sequence no longer has an 
action element (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.38 – 39). 
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So far this section has dealt with all the essential criteria and relevant aspects 
of defining the behaviour of interest, as required by the theory of reasoned 
action.  It is now necessary to clearly define the behaviour involved in this 
particular study in terms of its action, target, context and time elements as it 
best fits the research purpose of this study.  By now it is obvious that hunting 
is the behaviour of interest in this study.  It should be recalled that any 
behavioural criterion always involve an action element, whereas all the other 
elements may be left unspecified.  Clearly then, hunting must be the action 
element of the behaviour.  Since this study does not set out to investigate 
attitudes towards any particular kind of hunting (for example, traditional native 
subsistence hunting, recreational hunting, biltong hunting, trophy hunting, bow 
hunting, rifle hunting, etc.) the investigator argued that this broadly defined 
action element (hunting) would be sufficient for the purpose of this study.  As 
far as the context element of the behaviour is concerned, it should be recalled 
that the literature suggests that the context in which hunting is performed is of 
particular importance when assessing attitudes towards hunting.  Therefore, 
the investigator argued that it is essential to define the context in which 
hunting (the action) will be performed at some level of generality or specificity.  
After thoroughly considering all the possibilities for specifying the context 
element, the investigator decided that it will best suit the purpose of the study 
if hunting is put in a legal context.  Since research found that many people 
include various forms of illegal hunting (poaching) in their conception of 
hunting (see Duda & Jones, 2008, p.2), the term legal hunting will ensure that 
respondents distinguish between hunting and poaching when asked about 
their attitudes towards hunting.  Thus, it is argued that using the term legal 
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hunting will promote a uniform understanding and a similar conception of the 
behaviour amongst respondents and, consequently, enhance the accuracy 
with which respondents’ attitudes towards hunting can be measured (see 
paragraph 7 of this section).  Furthermore, it was decided to define the target 
element of the behaviour as wild animals.  The investigator argued that the 
research purpose of this study is not aimed at investigating attitudes towards 
the hunting of a particular animal species or category of animals (such as 
predators or ungulates).  Therefore, a more generalised target element, such 
as wild animals, will best suit the purpose of this study.  Finally, the time 
element of the behaviour was intentionally left unspecified.  The investigator 
argued that this will best suit the research purpose of this study, because it 
does not necessarily wish to investigate people’s attitudes towards hunting at 
any particular point in time.  In sum then, after considering the research 
purpose of this particular study in light of the necessary aspects that need to 
be taken into consideration when defining a behaviour of interest, it was 
decided that the behaviour of interest will be defined as the legal hunting of 
wild animals, where legal is the context in which hunting takes place, hunting 
is the action, and wild animals the target. 
 
Now that the behaviour of interest is defined, it is necessary to discuss the 
role that the behaviour’s definition serves in terms of the principle of 
compatibility.  The most important prerequisite for understanding attitudes 
towards a particular behaviour is to ensure that all of the constructs in the 
reasoned action approach conforms to the principle of compatibility (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2010, p.44).  For the purpose of this study, the principle of 
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compatibility requires that exactly the same definition of behaviour applies 
when measuring attitudes and when eliciting the causal determinants of the 
attitude – that is, the measure of attitude should involve the same action, 
target, context, and time elements as the items that is used to elicit the causal 
determinants of the attitude.  Thus, when trying to understand the public’s 
attitude towards the legal hunting of wild animals, it is essential that this 
definition (action, target, and context) should apply when eliciting the salient 
beliefs underlying the attitude during the formative elicitation survey, and 
when measuring attitudes during the primary survey.  The logic behind this 
requirement is that it will ensure that there is a strong relationship between the 
measures of an attitude and the causal determinants of that attitude – that is, 
that the causal determinants can indeed be considered as a valid reflection of 
the attitude under consideration.  In sum, to ensure a strong relationship 
between an attitude and its causal determinants, it is imperative that the 
definition of the behaviour that was used to measure attitude must be 
completely compatible to the definition of the behaviour that was used to elicit 
the causal determinants of the attitude in terms of the action, target, context, 
and time elements.  The degree of compatibility can greatly impact the 
accuracy with which attitudes can be understood and explained based on their 
salient behavioural beliefs. 
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2.4.5 Salient beliefs as the prevailing determinants of attitude 
 
Up to this point, it was explained that, according to the reasoned action 
approach, behavioural beliefs form the cognitive foundation on which attitudes 
are ultimately based.  In this section, it will become apparent that not all 
behavioural beliefs should be seen as causal determinants of a given attitude.  
Specifically, it will be explained that only salient behavioural beliefs act as the 
causal determinants of any given attitude.  This section explains the concept 
of salient beliefs, how to elicit and identify salient beliefs in an individual, how 
to identify a modal set of readily salient beliefs for a population and, finally, 
this section addresses some important issues related to salient behavioural 
beliefs as the causal determinants of attitude. 
 
During the basic outline of the theory of reasoned action it was explained that 
behavioural beliefs (beliefs about the likely consequences of performing the 
behaviour) represent the informational foundation on which attitudes are 
based (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.24).  Although people can, of course, form 
many different beliefs about a behaviour, the theory of reasoned action 
assumes that only a relatively small number of beliefs determine their attitude 
at any given moment (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.98).  Research suggests that 
people are capable of attending to or processing about five to nine items of 
information at a time (see, Mandler, 1967; Miller, 1956; Woodworth & 
Schlosberg, as cited in Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.98 – 99).  Clearly then, 
these limitations on our capacity for processing information suggest that 
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people are only capable of considering or processing a limited number of 
beliefs at any given time.  Consistent with our capacity for processing 
information, the theory of reasoned action assumes that a person’s attitude 
towards any behaviour is, at any given moment, primarily determined by no 
more than five to nine behavioural beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.99).  
Specifically, the theory of reasoned action refers to these prevailing 
determinants of the attitude as salient beliefs (salient behavioural beliefs in 
the case of attitude towards the behaviour).  Note that, in contemporary social 
psychology the term salience is sometimes also referred to as the notion of 
accessibility in memory and thus termed accessible beliefs (accessible 
behavioural beliefs in the case of attitude towards the behaviour) (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, pp.151 – 152; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.98).  Manfredo 
(2008, p.93) describes the notion of belief accessibility or saliency as “the 
prominence of certain beliefs that comprise a person’s attitudes and the extent 
to which these beliefs routinely occur to an individual in a given situation”.  
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.98) explain that “salient or accessible beliefs are 
those beliefs that are activated spontaneously without much cognitive effort in 
the actual or symbolic presence of the attitude object or behaviour.  This 
activation may occur below conscious awareness, but salient beliefs come 
readily to mind when a person has reason to retrieve them” (for example, 
when they are confronted with a given attitude object or behaviour).  Of 
course, given sufficient time and motivation, people can actively retrieve 
additional beliefs from memory, and these additional beliefs may then also 
influence the attitude at that point in time.  However, the theory of reasoned 
action merely suggests that under most circumstances a relatively small 
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number of salient beliefs serve as the determinants of a person’s attitude at 
any given point in time (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.99).  More specifically, only 
salient behavioural beliefs are assumed to determine attitude towards 
behaviour.  It therefore stands to reason that salient behavioural beliefs are 
better predictors of attitude than non-salient or less accessible beliefs.  
Available empirical evidence does indeed show that salient beliefs tend to 
correlate more highly with an independent measure of attitude than do non-
salient beliefs (see Petkova, Ajzen & Driver, 1995; van den Putte, as cited in 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.104; van der Pligt & Eiser, as cited in Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, p.111).  Clearly then, the notion that attitudes are 
predominantly determined by salient beliefs are supported by empirical 
research.   
 
The importance of belief accessibility in attitude research is widely recognised 
in contemporary social psychology (Fazio, 1995; Fazio, Chen, McDonel & 
Sherman, 1982; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.98 – 101; Maio & Haddock, 2009, 
p.28; Manfredo, 2008, pp.93 – 94; Manfredo, Yuan & McGuire, 1992; Perloff, 
2010, pp.73 & 76).  Manfredo (2008, pp.93 – 94) emphasises the importance 
of recognising the notion of accessibility in memory (salience) in attitude 
research and explains that it affects the methodological validity of attitude 
studies.  He explains that in many attitudinal studies, researchers include on a 
questionnaire a list of belief statements which they assume would represent 
the beliefs respondents might hold about a particular attitude object or 
behaviour.  Respondents are then typically asked about their level of 
agreement or disagreement with the statements.  This approach has a major 
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methodological flaw.  Because the statements have been selected through the 
researcher’s intuition, many of the belief statements that appear on an attitude 
scale may never have been considered by the respondents prior to receiving 
the questionnaire and, therefore may not represent the beliefs that determine 
respondents’ attitudes (also see section 2.2.6).  Consistent with the latter, 
research conducted by Barro, Manfredo and Wells (1994) also found that 
salient beliefs will predict attitudes better than items that were identified by the 
researcher. 
 
As already noted, beliefs represent the information people have about the 
behaviour and this serves as the cognitive foundation for their attitude 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.98).  This is because beliefs carry evaluative 
meaning which becomes automatically activated when the beliefs are recalled 
(see section 2.4.6.1).  “Just as the denotative meaning of any concept with 
which a person is familiar is immediately available and need not be 
constructed, so too is its evaluative meaning or attitude” (Osgood et al., as 
cited in Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010, p.99).  Thus, for example, when people are 
asked to indicate their attitudes regarding an issue (i.e., the legal hunting of 
wild animals), they need not review their beliefs about it before they can 
express a position or attitude.  Because of the salient beliefs people hold 
about the legal hunting of wild animals, this concept carries meaning for them 
– including evaluative meaning – which is automatically available (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, pp.99 – 100; Perloff, 2010, p.51). 
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By now it should be clear that, in order to understand why a person holds a 
certain attitude towards the behaviour at a given point in time, it is necessary 
to assess the person’s readily salient behavioural beliefs about the behaviour 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.100).  However, before this can be done it is, of 
course, necessary to first identify the person’s salient behavioural beliefs 
about the behaviour of interest.  It will now be explained how salient beliefs 
can be elicited and identified by conducting a formative elicitation study.  It 
was explained earlier that salient beliefs are those beliefs that come readily to 
mind – without much cognitive effort – when a person has reason to retrieve 
them (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.99; Manfredo, 2008, pp.86 – 87).  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.100), as well as Sutton et al. (2003, p.235) explain that 
salient beliefs are those beliefs that first come to mind when a person is asked 
open-ended questions with regard to the behaviour of interest.  For example, 
a person may be asked to list the advantages or disadvantages of them 
performing the behaviour in question, or to list the characteristics, qualities, 
and attributes they associate with the behaviour of interest (Sutton et al., 
2003, p.235; Zajonc, as cited in Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.100).  In line with 
the earlier discussion, it can be suggested that the first five to nine beliefs 
emitted are readily accessible in memory or salient and are therefore likely to 
serve as the primary determinants of the person’s attitude towards the 
behaviour under investigation.  It is possible, however, that only the first two or 
three beliefs emitted are readily salient for the individual and that additional 
beliefs emitted beyond this point are retrieved from memory with more effort.  
In other words, while listing beliefs about an object or behaviour, a person 
may recall some forgotten information or make new inferences on the basis of 
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existing information.  In this manner, beliefs that were previously not readily 
accessible may become part of the salient set of beliefs and, if so, they may 
become important determinants of the currently prevailing attitude (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, pp.100 – 101).  Nevertheless, once a person’s salient beliefs are 
identified, it is then possible to assess those salient beliefs as the casual 
determinants of the person’s attitude by measuring belief strength and 
outcome evaluation in the manner described in the next section (section 
2.4.6). 
 
According to the theory of reasoned action, when eliciting salient beliefs it is 
essential to ensure complete compatibility with respect to the action, target, 
context, and time elements of the behaviour under investigation (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.101).  For example, if we are interested in the determinants of 
a person’s attitude towards the legal hunting of wild animals, it is essential to 
elicit salient beliefs about this particular behaviour.  Thus, one could ask 
participants to list the advantages and the disadvantages, or the positive and 
negative aspects and consequences of the legal hunting of wild animals.  
Questions such as these observe the principle of compatibility in that they 
refer to the behaviour of interest in terms of the same action, target, context, 
and time elements.  Furthermore, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.101) point out 
that it must also be carefully considered whether respondents should be 
asked about them personally performing the behaviour, or about performance 
of the behaviour in general.  This is because the consequences people expect 
as a result of their own performing of the behaviour may differ from the 
consequences they associate with performance of the behaviour by others 
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(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.101).  For example, a person may associate 
mostly favourable consequences with the hunting of wild animals in general 
(perhaps that it contributes to the conservation of wildlife, or that hunting is an 
important wildlife management instrument), but may believe that this 
behaviour would produce mostly negative consequences for him personally if 
he is to perform the behaviour himself (perhaps having feelings of regret after 
killing an animal, or having to see a dead animal).  This consideration would 
clearly depend on the purpose of the study.  Thus, when the objective of the 
study is to ultimately understand why people engage in a specific behaviour or 
not, respondents should be asked about them personally performing the 
behaviour – for example, they could be asked to list the advantages and 
disadvantages of them performing the behaviour in question.  However, when 
the objective of the study is to understand people’s attitude towards the 
behaviour in general, it would be suitable to simply ask respondents to list the 
advantages and disadvantages of the behaviour in question.  In the case of 
this particular study, the purpose is to assess and understand people’s 
attitude towards the legal hunting of wild animals in general, and not 
necessarily towards the act of legally hunting wild animals themselves.  
Accordingly then, respondents’ salient beliefs should be elicited by asking 
respondents open-ended questions which refers to the performance of the 
behaviour in general. 
 
Consistent with most contemporary psychological understandings of attitudes, 
the theory of reasoned action recognises that it is necessary to distinguish 
between two interrelated aspects of attitude, namely the instrumental and 
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experiential aspects of attitude (see section 2.2.3) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.82).  Instrumental aspects of attitude involve such dimensions as harmful–
beneficial, useless–useful, and wise–foolish, whereas experiential aspects are 
reflected in such dimensions as pleasant–unpleasant, boring–interesting, 
dislike–like, and enjoy–hate (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.82; Sutton et al., 2003, 
pp.234 – 237).  Clearly, the instrumental aspects of attitude reflect the beliefs 
people hold about the positive or negative consequences associated with the 
performance of the behaviour, whereas the experiential aspects reflect the 
beliefs people hold about the positive or negative experiences or emotions 
associated with the performance of the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.84).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.85) as well as Sutton et al. (2003) regard 
it necessary to take into consideration both the instrumental and experiential 
aspects of attitudes when eliciting salient beliefs, since both aspects may 
have an influence on the overall attitude (see section 2.2.3).  Manstead and 
Parker (1995) found that the wording of the open-ended questions – as was 
recommended in the original formulation of the reasoned action approach 
(which only referred to advantages and disadvantages) – are likely to elicit 
instrumental beliefs rather than experiential beliefs, thus yielding a biased set 
of salient beliefs.  In their study, which attempted to elicit both kinds of beliefs 
with respect to committing various driving violations, Manstead and Parker 
(1995) reported that responses to questions designed to elicit salient 
instrumental beliefs did not overlap at all with responses to questions 
designed to elicit salient experiential beliefs: “When asked about the 
advantages and disadvantages of speeding (instrumental), respondents 
indicated that speeding reduces journey times, can cause an accident, may 
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result in being stopped by the traffic police, and so on.  When asked what they 
liked or disliked about speeding (experiential), respondents indicated that 
speeding made them feel exhilarated, or nervous, or powerful, or frightened, 
and so on” (Manstead & Parker, 1995, p.90).  Clearly then, the salient beliefs 
that were elicited by questions designed to prompt instrumental outcomes are 
completely different from those that were elicited by questions designed to 
prompt experiential outcomes.  The findings of Manstead and Parker (1995) 
are also confirmed by those of Ajzen and Driver (1991), who investigated the 
salient beliefs about participating in recreational activities such as mountain 
climbing, as well as by Sutton et al. (2003) who conducted an analysis of 
salient beliefs about being more physically active.  Thus, in conclusion, in 
order to obtain an unbiased set of salient beliefs, both instrumental and 
experiential adjective pairs should be used to identify salient beliefs (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2010, p.85; Sutton et al., 2003, p.246).  It is important to realise, 
however, that an unbiased set of salient beliefs need not always include both 
instrumental and experiential beliefs.  For attitudes towards some kinds of 
behaviour, it may be found that attitudes are primarily based on instrumental 
beliefs, whereas for other attitudes, the underlying beliefs are primarily 
experiential in nature.  In the most instances, however, an unbiased set of 
salient beliefs will be composed of both types of items.  In sum then, it is 
necessary to include both instrumental and experiential adjective pairs in the 
formative research that is aimed at eliciting salient beliefs (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.85). 
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In the above paragraphs it was explained that an individual’s salient beliefs 
may be elicited through open-ended questions which requires the individual to 
retrieve the readily available salient beliefs that form the basis of his attitude.  
Although this approach provides valuable insight into the basis for an 
individual‘s attitude, it may prove to be somewhat problematic when used for 
investigating the attitudes of a population.  This is because when it is applied 
to a population consisting of many different individuals, the elicitation 
procedure will usually produce sets of beliefs that differ from respondent to 
respondent in terms of its content and number.  This makes it difficult to 
describe or summarise the salient beliefs held in a population and, therefore, 
to compare the beliefs of different populations or to submit their responses to 
quantitative analysis.  For this reason, it is more practical to identify the set of 
beliefs that are salient in a given population – that is, the modal set of salient 
beliefs (Ajzen & Fishbein, 1980, p.68; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.102).  These 
modal salient beliefs of a population can be identified in formative research by 
asking a sample of individuals from the population of interest a series of open-
ended questions with regard to performing the behaviour under investigation.  
A typical example of such open-ended questions would be to ask respondents 
to list the advantages and disadvantages (instrumental aspects), as well as 
their likes and dislikes (experiential aspects) of the behaviour under 
investigation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.102; Sutton et al., 2003, p.235).  
 
Once individual respondents from a sample of the research population have 
listed their individual salient beliefs, it must be decided which of those salient 
beliefs to include in the modal set.  This is done by conducting a content 
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analysis of the various beliefs emitted by different individuals (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.102; Sutton et al., 2003, p.235).  It involves organising the 
responses by grouping together beliefs that refer to similar outcomes and 
counting the frequency with which each outcome was listed (Ajzen & Fishbein, 
1980, p.68).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.102) explain that “only when the 
differences between the outcomes listed by individuals are clearly semantic, 
they should be considered equivalent and grouped together”.  To 
demonstrate, they use an example of eliciting beliefs about drinking alcohol.  
They explain that while some respondents may list vomiting as a possible 
outcome, others may list throwing up.  These terms clearly refer to the same 
outcome.  Also listed may be the belief that drinking alcohol makes one feel 
nauseous.  Here the investigator must decide whether this refers to vomiting 
or to a different outcome.  With regard to a decision of this kind, Fishbein and 
Ajzen (2010, p.102) state that “a useful guideline is to ask whether the two 
outcomes in question (i.e., vomiting and being nauseous) could reasonably be 
emitted by the same person”.  Furthermore, if many respondents listed both 
outcomes, then the outcomes should be treated as separate beliefs.  
However, if only a few respondents listed both outcomes, one could decide 
that different individuals use different labels to refer to the same outcome.  
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.102) continue and explain that the researcher 
may also want to combine outcomes that are listed with a low frequency, but 
have something in common.  For example, different respondents may mention 
weight gain, headaches, and stomach aches as outcomes of drinking alcohol.  
Although these are not identical outcomes, all three refer to relatively minor 
side effects.  Despite the fact that each outcome might have been mentioned 
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by only a few respondents, when taken together they suggest a readily salient 
belief in the population concerning minor side effects of drinking alcohol.  To 
capture this belief, a statement such as ‘my drinking alcohol leads to minor 
side effects’ could be included in the modal set (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.102).  Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, p.69) explain that it is up to the researcher 
to use his common sense during the content analysis, since there are no clear 
rules that must be followed. 
 
The final decision to be made is how many of the identified salient beliefs 
within the population to include in the modal set (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.103).  Before this decision can be made, it is first necessary to consider 
some related issues.  When an individual’s salient behavioural beliefs are 
elicited, it is reasonable to assume that those beliefs emitted by the individual 
are indeed the causal determinants of that individual’s attitude.  However, 
salient beliefs that are elicited from a sample of a population can be assumed 
to contain information about the causal determinants of the attitude held by 
that specific population, but it is not to say that every salient belief emitted by 
the elicitation sample is necessarily a salient belief for every individual in the 
sample.  Instead, as stated earlier, eliciting the salient beliefs of a population 
will usually produce sets of beliefs that differ from respondent to respondent in 
terms of content and number (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.102; Sutton et al., 
2003, pp.234 – 250).  Based on the latter issue, Sutton et al. (2003, p.249) 
foresaw that this procedure of identifying a modal set of salient beliefs for a 
population will most likely produce two errors.  Firstly, it may fail to include one 
or more of an individual’s salient beliefs in the modal set and, secondly, one or 
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more of the beliefs that are included in the modal set may not be a salient 
belief of some individuals.  Terry, Hogg and White (2000, pp.67 – 93) also 
recognise this particular methodological problem in the theory of reasoned 
action’s use of sets of modal salient beliefs.  These problems are, however, to 
some degree unavoidable due to the previously discussed practical 
considerations (see paragraph 9 of this section).  To the knowledge of the 
researcher, the literature does not provide any better alternative approach to 
identify a modal set of salient beliefs for a population that can be used to 
investigate the underlying determinants (salient beliefs) of a population’s 
attitude.  Consequently, the researcher is of the opinion that, despite these 
two recognised shortcomings of this approach, it is arguably the only practical 
approach for identifying a modal set of salient beliefs for a population.  
Nevertheless, despite these two shortcomings, the theory of reasoned action 
has proven its adequacy in attitudinal research and enjoys strong empirical 
support (see section 2.3.2).  With the latter in mind, it may be argued that this 
shortcoming may have little effect on the empirical validity of studies which is 
based on modal sets of salient beliefs. 
 
Returning to the above issue of deciding how many of the identified salient 
beliefs within the population should be included in the modal set.  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.103) suggest three possible decision rules that may be 
used to guide a researcher’s decision as to how many salient beliefs to 
include in the modal set.  The first approach is to simply include the 10 or 12 
most frequently mentioned outcomes.  They explain that this procedure 
results in a modal set that is likely to include at least some of the readily 
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available salient beliefs listed by each respondent in the sample.  The second 
possibility is to use those beliefs that exceed a certain frequency.  For 
example, the researcher may decide to include in the modal set those beliefs 
that were mentioned by at least 10% or 20% of the sample.  The third 
alternative is to choose beliefs by their frequency of emission until a certain 
percentage of all beliefs listed, perhaps 75%, are accounted for.  For example, 
if the total number of beliefs emitted by all participants in the elicitation sample 
was 500, a 75% decision rule would require that the researcher includes in the 
modal set as many of the most frequently mentioned outcomes as needed to 
account for 375 emitted beliefs.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.103) 
recommend that the latter decision rule be used and explain that it is the least 
arbitrary and most reasonable decision rule, though they do not explain why.  
Sutton et al. (2003, p.250) criticise the three decision rules suggested by 
Fishbein and Ajzen and argue that “none of them has an explicit rationale”. 
 
This section explained that not all beliefs could be seen as causal 
determinants of attitude, but instead, only salient beliefs act as the underlying 
causal determinants of attitude.  Moreover, the concept of salient beliefs was 
explained, as well as how a modal set of salient beliefs for a population could 
be elicited in order to identify the underlying causal determinants of a 
population’s attitude.  Once a population’s modal salient beliefs are identified, 
it is then possible to assess these salient beliefs as the casual determinants of 
the population’s attitude in the manner described in the next section (section 
2.4.6). 
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2.4.6 Attitudes and its determinants 
 
The attitudinal construct of the theory of reasoned action is of particular 
importance to this study, because it provides a conceptual framework and 
valid approach to fully solve the study’s main research question.  This section 
is focused on providing a detailed discussion of the theory’s attitudinal 
construct.  More specifically, this section will commence with a discussion on 
how attitudes are defined in terms of the theory, followed by a discussion of 
the formation of attitudes and its cognitive structures.  This section then 
explains how attitudes can be assessed and understood based on an 
investigation of its underlying cognitive structure. 
 
2.4.6.1 Salient beliefs as a basis of attitudes and the expectancy-value model 
 
In accordance with most contemporary views (see section 2.2.1), Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, pp.76 & 125) define attitude as “a latent disposition or 
tendency to respond with some degree of favourableness or 
unfavourableness to a psychological object”.  Their theory of reasoned 
action’s belief-based approach to the formation of attitudes is based on one of 
the most popular models of attitude formation and structure, namely the 
expectancy-value model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.97 & 126).  Eagly and 
Chaiken (1993, pp.106, 109 & 231), as well as Kruglanski and Stroebe (2005, 
p.328) also recognises the popularity of the expectancy-value model and state 
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that it is the most popular model for describing how beliefs are combined to 
form and change attitudes.  Eagly and Chaiken (1993, pp.231 & 236) explain 
that the expectancy-value model is quite appealing as a way of thinking about 
attitude formation and change.  Perloff (2010, pp.50 – 51) emphasises that the 
expectancy-value model is a prevailing attitude theory that is supported by an 
abundance of empirical evidence.  The expectancy-value model of attitude is 
embodied in the theory of reasoned action and forms an integral part of the 
reasoned action approach (Ajzen, 1991, p.192; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.98).  
One of the most complete statements of the expectancy-value model can be 
found in Fishbein’s (1963; 1967) summation theory of attitude, although 
somewhat narrower versions were proposed earlier by Carlson (1956), Peak 
(1955), and Rosenberg (1956). 
 
Consistent with the expectancy-value model, the theory of reasoned action 
postulates that attitudes develop reasonably and spontaneously from the 
salient beliefs people hold about the attitude object (Ajzen, 1991, p.191).  
According to Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.103) and Manfredo (2008, p.78) this 
point of view is not unique to the expectancy-value model, but is widely 
shared amongst most contemporary researchers and theorists.  Generally 
speaking, beliefs about an object are formed by associating the object with 
various characteristics, qualities, and attributes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.96).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.96) explain that beliefs may be defined as 
“the subjective probability that an object has a certain attribute”.  Each belief 
links an object to an attribute.  In the case of behaviour, however, each belief 
links the behaviour in question to a certain outcome or expectation of the likely 
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consequences (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.126).  Since people have a pre-
existing positive or negative evaluation of the likely outcomes of the 
behaviour, they automatically and simultaneously acquire an attitude towards 
the behaviour (Ajzen, 1991, p.191).  For example, a person may believe that 
the legal hunting of wild animals (the behaviour) leads to the endangerment of 
wildlife (the outcome).  Clearly, this belief links the behaviour to an outcome 
that is likely to have a pre-existing negative evaluation.  In this fashion, people 
form unfavourable attitudes towards behaviours they believe have largely 
undesirable outcomes and favourable attitudes towards behaviours they 
associate with mostly desirable outcomes (Ajzen, 1991, p.191; Albarracín et 
al., 2001, p.143; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.97).  Consistent with the latter 
conceptualisation of attitude, the expectancy-value model postulates that 
attitude towards behaviour is a function of the strength of a person’s 
accessible beliefs that the behaviour will result in specific outcomes (belief 
strength), together with the person’s positive or negative evaluations of those 
perceived outcomes (outcome evaluation) (Albarracín et al., 2001, p.143; 
Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.104).   
 
The expectancy-value model’s approach to the formation of attitudes is shown 
algebraically in Equation 3.2: 
         
 
   
   
(Equation 3.2) 
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where   is the attitude towards performing behaviour  ,    is the strength of 
the belief that performing behaviour   leads to outcome  ,    is the evaluation 
of outcome  , and   is the number of salient or accessible outcomes.  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.104) explain that, from a theoretical perspective, the 
expectancy-value model’s belief index (     ) is best considered a composite 
measure of beliefs that are assumed to determine the attitude.  As indicated in 
Equation 3.2, the expectancy-value model suggests that a person’s attitude 
towards a behaviour (  ) is directly proportional ( ) to this summative belief 
index (     ) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.97).  This suggests that an attitude 
towards a behaviour is computed by multiplying the strength of each salient 
belief (  ) with its respective outcome evaluation (  ), and aggregating the 
products in a process of summation to produce the overall attitude towards 
the behaviour (Ajzen, 2011b, online).  In other words, the strength of each 
salient belief (  ) is weighted by the evaluation of each belief’s respective 
outcome (  ), and the products are aggregated in a process of summation to 
produce the overall attitude towards the behaviour (  ) (Ajzen, 2011b, online).  
By implication, the more strongly a belief is held, and the more positive or 
negative the outcome evaluation, the greater is its expected contribution to the 
overall attitude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.100). 
 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.99 – 100) explain that the equation used to 
compute an attitude estimate on the basis of beliefs (Equation 3.2) may seem 
to imply that people go through a complex calculus, involving multiplication of 
belief strength by attribute evaluation and summation of the resulting product 
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terms.  They explain that this is, however, not the case.  The expectancy-
value model merely proposes that attitude formation may be modelled 
mathematically in this fashion.  In actuality, however, the expectancy-value 
model does not assume deliberate and conscious attitude construction.  
Instead, as noted already, attitudes are assumed to emerge automatically and 
spontaneously as beliefs are formed about the attitude object or behaviour. 
 
The idea that attitudes are based on relevant information that is accessible in 
memory (salient) imbues them with a degree of reasonableness.  This is not 
to say that people form attitudes in a rational manner by conducting an 
unbiased review of all the relevant information and integrating it according to 
formal rules of logic.  To the contrary, the expectancy-value model recognises 
that beliefs – although often quite accurate – may be biased by a variety of 
cognitive and motivational processes and that they may be based on invalid or 
selective information, be self-serving, or otherwise fail to correspond to reality 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.99).  However, once a set of beliefs is formed and 
is accessible in memory (salient), it provides the cognitive foundation from 
which attitudes are assumed to follow automatically in a reasonable and 
consistent fashion (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.99). 
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2.4.6.2 Assessing attitudes, belief strength and outcome evaluation 
 
So far, it should be evident that the expectancy-value model proposes that the 
causal determinants of an attitude towards any behaviour can be understood 
by investigating the underlying salient beliefs pertaining to the specific 
behaviour.  This, of course, firstly involves that the behaviour of interest be 
clearly defined (as was explained in section 2.4.4), and secondly that the 
population’s modal salient behavioural beliefs related to the behaviour be 
identified during a formative elicitation survey (as was explained in section 
2.4.5).  Once a modal set of salient beliefs has been identified, the individual 
beliefs may then be assessed by means of the expectancy-value model’s 
summative belief index (         ).  This entails that every individual salient 
belief in the modal set be measured in terms of belief strength (  ) and 
outcome evaluation (  ).  It is now necessary to address the issue of obtaining 
measurements of the various components of the expectancy-value model’s 
summative belief index (         ) – that is, measures of the attitude 
towards the behaviour (  ), belief strength measures (  ), and outcome 
evaluation measures (  ). 
 
Within the reasoned action approach, attitude towards behaviour (  ) is 
assessed by a standard questionnaire based on the semantic differential.  The 
semantic differential is an attitude scaling method that was developed by 
Osgood et al. (1957), and it is widely considered to be the most preferred and 
most successful way of measuring attitudes in contemporary research (Eagly 
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& Chaiken, 1993, pp.55 & 57; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.79; Maio & Haddock, 
2009, p.27; Perloff, 2010, p.111).  Typically, the semantic differential consists 
of a series of seven–point evaluative bipolar scales which measure a single 
construct (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.79).  These scale ratings are usually 
scored from –3 on the negative side of the scale (e.g. disagree, harmful, bad, 
unfavourable) to +3 on the positive side (e.g. agree, beneficial, good, 
favourable).  Respondents are presented with specific behaviours and then 
asked to rate it by checking a category on each of the bipolar evaluative 
scales.  The sum or mean score across all scales is taken as a direct measure 
of the respondent’s attitude.  The higher the score is, the more favourable the 
respondent’s attitude is towards the behaviour (Ajzen, 2011h, online; Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, pp.55 & 56; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.79 – 80 & 461).  
Cronbach’s coefficient alpha, which can range from a low of 0 to a high of 1, is 
usually used to measure the degree to which the related sets of items on the 
scale are internally consistent.  A coefficient of 0.70 or higher is generally 
taken as evidence of satisfactory internal consistency (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.80; Litwin, 2003, p.25). 
 
It should be recalled that attitudes are formed by two interrelated processes, 
one instrumental and the other experiential in nature (see section 2.2.3).  It 
was explained that attitude can be formed primarily on the basis of any one of 
these two types of processes, or by any combination of these two aspects.  
This seems to imply that a valid attitude measure must make provision to 
capture both the instrumental and experiential aspects of attitudes in order for 
a true evaluative tendency to emerge from it.  Eagly and Chaiken (1993, 
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p.16), as well as Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.85) explain that for attitudes 
towards some kinds of behaviours, one may find that valid measures consist 
primarily of instrumental items, whereas for attitudes towards other 
behaviours, valid items are primarily experiential in nature.  For this reason, a 
valid measure of attitude need not always include both instrumental and 
experiential items.  They also explain, however, that for most behaviours, valid 
attitude measures will be composed of both types of items.  This raises the 
question of how an investigator should then decide whether to include 
instrumental items or experiential items in an attitude measure, or perhaps 
both.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.82 – 85) address this issue and explain 
that, in order to construct a valid semantic differential measure of attitude, it is 
necessary to identify adjective pairs that serve as good indicators of the 
underlying evaluative dimension.  As a starting point, it is a good idea to 
include both instrumental and experiential adjective pairs in prior research, but 
there is no assurance that both types of items will meet the criterion for 
inclusion on the final scale (the criterion of internal consistency).  The criterion 
requires that only adjective pairs that contribute to an internally consistent 
index should be selected, regardless of whether it is of an instrumental nature, 
experiential nature, or a combination of the two.  Maio and Haddock (2009, 
p.27), on the other hand, provide a somewhat different approach to the former 
issue.  They propose that broad evaluative semantic adjective dimensions 
(e.g., approve–disapprove) be used to measure the overall attitude, instead of 
the more specific adjective dimensions which makes clear distinctions 
between the instrumental and experiential aspects of attitude (e.g., beneficial–
harmful and happy–sad). 
104 
Belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ) are each typically assessed 
with a single, seven–point bipolar adjective scale (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.81).  Similar to the semantic differential, these scales are usually scored –3 
on the negative side of the scale (e.g. dislike, bad, unlikely, unfavourable) to 
+3 on the positive side (e.g. like, good, likely, favourable).  Respondents are 
presented with specific belief statements and asked to rate it by checking a 
category on each of the bipolar adjective scales.  These belief statements are, 
of course, formulated based on the modal set of salient beliefs that was 
identified in the population of interest during the formative elicitation study.  
Every belief statement is assessed in terms of belief strength (  ) and 
outcome evaluation (  ), each with a single bipolar adjective scale (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, pp.85 – 98 & 435 – 456).  Thereafter, the strength of each belief 
(  ) is multiplied by the evaluation of the outcome (  ), and the products are 
aggregated in a process of summation to produce the overall attitude towards 
the behaviour (Ajzen, 2011b, online).  If the belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluation (  ) scores ranged from +3 to –3, the     products would then 
range from +9 to –9.  A positive value results when an outcome is considered 
either likely and good (+ +), or bad but unlikely (– –).  In either case, a positive 
    product for a particular salient belief suggests that the belief contributes 
to a positive attitude.  In contrast, a negative     product results when an 
outcome is considered likely but bad (+ –), or unlikely but good (– +), either of 
which contributes to a negative attitude. 
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As already noted, direct measures of attitude towards a given behaviour (  ) 
is typically obtained by asking respondents to rate the behaviour under 
investigation on semantic differential scales.  It is, however, essential that the 
items on the questionnaire which are designed to obtain a direct measure of 
attitude, strictly conforms to the principle of compatibility (see section 2.4.4).  
Thus, the direct measures of attitude must be formulated to obtain measures 
of attitude towards the particular behaviour under investigation in this study, 
namely the legal hunting of wild animals.  Related to the latter, is the issue of 
assessing belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ), which too must 
conform to the principle of compatibility.  To achieve this, it is necessary to 
ensure that the modal salient beliefs – on which the belief statements are then 
based – are identified with respect to the particular behaviour under 
investigation (the legal hunting of wild animals).  The belief statements must 
then be formulated exactly as the modal salient beliefs were identified by the 
formative elicitation survey.  This is necessary to ensure that belief strength 
and outcome evaluation is indeed assessed with respect to the particular 
modal salient beliefs that were identified by the formative elicitation study 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.105 – 106).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.110) 
address a related issue, namely whether belief statements should be 
presented in a positive or negative format.  Thus, instead of asking 
respondents whether they believe that performing some behaviour will lead to 
a certain outcome, we could ask how likely it is that performance of the 
behaviour will not lead to the outcome in question.  For example, one could 
assess the strength of the belief that the legal hunting of wild animals does not 
endanger wildlife.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.110) explain that belief 
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statements of this kind will generally not be obtained in an elicitation of readily 
accessible beliefs because, when asked to list what they perceived to be the 
outcomes of a behaviour, people are unlikely to mention outcomes they do not 
expect to occur.  Clearly, when belief statements are rephrased to be 
presented in a negative format, the principle of compatibility is not adhered to.  
Consistent with this argument, Trafimow and Finlay (2002) also found that 
rephrasing belief statements in a negative format reduces the predictive 
validity of the expectancy-value formulation. 
 
It was stated earlier that belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ) are 
each assessed with single adjective scales that is scored in a bipolar fashion 
(e.g., from –3 to +3 on a seven-point scale).  Although it is generally agreed 
that these scales should be scored in a bipolar fashion, questions have 
sometimes been raised with respect to the appropriate scoring in certain 
instances (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.234).  Whereas most investigators would 
agree that outcome evaluations (  ) be assessed with bipolar evaluative 
scales (e.g., from –3 to +3 on a seven-point scale), it sometimes seem 
reasonable to assess belief strength (  ) with unipolar likelihood scales (e.g., 
from +1 to +3 on a three-point scale, or from +1 to +7 on a seven-point scale).  
This consideration depends to a large extent on whether the investigator is 
dealing with an individual or with a population consisting of many different 
individuals.  In the case of an individual’s salient beliefs, outcome evaluations 
(  ) can be reasonably assessed by means of a bipolar evaluative scale, such 
as good to bad, while belief strength (  ) can be measured on a unipolar 
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likelihood scale, such as a scale ranging from slightly likely to extremely likely.  
This is because the belief statements in the case of an individual person deal 
with outcomes that were listed by the individual himself, and therefore it can 
reasonably be assumed that the respondent in fact expects the behaviour to 
produce the outcome in question.  Thus, all that remains is to assess the 
strength of the individual’s beliefs.  In such an instance, a unipolar likelihood 
scale, ranging, for example, from +1 (slightly likely) to +3 (extremely likely) 
can thus be used to assess belief strength.  We do not need to be concerned 
with the possibility that a person will rate the outcome as unlikely.  The 
outcome evaluation, however, is still assessed on a bipolar scale (e.g. from –3 
to +3), such as a good – bad scale, because the individual may still rate each 
outcome as negative or positive to a certain degree.  Nevertheless, when 
dealing with a population’s modal set of salient beliefs, it is possible that some 
individual within the population may not believe that performing the behaviour 
in question will lead to one or more of the outcomes included in the modal set 
(see section 2.4.5).  Because of the possibility that some of these modal 
salient beliefs may not be held by every individual within the population, it is 
important to allow them to deny the beliefs by ascribing low probabilities to 
them.  Consequently, it is preferable to adopt bipolar scales to make provision 
for the possibility that a person will rate the outcome as unlikely (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, pp.234 – 236; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.101 & 105 – 110).  
 
Although theoretical arguments can be made in favour of bipolar or unipolar 
scoring of belief strength measures (  ) and outcome evaluation measures 
(  ), Ajzen (1991, p.193) argues that “from a measurement perspective, 
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however, either type of scoring could be applied with equal justification”.  
Rating scales of the kind used in research based on the expectancy-value 
model can at best be assumed to meet the requirements of equal-interval 
measures.  As such, it is permissible to apply any linear transformation to the 
respondents’ ratings without altering the measure’s scale properties.  Going 
from a bipolar to a unipolar scale, or vice versa, is of course a simple linear 
transformation in which a constant is added or subtracted from the obtained 
values (Ajzen, 1991, p.193).   
 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.109 & 126), evidence available to 
date indicates that bipolar scoring is generally superior to unipolar scoring in 
that it usually leads to better prediction of attitude than does unipolar scoring.  
Nevertheless, exceptions to this rule are sometimes observed.  Particularly 
when respondents disagree that a behaviour will lead to a negative outcome, 
care must be taken to ensure that bipolar scaling is appropriate.  Fishbein and 
Ajzen (2010, p.109) therefore suggest that investigators should be mindful of 
this issue of bipolar and unipolar scaling in their own work with the 
expectancy-value model. 
  
2.4.6.3 Verifying salient behavioural beliefs as the determinants of an attitude 
 
In section 2.4.6.1 it was explained that the expectancy-value index of beliefs 
(     ) is considered to be a composite measure of salient behavioural beliefs 
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that are assumed to determine the attitude towards the behaviour (  ).  It is 
thus essential to verify the expectation that the behavioural beliefs which were 
identified (during the formative survey) and assessed (during the primary 
survey) do indeed sufficiently capture the determinants of the attitude under 
consideration.  According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.185), the validity of 
the identified behavioural beliefs may be confirmed by showing that they are 
predictive of a standard, validated measure of attitude.  This is generally done 
by correlating the summated products of the identified behavioural beliefs 
times outcome evaluations (     ) with the direct measure of the attitude (  ) 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.329).  If it is then found that the belief-based 
indices of attitude (     ) correlates significantly with the previously validated 
direct attitude measure (  ), it confirms that the identified salient beliefs 
accurately capture the determinants of the attitude under consideration.  
Consequently, high correlations would thus verify that modification of the 
identified salient beliefs will have a significant impact on the attitude one 
wishes to change (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.330).  Conversely, low 
correlations would be a warning sign, indicating that the identified salient 
beliefs do not relate to the attitude under consideration and can, therefore, not 
be considered to be causal determinants of the attitude.  Consequently, 
changes in these beliefs will have relatively little impact on the attitude one is 
trying to change (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.330).  Evidently, verifying the 
expectation that the identified salient beliefs do indeed capture the causal 
determinants of the attitude under consideration clearly provides very 
important information in terms of understanding the attitude’s underlying 
determinants and its implications for changing attitudes. 
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Correlating the summative belief index (     ) of the expectancy-value model 
with a direct measure of the attitude (  ) does not only confirm that the 
identified salient beliefs are the causal determinants of the particular attitude, 
but it is also a way of verifying the validity of the expectancy-value model.  
The next section briefly explains this and explores the empirical support that 
exists for the expectancy-value model. 
 
2.4.6.4 Empirical support for the expectancy-value model 
 
The expectancy-value model postulates that a person’s attitude (  ) is directly 
proportional ( ) to the summative belief index (     ) of the expectancy-value 
model (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.97).  Thus, it stands to reason that in order 
for the       index to be valid, it should correlate with a standard, direct 
measure of attitude (  ) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.103 – 104). 
 
A great number of studies have, over the years, tested the validity of the 
expectancy-value model of attitudes by correlating a direct measure of attitude 
(  ) with an estimate of the same attitude based on the expectancy-value 
model’s belief index (     ) (Ajzen, 1991, pp.191 – 192; Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993, p.232).  The empirical results of such studies have generally supported 
the expectancy-value model’s hypothesised relation between salient beliefs 
and attitude, and obtained moderately high correlations (e.g., Ajzen, 1974; 
Cronen & Conville, 1975a, 1975b; Daigle et al., 2002; Fishbein, 1963, 1965; 
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Fishbein & Coombs, 1974; Hrubes et al., 2001; Inosko, Blake, Cialdini & 
Mulaik, 1970; Jaccard & Davidson, 1972; Rosenberg, 1956; Smith & Clark, 
1973).  Several meta-analyses of the empirical literature have also provided 
correlational evidence in support of the expectancy-value model as applied to 
attitudes towards a variety of behaviours.  Armitage and Conner (2001, p.481) 
conducted a meta-analysis (which consisted of 185 independent studies) 
across a broad range of behaviours, and reported a mean correlation of 0.50 
between the expectancy-value index of beliefs (     ) and a direct attitude 
measure (  ).  In another meta-analysis that was conducted across a broad 
range of behaviours, a mean correlation of 0.53 between the expectancy-
value index (     ) and a direct attitude measure (  ) was obtained (van den 
Putte, as cited in Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.103).  In Albarracín et al. (2001, 
p.142 & 157), a meta-analysis (which consisted of 96 different data sets) of 
research on condom use, revealed a mean correlation of 0.56 between the 
expectancy-value index (     ) and direct measures of attitudes towards this 
behaviour (  ). 
 
 In addition to the vast body of correlational evidence in support of the 
expectancy-value model, experiments presenting subjects with persuasive 
communications that were designed on the basis of the expectancy-value 
model provide even more convincing support for the model (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993, p.237).  In fact, persuasive communications based on the expectancy-
value model have shown to change message recipients’ salient beliefs about 
the attitude object or behaviour they address and to have corresponding 
112 
effects on recipients’ overall attitudes (e.g., Bamberg, 2006; Brubaker & 
Fowler, 1990; Carlson, 1956; Fishbein, Ajzen & McArdle, 1980; Murphy & 
Brubaker, 1990; Sanderson & Jemmott, 1996). 
 
It is clear that there is strong empirical support for the expectancy-value 
model.  This indicates that the expectancy-value index of beliefs (     ) 
provides a valid approach for assessing and understanding attitudes towards 
behaviours, as well as to investigate the implications that the causal 
determinants of the attitude may have for changing attitudes. 
  
2.4.7 The expectancy-value model and attitudinal ambivalence 
  
It should be recalled that attitudinal ambivalence refers to the coexistence of 
positive and negative reactions to an attitude object or behaviour (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.118; Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005, p.331).  It is a state of conflict 
that exists within an individual’s mind when he simultaneously possesses 
positive and negative evaluations of an attitude object or behaviour (Eagly & 
Chaiken, 1993, p.123; Fabrigar et al., 2005, p.84; Kruglanski & Stroebe, 2005, 
p.332; Maio & Haddock, 2009, pp.36 – 37).  It should also be recalled that the 
amount of conflict between peoples’ positive and negative evaluations of an 
attitude object or behaviour (attitudinal ambivalence) can be estimated 
through Thompson et al. (1995) mathematical formula (see Equation 3.1) that 
was introduced in section 2.2.4.  According to the model of Thompson et al. 
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(1995), attitudinal ambivalence is estimated by adding the positive ( ) and 
negative ( ) ratings of the object or behaviour, dividing the sum by two, and 
subtracting the absolute value of the difference between   and  . 
  
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.119) explain that in the context of the 
expectancy-value model, information about the origins of ambivalence is 
provided by the salient beliefs that serve as the attitude’s determinants.  In 
other words, it is possible to examine an individual’s personal salient beliefs, 
or responses to a modal salient set of beliefs, for evaluative inconsistency or 
ambivalence.  Specifically, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.119) explain that one 
could compute for each outcome the product of belief strength times outcome 
evaluation and then separately compute the sum of the products that have 
positive values ( ) and the absolute sum of products that have negative 
values ( ).  Using Equation 3.1, these measures of positive and negative 
valence can be used to compute an index of ambivalence.  Fishbein and 
Ajzen (2010, p.119) continue to explain that close examination of the salient 
beliefs that enter into the positive and negative scores provides substantive 
information about the specific considerations that are in conflict with each 
other and hence offers a better understanding of the origins or basis for 
observed ambivalence. 
 
 
 
114 
2.4.8 Origins of beliefs and the role of background factors 
  
The aim of this section is to examine the origins of beliefs in an effort to obtain 
a deeper understanding of how beliefs and ultimately attitudes are formed.  
This section commences by providing an overview of the most important 
psychological processes whereby beliefs are formed and then turns to 
exploring the influence of personal, social, and environmental factors on 
people’s behavioural beliefs regarding hunting.   
  
2.4.8.1 Belief formation 
  
Three different processes underlie belief formation.  Firstly, beliefs can be 
established on the basis of direct observation (observational beliefs).  
Secondly, they can be established by accepting information that is provided 
by an outside source (informational beliefs).  Finally, beliefs can be formed 
through a process of inference that relies on other beliefs relevant to the 
behaviour under consideration (inferential beliefs) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
pp.221 – 223).  These three processes underlying belief formation will now be 
discussed. 
  
Observational beliefs are those beliefs that are established on the basis of 
direct observation.  In the case of behavioural beliefs, people may notice that 
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when they perform a given behaviour, certain outcomes are likely to follow 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.222).  To take a concrete example, a person may 
experience that drinking alcohol makes him feel nauseous (behavioural 
belief).  These direct experiences associated with performance of a behaviour 
result in the formation of observational beliefs about the behaviour of interest, 
which in turn influences a person’s attitude towards that particular behaviour. 
  
Informational beliefs are those beliefs that are formed not on the basis of 
direct observation, but rather by accepting information provided by an outside 
source.  Such sources include television, radio, the Internet, newspapers, 
books, magazines, lecturers, friends, relatives, co-workers, etc. (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.222).  For example, a person may see an advertisement that 
Quit-Smoking nicotine patches alleviate the urge to smoke cigarettes.  Based 
on this information, he may form the corresponding behavioural belief that 
using Quit-Smoking nicotine patches will alleviate this urge to smoke 
cigarettes, which in turn may have a corresponding effect on their attitudes 
towards using Quit-Smoking nicotine patches. 
 
Inferential beliefs are those beliefs that go beyond direct observation or 
information from outside sources by means of various inference processes.  
Thus, these beliefs are formed through a process of inference that relies on 
other beliefs relevant to the behaviour under consideration (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.222).  If a person observes the outcomes produced by other people’s 
behaviour, then the person may infer that the same outcome would occur if he 
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performs the behaviour himself.  Similarly, if a person observes that his own 
behaviour produces a certain outcome, then he may infer that other related 
outcomes are also likely to occur (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.222).  To 
demonstrate, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.222 – 223) explain that if, for 
example, a person discovers that regular exercise has lowered his blood 
pressure, he may infer that regular exercise will increase his life expectancy. 
 
Whether based on direct observation, outside information, or inference 
processes, the theory of reasoned action assumes that once beliefs related to 
a particular behaviour have been formed, they provide the cognitive basis for 
attitudes.  It is important to note that, within the reasoned action framework, it 
is not assumed that people are rational, but only that their actions follow in a 
reasonable manner from the beliefs they hold.  Given the fact that beliefs are 
often based on limited observations, information provided by others, or on 
fallible inference processes, behavioural beliefs may often be veridical.  They 
may be inaccurate, biased to conform with preconceptions or motives, or they 
may represent rationalisations, wishful thinking, or other irrational processes.  
Moreover, people’s cognitive processes, predispositions, and desires can bias 
their interpretation of available information, leading to the formation of 
inaccurate beliefs, and because the validity of one’s own senses is rarely 
questioned they naively assume that their beliefs are valid.  Nevertheless, the 
beliefs people hold constitute the information they have about a behaviour, 
and it provides the basis for their attitude towards that behaviour (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.223).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.333) explain that, as a 
general rule, beliefs based on personal experience (observational beliefs) are 
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often much more difficult to change than beliefs based on second-hand 
information (informational beliefs) or beliefs inferred from other available 
information (inferential beliefs). 
 
2.4.8.2 Differences in beliefs and the role of background factors 
 
In the previous section, three different processes that underlie belief formation 
were explained.  These processes do not address the origin of the beliefs 
people hold.  This section will explain how beliefs are assumed to originate 
according to the reasoned action approach. 
 
The reasoned action approach postulates that the beliefs people hold 
originate from information people acquire from a variety of sources, and are 
subject to various social and individual differences, which may influence not 
only the experiences people have and the sources of information to which 
they are exposed, but also the way in which they interpret and remember this 
information (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.20).  Differences in beliefs are thus 
assumed to be the result of differential learning experiences.  The kinds of 
experiences people have are likely to vary as a function of personal 
characteristics (e.g., personality, temperament, intelligence, values, mood, 
emotion), social and cultural factors (e.g., age, gender, ethnicity, socio-
economic status, education, nationality, religious affiliation, social ties), and 
exposure to media and other sources of information (e.g., past experiences, 
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exposure to information) (see Figure 2.1).  Clearly, a multitude of variables 
could potentially influence the beliefs people hold.  It should be recalled that, 
within the reasoned action approach, the potential influences of these 
variables on the beliefs people hold are recognised as background factors 
(see section 2.4.1).  Specifically, the theory of reasoned action postulate that 
background factors influence the behavioural beliefs a person forms, which in 
turn results in a corresponding attitude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.18).  Thus, 
background factors are assumed to have an indirect influence on attitudes by 
influencing behavioural beliefs. 
 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.224) suggest that, when investigators conduct 
their research within the reasoned action framework, they may want to 
consider specific background factors if there is reason to believe that people 
who vary in terms of those factors may have been exposed to different 
experiences and thus may have formed different behavioural beliefs and, as a 
result, different attitudes towards a behaviour.  By including background 
factors in the context of the theory of reasoned action, it is possible to trace 
the extent to which they influence beliefs with respect to the particular attitude 
under investigation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.252).  By examining the effects 
of a background factor on beliefs, it is possible to explain why the factor in 
question does or does not influence a particular attitude in a given population.  
Moreover, studying the effects of background factors on beliefs about a 
behaviour of interest enables the researcher to gain insight into the possible 
origins of the beliefs that serve as the cognitive foundation for the attitude 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.253).  Evidently, including relevant background 
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factors in the context of the theory of reasoned action deepens one’s 
understanding of the origin of beliefs and attitudes.  For this reason, the 
researcher deemed it necessary to identify the relevant background factors 
that should be considered with regard to this study.  In the following section, 
the background factors that may be of relevance to the study will be identified, 
followed by a brief discussion of the likely effects that these background 
factors may have on attitudes. 
  
2.4.8.3 Identifying background factors that affect attitudes towards hunting 
  
In light of the vast number of potential background factors that may be of 
relevance to this study, a literature review of existing research concerning 
people’s attitudes towards hunting was conducted.  The purpose of the 
literature review was to identify background factors that may be of particular 
interest to this study.  A large number of research studies have focused on 
identifying demographic characteristics, social variables, and personal 
attributes that influence people’s attitudes towards hunting.  The findings of 
those studies served as a guideline for selecting the kinds of background 
factors that may be of relevance to this study and that should therefore be 
included in the empirical component of the study.  This section sets out to 
provide a brief discussion of the relevant background factors that was 
identified during a review of the existing literature. 
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 The first scientific research on attitudes towards hunting was conducted by 
Shaw & Gilbert (1974), as well as by Kellert between 1973 and 1978 (as cited 
in Heberlein & Willebrand, 1998, p.1071).  To date, a large number of studies 
have investigated attitudes towards hunting in the United States and identified 
a variety of background factors that seem to influence people’s attitudes 
towards hunting.  Although the large majority of these studies were conducted 
in the United States (Heberlein & Willebrand, 1998, p.1073), their findings on 
general tendencies are, in broad terms, consistent with that of a South African 
study which investigated attitudes towards hunting amongst the economically 
active public in Port Elizabeth (Coetzer, 2010).  A brief discussion of the 
relevant background factors that were identified during a review of the existing 
literature will now follow. 
 
Gender seems to have a considerable effect on attitudes towards hunting, 
with males being more likely than females to approve of hunting.  While in the 
United States 84% of males approve of hunting, only 72% of females approve 
of it, and, conversely, only 13% of males disapprove of hunting, while 20% of 
females disapprove (Responsive Management, as cited in Duda & Jones, 
2008, p.11).  Consistent with this tendency, Coetzer’s (2010, p.110) study – 
that was conducted amongst the economically active public in Port Elizabeth – 
found that, while 68% of male respondents supported hunting, only 35% of 
female respondents supported it, and, conversely, only 14% of male 
respondents opposed hunting, while 40% of female respondents opposed it.  
The results revealed a statistical significant difference between male 
respondents and female respondents with regard to their attitudes towards 
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hunting (    46.26;     4;    0.01; Cramer’s    0.35   moderate effect 
size).  Adams and Thomas (as cited in Duda & Jones, 2008, p.11) found in a 
study in Texas that the majority of state residents who were members of or 
who expressed a desire to become members of an anti-hunting organisation 
were females.  Duda (2003) found that gender also effect attitudes towards 
hunting amongst the youth in the United States, and boys were more than 
twice as likely to strongly support hunting than were girls.  The latter finding 
seems to suggest that gender related differences in attitudes towards hunting 
begin at an early age.   
 
 The likelihood of approving of hunting generally increases as age increase.  A 
national study, conducted by Responsive Management, found that 83% of 
Americans of 65 years old and older approved of hunting, while only 55% of 
Americans of 18 to 24 years old approved of it (Duda & Jones, 2008, p.12).  In 
support of the latter, Adams and Thomas (as cited in Duda & Jones, 2008, 
p.11) found in a study in Texas that the majority of state residents who were 
members of, or who expressed a desire to become members of an anti-
hunting organisation, were between 18 and 34 years old.  A similar trend was 
detected amongst the youth in the United States, and one study found that as 
children get older they become more supportive of hunting.  Whereas 40% of 
children in grades one to four supported hunting, 64% of youth in the ninth to 
twelfth grades supported hunting (Responsive Management, as cited in Duda, 
2003).  Duda and Jones (2008, pp.12 – 13) speculate that this age related 
difference in attitudes towards hunting amongst youth may be related to 
cognitive and emotional development, and possibly a lack of exposure to 
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hunting at a very young age (Duda, 2003).  Clearly, research in the United 
States seem to generally support the notion that age related differences exist 
in the public’s attitudes towards hunting.  However, Coetzer’s (2010, p.116) 
study in the South African setting found insufficient evidence to conclude that 
there are age related differences in the attitudes of the economically active 
public in Port Elizabeth (    20.22;     16;    0.21).   
 
 There is some evidence that ethnicity is linked to variations in attitudes 
towards hunting.  In a national study, white Americans were found to have a 
higher approval rate (83%) than do non-whites (61%).  A study in Connecticut 
supports this finding, where only 18% of white respondents disapproved of 
hunting, but 30% of non-white respondents disapproved of it (Duda & Jones, 
2008, p.13).  Furthermore, Coetzer (2010, p.113) found that, amongst the 
economically active public in Port Elizabeth, coloured respondents’ attitudes 
towards hunting were slightly different from that of black respondents (    
9.78;     4;    0.04; Cramer’s    0.20   small effect size) and also from 
that of white respondents (    14.23;     4;    0.01; Cramer’s    0.26   
small effect size).    
 
 Research suggests that higher levels of education are negatively correlated 
with approval of hunting.  Responsive Management (as cited in Duda & 
Jones, 2008, p.12) found that in the United States 51% of those with no 
degree strongly approve of hunting, while only 43% of those with Bachelor’s 
degree and 40% of those with a post-graduate degree strongly approve of 
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hunting.  Other similar research studies at state level verified that this finding 
holds true.  In the state of Pennsylvania, it was found that the higher the level 
of education rises, the more the percentage who approve of hunting declines.  
Furthermore, a study amongst landowners in the state of Texas found that 
those who prohibited hunting on their land were more educated than were 
those who allowed it (Wright, Keiser & Fletcher, 1988, p.154).  In the South 
African setting, however, Coetzer (2010, p.116) found no evidence that 
differences exist between various levels of education and their attitudes 
towards hunting (    20.17;     16;    0.21).   
 
 The likelihood of approving of hunting increases as the population density 
decreases.  Responsive Management (as cited in Duda & Jones, 2008, p.11) 
found that in the United States, 70% of urban residents, 72% of suburban 
residents, 80% of residents in small cities or towns, and 89% of rural residents 
approved of hunting.  Other studies conducted by Heberlein and Willebrand 
(1998), Miller (as cited in Duda & Jones, 2008, p.11), as well as by 
Responsive Management (1995; 1996) also found conclusively that rural 
societies hold more positive attitudes towards hunting than urbanised 
societies.  Similarly, the aforementioned study of Adams and Thomas (as 
cited in Duda & Jones, 2008, p.11) found that the majority of state residents 
who were members of, or who expressed a desire to become members of an 
anti-hunting organisation, were urban residents.  Decker and Mattfield (as 
cited in Heberlein & Willebrand, 1998, p.1074) explain that the reason for this 
tendency is possibly because rural residence and rural ties are key factors 
leading to exposure to hunting and pro-hunting attitudes. 
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 Consistent with the above overview of the various demographical factors 
which were found to influence attitudes towards hunting, Kellert and Shaw (as 
cited in Duda and Jones, 2008, p.13) are also in agreement that anti-hunters 
are generally well-educated, female, and urban living.  In addition to the 
demographical factors that were identified, the literature review also revealed 
that exposure to hunting, as well as social ties significantly influence peoples’ 
attitudes towards hunting. 
  
 As could be expected, the literature review revealed that hunters generally 
show the strongest support for hunting (Duda, 2002, p.46).  Related to the 
latter is the findings of Coetzer (2010, pp.136 – 138), who’s research provided 
strong evidence of an significant difference between people who have been 
directly exposed to hunting and those who have never been directly exposed 
to it with regard to their attitudes towards hunting (    78.20;     4;    
0.01; Cramer’s    0.45   moderate effect size).  In Coetzer’s (2010) study, 
direct exposure to hunting was found to be the single variable that had the 
most profound influence on attitudes towards hunting.  His study found that 
respondents who have never been directly exposed to hunting were five times 
more likely to oppose hunting than respondents who have been directly 
exposed to hunting.  The study concluded that the more a person has been 
exposed to hunting, and the greater a person’s knowledge is about hunting, 
the greater his ability would be to attain an accurate perception of what 
hunting entails (Coetzer, 2010, pp.137 – 138). 
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 Having social ties with hunters were found to have a considerable effect on 
attitudes towards hunting.  According to research conducted by Responsive 
Management for Ducks Unlimited in the United States, having a family 
member or close friend who hunts have a large influence on attitudes towards 
hunting (Duda, 2002, p.46).  Consistent with the latter, Coetzer (2010, pp.143 
– 146) also found that people who have family members or friends who hunt 
had significantly different attitudes towards hunting than those without any 
family members or friends who hunt (    36.61;     4;    0.01; Cramer’s 
   0.31   moderate effect size).  In addition to the latter, the literature review 
revealed that having social ties with farmers or people in rural areas have a 
significant influence on their attitudes towards hunting.  Coetzer (2010, p.140) 
found that people who have social ties with farmers or people in rural areas 
had significantly different attitudes towards hunting than those who do not 
have any social ties with farmers or people in rural areas (    48.50;     4; 
   0.01; Cramer’s    0.36   moderate effect size). 
  
 In sum, this section provided a brief discussion of the background factors that 
were identified to be of relevance to this study.  These background factors 
were taken into consideration by the researcher while designing the empirical 
component of this study.   
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2.5 INTRODUCING THE THEORY OF REASONED ACTION AS A 
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK FOR CHANGING ATTITUDES 
 
Most contemporary social psychologists take a cognitive or information 
processing approach to attitude formation and structure.  This approach is 
exemplified by the expectancy-value model of attitudes (Ajzen, 1991, p.191). 
The expectancy-value approach to attitude formation and structure contains 
insight about the underlying dynamics of people’s attitudes and is of particular 
interest to investigators who hope to change attitudes (Eagly & Chaiken, 
1993, p.109; Perloff, 2010, p.54).  This approach is quite appealing as a way 
of thinking about attitude change and in fact has been quite popular in applied 
contexts (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.236; Manfredo, 1992, p.21).  In this 
section, the theory of reasoned action – which is based on the expectancy-
value model – is introduced as a conceptual framework for changing attitudes; 
its approach to changing attitudes is briefly explained; a number of issues 
related to the theory’s approach to attitude change are considered; and finally, 
some literature sources regarding the theory’s validity and adequacy as an 
approach to changing attitudes are explored. 
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2.5.1 Basic principle of the theory of reasoned action’s approach to changing 
attitudes: salient beliefs as the informational foundation of attitudes 
 
 By now it should be clear that the central idea of the expectancy-value model 
(and, thus in effect, the theory of reasoned action) is that people’s attitudes 
are a function of their salient beliefs, when these beliefs are represented as 
the sum of the expected values (     ) of the attributes ascribed to the 
attitude object or behaviour (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.106).  In other words, 
people’s salient beliefs about a particular behaviour reflect the information 
they have relevant to the behaviour (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.316).  
Irrespective of whether the information people have about a particular 
behaviour is accurate or not, it forms the cognitive structure for their attitudes 
towards that behaviour.  It thus follows that if a person is exposed to new 
information, and this new information is accepted, the person’s existing beliefs 
will change or new beliefs will be formed.  Thus, the expectancy-value model 
postulates that exposure to new information about the possible consequences 
of a given behaviour may be expected to produce changes in attitudes 
towards the behaviour, and that these changes will be consistent with the 
nature of the new information (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.316). 
  
 Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.236) explain that the expectancy-value model 
(and consequently, the theory of reasoned action) may be seen as adopting 
an educational approach to changing attitudes in the sense that it implies that 
in order to induce a change in people’s attitudes, they need only be exposed 
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to relevant messages, information, or experiences that would cause them to 
change their underlying behavioural beliefs in a desired manner.  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.338) explain that exposing the target population to 
persuasive messages is the most widespread strategy to communicate such 
relevant information to a target population.  Persuasive communications 
typically consist of arguments in favour of (or against) a certain position on an 
issue, arguments usually bolstered by supportive evidence (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.316). 
 
 Manfredo (1992, p.12) argues that one of the main reasons persuasive 
communications (or any other forms of attitude or behaviour change 
interventions for that matter) fail to produce the desired change in a targeted 
attitude, is because often they do not address appropriate beliefs.  However, 
the theory of reasoned action directly addresses this issue by providing a 
simple and appealing model to explain the determinants of any attitude and to 
understand the relationship between beliefs and attitudes.  In fact, the 
reasoned action approach provides guidance concerning the content of a 
persuasive message in that it specifies the particular primary beliefs that must 
be addressed by a persuasive message in order for the message to be 
successful at changing an attitude (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.346).  Rossi and 
Armstrong (1999, p.41) agree and explain that the reasoned action model 
provides a basis for identifying where and how to target strategies for 
changing attitudes and behaviours.  In the next section, it will be explained 
how the reasoned action approach provides guidance with regard to the 
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fundamental beliefs that should be targeted by interventions that aim to 
change people’s attitudes towards a behaviour. 
 
2.5.2 The theory of reasoned action’s routes to attitude change   
 
 By now it should be clear that, according to the theory of reasoned action, if 
one wants to change a person’s attitude towards the legal hunting of wild 
animals, for example, one must change that person’s salient beliefs with 
respect to the legal hunting of wild animals.  Consistent with the expectancy-
value approach, the theory of reasoned action postulates that any desired 
change in a particular attitude could be brought about by either changing 
some of the existing salient beliefs on which the targeted attitude is based 
or by introducing new salient beliefs into the underlying belief system 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.236).  Each one of these two possible ways 
through which an attitude can be changed will now be discussed briefly. 
  
2.5.2.1 Producing attitude change through modification of existing salient beliefs 
  
 As already stated, an attitude can be changed by modifying the existing 
salient beliefs on which the targeted attitude is based.  This modification of 
beliefs may take place either in the strength of a belief (  ) or the evaluation of 
its outcome (  ).  In terms of modifying belief strength (  ), it is possible to 
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make people’s attitudes towards the behaviour of interest more favourable by 
raising their perceived likelihood that the behaviour will indeed produce 
desirable outcomes, or by reducing their perceived likelihood that the 
behaviour in question will produce undesirable outcomes.  Consider, for 
example, a positive salient belief that the legal hunting of wild animals will lead 
to the conservation of wildlife.  Under the assumption that people are in favour 
of conserving wildlife, it is thus possible to try to make attitudes more 
favourable by providing people with information that would raise the perceived 
likelihood that the legal hunting of wild animals will indeed produce this 
desirable outcome.  Similarly, with regards to a negative salient belief (for 
example, that the legal hunting of wild animals is a dangerous activity to 
participate in), it is possible to make attitudes more favourable by reducing the 
perceived likelihood that the legal hunting of wild animals is a dangerous 
activity.  In terms of modifying outcome evaluations (  ), it is possible to make 
people’s attitudes towards the behaviour of interest more favourable by raising 
their positive evaluations of desirable outcomes associated with the 
behaviour, or by reducing their negative evaluations of undesirable outcomes 
linked to the behaviour.  For example, a salient belief may link the legal 
hunting of wild animals to a desirable outcome of connecting with nature or 
experiencing the outdoors.  If a significant proportion of the population believe 
that hunting will indeed produce this outcome, their attitudes could be made 
more favourable by raising people’s positive evaluations of connecting with 
nature or experiencing the outdoors.  Similarly, in the case where a salient 
belief links the legal hunting of wild animals with an undesirable outcome (for 
example, that it results in wild animals being exploited for financial benefit), it 
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is possible to make attitudes more favourable by reducing people’s negative 
evaluations of using wild animals to gain financial benefits – perhaps by 
providing them with appropriate information which points out that the legal 
hunting of wild animals produces financial incentives for private landowners to 
conserve habitats and wildlife on their land. 
 
 So far in this discussion, it is apparent that one way of changing an attitude 
towards a behaviour is by influencing those salient beliefs on which the 
attitude is based.  It should be realised, however, that it will not be an effective 
approach to changing an attitude by simply trying to target all of the salient 
beliefs that were identified in the elicitation survey.  Instead, it would be more 
effective to establish which particular salient beliefs should be changed in 
order to effectuate the desired change in attitude – and whether this change 
should occur in the particular belief’s strength (  ), its outcome evaluation (  ), 
or perhaps in both aspects in order to produce the desired results.  The theory 
of reasoned action provides guidance in this regard and enables one to 
choose the most effective route to achieve the desired change in attitude.  In 
the remainder of this sub-section it will be briefly explained how the theory of 
reasoned action is used for the abovementioned purpose. 
 
To produce attitude change through a modification of existing salient beliefs 
would, of course, require that the salient beliefs underlying the attitude of 
interest first be identified by means of an elicitation survey.  According to the 
theory of reasoned action, once the salient beliefs have been identified, each 
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of the salient beliefs must then be assessed in terms of the expectancy-value 
model’s summative belief-index (     ).  Having established that the direct 
attitude measure can be predicted from the relevant belief indices (     ) (see 
section 2.4.6.3), the information produced by the expectancy-value model’s 
summative belief-index (     ) may then be analysed with the aim of 
identifying the specific salient beliefs that ought to be targeted in order to 
effectively change an attitude in a desired direction.   
 
 By using the expectancy-value model to assess and examine the salient 
beliefs underlying an attitude, it is possible to observe how beliefs discriminate 
between people with different attitudes.  Specifically, the means and standard 
deviations of each belief’s strength (  ), of each belief’s outcome evaluation 
(  ), and of each belief’s     products are particularly important indicators 
that may be used to discriminate between people with different attitudes 
towards a behaviour.  In order to observe how beliefs can be used to explain 
differences in attitudes, the sample must, for example, be divided into 
participants who hold favourable attitudes and those who hold unfavourable 
attitudes towards the legal hunting of wild animals (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.206).  The mean values and standard deviations of each belief’s strength 
(  ), outcome evaluation (  ), and     product of the two sub-samples can 
then be compared and the differences identified.  In parallel fashion, it is also 
possible to compare differences in beliefs structure between various 
demographical sub-groups and other background variables.  For example, to 
understand why males are more inclined to have favourable attitudes towards 
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the legal hunting of wild animals than females, one must compare the mean 
beliefs and standard deviations underlying the attitudes of these two sub-
groups.  Based on such an analysis, the particular salient beliefs that 
discriminate between people with different attitudes can be identified (Fishbein 
& Ajzen, 2010, p.206).  Interventions that attempt to effectuate a desired 
change in a specific attitude should target those particular salient beliefs that 
discriminate between individuals with favourable attitudes and those with 
unfavourable attitudes. 
 
Assessing salient beliefs in terms of the expectancy-value model also 
provides particularly important information regarding a given salient belief’s 
contribution to the overall attitude, and its ability to account for variation in the 
attitude.  Note that not all salient beliefs carry equal weight in determining an 
attitude.  Instead, the relative importance of each salient belief underlying an 
attitude will vary as a function of the behaviour under consideration and the 
population of interest (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.332).  When designing 
interventions to change an attitude towards a specific behaviour, it is thus 
wise to identify those underlying salient beliefs that, if changed, are likely to 
have the most significant impact on the targeted attitude (Manfredo, 1992, 
p.40).  Before such beliefs can be identified, it must first be verified that the 
direct attitude measure can be predicted from the relevant belief indices 
(     ) – as was explained earlier in section 2.4.6.3.  Thereafter, the specific 
beliefs that should be targeted could be identified by considering the 
explanatory power of each belief with regard to the attitude under 
consideration.  A given belief’s contribution to the overall attitude, and its 
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ability to account for variation in the attitude, can be discerned in two ways: 
firstly by examining the mean values of each belief’s     product; and 
secondly by examining the correlation between each belief’s     product 
and the overall direct attitude measure (  ) (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.123 – 
124).  In the case of the first approach, each belief’s contribution to the overall 
attitude can be detected by examining which of the beliefs’ mean     
products make the largest positive and largest negative contributions towards 
the attitude.  The more a particular belief is found to contribute towards the 
attitude, the greater the likelihood that changing that particular belief will result 
in corresponding changes in the attitude.  As far as the second approach is 
concerned, correlations are calculated between individual beliefs’     
products and the direct measures of attitude (  ).  The stronger the 
correlation between an individual belief’s     product and the direct attitude 
measure (  ), the more the particular belief in question discriminates between 
those with different attitudes towards the behaviour in question, the greater 
the belief’s relative contribution to the overall attitude, and the more it 
accounts for variation in attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.123 – 124 & 
206).  Thus, the stronger the correlation, the more likely it is that changing that 
particular belief will result in changes in the targeted attitude.  
 
2.5.2.2 Producing attitude change by establishing new beliefs 
 
As noted earlier, attitudes can be influenced not only by changing existing 
salient beliefs but also by making new beliefs salient (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, 
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p.237; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.334).  In other words, attitude change 
interventions can be designed to provide people with new information which 
they have not considered before.  If this new information is accepted, it will 
lead them to form new beliefs in support of the desired attitude.  Of course, it 
may be expected that these new beliefs are consistent with the nature of the 
new information.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.334) are of the opinion that 
attitudes may sometimes be more easily influenced by making new beliefs 
salient rather than trying to change existing beliefs.  
 
Once the salient beliefs underlying a particular attitude has been identified 
and assessed in terms of the expectancy-value model’s approach, the 
researcher will have sufficient information on the existing salient beliefs within 
the population.  In addition to revealing how existing salient beliefs may be 
targeted, this information also provides a good basis for discerning the 
absence of potentially influential beliefs amongst a significant proportion of the 
research population.  If it is found that a significant proportion of the 
population is unaware of a specific positive or negative consequence of the 
behaviour of interest, it suggests a potential opportunity to introduce a new 
belief to their belief system.  
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2.5.3 General considerations influencing the effectiveness of attitude change 
interventions based on the theory of reasoned action 
 
Up to this point, the discussions under section 2.5 mainly revolved around 
how the theory of reasoned action provides guidance with regard to effectively 
changing attitude.    When using the theory of reasoned action to determine 
the most effective route to achieve the desired change in salient beliefs and 
attitudes, a number of issues need to be considered.  While most of these 
issues are particularly relevant when trying to change existing beliefs, there 
are also some considerations that are of importance when trying to change 
either existing beliefs or establishing new beliefs.  A discussion of the various 
aspects that needs to be considered will now follow. 
 
When trying to change attitudes by modifying existing beliefs, a number of 
issues should be considered when selecting the particular beliefs that should 
be changed.  First, if most people already strongly agree with a particular 
belief, there is little one can do to strengthen it further, and if most people 
strongly disagree, one cannot weaken it further (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.332).  Thus, when selecting beliefs to be targeted by an intervention, one 
should ensure that the chosen beliefs have enough room for change to occur.  
This principle, of course, applies when attempting to change either the 
strength with which a particular belief is held (  ) or the degree to which its 
outcome is positively or negatively evaluated (  ). 
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A second consideration when exploring the possibilities to change attitudes 
through modifying existing beliefs is whether it will, in fact, be possible to 
change a particular belief under consideration.  To change a specific belief on 
an issue, a persuasive communication has to address some of the 
fundamental information on which the belief is based.  Manfredo (1992, p.22) 
explains that “the information introduced by a persuasive communication must 
be information from which the belief in question can be probabilistically 
inferred”.  It should be noted, however, that beliefs based on personal 
experience (observational beliefs) are often much more difficult to change 
than beliefs that are based on second-hand information (informational beliefs) 
or beliefs inferred from other available information (inferential beliefs) 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.333).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.334) explain 
that “if a belief is based on sufficient personal experience, it would be 
extremely difficult if not impossible to change it by means of persuasive 
communication”. 
 
A third consideration that should be kept in mind when trying to change 
existing beliefs is that it is generally more difficult to change the outcome 
evaluations (  ) of a belief than it is to change the strength with which a belief 
is held (  ).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.333) explain that this is possibly 
because outcome evaluations (  ) are in essence themselves attitudes based 
on many different beliefs.  Consistent with the latter, Eagly and Chaiken 
(1993, p.237) also note that attempts to change attitudes through outcome 
evaluations generally prove less effective.  Interventions that have been 
designed explicitly to change outcome evaluations have generally had 
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relatively little effect on these evaluations and thus little corresponding effect 
on overall attitudes.  Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.237) speculate that the 
reason why this route is sometimes less effective, is because evaluations of 
outcomes are often well anchored in extensive prior learning or personal 
experience.  This view is consistent with Fishbein and Ajzen’s (2010, pp.333 – 
334) perspective that observational beliefs are often much more difficult to 
change than informational and inferential beliefs. 
 
Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.236), as well as Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.334) 
explain that whether existing beliefs are changed or new beliefs are made 
salient, it is important to realise that changing or adding one or two beliefs 
may not be sufficient to produce a change in attitude.  Only when there is a 
substantial shift in the summative indices of beliefs (     ) can a change in 
attitude be expected.  This implies that, whenever possible, attitude change 
interventions should be designed to change multiple beliefs rather than only 
one or two beliefs. 
 
A final important issue to consider when either targeting existing salient beliefs 
or making new beliefs salient has to do with the possible unintended effects 
that goes beyond the information contained in a message.  Manfredo (1992, 
p.18) explains that any changes in a person’s primary beliefs can extend far 
beyond the information directly contained in a persuasive message.  Thus, a 
persuasive message may also influence primary beliefs that were not directly 
targeted.  Such unintended changes that are brought about in a person’s 
belief system are termed impact effects (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.347).  
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Suppose that participants accept the major arguments about supporting the 
legal hunting of wild animals contained in a persuasive message, and that 
acceptance of the arguments causes a change in the targeted salient beliefs.  
At the same time they may form new beliefs or change existing beliefs that 
were not directly targeted by the message.  To illustrate, suppose that 
participants accept one of the major arguments about supporting the legal 
hunting of wild animals contained in a persuasive message, perhaps that as a 
direct result of hunting there has been a substantial increase in wildlife 
numbers and the conservation of habitats on private land.  While this 
argument is meant to target participants’ existing beliefs or to form new beliefs 
regarding the essential role hunting plays in conservation, some of them may 
at the same time draw inferences that may work in favour of or against the 
aims of the communicator.  For example, some participants may unexpectedly 
form the belief that, since hunting leads to an increase in the total land area 
under wildlife utilisation, it poses a threat to conventional agricultural 
industries such as mohair production or cattle farming; or that, since hunting 
leads to an increase in wildlife, there would be an increase in problem 
animals, parasites, or pests.  These impact effects may very well influence 
attitudes in an undesired direction, thus undermining the effectiveness of the 
intervention.  In a similar manner, participants may also unexpectedly draw 
inferences that could enhance the effectiveness of the intervention.  Although 
it is not always possible to anticipate in advance how impact effects may 
influence a targeted attitude, it is, however, important to be aware of its 
presence and influence when designing attitude change interventions. 
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2.5.4 Validity and adequacy of the expectancy-value model’s approach to changing 
attitudes 
  
Since the theory of reasoned action is exemplified by the expectancy-value 
model, it is necessary to consider the validity of the expectancy-value model.  
In exploring the validity and adequacy of the expectancy-value model as a 
model for changing attitudes, it is first necessary to consider the validity of the 
model’s assumption that exposure to persuasive messages or new 
information can bring about changes in beliefs and corresponding changes in 
attitudes.  Over the past 60 years, a vast body of research on the effects of 
persuasive communication has validated this expectation (Fishbein & Ajzen, 
2010, p.316).  Eagly and Chaiken (1993, p.237) agree and explain that 
numerous experiments revealed that compared to a no-message control 
group, participants who receive a properly designed persuasive message was 
found to usually change their attitudes in the advocated direction.  They 
explain that those experiments provide strong evidence for the model’s 
assumption that persuasive communications are indeed capable of changing 
message recipients’ beliefs and to have corresponding effects on their overall 
attitude.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.316 – 317) state that although 
questions remain regarding the factors that make a persuasive message more 
or less effective, there can be no doubt that exposure to a properly designed 
message often produces changes in beliefs and corresponding changes in 
attitudes. 
 
141 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.369 – 396) reviewed a number of studies which 
set out to evaluate the effectiveness of attitude and behaviour change 
interventions (persuasive messages) that were designed on the basis of the 
reasoned action approach.  As was mentioned throughout this chapter, an 
essential requirement in any application of the theory of reasoned action is to 
maintain strict compatibility amongst all measures.  Unfortunately, Fishbein 
and Ajzen found that some of the studies in their review were compromised by 
a lack of compatibility in their measures, in which case interventions based on 
the reasoned action approach generally seemed to have had only small 
effects on changing attitudes and behaviours.  However, those studies where 
the principle of compatibility was carefully observed revealed that the 
interventions based on the reasoned action approach had strong effects on 
the targeted theoretical components (of which attitudes are one) and on actual 
behaviour (see for example, Brubaker & Fowler, 1990; Jemmott, Jemmott & 
Fong, as cited in Fishbein and Ajzen, 2010, p.371; Murphy & Brubaker, 1990; 
Sanderson & Jemmott, 1996).  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.371) concluded in 
their review that these findings firstly stress the importance of adhering to the 
principle of compatibility, since this has a considerable influence on the 
validity and effectiveness of attitude and behaviour change interventions 
based on the reasoned action approach.  Secondly, they concluded that these 
findings provide strong evidence that attitude and behaviour change 
interventions can be quite effective when they are designed carefully in 
accordance with the principles of the reasoned action approach. 
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2.6 SUMMARY 
 
 This chapter was divided into five major sections.  The introduction to this 
chapter formed the first major section.  The chapter sets out to identify and 
discuss a suitable research approach to understand attitudes towards hunting 
and its underlying causal determinants, as well as to explore the implications 
this has for potentially broadening the base of public support for hunting. 
  
 The second major section of this chapter commenced with a review of the 
existing literature with the view to identify a suitable definition for the term 
attitude.  Thereafter, it was explained that, in contemporary social psychology, 
beliefs are considered to be the primary building blocks or causal 
determinants of attitudes.  A popular model for investigating how beliefs are 
combined to ultimately form the cognitive structure on which attitudes are 
based – namely the expectancy-value model – was introduced.  It was pointed 
out that the expectancy-value model’s conceptualisation of attitudes is of 
particular interest to investigators who hope to understand and change 
attitudes.  Thereafter, the discussions turned to the introduction of some 
general concepts in contemporary social psychology that are of relevance to 
this study.  In short, the instrumental and experiential components that 
capture different aspects of a given attitude were explained in detail, as well 
as how discrepancies or conflict that may exist between the various 
instrumental and experiential beliefs may result in attitudinal ambivalence.  
The concept of attitudinal ambivalence was described and its relevance to this 
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study was explained.  Furthermore, it was pointed out that hunting is a topic 
that often arouses strong emotions and attitudes amongst those who care 
about wildlife.  Consequently, the psychology of strong attitudes was 
discussed in detail and its relevance to this study was pointed out.  In addition, 
it was noted that cognitive dissonance is yet another important phenomenon 
that needs to be considered when engaging in attitude studies.  The notion of 
cognitive dissonance was discussed in detail.  It was noted that in some 
situations it might be possible to employ cognitive dissonance to effectuate a 
desired change in a given attitude, while in other situations the notion of 
cognitive dissonance may make it very difficult to effectuate a desired change 
in beliefs and attitudes.  Finally, four well-known standard techniques of 
attitude measurement were then introduced, namely Thurstone’s equal-
appearing interval scaling method, Likert’s method of summated ratings, 
Guttman’s cumulative scaling method, and Osgood, Suci and Tannenbaum’s 
semantic differential scale.  It was explained that although these techniques 
may provide reliable indicators of an attitude, they do not provide a valid basis 
for investigating the underlying belief structure that form the cognitive 
foundation on which an attitude are based.   
 
 In light of the recognised shortcoming of the standard attitude scaling 
techniques, the third major section in this chapter set out to select an 
adequate and methodologically valid research approach for this particular 
study.  The selection process was guided by the main research purpose of the 
study.  It was noted that attitude studies related to human dimensions of 
wildlife and natural resources generally follow one of two possible 
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approaches, namely a descriptive approach or a theoretical approach.  After 
carefully considering the adequacy of both these approaches, it was 
concluded that a theoretical approach would be the most suitable and 
methodologically valid research approach for the study.  More specifically, 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action (which is exemplified by the 
expectancy-value model) was identified as the most suitable theoretical modal 
and conceptual framework for the purposes of this study. 
 
 In the fourth major section of this chapter, a basic outline of the entire theory 
of reasoned action was provided.  The theory of reasoned action was then 
aligned with the research purpose of the study and it was pointed out that only 
the attitudinal construct of the reasoned action model is of relevance to this 
study.  After carefully considering relevant literature, it was decided that the 
behaviour of interest in this particular study would be best defined as the ‘legal 
hunting of wild animals’.  This was followed by comprehensive discussions of 
the procedures and various methodological considerations concerning the 
application of the attitudinal construct of the reasoned action approach in 
attitudinal research.  The logic of the reasoned action approach for 
investigating the beliefs that form the cognitive foundation on which an attitude 
is based, was explained in detail.  The psychological processes whereby 
beliefs are attained were then reviewed.  In short, it was said that beliefs are 
formed as a result of the experiences people have, the sources of information 
to which they are exposed, as well as the way in which they interpret and 
remember information.  It was noted that these processes are subject to a 
multitude of social and individual differences.  These differences are 
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recognised within the theory of reasoned action as background factors.  It was 
pointed out that including background factors in the context of the reasoned 
action approach enables the researcher to gain insight into the possible 
origins of the beliefs that serve as the cognitive foundation of an attitude.  
Thereafter, a number of background factors that may be of importance to this 
study were identified from the existing literature, namely gender, age, 
ethnicity, education, exposure to hunting, social ties, as well as rural or urban 
living. 
 
 In the fifth and final major section of this chapter, the reasoned action model 
was introduced as a conceptual framework for investigating the implications 
for changing attitudes.  It was explained that the central idea of the 
expectancy-value model is that people’s salient beliefs provide the 
informational foundation for their attitudes.  If people are exposed to new 
information – and this new information is accepted – then existing beliefs will 
change or new beliefs will be formed, resulting in corresponding changes in 
attitude.  A vast body of research provides strong evidence that persuasive 
communications based on the reasoned action approach are indeed capable 
of changing message recipients’ beliefs and to have corresponding effects on 
their overall attitudes.  Thus, the theory of reasoned action was found to 
provide a valid basis for identifying where and how to target strategies to 
change a targeted attitude. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
 In this chapter, the broad research design and specific methodologies used 
will be outlined.  It should be noted that the research design and methodology 
of this particular study is largely based on the conceptual framework and 
prescribed standard procedures of the theory of reasoned action (as 
described throughout chapter 2).  Studies that are based on the reasoned 
action approach typically adopt a two phased research design.  In the case of 
this study, a formative research phase and a primary research phase can be 
distinguished. 
  
This chapter commences with a broad outline of the study’s research design.  
Thereafter, a discussion of the methodological design of the study’s formative 
research phase as well as the study’s primary research phase will follow.  This 
chapter will then be concluded by a brief summary of the research design and 
methodologies discussed throughout this chapter. 
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3.2 BROAD OUTLINE OF THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
A research design is a plan, structure, and procedural strategy of how a 
research study is to be conducted in order to address its main research 
purpose (Kumar, 2011, pp.93 – 94).  It should be recalled that this study is 
focused on understanding attitudes towards hunting and its underlying causal 
determinants and to explore the implications it holds for potentially improving 
the social acceptability of hunting. 
 
In this section, a broad outline of the study’s research design will be provided.  
In particular, the nature of the data that is required in order to address the 
study’s main research purpose will be carefully considered.  This is then 
followed by an explanation of how the required data will be obtained through 
two separate components of the study’s design, namely its literature 
component and its empirical component.  The focus of this section then turns 
towards introducing the broad methodological design of the study’s empirical 
component. 
  
3.2.1 Nature of the data and data gathering 
  
As with any research study, data is required in order to address the sub-
questions, and hence, the main research question of the study.  When 
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planning a research design, it is extremely important to consider the nature of 
the data that an investigation of the research problem will require, because 
“data and methodology are inextricably interdependent” (Leedy & Ormrod, 
2005, pp.87 & 93).  Thus, to some extent, the required data dictate the 
appropriate research method (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p.94).  Kumar (2011, 
p.138), as well as Leedy and Ormrod (2005, p.89) distinguish between two 
categories of data, namely primary data and secondary data.  Kumar (2011, 
p.139) explains that primary data refers to original data that is collected “first-
hand” by the researcher.  Secondary data, on the other hand, refers to any 
data that was collected in the past or by parties other than the researcher in 
question – in other words, “second-hand” data.  Secondary data typically 
includes literature sources, such as books, journals, articles, records, census 
data, and any other sources of published material or research findings 
(Kumar, 2011, p.139).  The nature of the data that is required in this study will 
now be investigated with a view to selecting the most suitable research 
methodology for the specific circumstances of this study. 
 
After carefully examining the nature of the data that is required to address the 
research problem of this study, it was found that data of both a primary 
nature and a secondary nature is needed.  The primary data is collected as 
part of the study’s empirical component, while the secondary data is 
gathered through its literature component.  Each of these two components 
makes a specific contribution to this study and jointly they address the study’s 
main research question.  Both of these components will now be discussed 
with regard to what they entail, as well as their contributions to solving the 
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study’s main research problem.  Note, however, that the literature component 
plays an essential determining role with regard to the exact nature of the 
primary data and it also offers useful perspectives on how to handle 
methodological issues related to the empirical component of the study.  For 
this reason, the literature component of the study will be addressed first, 
followed by a discussion of its empirical component. 
 
3.2.1.1 Literature component of the study 
  
The literature component of the study is crucial because it focuses on 
collecting the secondary information that is required to address the main 
research question, sub-questions, and goals of this study.  The literature 
component of this study largely entails a review of existing literature on the 
psychology of attitudes, attitude formation, and attitude change (see chapter 
2).  Leedy and Ormrod (2005, p.64) explain that a literature review generally 
describes theoretical perspectives, various approaches, and previous 
research findings regarding a problem at hand.  A large number of literature 
sources – dealing with a broad range of information on topics that are related 
to this study – formed part of the literature review and was used to compile the 
literature component of this study.  These literature sources primarily 
consisted of books of academic and scientific nature, scientific journal articles 
and other published research findings relevant to the study.   
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Kumar (2011, p.31) notes that the literature review is an integral part of the 
research process and makes a valuable contribution to almost every 
operational step of a research study.  Specifically, the literature component of 
this study serves three main purposes, which will be discussed in the 
paragraphs that follow below. 
 
Firstly the literature component of this study establishes a sound cognitive 
foundation for conducting the study.  It provides a broad overview of some 
general concepts in contemporary social psychology pertaining to attitudes 
and attitude changes.  Not only does this ensure a clear and uniform 
understanding of these concepts, but it also enables one to contextualise the 
research findings in relation to the existing body of knowledge.  Perhaps more 
importantly, however, the cognitive foundation provides a sound knowledge 
base for assessing and understanding attitudes; for analysing research 
findings; as well as for interpreting the implications these findings may hold for 
improving the social legitimacy of hunting. 
 
The second purpose of the literature component is to establish a conceptual 
framework that serves as the very basis on which the empirical component of 
this study is designed.  Dane (1990, p.63) and Kumar (2011, p.40) explain 
that a conceptual framework of a study usually stems from the literature 
review and is closely related to the study’s specific research problem.  The 
purpose of the conceptual framework is to ensure that the research follows a 
suitable and systematic research approach or course of action to ultimately 
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address the empirical component of the research problem.  Kumar (2011, 
p.94) emphasises that the conceptual framework ensures that the chosen 
research approach is adequate to obtain valid, objective and accurate 
answers to the research questions of a study.  Consistent with this view, it 
should be recalled that the theory of reasoned action was identified through 
the literature review as the most suitable conceptual framework for the 
purposes of this study (see chapter 2).  From the literature review, it is evident 
that the theory of reasoned action relates directly to the specific research 
problem of the study and thus provides a suitable approach that directly 
addresses the research questions of the study.  Kumar (2011, p.94) further 
explains that it is essential to rationalise, justify, and validate the chosen 
cognitive framework by supporting one’s choice critically from existing 
literature.  It should be recalled that the literature review in chapter 2 explicitly 
rationalises and justifies the researcher’s decision to employ the theory of 
reasoned action as a conceptual framework for this study.  Moreover, the 
literature review also shows that the reasoned action approach is thoroughly 
tested, well supported by empirical evidence across various disciplines, and 
widely acknowledged for its ability to provide valid, objective, and accurate 
answers. 
 
Thirdly and finally, the literature component also clarifies the nature of the 
primary data that is required in order to address the study’s research problem; 
makes the researcher more familiar with the approaches and methodologies 
that are suitable for obtaining the required primary data; and offers useful 
perspectives on how to handle methodological issues related to the empirical 
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component of the study.  Consequently, the literature component ensures that 
the study is methodologically sound. 
  
3.2.1.2 Empirical component of the study 
  
The literature component of this study is followed by its empirical component.  
The empirical component forms a crucial part of the study, because it provides 
the primary data that is required to assess and understand attitudes towards 
hunting and its causal determinants, as well as to investigate the implications 
it holds for changing attitudes and improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  
The results that were derived from the primary data are discussed throughout 
chapter 4 of this study. 
 
In sum then, while the literature component of this study provides the 
necessary secondary information that is needed to establish a cognitive 
foundation and conceptual framework for the study, the empirical component 
provides the primary information that is required in order to fully address the 
research purpose of the study.  However, the research methodologies that 
were used to collect the primary data are yet to be properly discussed.  
Therefore, from this point on, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to 
discussing the methodological design of this study’s empirical component and 
the research methodology that was employed to collect the required primary 
data.   
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3.2.2 Research design of the study’s empirical component 
  
Leedy and Ormrod (2005, pp.93 – 95), as well as Schutt (2004, p.14) explain 
that in order to decide whether a study should follow a qualitative or 
quantitative research design, the exact nature of the required data must first 
be considered.  It was already pointed out that the purpose of the empirical 
component is to provide the primary information that is required in order to 
answer the main research problem and remaining sub-problems of this study.  
This, however, requires that the primary data be obtained directly from the 
research population in question.  It should be recalled that the theory of 
reasoned action was already identified as the most suitable research 
approach for the purposes of this study.  The theory of reasoned action 
prescribes, to a large extent, the research design and methodology of studies 
which are based on its approach.  Consequently, the research design and 
methodology of this study’s empirical component is largely based on the 
conceptual framework and prescribed procedures of the theory of reasoned 
action (as described throughout chapter 2).  According to Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010, pp.326 – 330), studies that are based on the reasoned action approach 
typically contain qualitative as well as quantitative components in its empirical 
design.  Thus, after considering the exact nature of the required primary data 
in conjunction with the theory of reasoned action’s postulations and prescribed 
procedures for collecting the required primary data, it is clear that this study 
calls for a mixed-method research design.  Leedy and Ormrod (2005, p.97) 
explain that a mixed-method research design combine elements of both 
qualitative and quantitative approaches.   
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Once the nature of the required data have been considered and a decision 
has been taken as to whether the research should follow quantitative or 
qualitative approaches, the research methods need to be pinned down more 
precisely (Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p.107).  Since the theory of reasoned action 
forms an integral part of the research design of this study, it also dictates the 
appropriate research methods that should be employed in order to gather the 
primary data for this study.  The reasoned action approach relies primarily on 
survey research.  Survey research obtains information directly from the 
research population (Dane, 1990, p.120) and is the most common method of 
obtaining primary data on people’s attitudes, beliefs, values, and experiences 
(Mitchell & Jolley, 1992, p.451).  Fink (2003, p.142) also states that survey 
research is a way of collecting information in order to describe, compare, or 
explain people’s knowledge, attitudes, and behaviours.  Aaker and Day (1990, 
p.187) agree that surveys are the preferred choice of researchers for the 
collection of primary data of this particular nature.   
 
The empirical component of studies that are based on the reasoned action 
approach typically consists of two consecutive surveys which are 
methodologically interrelated (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.326 – 330).  
Consistent with this approach, the empirical design of this particular study 
necessitates that two separate surveys be conducted, namely the formative 
survey and the primary survey.  Jointly, these two surveys address the main 
research problem and sub-problems of this study.  Nevertheless, each of the 
two surveys serves its own purpose in the study’s empirical component and 
has its own methodological design.  For this reason, it is necessary to discuss 
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the purpose and methodology of each of the two surveys separately.  The 
methodological design of the formative survey is discussed under section 3.3 
of this chapter, while the methodological design of the primary survey is 
discussed under section 3.4.  Jointly then, these two sections represent the 
entire methodological design of the empirical component of this study. 
  
3.3 METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN OF THE FORMATIVE SURVEY 
  
 The first phase of the empirical research entails that a formative survey be 
conducted amongst a small sample of the research population.  According to 
Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.327), the formative survey may contain 
qualitative as well as quantitative components – each with their own specific 
purpose.  In order to fully comprehend how the formative survey fits into the 
research design of this study’s empirical component, it is necessary to 
consider the purpose of the formative survey.  McBurney and White (2010, 
p.246) recommend that before designing a survey, it is extremely important 
that the objectives and purpose of the particular survey be considered.  For 
this reason, a broad outline of the purpose of the formative survey’s qualitative 
and quantitative components will now follow. 
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3.3.1 Purpose of the formative survey 
  
The main purpose of the qualitative component of the formative survey was 
to determine which readily available salient behavioural beliefs about hunting 
are commonly present (prominent) amongst members of the public.  By 
incorporating content analysis in the qualitative component, it is possible to 
compile a set of modal salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that are 
commonly present within the research population.  This modal set of salient 
behavioural beliefs about hunting will then be used to construct items that will 
later be included in the survey instrument of the subsequent primary survey.  
Clearly then, the formative survey and the primary survey of this study are 
methodologically interrelated in the sense that the modal set of salient beliefs 
that were identified during the formative research phase formed the very basis 
on which the questionnaire of the primary survey was developed.  The 
formative survey is an essential methodological step in the empirical design of 
this study, because it ensures that the notion of belief accessibility is taken 
into consideration (refer to section 2.4.5 of chapter 2).  Manfredo (2008, pp.93 
– 94) emphasises the importance of recognising the notion of belief 
accessibility in attitude research and explains that it significantly improves the 
methodological validity of attitude studies. 
 
The quantitative component of the formative research, on the other hand, 
served as a pilot study and it provided information about several important 
theoretical issues (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.328).  Firstly, the formative 
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survey allowed the researcher the opportunity to develop a valid direct attitude 
measure and to formally test its reliability before including it in the survey 
instrument of the subsequent primary survey (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.328).  
Thus, by including multiple attitude measures (instrumental, experiential, and 
broad direct attitude measures) in the formative survey, the researcher can 
take advantage of the pilot data to formally test the validity and reliability of the 
direct attitude measure (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.328).  This is essential in 
order to ensure that a reliable and valid direct measure of attitude is obtained 
during the primary survey of the study.  Secondly, the pilot work of the 
formative survey provides an opportunity to identify problems in the format 
and wording of attitude measurement scales before it is incorporated into the 
survey instrument of the primary survey (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.328).  
Thirdly, the formative survey can be used to obtain an initial test of the 
relevance of some background factors (e.g., demographical variables, social 
variables, etc.) by checking whether or not they have a significant influence on 
the direct attitude measure (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.328). 
 
In sum, the formative survey serves an exploratory purpose in the sense 
that it, firstly, sets out to explore which readily salient behavioural beliefs 
about hunting are present within the research population (through its 
qualitative component); and secondly, to test and verify methodological 
procedures, as well as to identify potential problems of later research (through 
its quantitative component).  Clearly then, the objectives of this particular 
formative survey is not to make generalisations to a larger population.  
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3.3.2 Selection of a suitable survey research method 
 
Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.163) describe survey research as the process 
of collecting information from a sample of individuals through their responses 
to a set of standardised questions.  Malhotra and Birks (1999, p.209) explain 
that survey research involves obtaining information directly from participants 
by posing questions to them.  According to Malhotra and Birks (1999, p.225), 
survey research methods may be classified by mode of administration as 
shown in Figure 3.1. 
 
Figure 3.1. CLASIFICATION OF SURVEY METHODS 
 
CAPI = Computer Assisted Personal Interview  
CATI = Computer Assisted Telephone Interview  
Source: Malhotra and Birks (1999, p.225). 
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In selecting the most appropriate survey methods for data collection, a 
number of factors had to be considered.  First and foremost, since the 
formative survey will contain qualitative as well as quantitative elements, it is 
imperative that the survey method is able to accommodate both of these 
elements.  Secondly, the survey method and instrument must allow 
participants to express their own opinions, beliefs, and thoughts in order to 
elicit the salient beliefs they hold about hunting.  Thus, the survey method and 
instrument needs to be somewhat flexible in the sense that it should allow 
participants to respond in a free-response format.  Thirdly, it is important that 
the elicitation study be conducted at the level of individuals and not in a group 
setting.  This is because elicitation procedures that rely on focus groups or 
group discussions to identify a set of modal salient beliefs are not a valid 
elicitation procedure (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.103).  Fishbein and Ajzen 
(2010, p.103) explain that in a group setting, dominant individuals tend to 
influence the direction of the discussion and therefore it may appear that a 
rarely held belief is readily salient in the population, or that a readily held belief 
is rarely salient in the population.  Furthermore, in a group setting individuals 
of the group may influence each other’s beliefs that come readily to mind.  For 
example, individuals may make inferences and form new beliefs on the basis 
of beliefs that are emitted by other individuals.  Thus, beliefs that were 
previously not salient may now become part of the salient set of beliefs and, if 
so, they may become important determinants of the currently prevailing 
attitude.  Therefore, in selecting a suitable and valid survey method, this 
potential methodological flaw must be kept in mind.  Fourthly, the survey 
needs to be administered amongst as diverse a population as possible.  The 
160 
formative survey must thus elicit salient beliefs across a diverse spectrum of 
background factors (such as demographical and social differences).  Most 
importantly, however, the formative survey must extend across the entire 
spectrum of different attitudes towards hunting (ranging from those in favour 
of and strongly in favour of hunting; those with neutral attitudes towards 
hunting; and through to those who are opposed to and strongly opposed to 
hunting).  Fifthly, the formative survey serves an exploratory purpose only 
and, consequently, there is no need for the formative survey to produce 
results that accurately represent a larger population.  Sixthly, the budget for 
the formative survey was relatively restricted, and means had to be found to 
involve not only a suitable number of respondents, but also to include a 
sufficiently diverse range of respondents across the necessary background 
and attitudinal spectrums.  Finally, some practical constraints of conducting 
the formative survey had to be kept in mind.  The formative survey had to be 
conducted in a reasonable period of time and with very limited personnel and 
infrastructure at the researcher’s disposal.  The selection of a suitable survey 
method for the formative survey took into account all of the above mentioned 
circumstances and limitations. 
 
Dane (1990, pp.128 – 135) and Malhotra and Birks (1999, p.225) are in 
agreement that survey research methods may be classified by mode of 
administration into telephone interview, personal interview and mail surveys 
(see Figure 3.1).  After comparing all three of these survey methods, it was 
decided that – given the abovementioned circumstances – a mail survey 
method was the most suitable for the purpose of the formative survey.  
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Malhotra and Birks (1999, p.225) distinguish between three types of mail 
surveys, namely traditional mail surveys, mail panels, and electronic mail 
surveys.  After considering all the available options with reference to the 
criteria discussed in the previous paragraph, it was decided that an electronic 
mail survey would be the most suitable survey method.  An electronic mail 
survey is a survey method where a questionnaire is distributed by means of a 
computer, and responses are received either through e-mail or on the World 
Wide Web (Chambliss & Schutt, 2010, p.179).  Dillman (2000, pp.352 – 354) 
and Fowler (2009, p.61) distinguish between two types of electronic surveys, 
namely e-mail surveys and Web-surveys.  With e-mail surveys, questions are 
sent and answered through e-mail.  With Web-surveys, on the other hand, 
respondents are asked to visit a website (often by just clicking an e-mailed 
link) and simply respond to the questionnaire on the website.  After careful 
consideration of the advantages and disadvantages of these two electronic 
survey methods, it was decided to make use of Web-surveys. 
 
Chambliss and Schutt (2010, pp.179 – 182) as well as Malhotra and Birks 
(1999, pp.232 – 233) recognise a number of advantages and disadvantages 
of Web-surveys.  Some of the most important advantages of Web-surveys are 
that it is inexpensive to design and administer; the questionnaire design is 
very flexible and can be tailored to seem shorter, more interesting, and more 
attractive; it enables one to remove interviewer bias, thereby ensuring the 
consistency of measurements; data entry errors are virtually eliminated 
because answers are often recorded directly in an electronic database; and in 
areas where open-ended responses are required, the respondent types in 
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answers ready for analysis – thus, saving the researcher time and resources 
to prepare the qualitative data for content analysis (e.g., by compiling 
transcripts of open-ended responses).  On the other hand, however, possibly 
the most important drawback of any electronic survey approach is the large 
number of people that do not have access to a computer or the Internet.  
Since there is a non-probability of obtaining responses of people who do not 
have computer or internet access, this may place serious constraints on 
obtaining a sample that is representative of a target population.  The 
researcher cannot ascertain whether those people who were able and willing 
to take part in an electronic survey are really representative of a target 
population.  Clearly, under conditions where it is imperative to obtain 
representative samples of a target population, electronic surveys may often 
pose methodological problems. 
 
3.3.3 Selection of a suitable research sample 
  
Daniel (2012, p.69) and Henry (1990, p.17) distinguish between two broad 
sampling designs, namely a probability sample design or a non-probability 
sample design.  Probability samples have a greater likelihood than non-
probability samples to be representative of the population from which they 
were drawn.  Henry (1990, p.17) explains that this is largely because the 
selection method for non-probability sampling are often based on the 
subjective judgements of the researcher to achieve particular objectives of the 
research at hand and, consequently, not every member of the target 
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population has a possibility of being included in the sample.  In contrast, 
probability samples are generally selected by a randomised mechanism with 
well-defined procedures for selecting the sample – this assures selection 
independent of subjective judgements and ensures that every individual in the 
research population has a possibility of being included in the sample (Henry, 
1990, p.17). 
 
The choice of a sampling design must be based on the particular objectives of 
the survey (Daniel, 2012, p.71; Leedy & Ormrod, 2005, p.145), the nature of 
the target population (e.g., population heterogeneity or homogeneity, size, 
spatial distribution, accessibility, etc.), the study’s research design 
(methodology and data collection design), and the availability of resources 
(Daniel, 2012, pp.10 – 12 & 71).  All these factors largely influenced the 
selection of the most appropriate sampling design for the formative survey 
and will now be discussed briefly.  Firstly, it should be recalled that the 
formative survey serves an exploratory purpose (see section 3.3.1 of this 
chapter).  Daniel (2012, pp.69 & 71) and Henry (1990, pp.23 – 25) both agree 
that non-probability samples are very often the preferred and most reasonable 
sampling design for research of such an exploratory nature.  Furthermore, 
consistent with the objectives of this particular formative survey, Daniel (2012, 
p.71) explains that the intention of exploratory research is not to use the 
sample data to extrapolate study findings to a larger population or to make 
conclusive generalisations about a larger population.  Instead, the purpose of 
exploratory research is, amongst other, to determine if a particular salient 
belief is present in the research population; to test or verify methodological 
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procedures; and to identify potential problems of later research (Daniel, 2012, 
p.71).  Clearly then, from a purely methodological perspective, a non-
probability sampling design would be a valid sampling approach for the 
formative survey.  Secondly, the nature of the research population was also 
an important consideration in selecting between a probability sampling design 
and a non-probability sampling design.  This is because obtaining a sample 
from members of the general public of South Africa that is 18 years of age and 
older presents some challenges in terms of the practicability of the various 
sampling designs.  The research population of this study clearly consists of an 
extremely large and heterogeneous population.  To complicate matters 
further, the research population is distributed across an extremely large 
geographical area – which, on its own, presents problems in terms of the 
accessibility of the research population to the researcher.  Seen in light of the 
size, heterogeneity, and spatial distribution of the research population, it is 
apparent that a probability sampling design would be extremely expensive, 
time consuming, impractical, and nearly an impossible task without the 
availability of the necessary infrastructure and human resources.  Henry 
(1990, pp.24 – 25) argues that, under appropriate circumstances, limited 
resources could justify the use of a non-probability sample.  Thirdly, a 
probability sampling design for such a large and heterogeneous population 
would necessitate that a very large sample size be obtained.  This could pose 
serious problems in terms of analysing the qualitative data (open-ended 
responses) that would be collected by the formative survey.  Gillham (2007, 
pp.66 & 70) and Oppenheim (1992, p.113) both warn that analysing the 
content of open-ended responses are intellectually demanding, a lot of work, 
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and often extremely time consuming.  The analysis of even a small number of 
open-ended responses involves a great deal more work than responses to 
closed questions (Gillham, 2007, p.70).  Therefore, the practicability of 
processing and analysing large numbers of open-ended responses had to be 
considered in selecting an adequate sampling design.  Furthermore, 
according to Daniel (2012, pp.69 & 77), non-probability samples are generally 
suitable for conducting research of a qualitative nature.  Fourthly, Mitchell and 
Jolly (2010, p.288) explain that before a representative sample of a target 
population can be selected, one usually needs to acquire an accurate and 
complete list of the target population.  A representative sample may then be 
selected from such a list by using probability sampling techniques.  Since an 
accurate list of a large, general population – such as is the case in this study – 
is seldom available, it complicates the task of developing a reasonable 
sampling frame from which a probability sample could be obtained.  Henry 
(1990, p.85) agrees and states that “as a general rule, researchers find 
locating an available list of the general population difficult, if not impossible.  
On the national level, no list is available of the general population”.  Neuendorf 
(2002, p.88) point out that non-probability sampling is typically used in cases 
when there is insurmountable difficulty in creating a reasonable sampling 
frame. 
 
A number of credible literature sources also support the use of non-probability 
samples for identifying modal salient beliefs in very large heterogeneous 
populations (see for example, Ajzen & Driver, 1991; Campbell & Mackay, 
2003; Petkova, Ajzen & Driver, 1995; Whittaker, Manfredo, Fix, Sinnott, Miller, 
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& Vaske, 2001).  Thus, there is sufficient evidence in the literature that non-
probability sampling designs will be able to fully meet the particular objectives 
of the formative survey.  
 
After considering the adequacy of non-probability sampling compared to 
probability sampling for the formative survey, it was decided that a non-
probability sampling design would be the best choice.  Daniel (2012, p.81) 
indicates that once a choice is made to use a non-probability sampling design, 
it is necessary to select the specific type of non-probability sampling method 
that will best serve the purpose of the survey.  Daniel (2012, p.81), Neuendorf 
(2002, pp.87 – 88), and Schutt (2009, pp.169 – 175) recognise four major 
types of non-probability sample designs: availability sampling (also known as 
convenience sampling), where participants are selected simply because they 
are readily available and convenient for the researcher to survey; purposive 
sampling, where participants are selected from the target population on the 
basis of their fit with the purpose of the study; quota sampling, where 
participants are selected to ensure that the sample represents certain 
characteristics in proportion to their prevalence in the population; and 
snowball sampling (also known as respondent-assisted sampling), where 
participants are selected as they are identified by successive informants or 
interviewees.  After carefully considering all the weaknesses and strengths of 
the various non-probability sampling methods against the particular 
circumstances pertaining to the formative survey, the researcher decided to 
make use of a combination of availability sampling and purposive 
sampling.  This entailed that the sampling procedure be executed in two 
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consecutive phases: first, the availability sampling phase and, second, the 
purposive sampling phase.  The details of these two sampling phases are 
discussed below. 
 
In absence of a reasonable sampling frame for the research population of this 
study, the researcher was faced with the challenge of identifying a suitable 
and convenient target population to obtain both an availability sample and 
purposive sample from.  In order for the target population to be adequate for 
this purpose, it had to meet four important criteria.  In the first place, the 
chosen target population had to form part of the research population of this 
study – in other words, members of the general public of South Africa that is 
18 years of age and older.  Secondly, it was essential that the target 
population consisted of individuals from across the entire attitudinal spectrum 
(namely individuals who approve and strongly approve of hunting; individuals 
who neither approve nor disapprove of hunting; and individuals who 
disapprove and strongly disapprove of hunting).  This is because people with 
different attitudes towards hunting could reasonably be expected to hold 
substantially different salient beliefs about hunting (this expectation is 
supported by the literature review in chapter 2).  In the third place, the chosen 
target population had to be a sufficiently diverse and heterogeneous 
population (similar to that of the research population in this study) and had to 
include individuals from a wide variety of demographical and social 
backgrounds (e.g., ages, ethnicity, social ties, genders, etc.).  This is because 
the literature review in chapter 2 suggested that people’s attitudes towards 
hunting (and, consequently, also the salient beliefs they hold about hunting) 
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might differ across some demographical and social variables.  Finally, since 
the budget for the formative survey was very limited, the chosen target 
population had to be easily accessible to the researcher and data collection 
had to be relatively convenient and inexpensive. 
 
After due consideration was given to the abovementioned criteria, the 
students and staff members of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University (NMMU) were identified as a suitable target population for the 
formative survey’s sampling procedure.  In terms of the first requirement 
mentioned in the paragraph above, the students and staff members of NMMU 
do, in fact, all form part of the research population of this study – namely they 
are members of the general public of South Africa who are 18 years of age 
and older.  To ensure that no participants from countries other than South 
Africa were included in the sample (such as foreign students), question 5 the 
formative survey’s Web-questionnaire required that all participants indicate 
whether or not they are a South African citizen (see Annexure A).  All 
participants who indicated that they were not South African citizens were 
removed from the sample.  As far as the second requirement is concerned, 
the researcher felt that it could be reasonably assumed that the entire 
spectrum of attitudes towards hunting would be present amongst the students 
and staff members of NMMU.  In terms of the third requirement, the 
researcher argues that the students and staff members of NMMU are a 
sufficiently diverse and heterogeneous population that includes individuals 
from a wide variety of demographical and social backgrounds.  Note, 
however, that the researcher acknowledges that, compared to the research 
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population (general public of South Africa that is 18 years of age and older), 
the target population (students and staff members of NMMU) are likely to 
over-represent the higher socio-economic classes. 
 
After choosing an appropriate target population for the formative survey, it 
was then possible to proceed with the first phase of the formative survey’s 
sampling procedure, namely the availability sampling.  The availability 
sample was obtained through the voluntary participation of students and staff 
members of NMMU.  All the students and staff members of NMMU were 
invited to participate in the formative survey via the so-called NMMU 
Communique service – which is an internal organisational e-mail service that 
is used to communicate with the students and staff of NMMU.  Participants 
who were willing to take part in the survey simply had to click on the electronic 
link that was included in the e-mail invitation.  The availability sample that was 
obtained was considered to be sufficiently diverse in terms of its 
demographical composition, social variables, and attitudes towards hunting.  
This was established by analysing participants’ responses to all the questions 
in section A and section B of the formative survey’s Web-questionnaire (see 
Annexure A).  Details regarding the size and composition of the availability 
sample can be found under section 3.3.4 of this chapter.  The availability 
sample of the formative survey basically served two purposes: firstly, it 
provided a large amount of data that would satisfy the quantitative component 
of the formative survey; and secondly, it provided a platform for selecting a 
purposive sample that would satisfy the qualitative component of the formative 
survey. 
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After the availability sample was obtained, it was then possible to proceed 
with the second phase of the formative survey’s sampling procedure, namely 
the purposive sampling.  As mentioned above, the purposive sample 
provided the information needed to satisfy the qualitative component of the 
formative survey – that is, to identify the salient behavioural beliefs that are 
commonly held in the research population.  The purposive sample was drawn 
from those very participants that formed part of the availability sample.  When 
making use of purposive sampling, the researcher intentionally included those 
individuals in the purposive sample who possess the particular characteristics 
of interest that will best serve the purpose of the survey (Daniel, 2012, p.88; 
Neuendorf, 2002, pp.87 – 88; Schutt, 2009, pp.169 – 175).  Daniel (2012, 
p.88) explains that this selection procedure requires that the researcher 
specifies the specific inclusion or exclusion criteria that were used to compile 
a purposive sample.  The researcher’s aim was to select a purposive sample 
comprising of individuals whose attitudes towards hunting extend across the 
entire attitudinal spectrum.  According to Daniel (2012, p.90), inclusion criteria 
of this particular nature are clearly focused on maximising the variability of the 
purposive sample in terms of its diversity and heterogeneity.  Daniel (2012, 
p.90) explains that this can generally be done by selecting a wide variety of 
the elements of interest so as to identify important common patterns that cut 
across the variation.  In selecting a purposive sample for the formative survey, 
the aim of the researcher was thus to select individuals with a wide variety of 
attitudes towards hunting so as to identify those salient behavioural beliefs 
that cut across the attitudinal variation.  Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.237) 
also supports this sampling approach and explain that, in qualitative sampling, 
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researchers should try to select participants who represent a range of different 
perspectives.  Henry (1990, p.22) cautions that selection bias is likely to occur 
when non-probability samples are selected on the basis of the researcher’s 
discretion and subjective judgements.  Daniel (2012, p.74) points out that 
random sampling minimises selection bias by eliminating the subjective 
biases of the researcher from the selection process.  For this reason, the 
researcher decided to select individuals that comprised the purposive sample 
on the basis of a random selection procedure.  This was done by dividing all 
the individuals which formed part of the already obtained availability sample 
into five different attitudinal categories based on their responses to the direct 
attitude measure in the formative survey’s Web-questionnaire (question 19 of 
Annexure A).  The five attitudinal categories were comprised of individuals 
who approved and strongly approved of hunting; individuals who neither 
approved nor disapproved of hunting; and those individuals who disapproved 
and strongly disapprove of hunting.  Individuals from each of these five 
attitudinal categories were then randomly selected for inclusion in the 
purposive sample by making use of the software package Microsoft Office 
Excel 2007.  This sample selection procedure, firstly, ensured that the 
purposive sample included individuals across the entire attitudinal spectrum 
and, secondly, that selection bias was minimised by eliminating the subjective 
biases of the researcher from the selection process.  Details regarding the 
size and composition of the purposive sample can be found under section 
3.3.4 of this chapter. 
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In light of Sutton et al’s (2003, p.249) perspective (as was discussed earlier in 
section 2.4.5 of chapter 2), the researcher acknowledges that compiling a set 
of modal salient beliefs from a non-representative sample – such as 
implicated in this study – may possibly increase the likelihood of producing 
two errors: firstly, it may fail to include one or more of an individual’s salient 
beliefs in the modal set and, secondly, one or more of the beliefs that are 
included in the modal set may not be a salient belief of some individuals in the 
research population.  From the perspective of the researcher, these two 
recognised shortcomings of using a non-representative sample to compile a 
set of modal salient beliefs are to some degree unavoidable due to those 
practical considerations of selecting a suitable sampling design that were 
discussed earlier in this section.  Nevertheless, in light of the importance of 
taking the notion of belief accessibility (saliency) into consideration in attitude 
research (see Manfredo, 2008, pp.93 – 94), the researcher argues that this 
approach does still take heed to the notion of belief accessibility and may 
therefore be considered to be more methodologically sound than if the modal 
set of salient beliefs were to be based purely on the researcher’s intuition. 
  
3.3.4 Sample size and composition 
  
 In deciding on a suitable sample size for the formative survey, the researcher 
was, firstly, guided by the objectives of the survey.  Recall that the formative 
survey serves an exploratory purpose (see section 3.3.1 of this chapter).  
Daniel (2012, p.237) states that “when conducting a study with an exploratory 
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objective, the researcher is not attempting to make conclusive analysis, and a 
small sample size may thus suffice”.  Clearly then, a relatively small sample 
size will be able to meet the objectives of the formative survey.  Secondly, in 
deciding on a sample size for the formative survey the researcher had to 
select a sample size that would not exceed the resources that are available 
for doing the survey.  Daniel (2012, pp.240 – 241) explains that “there must be 
a balance between available resources and sample size.  The more limited 
one’s resources (e.g., financial, time, personnel, infrastructure), the more 
consideration should be given to choosing a smaller sample size”.  Thirdly, in 
selecting a sample size for the formative survey, the researcher was guided 
by a number of considerations pertaining to the particular survey’s research 
design.  Daniel (2012, p.69) explains that research studies that make use of 
non-probability samples (such as in the case of the formative survey) 
generally target small sample sizes.  Furthermore, Daniel (2012, p.243) 
explains that “when a researcher uses non-probability sampling, statistical 
theories and calculations are not applicable in determining sample size.  
Instead, one may consider using various conventions, rules of thumb, and ad 
hoc, non-statistical methods”.  Daniel (2012, p.243) provides guidelines for 
this approach and suggest that surveys with an exploratory research design 
(such as in the case of the formative survey) are typically conducted with 
sample sizes of between 30 to 150 participants, depending on the particular 
objectives and details of the survey.  Moreover, recall that the formative 
survey consists of both a quantitative and a qualitative component (see 
section 3.3.1 of this chapter).  Daniel (2012, p.241) explains that quantitative 
research designs generally require larger sample sizes than qualitative 
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research designs.  This seems to suggest that a sample of a different size 
may be needed to meet the objectives of the formative survey’s quantitative 
component than would be needed to meet the objectives of its qualitative 
component.  Thus, the remainder of this section will focus on discussing the 
selection of a suitable sample size for the quantitative component and the 
qualitative component of the formative survey.   
 
As far as the quantitative component of the formative survey is concerned, 
the availability sample size needed to be large enough to obtain a sufficient 
amount of pilot data to formally test and validate the direct attitude measure, 
as well as to identify potential problems for later research.  To do this, 
however, entails that quantitative data analysis be conducted.  Since larger 
sample sizes are often preferred in instances where quantitative data analysis 
is required (Daniel, 2012, p.241), it was decided to use as large a sample size 
as possible for the purposes of testing and validating the direct measures of 
attitude.  For this reason, it was decided to use the total sample size that was 
obtained during the availability sampling procedure, which amounted to 
exactly 250 responses in total.  The availability sample consisted of 
participants across the entire attitudinal spectrum and included individuals 
who strongly approve (    ) and approve (    ) of hunting; individuals 
who neither approve nor disapprove of hunting (    ); and individuals who 
disapprove (    ) and strongly disapprove (    ) of hunting.  Although 
these attitudinal sub-groups do not produce an accurate proportional 
representation of the research population, it is sufficient for the particular 
purpose of formally testing and validating the direct measure of attitude.  The 
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size and composition of the availability sample was discussed with a 
statistician, who also agreed that the availability sample is sufficiently diverse 
and large enough for the particular purpose it was meant for. 
 
In choosing an adequate purposive sample size for the qualitative 
component of the formative survey, a number of issues came into 
consideration.  Firstly, as was already mentioned, the formative survey is 
expected to produce a number of open-ended responses that must be 
prepared and subjected to content analysis.  Because of the immense 
practical implications and time consuming implications of processing and 
analysing open-ended responses, it is often impractical to obtain large 
samples which will produce many open-ended responses.  Gillham (2007, 
pp.66 & 70) warns that analysing the content of open-ended responses are 
intellectually demanding, a lot of work, and often very time consuming.  Thus, 
the practicability of processing and analysing large numbers of open-ended 
responses were a major consideration in selecting an adequate sample size.  
Secondly, although a representative sample was not required for the formative 
survey, the purposive sample size nevertheless needed to be large enough to 
identify a set of modal salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that are 
commonly present within the research population.  With these two 
considerations in mind, a discussion will now follow on how a suitable 
purposive sample size was chosen for the qualitative component of the 
formative survey.  
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To identify a set of modal salient behavioural beliefs that are commonly held 
within a population would require research of a qualitative nature, which 
generally involves a relatively small sample size.  Daniel (2012, p.69) agrees 
that small sample sizes are generally targeted in research studies with a 
qualitative design.  Recall that, in terms of this study, three distinct segments 
are expected to hold significantly different salient beliefs and attitudes 
regarding hunting, namely, those who are in favour of hunting, those with 
neutral attitudes towards hunting, and those who oppose hunting.  Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.327) recommend that, for the purposes of a formative 
survey, a total sample of about 30 individuals will usually be sufficient for a 
highly homogenous population, but for a more heterogeneous population, a 
larger sample is usually required.  For a heterogeneous population, Fishbein 
and Ajzen (2010, p.327) suggest that 15 – 20 participants from each major 
segment or sub-group in the population would generally be sufficient.  These 
suggested sample sizes seem to be widely accepted in the literature as a 
reasonable norm for identifying modal salient beliefs in large heterogeneous 
populations.  To take some examples from the literature, Ajzen and Driver 
(1991) used a non-probability sample of just 34 participants to compile a list of 
modal salient beliefs pertaining to five leisure activities performed by 
undergraduate students at the University of Massachusetts in the United 
States; Campbell and Mackay (2003) successfully used a small non-
probability sample of only 30 respondents to generate a set of modal salient 
beliefs of non-supporters and supporters of hunting from the general public in 
the entire Manitoba in Canada; and Whittaker et al. (2001) successfully used 
a sample of a mere 27 participants to identify a set of modal salient beliefs 
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about a controlled moose hunt amongst Anchorage residents (a general 
population of 260 000 individuals) in Alaska.  
 
Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.237) as well as Daniel (2012, p.247) explain 
that a sequential sampling approach is often the best way to determine a 
sufficient sample size in qualitative research.  Daniel (2012, p.247) explains 
that when using a sequential sampling approach, a fixed sample size is not 
set in advance of data collection.  Instead of setting a fixed sample size, the 
researcher sets a decision rule to govern when sampling will stop.  The 
researcher will then continue to include new participants in the sample until 
the decision rule is fully satisfied.  Daniel (2012, pp.237 & 247) explains that 
the point of data saturation (also referred to as information redundancy) is a 
decision rule that is typically used in qualitative research of an exploratory 
nature.  Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.237) explain that this decision rule 
requires that the researcher continues to add participants to the sample until a 
data saturation point is reached – that is, the point when the responses of 
new participants seem to yield little additional information.  Clearly, such a 
sequential sampling approach would have an explicit rationale for determining 
a suitable purposive sample size for the formative survey’s qualitative 
component.  Thus, the researcher employed a sequential sampling 
approach to determine a suitable purposive sample size for identifying a set 
of modal salient behavioural beliefs about hunting for the research population.  
To do this, the researcher simply continued to add participants to the 
purposive sample until it was evident that no new behavioural beliefs were 
identified when additional participants were included in the purposive sample.  
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Participants were included in the purposive sample through randomly 
selecting individuals from each one of the five attitudinal categories.  The final 
purposive sample consisted of 20 participants from each one of the three 
major attitudinal sub-groups, namely individuals who approve (    ) and 
strongly approve (   ) of hunting; individuals who neither approve nor 
disapprove of hunting (    ); and individuals who disapprove (    ) and 
strongly disapprove (   ) of hunting.  Thus, a total purposive sample size of 
60 participants was used to identify a modal set of salient behavioural beliefs 
about hunting amongst the research population.  The researcher found that 
this purposive sample was more than sufficient to reach a definite data 
saturation point, which in turn ensured that the sample was adequate for 
identifying a valid set of modal salient behavioural beliefs about hunting.   
 
3.3.5 Design of the formative survey’s research instrument 
  
It was already established earlier in this chapter that the formative survey was 
administered as a Web-survey, during which respondents were asked to visit 
a website by clicking on an e-mailed link and simply respond to the electronic 
questionnaire that appears.  Punch (2003, p.30) explains that the electronic 
questionnaire is a data collection tool (survey instrument), and its design must 
be guided by the goals of the survey.   
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Schnetler, Stoker, Dixon, Herbst & Geldenhuys (1989, p.44) emphasise the 
importance of a well-designed questionnaire and state that it will increase the 
reliability and validity of the survey results.  Conversely, a poorly designed 
questionnaire can invalidate the survey results.  The theory of reasoned action 
prescribes some important guidelines regarding the design of a questionnaire 
for research studies that make use of the reasoned action framework.  These 
prescribed guidelines ensure the validity and reliability of the survey results 
and should therefore not be ignored.  Consequently, the prescribed guidelines 
of the theory of reasoned action played a major role in the design of the 
formative survey’s questionnaire.  Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.169) 
support this approach and explain that when previously validated approaches 
to questionnaire design are available – and when these designs are 
appropriate to the specific circumstances and research concerns of one’s own 
research – then it may be advantageous to make use of such a design.  They 
also explain that the design of one’s own survey instrument can be improved 
by building on existing approaches and questionnaire designs that are known 
to provide reliable and valid results. 
 
The questionnaire of the formative survey appears in Annexure A, and the 
subsequent sub-sections focus specifically on discussing all the relevant 
aspects of its design.  The questionnaire design will firstly be discussed with 
specific reference to question contents, question types, and wording of the 
questions.  Thereafter, the design of the formative survey’s questionnaire will 
be discussed with specific reference to the question order, length of the 
questionnaire, as well as the format and layout of the questionnaire. 
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3.3.5.1 Question contents 
  
Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.164) claim that the selection of good questions 
is the single most important concern for survey researchers.  Oishi (2003, 
p.22) explains that the primary aim of the survey questions should be to meet 
the purpose of the survey.  Thus, each question included in the formative 
survey’s questionnaire was designed with the specific purpose of the survey in 
mind.   
 
Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.164) state that question writing for a survey 
may begin with a review of similar studies which were previously conducted.  
They also explain that surveys may contain questions that were previously 
used in similar studies.  In designing the question content of the questionnaire 
for this survey, the researcher studied a large number of literature sources 
pertaining to the public’s attitudes towards hunting, wildlife management 
issues and natural resources.  From these literature sources the researcher 
was able to establish what questions would be of importance and what the 
content of these questions should be.  Furthermore, the question content was 
designed in a manner which complies with the theory of reasoned action’s 
prescribed guidelines. 
 
Emory and Cooper (1991, pp.356 – 361) are of the opinion that question 
content should be tested, firstly, by ascertaining whether the specific question 
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will produce any meaningful information for the study.  In the second place, 
the scope of each question should be narrow enough for a single question to 
produce a meaningful answer.  Thirdly, the researcher should determine 
whether respondents have the necessary information to answer all the 
questions, and, lastly, whether the respondents would be willing to answer all 
the questions.  All the questions were checked for relevance in terms of the 
survey’s main purpose and the information sought, namely to elicit and 
identify respondents’ salient behavioural beliefs regarding hunting (questions 
9 to 12 of Annexure A), to obtain pilot data regarding the instrumental, 
experiential, and direct measures of their attitudes towards hunting which are 
needed to test and validate the direct attitude measure (questions 13, 15, 17; 
questions 14, 16, 18; and question 19 of Annexure A, respectively) and, 
finally, to obtain pilot data regarding the relevance of certain background 
variables in this study (questions 1 to 8 of Annexure A).  Since the survey 
questions simply require of participants to express their personal beliefs, 
opinions and attitudes towards hunting, it may be reasonably argued that 
people are indeed in possession of the information that is required to answer 
the questions.  Furthermore, the question contents do not require of 
respondents to share any personal or sensitive information and, thus, there is 
also no obvious reason for concern regarding respondents’ willingness to 
answer the questions. 
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3.3.5.2  Question types and wording of the questions 
  
 The types of questions used in a questionnaire are extremely important as 
they have an effect on the type and quality of information obtained from a 
respondent (Gillham, 2007, p.28; Kumar, 2011, p.151).  Two basic question 
types can be distinguished in survey research, namely open-ended questions 
and closed-ended questions (Kumar, 2011, p.151).  Open-ended questions – 
also known as unstructured questions – require respondents to express their 
responses using their own words and ideas.  Open-ended questions are used 
for complex questions that cannot be answered in a few simple categories but 
require more detail and discussion.  Closed-ended questions – also known as 
structured questions – give respondents a set of standardised answers to 
select from.  Closed-ended questions should be used when the answer 
categories are discreet and relatively few in number (Nardi, 2006, pp.73 – 74). 
  
The theory of reasoned action requires that the formative survey 
questionnaire consists of open-ended as well as closed-ended questions.  
The open-ended questions and closed-ended questions that were included in 
the questionnaire will now be discussed with specific reference to the purpose 
they served in the formative survey.  The open-ended questions were 
specifically designed to elicit and identify respondents’ salient behavioural 
beliefs regarding hunting.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.100), as well as Sutton 
et al. (2003, p.235) explain that salient beliefs are those beliefs that first come 
to mind when a person is asked open-ended questions with regard to the 
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behaviour of interest.  It should be recalled that Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, 
p.85) as well as Sutton et al. (2003, p.246) regard it as necessary to take into 
consideration both the instrumental and experiential aspects of attitudes when 
eliciting salient behavioural beliefs, since both aspects may have an influence 
on the overall attitude (see section 2.4.5 of chapter 2).  Thus, in order to 
ensure that the elicitation procedure produced an unbiased set of salient 
behavioural beliefs, the open-ended questions were worded in such a way 
that they prompt instrumental and experiential outcomes.  In total, four open-
ended questions were included in the questionnaire to elicit salient 
behavioural beliefs about hunting (questions 9 to 12 of Annexure A).  The first 
two of these questions were aimed at identifying experiential behavioural 
beliefs by asking participants what they ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ about hunting.  The 
last two of these questions were aimed at identifying instrumental behavioural 
beliefs by asking participants what they think the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
consequences (or the ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’) are of hunting.  
During all four of these open-ended questions, participants were allowed to 
express their thoughts in a free-response format. 
 
Two types of closed-ended questions were included in the questionnaire.  
Firstly, factual questions were employed to collect data on a number of 
background variables that may be of interest to this study (questions 1 to 8 of 
Annexure A).  The purpose of including questions regarding background 
variables in the formative survey is mainly to obtain an initial test of their 
relevance and to identify potential problems in question formats, question 
wording, and so forth.  This allows the researcher to test and refine the 
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questions regarding the background variables prior to the primary survey.  In 
addition the background variables also enabled the researcher to verify that 
the sample was sufficiently diverse in terms of the relevant background 
factors, as well as to ensure that the sample consisted only of South African 
citizens from 18 years of age and older.   
 
The second type of closed-ended questions used in the questionnaire was 
scale-type questions.  More specifically, semantic differential evaluative 
scales were used to obtain different measures of attitudes towards hunting 
(  ).  The semantic differential is an attitude scaling method that was 
developed by Osgood et al. (1957) and typically consists of a series of seven-
point bipolar adjective scales which all measure a single construct (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.79).  Although it often consists of a series of seven-point 
bipolar adjective scales, Ajzen (2011h, online) states that “there is nothing 
sacred about seven-point scales and it is at the investigator’s discretion to use 
fewer or more scale points”.  A reputable international survey research 
company who has vast experience in survey research in South Africa, namely 
Ipsos, advised the researcher that from a statistical point of view it has been 
proven that South Africans tend to provide more accurate ratings on five-point 
scales (Fleetwood, 2013, pers. comm.).  Furthermore, Gillham (2007, p.32) 
warns that a seven point-scale is usually redundant, and people often don’t 
use the whole scale.  For these reasons the researcher decided to make use 
of five-point bipolar scales.  It should be recalled that a valid attitude measure 
should make provision to capture both the instrumental and experiential 
aspects of attitude (see section 2.4.6.2 of chapter 2).  For this reason, the 
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questionnaire contains a series of six five-point evaluative bipolar scales, 
which jointly captures the instrumental and the experiential components of 
respondents’ attitudes towards hunting.  Bipolar adjective pairs such as good–
bad, beneficial–harmful and positive–negative were used to capture the 
instrumental component of respondents’ attitudes towards hunting (questions 
13, 15, and 17 of Annexure A, respectively), while bipolar adjective pairs such 
as happy–sad, like–dislike and pleasant–disturbing were used to capture the 
experiential component of respondents’ attitudes towards hunting (questions 
14, 16, and 18 of Annexure A, respectively).  In a similar fashion, a single 
semantic differential evaluative scale consisting of bipolar adjective pairs such 
as strongly approve to strongly disapprove were used to obtain a broad, 
overall measure of respondents’ attitudes towards hunting (question 19 of 
Annexure A).   
 
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.101), when eliciting salient beliefs, 
the researcher must carefully consider whether respondents should be asked 
about them personally performing the behaviour, or about performance of the 
behaviour in general.  This is because the consequences people expect as a 
result of them performing the behaviour may differ from the consequences 
they associate with performance of the behaviour in general by others.  It 
should be noted, however, that the purpose of this study is to assess and 
understand people’s attitude towards the legal hunting of wild animals in 
general and not necessarily towards them participating in the legal hunting of 
wild animals themselves (see section 2.4.5 of chapter 2).  Consequently, care 
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was taken to word all the questions of the formative survey in such a way that 
it refers to the performance of the behaviour in general. 
 
Schnetler et al., (1989, p.56) warns that the manner in which questions are 
worded can influence the response that the researcher receives and lead to 
misrepresentation of results.  Guidelines provided by Kumar (1999, pp.119 – 
121), Nardi (2006, pp.78 – 80), Oishi (2003, pp.25 – 28), Oppenheim (1992, 
pp.119 – 147) and Schnetler et al. (1989, pp.56 – 64) were used to select the 
wording of the questions in the formative survey questionnaire.  In sum, 
ambiguous and vague questions were avoided at all cost, because it would 
lead to incorrect or obscure answers.  Care was also taken not to ask double-
negative or double-barrelled questions that may lead to confusion or 
uncertainty in participants.  Extra care was taken to avoid leading and loaded 
questions, since they are generally not neutral and lead to biased responses 
(leading questions direct respondents’ attention to a specific type of response, 
while loaded questions are worded in such a way that they unconsciously lead 
respondents towards a specific response).  Moreover, questions were also 
worded carefully to avoid presumptions as far as possible.  Finally, in wording 
questions it was necessary to take into account the language proficiency and 
educational level of the respondents.  The research population of this study is 
very diverse and includes people from various educational levels.  For this 
reason, extra care was taken to simplify the wording of questions as well as 
the instructions for completing the questionnaire.  Questions were worded in 
such a way that they were short, simple and specific, so that all respondents 
could comprehend what was asked.  The use of technical terms was avoided 
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as far as possible and words that are easy to understand were used.  The 
researcher does, however, acknowledge that since the formative survey 
questionnaire is in English, this limits potential respondents to those who are 
sufficiently proficient in the English language.  Nevertheless, the researcher 
argues that since the formative survey will only be conducted amongst the 
students and staff members of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University 
(and since proficiency in the English language is essential to study or work at 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University) it may reasonably be assumed that 
virtually everybody in the research population has the required language 
proficiency to participate in the formative survey. 
 
3.3.5.3 Question order 
 
Once the design of the questions in the questionnaire is complete, the order of 
the questions must be planned.  The order in which questions appear is 
important because it may influence how respondents react to the 
questionnaire as a whole and how some questions are answered, 
consequently affecting the quality of the responses obtained (Schutt, 2004, 
p.244). Oishi (2003, p.49) explains that the researcher must consider the 
possibility of question-order effects, where respondents’ exposure to one 
question may influence how subsequent questions are answered. The 
guidelines of Bailey (1987, pp.131-135), Oishi (2003, pp.39-49), Schnetler et 
al. (1989, pp.82-84) and Schutt (2004, pp.244-245) were taken into account in 
this regard and are briefly discussed below. 
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The questionnaire begins with easy, non-threatening questions which will put 
the respondent at ease.  General demographical questions were asked first, 
followed by general questions regarding respondents’ direct exposure to 
hunting and social ties with hunters.  The more specific questions regarding 
respondents’ beliefs and attitudes towards hunting were asked later in the 
questionnaire.  This approach has the advantage of the respondents 
becoming relaxed and acquainted with the process of answering the Web-
based questionnaire.  It may also give information regarding background 
variables influencing refusals, should the respondent decide not to fully 
complete the questionnaire for some reason. 
 
Questions were arranged thematically and logically in a chronological order.  
This enabled respondents to understand the relationship between the 
questions.  The questions pertaining to each theme were addressed under 
separate sections in the questionnaire (see section 3.3.5.4 of this chapter for 
details).  Introductory remarks and instructions were provided to respondents 
in writing at the beginning of every section of the questionnaire.  Furthermore, 
questions that require similar responses were grouped together.  However, at 
the same time care was taken to ensure that questions and response choices 
did not become monotonous and tiring. 
 
A final consideration pertaining to question order was that of the order in 
which the four open-ended questions in the questionnaire should be asked 
(questions 9 to 12 of Annexure A).  Sutton et al. (2003, p.239) found a 
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significant order effect when using open-ended questions to elicit and identify 
salient beliefs.  They found that when the experiential open-ended questions 
were placed before the instrumental open-ended questions, significantly more 
salient beliefs were elicited in response to the experiential questions than 
when the order was reversed.  Clearly then, by placing experiential open-
ended questions before instrumental open-ended questions, the elicitation of 
salient beliefs may be improved.  This in turn may, of course, enable the 
researcher to form a more complete understanding of the causal determinants 
underlying a particular attitude.  Based on the findings of Sutton et al. (2003, 
p.239), it was thus decided to place the experiential open-ended questions 
(questions 9 and 10 of Annexure A) before the instrumental open-ended 
questions (questions 11 and 12 of Annexure A) in the formative survey 
questionnaire. 
  
3.3.5.4 Format and layout of the questionnaire 
  
Schnetler et al. (1989, p.86) provides guidelines for creating a questionnaire 
with an effective format and layout.  They recommend that the questionnaire 
should be attractive, the instructions must be clear and not lead to any 
confusion, the questionnaire format must be designed to be as respondent 
friendly as possible, and the layout must be logical and consistent to avoid 
confusion.  
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 Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.179) point out that the design of electronic 
questionnaires for Web-surveys are flexible and can feature appealing graphic 
and topographic elements.  The formative survey questionnaire was made as 
neat and attractive as possible.  The questionnaire commences with a brief 
explanation of the term hunting.  It is explained that the term ‘hunting’ refers to 
the ‘legal hunting of wild animals’ and that it does not refer to any illegal 
practice such as poaching (see page 2 of Annexure A).  This is essential in 
order to ensure that all respondents have an uniform understanding of the 
term hunting – as is required by the theory of reasoned action (see section 
2.4.4 of chapter 2).  Some measures were taken to ensure that respondents 
notice this definition of hunting before commencing with the completion of the 
survey questions.  Firstly, the definition of the term hunting was provided on 
the very first page of the Web-questionnaire.  No instructions or any 
information regarding the survey were provided on the first page other than 
the definition of the term hunting.  Secondly, before respondents were allowed 
to proceed to the next page of the questionnaire, they were required to 
acknowledge that they have read the definition of hunting by clicking on a box 
which appeared directly below the definition of hunting.  This was done in 
order to ensure that all respondents were forced to notice the definition.  
Thirdly, large bold lettering was used in order to immediately attract 
respondents’ attention to the definition. 
 
 As mentioned previously, the questionnaire is divided into four sections, each 
comprised of questions that addresses a different theme (see Annexure A): 
section A of the questionnaire asks questions about the demographical 
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background of respondents, section B of the questionnaire is focused on 
collecting other background information that is expected to be of relevance to 
this study, section C of the questionnaire contains open-ended questions 
where respondents can express their experiential and instrumental 
behavioural beliefs about hunting and section D of the questionnaire is 
focused on obtaining measures of respondents’ attitudes towards hunting.  
Each section appears on its own page with short and clear instructions for 
answering the questions that follow.  The Web-questionnaire requires that 
respondents provide an answer to every question on the page before it is 
possible to proceed to the next page of the questionnaire.  This not only 
ensures that all questions are noted and answered by respondents, but it also 
ensures that all the respondents answer the questions in an identical order 
and that the flow of the questions is controlled throughout the survey. 
  
3.3.5.5 Length of the questionnaire 
  
 Schnetler et al. (1989, p.85) explain that the length of the questionnaire is 
determined by what the researcher needs to know, the number of questions 
required, the type of survey and the type of respondent.  Gillham (2007, pp.39 
– 41) emphasises that the overall length of a questionnaire is critical and 
therefore the researcher needs to ensure that there are not too many 
questions on the questionnaire and that every question deserves inclusion.  It 
is generally suggested that a questionnaire should be as short and as simple 
as possible.  Similarly, Schnetler et al. (1989, p.86) suggest that the 
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questionnaire should consist of a realistic number of items.  Oppenheim 
(1992, p.122) warns that open-ended questions, which require thinking and 
writing on the part of the respondent, should be kept to a minimum.   
  
The formative survey questionnaire consisted of 19 questions in total.  In 
order to keep the questionnaire as short and simple as possible, closed-ended 
questions were asked whenever it was possible.  However, for the purposes 
of eliciting respondents’ salient behavioural beliefs regarding hunting, it was 
necessary that a total of four open-ended questions be asked.  Furthermore, 
since the formative survey was administered as a Web-survey, it had the 
advantage that the questionnaire design was very flexible and could be 
tailored to seem shorter, more interesting, and more attractive (Chambliss & 
Schutt, 2010, pp.179 – 182; Malhotra & Birks, 1999, pp.232 – 233).   
 
The Web-survey automatically recorded how long it took every participant to 
complete the survey.  On average, it took respondents 8 minutes and 19 
seconds to complete the Web-questionnaire of the formative survey.  Thus, it 
may be argued that the questionnaire was not too long. 
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3.3.6 Pre-testing 
 
Bailey (1987, p.141) regards pre-testing as the final stage in the questionnaire 
design.  Litwin (2003, p.66) emphasises the importance of pre-testing in the 
development of a survey instrument and explains that pre-testing is a critical 
step in assessing the practical application of the survey instrument.  Nardi 
(2006, pp.95 – 96) explains that pre-testing is the best way of assessing 
whether the questionnaire has any flaws, the instructions are adequate, the 
wording of the questions and format are clear, the questionnaire takes a 
reasonable time to complete, and to ensure that the questionnaire produces 
the required information. 
 
According to Schnetler et al. (1989, p.87) pre-testing may be done in two 
steps.  Firstly, the questionnaire may be informally tested by subjecting it to 
the criticism, comments and inputs of people who are familiar with the study 
and people who are familiar with the principles of question construction.  
Secondly, the questionnaire may be tested formally by asking a small sample 
of persons who represent the study population, to complete the questionnaire. 
 
The questionnaire was informally tested firstly by presenting it to the promoter 
of this study for comments.  Secondly, the statistician who was involved in this 
study was also asked to comment on the questionnaire.  Thirdly, the final 
questionnaire was presented to the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University’s 
Research Ethics Committee for human subjects (NMMU REC–H) for 
comment.  The committee consists of a panel of experts who not only 
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comment on the questionnaire, but also on the research design of the study.  
Based on a few comments and recommendations from the promoter, the 
statistician, and the NMMU REC–H, a number of changes were made as part 
of the final refinements before testing the questionnaire formally. 
 
The questionnaire was formally tested by e-mailing the electronic link to the 
Web-survey to a small number of selected people who agreed beforehand to 
respond to the Web-questionnaire.  Their responses were not included in the 
data set and were purely used for the purposes of formally testing the 
practical application of the formative Web-questionnaire.  The formal testing 
confirmed that the Web-questionnaire was able to satisfy all the necessary 
requirements and produced the required information. 
 
3.3.7 Administering the formative survey and the response 
 
As discussed earlier, the formative survey was conducted as a Web-survey.  
This entailed that the electronic link to the Web-questionnaire had to be e-
mailed to every individual in the research population.  The electronic link to 
the Web-questionnaire was distributed along with a preamble letter via the 
NMMU Communique internal e-mail service amongst all students and staff 
members of NMMU.  This preamble letter explained the purpose of the study 
and all the necessary information with regards to the participation in the study.  
The preamble letter also provided potential participants with the electronic link 
to the Web-survey and with the contact details of the researcher.  In addition, 
the preamble letter also obtained the necessary consent from participants and 
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ensured participants of their anonymity and the confidentiality of their 
participation. 
 
Once participants clicked on the electronic link which appears in the preamble 
letter, they were directed to a website where they were required to complete 
the electronic Web-questionnaire.  Written instructions were provided on the 
electronic questionnaire to guide participants through the response process.  
The Web-questionnaire was, of course, self-administered, meaning that it was 
completed by the respondents themselves without the assistance of the 
researcher or an interviewer.  Nardi (2006, p.67) claims that self-administered 
questionnaires are best designed for investigating attitudes, beliefs, and 
opinions that are not usually observable.  Oppenheim (1992, p.103) explains 
that self-administered questionnaires ensures accurate sampling, since the 
presence of the researcher may influence participants’ responses. 
 
The formative survey took place over a relatively short period of time and 
commenced on 10 April 2013 and continued to 14 April 2013.  Within this 
period of five days, a total of 411 participants responded to the formative 
survey’s Web-questionnaire, of which exactly 250 participants fully completed 
the questionnaire.  Since this number of responses was more than adequate 
for the purpose of the formative survey, it was decided to close the Web-
survey. 
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It is necessary to take note of the reasons why some participants did not 
complete the questionnaire, since this will indicate to what extent their 
unwillingness to co-operate may have influenced the research results 
(McBurney & White, 2007, p.247).  The 161 uncompleted questionnaires were 
analysed to obtain some clues as to why those participants chose to abort the 
survey after they initially started to answer the questions.  It was found that 
160 out of the 161 uncompleted questionnaires were aborted when 
respondents were presented with the open-ended questions of the 
questionnaire (question 9 to 12 of Annexure A).  Since the open-ended 
questions are not of a personal or sensitive nature, the only reasonable 
explanation may be that participants were simply discouraged by the fact that 
open-ended questions require more thought and effort to respond to.  This 
argument is consistent with the opinion of Oppenheim (1992, p.122), who 
explains that open-ended questions – which require thought and writing on the 
part of the respondent – generally reduces the willingness of respondents to 
co-operate.  Clearly, the reason for the participants’ unwillingness to fully 
complete the questionnaire had little to do with the subject under investigation.  
Therefore, the researcher reasonably argues that it had very little effect – if 
any – on the survey results.  
 
3.3.8 Capturing and processing of the formative survey’s data 
 
 By now it should be clear that the formative survey produced data of both a 
qualitative and a quantitative nature.  This section sets out to firstly report how 
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the qualitative data was captured, processed and analysed to meet the main 
purposes of the formative survey.  Thereafter, the focus of this section shifts 
to report on how the formative survey’s quantitative data was captured, 
processed and analysed. 
 
There was no need to compile transcripts of the qualitative data produced by 
the open-ended questions (questions 9 to 12 of Annexure A) since the Web-
survey required respondents to type their answers to the open-ended 
questions in the Web-questionnaire.  This resulted in the open-ended 
responses being ready for analysis.  By applying content analysis to the 
open-ended responses of the formative survey, a list of modal salient 
behavioural belies was compiled to reflect those salient beliefs that are most 
commonly held within the research population.  Ajzen and Fishbein (1980, 
p.68) explain that content analysis involves organising the content of open-
ended responses by grouping together those beliefs that refer to similar 
outcomes.  Gillham (2007, pp.21, 63, & 66) explains that content analysis 
involves the organising of similar answers from all the different respondents 
into similar categories.  The aim of content analysis is ultimately to reduce and 
translate the variety of different answers into a manageable and 
comprehensible form (Gillham, 2007, p.63).   
 
The content analysis procedure was conducted by the researcher based on 
the guidelines provided by Gillham (2007, pp.63 – 69).  According to Gillham 
(2007, p.64), the first stage of content analysis is to decide on the categories 
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that will be needed for the research purpose.  This was done by systematically 
working through the content of the typed, open-ended responses in order to 
identify and list the substantive statements – in other words, those statements 
that represent respondents’ key beliefs about hunting.  Thereafter, the 
researcher attentively worked through the list of substantive statements a 
number of times, while constantly reflecting on the content of the statements 
to allow his impressions a chance to settle.  Based on the common themes 
embedded in the substantive statements, the researcher then derived a set of 
tentative categories.  While many new categories were initially identified, 
progressively fewer new categories were, of course, identified as the 
researcher progressed through the statements.  Each tentative category was 
given a simple heading which captured the essence of the belief (e.g., ‘a way 
to experience and enjoy nature’; ‘a way of managing wild animal populations’; 
‘cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals’). 
 
Having compiled a list of tentative categories, the researcher then considered 
whether some of the categories could be combined under one heading or, 
alternatively, split up.  Only those categories representing beliefs which are 
essentially similar were combined.  Thereafter, the researcher worked through 
the list of substantive statements again, checking each statement against the 
category list to see under which category each statement belongs.  A question 
mark was placed next to those statements which the researcher found difficult 
to assign to an appropriate category.  The wording of category headings was 
continuously modified so that they would fit the substantive statements better 
or that they could include statements which were difficult to assign to an 
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existing category.  New categories were also added where necessary.  This 
procedure was repeated until the researcher was completely satisfied that the 
identified categories were adequate. 
 
Gillham (2007, pp.64 & 69) explains that once the categories have been 
finalised, the researcher has to decide under which category each of the 
substantive statements belongs.  This, of course, required that statements, 
which referred to essentially similar beliefs, be grouped together in 
appropriate categories.  This was done by making use of content analysis 
grids – as recommended by Gillham (2007, pp.67 – 69).  For the purpose of 
this study, it made sense to have two separate grids: one for the statements 
pertaining to respondents’ emitted ‘likes’ and ‘positive consequences’ of 
hunting (question 9 and 11 of Annexure A) and another one for the statements 
pertaining to respondents’ emitted ‘dislikes’ and ‘negative consequences’ of 
hunting (question 10 and 12 of Annexure A).  These content analysis grids are 
presented in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2.  Consistent with Gillham’s (2007, 
pp.67 – 69) recommendations, each content analysis grid listed the category 
headings along the top of the grid, and the identifying code for the 
respondents down the side of the grid.  After constructing these content 
analysis grids, the researcher worked through the list of substantive 
statements once again for the final time, assigning each statement to an 
appropriate category.  Those statements that could not be assigned to an 
appropriate category were classified under a separate category that was 
named ‘unclassified statements’.  Gillham (2007, p.65) explains that, in 
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practice, there are almost always unclassifiable statements during a content 
analysis.   
 
After every single statement was assigned to an appropriate category, the 
researcher then used the content analysis grids to analyse the qualitative data 
in a number of ways.  The number of participants whose statements appeared 
in each of the belief categories in the content analysis grids was counted for 
every attitudinal category.  This enabled the researcher to calculate the mean 
number of positive and negative salient beliefs that were emitted by 
respondents in the various attitudinal categories for comparative purposes.  
This provided some noteworthy information on the mean number of salient 
beliefs about hunting that was readily accessible to participants in every 
attitudinal category (see Table 4.1 in chapter 4).  More importantly, however, 
by counting the number of participants whose statements appeared in each of 
the belief categories in the content analysis grids, it was possible to identify 
those salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that were most frequently 
emitted by respondents (Table 4.2 in chapter 4).  Based on the most 
frequently emitted beliefs, the researcher then selected a modal set of 
salient beliefs for inclusion in the primary survey of this study.  To make sure 
that the selection procedure was objective and not biased by the researcher’s 
subjective judgements, a predetermined decision rule was used to guide the 
researcher’s decision with respect to which salient beliefs to include in the 
modal set.  The particular decision rule that was used to guide the selection 
procedure was twofold and employed a combination of two of the decision 
rules that are recommended by Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.103) (see 
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paragraph 11 in section 2.4.5 of chapter 2 for a discussion of the various 
decision rules recommended by Fishbein and Ajzen).  The researcher 
decided to select beliefs by their frequency of emission for inclusion in 
the modal set until a maximum of 75% of all the beliefs listed were 
accounted for or until all the beliefs that were mentioned by at least 15% 
of the sample was selected.  Whichever one of these two criterions was 
satisfied first thus determined when the selection of beliefs for inclusion in the 
modal set would stop.  The total number of beliefs emitted by all participants 
in the qualitative elicitation sample (   60) was 339.  The researcher thus 
included in the modal set as many of the most frequently mentioned outcomes 
(that were mentioned by at least 15% of the sample) as needed to account for 
254 emitted beliefs (which represent 75% of all the beliefs emitted).  This 
decision rule resulted in 14 of the most frequently emitted behavioural 
beliefs being included in the modal set of salient beliefs about hunting.  
These 14 salient beliefs that were included in the modal set are listed in Table 
4.3 of chapter 4.  The primary survey’s questionnaire was developed on the 
basis of the 14 salient beliefs in the modal set and therefore formed a central 
part of the primary survey. 
 
The quantitative data of the formative survey, on the other hand, was captured 
by exporting the data from the Web-survey’s electronic database directly to 
Microsoft Office Excel 2007 software package.  This procedure virtually 
eliminates any data entry errors.  The Institute for Statistical Consultation at 
Nelson Mandela Metropolitan University undertook the processing of the data.  
The software package Statistica version 9.0 was used for the statistical 
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analysis.  The formative survey’s quantitative data was used for the theoretical 
purpose of formally testing and verifying the validity of the direct attitude 
measure (  ) before it was used in the survey instruments of the subsequent 
primary survey of this study.  Recall that, in order to test the validity of a direct 
attitude measure, it must be verified that it sufficiently captures both the 
instrumental and experiential aspects of the attitude under consideration 
(Eagly & Chaiken, 1993, p.16; Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, p.85).  This 
expectation was tested through two consecutive analysis procedures.  In the 
first procedure, the Cronbach alpha coefficient for the various instrumental 
and experiential measures of attitude (question 13, 15, and 17 and questions 
14, 16, and 18 of Annexure A, respectively) were calculated to verify that they 
do indeed produce reliable results.  The Cronbach alpha coefficient measures 
the internal reliability of scale items and is an indicator of the consistency with 
which the related items in a summated scale measure the same construct 
(Litwin, 2003, pp.20 – 22).  The Cronbach alpha coefficient ranges from 0 to 1.  
The higher the score, the more reliable the scale items are.  A Cronbach 
alpha coefficient of 0.7 or higher is generally considered to be an acceptable 
reliability coefficient, although lower thresholds may sometimes be used as 
well (Litwin, 2003, p.25).  The Cronbach alpha coefficients for the three 
instrumental measures of attitude as well as for the three experiential 
measures of attitude were both very high (0.97 and 0.95, respectively), 
indicating that these scales produced highly reliable results.  Thereafter, in the 
second analysis procedure, these internally consistent instrumental and 
experiential measures of attitude were then used to formally test and validate 
the direct attitude measure (  ) (question 19 of Annexure A).  This was done 
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by calculating the mean value of all the instrumental and experiential 
measures and then correlating it with the direct attitude measure (  ).  An 
extremely significant correlation was obtained between the mean instrumental 
and experiential measurements of attitude and that of the direct attitude 
measure (  ) (   0.95 at    0.01).  This provides strong evidence that 
the direct attitude measure (  ) does indeed capture both the 
instrumental and experiential aspects of the attitude and, therefore, 
confirms the validity and reliability of the direct attitude measure (  ). 
 
3.4 METHODOLOGICAL DESIGN OF THE PRIMARY SURVEY 
 
Once the formative research phase was completed, the second and final 
phase of the study’s empirical research commenced, namely the primary 
survey.  In this phase of the empirical research, primary data of a 
quantitative nature was collected amongst a sample of members of the 
public across the entire attitudinal spectrum.   
 
It is necessary to consider the purpose of the primary survey in order to fully 
comprehend how the primary survey fits into the research design of the 
study’s empirical component.  Oppenheim (1992, p.12) explains that the 
selection of a suitable survey design must be guided by the objectives and 
purpose of the particular survey.  For this reason, a broad outline of the 
purpose of the study’s primary survey will now follow. 
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3.4.1 Purpose of the primary survey 
 
 Consistent with the standard procedures stipulated by the theory of reasoned 
action, the primary survey was developed on the basis of the results produced 
by the initial formative research phase.  Therefore, once the initial formative 
research was completed, the primary survey was then designed and 
administered.  The primary research phase was designed to measure the 
constructs in the theory of reasoned action’s attitude model (         ).  
Towards this aim, the primary survey firstly obtained measures of belief 
strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) for every modal salient belief; it 
secondly obtained a valid direct measure of participants’ related attitude 
towards hunting (  ); and thirdly gathered information about a number of 
relevant background variables of participants (demographical and social 
information).   
 
The primary research allows the researcher to verify that participants’ 
attitudes towards hunting are related to the salient beliefs identified in the 
initial phase.  Furthermore, this phase of the research is expected to enable 
the researcher to: examine and understand the salient beliefs that form the 
basis of different attitudes towards hunting; explain differences in the salient 
belief structure that ultimately forms the cognitive foundations on which 
different attitudes towards hunting are based; explain the influence that 
demographical and social variables have on attitudes towards hunting and its 
underlying salient beliefs; and draw conclusions that may guide the 
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development of future strategies towards improving the social legitimacy of 
hunting.  It can be seen that the primary research is mainly aimed at 
explaining the relationship between two variables (namely the relationship 
between salient beliefs and attitudes towards hunting), where the first variable 
is the cause (salient beliefs) and the second variable is the effect (attitude 
towards hunting) – thus, the second variable is a consequence of the first.  
Kowalczyk (2003, online) explains that research of this nature serves an 
explanatory purpose.  In the case of this study, the theory of reasoned 
action is employed to conduct the explanatory research.  Consistent with this 
approach, Neville (2007, p.8) agrees that in research studies with an 
explanatory objective, theories are often used as a basis for understanding 
and explaining phenomena.  The design of the primary survey was guided by 
the abovementioned purpose of the primary survey in conjunction with the 
theory of reasoned action’s standardized procedures. 
  
3.4.2 Selection of a suitable survey research method 
  
In selecting the most appropriate survey research method for collecting the 
data of the primary survey, a number of considerations had to be kept in mind.  
First and foremost, the chosen survey method must be particularly suitable for 
obtaining valid and reliable quantitative measurements of belief strength (  ), 
outcome evaluation (  ), and attitudes (  ) – as required by the reasoned 
action approach.  Secondly, the chosen survey research method must be able 
to involve participants from across the entire attitudinal spectrum (ranging 
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from individuals who approve and strongly approve of hunting; individuals who 
neither approve nor disapprove of hunting; and individuals who disapprove 
and strongly disapprove of hunting).  Thirdly, the chosen survey research 
method must be able to acquire a sufficiently diverse sample with respect to 
those demographical and social background factors that are expected to be of 
interest to the study.  Fourthly, the primary survey serves an explanatory 
purpose and the chosen survey research method had to be entirely 
compatible with the purpose of the primary survey.  Finally, some practical 
constraints of conducting the primary survey had to be kept in mind.  The 
survey had to be conducted within a reasonable period of time, as the 
researcher had limited finances, personnel and infrastructure at his disposal.   
 
The selection of a suitable survey research method was subjected to all of the 
above mentioned considerations.  After considering the three basic survey 
methods as classified by Malhotra and Birks (1999, p.225) in Figure 3.1 – 
namely telephone interviews, personal interviews and mail surveys – it was 
decided that a mail survey method would best serve the purpose of the 
primary survey.  Each of the three possible types of mail surveys – namely 
traditional mail surveys, mail panels, and electronic mail surveys (see Figure 
3.1) – were carefully considered against the criteria discussed in the previous 
paragraph.  It was decided that an electronic mail survey would be adequate 
for the purpose of the primary survey and in line with the considerations that 
were stipulated in the previous paragraph.  As previously noted, Dillman 
(2000, pp.352 – 354) and Fowler (2009, p.61) distinguish between two types 
of electronic surveys, namely e-mail surveys, where questions are sent and 
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answered through e-mail; and Web-surveys, where respondents are asked to 
visit a website and respond to an electronic questionnaire.  After considering 
all the advantages and disadvantages of these two electronic survey methods, 
it was concluded that a Web-survey would again be able to meet the purpose 
of the primary survey.  A brief discussion of the major advantages and 
disadvantages of Web-surveys was provided earlier in paragraph 4 of section 
3.3.2 of this chapter. 
  
3.4.3 Selection of a suitable research sample 
 
Prior to making choices on sampling, one must have a good understanding of 
the special requirements that the research sample should meet in order to 
achieve the purpose of the study (Daniel, 2012, p.8).  The research sample of 
the primary survey should meet three important criteria.  Firstly, the sample 
must be drawn from members of the general public of South Africa that is 18 
years of age and older.  In the second place, it is imperative that the research 
sample contains sufficiently large proportions of participants from across the 
entire attitudinal spectrum (ranging from those who strongly approve; approve; 
neither approve nor disapprove; disapprove; and strongly disapprove).  This 
requirement is absolutely essential in order to form an understanding of the 
salient belief structure on which different attitudes towards hunting are based, 
as well as to compare differences in the cognitive foundations on which 
various attitudes towards hunting are based.  This is because the theory of 
reasoned action suggests that people with different attitudes towards hunting 
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may not only hold substantially different beliefs about hunting, but they are 
also likely to show significant variance in the strength with which they hold 
their beliefs (  ) as well as how they evaluate the perceived outcomes of their 
beliefs (  ).  Thus, in using the expectancy-value model’s summative belief 
index (         ) to assess salient beliefs about hunting, it is imperative that 
the entire range of different attitudes towards hunting is well represented 
amongst participants.  In the third place, the research sample should also 
contain participants from across a broad spectrum of demographical and 
social variables that are expected to influence people’s attitudes towards 
hunting.  This is because some demographical and social characteristics 
influence the experiences people have, the sources of information to which 
they are exposed, and the way they interpret and remember information.  In 
this manner, demographical and social variables may not only influence the 
salient beliefs people form, but also the strength with which they hold their 
beliefs (  ) and how they evaluate the perceived outcomes of their beliefs (  ) 
(Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.18 – 20).  Lastly, it should be noted that since the 
primary survey does not set out to make explicit generalisations about a larger 
population, there is no obvious need to obtain a probability sample that would 
be representative of the research population; instead, it is important that the 
different attitudinal categories be well represented amongst sample 
participants. 
 
In deciding whether to use a probability sampling design or a non-probability 
sampling design for the primary survey, the nature of the research population 
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presented practical challenges similar to those experienced during the 
formative research phase.  In short, seen in light of the size, heterogeneity 
and spatial distribution of the research population, adopting a probability 
sampling design would be extremely expensive, time consuming, impractical, 
and a very difficult task without the necessary infrastructure and human 
resources at the researcher’s disposal.  Furthermore, the absence of a list of 
the general population in South Africa from which a probability sample could 
be drawn complicates the task of developing a reasonable sampling frame.  
Under appropriate circumstances, limited resources could justify the use of a 
non-probability sample (Henry, 1990, pp.24 – 25), as well as when there is 
insurmountable difficulty in creating a reasonable sampling frame (Neuendorf, 
2002, p.88).  In light of these considerations, the researcher had to make use 
of a non-probability sampling design.  Despite this necessary limitation, 
there is sufficient evidence in the literature that a non-probability sampling 
design would be adequate for the purpose of this study’s primary survey.  The 
literature suggests that when there is a need to target specific elements of a 
population (in the case of this study, specific attitudinal sub-groups must be 
targeted), it is more favourable to choose a non-probability sampling design 
(Daniel, 2012, p.73).  A number of researchers who also adopted the 
reasoned action approach as a conceptual framework for their research have 
successfully used non-probability samples for purposes similar in nature to 
that of this particular study’s primary survey (see for example, Ajzen & Driver, 
1991; Daigle, Hrubes & Ajzen, 2002; Hrubes, Ajzen & Daigle, 2001; Petkova, 
Ajzen & Driver, 1995; Smith & Clark, 1973; Young & Kent, 1985).  This 
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provides support for the researcher’s decision to make use of a non-
probability sampling design. 
 
After carefully considering all the weaknesses and strengths of the various 
non-probability sampling methods and taking into account the particular 
purpose of the primary survey, the researcher decided to make use of quota 
sampling.  Daniel (2012, pp.102 – 103) explains that “quota sampling is a 
non-probability sampling procedure in which the population is divided into 
mutually exclusive sub-categories, and the researcher solicits participation in 
the study from members of the sub-categories until a target number of 
elements to be sampled for every sub-category have been met.  In a sense 
quota sampling combines availability sampling and purposive sampling by 
targeting specific numbers of elements that have specific characteristics”.  
 
Daniel (2012, pp.104 – 105) identifies two major sub-types of quota sampling, 
namely proportional quota sampling and non-proportional quota sampling.  In 
proportional quota sampling, the researcher selects sample participants to 
represent certain sub-groups or characteristics in proportion to their 
prevalence in the target population.  In non-proportional quota sampling, 
however, the focus is simply on obtaining a minimum required number of 
participants for each sub-group or characteristic that is of interest, regardless 
of its proportion in the target population.  Note that the primary survey will be 
mainly used to investigate and compare the underlying beliefs structure of 
those with different attitudes towards hunting, as well as across various 
demographical and social differences.  Thus, there is no obvious need for the 
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attitudinal and background variables to be in proportion to their prevalence in 
the target population; instead, it was important for the different attitudinal 
categories and background variables to be well represented amongst sample 
participants.  Furthermore, Daniel (2012, p.106) explains that non-proportional 
quota sampling can increase the likelihood that small sub-groups of the 
population are well represented in a sample in sufficient numbers to facilitate 
the comparison of sub-populations to each other. Therefore, non-
proportional quota sampling was identified as a suitable sampling approach 
for the primary survey.  Thus, by adopting a non-proportional quota sampling 
approach, the researcher was able to ensure that each of the attitudinal 
categories pertaining to hunting (ranging from those who strongly approve; 
approve; neither approve nor disapprove; disapprove; and strongly 
disapprove) is well represented amongst participants.  The researcher 
solicited participation in the primary survey amongst members of the general 
public of South Africa until a sufficient number of responses were collected for 
each of the five attitudinal categories.  The specific method that was used to 
determine when enough responses were obtained per attitudinal category to 
adequately represent each of the five attitudinal categories is discussed under 
section 3.4.4 of this chapter.  Furthermore, the researcher made sure that the 
participants spanned across a broad spectrum of demographical and social 
characteristics of the general public in South Africa. 
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3.4.4 Sample size and composition 
 
Daniel (2012, p.243) explains that “when a researcher uses non-probability 
sampling, statistical theories and calculations are not applicable in 
determining sample size.  Instead, various conventions, rules of thumb, and 
ad hoc, non-statistical methods are used”.  Consequently, the choice of the 
size and composition of the primary survey’s non-proportional quota sample 
was largely influenced by and based on various considerations, which are 
discussed below. 
 
In deciding on a suitable sample size for the primary survey, the data analysis 
design of the primary survey was of particular importance.  In short, the 
researcher ensured that the sample size requirements of those statistical 
procedures that were to be used for data analysis were met in order to ensure 
the internal validity of the study.  Furthermore, the complexity and amount of 
detail the data analysis design required was carefully considered.  In this 
regard, the minimum required sample size per cell of cross-tabulations and 
per sub-sample that may form part of the study’s analysis design was of 
particular importance.   
 
 Another important factor that was essential in deciding on a suitable sample 
size and its composition is the heterogeneity of the population in terms of the 
variables of interest (Daniel, 2012, p.240).  It was important to ensure that 
213 
each of the five attitudinal categories towards hunting (strongly approve; 
approve; neither approve nor disapprove; disapprove; and strongly 
disapprove) was well represented amongst participants.  Towards this goal, 
the researcher adopted a sequential sampling approach which relied on the 
principle of data saturation to govern when a sufficient sample size was 
obtained for each attitudinal category.  Daniel (2012, p.247) agrees that such 
an approach is often the most effective, practical, and reasonable way of 
deciding on a sample size for non-probability samples.  Thus, instead of 
preselecting a specific sample size target, sampling continued until the 
researcher was confident that adding additional samples to each attitudinal 
category did not cause the various measures of their respective belief strength 
(  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) to undergo significant changes in their 
central tendencies (e.g., means and standard deviations).  Once this point of 
data saturation was reached, adding additional samples would simply result in 
redundant information being added. 
 
The sample that was obtained was considered to be sufficiently diverse in 
terms of the study’s main variable of interest – namely attitudes towards 
hunting.  Furthermore, the sample comprised of participants from a sufficiently 
diverse range of demographical and social characteristics that are expected to 
impact on this study.  Table 3.1 provides a summary of the size and 
composition of the non-proportional quota sample that was obtained. 
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Table 3.1. Primary survey’s sample size and composition: attitudinal categories, 
as well as demographical, social and behavioural background variables 
Attitudes towards                                     
hunting
Obtained sample 
(n = 327 )
Proportion to 
total sample
Strongly Approve 40 12.2%
Approve 97 29.7%
Neither 52 15.9%
Disapprove 77 23.5%
Strongly Disapprove 61 18.7%
TOTAL 327 100%
Demographical background                                          
variables
Obtained sample 
(n = 327 )
Proportion to 
total sample
Gender
Male 169 51.7%
Female 158 48.3%
TOTAL 327 100%
Age
18 to 24 158 48.3%
25 to 34 72 22.0%
35 to 44 33 10.1%
45 to 54 36 11.0%
55 and older 28 8.6%
TOTAL 327 100%
Ethnicity
Black African 105 32.1%
Coloured 73 22.3%
White 140 42.8%
Indian or Asian 9 2.8%
TOTAL 327 100%
Qualification
Less than grade 12 17 5.2%
Grade 12 Certificate 113 34.6%
National Diploma 72 22.0%
Degree 56 17.1%
Postgraduate Degree 69 21.1%
TOTAL 327 100%
Social and behavioural background                                               
variables
Obtained sample 
(n = 327 )
Proportion to 
total sample
Social ties with people who hunt regularly
Yes 177 54.1%
No 150 45.9%
TOTAL 327 100%
Hunting behvaiour
Never gone hunting before 211 64.5%
Go hunting once in 2 year or less 81 24.8%
Go hunting once a year or more 35 10.7%
TOTAL 327 100%  
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Since the sample needs to ensure that each one of the five attitudinal 
categories is well represented in terms of their belief strength (  ) and 
outcome evaluations (  ), it was important to ensure that an adequate number 
of samples was obtained for each of the five attitudinal categories.  The 
researcher decided to employ statistical analysis procedures to verify that a 
point of data saturation was reached and that each of the five attitudinal 
categories towards hunting was, therefore, well represented in the sample.  
Towards this aim, all of the participants in the sample were divided into five 
sub-samples based on their response to the primary survey’s direct attitude 
measure (  ) (question 8 of Annexure B), namely those who strongly 
approved; approved; neither approved nor disapproved; disapproved; and 
strongly disapproved of hunting.  The researcher argued that once a point of 
data saturation was reached, adding additional samples to any one of the sub-
samples would no longer have a significant influence on the central 
tendencies (e.g., means and standard deviations) of the particular sub-sample 
involved.  Based on this argument, the researcher decided to make use of  -
tests – which is a statistical analysis procedure that is designed to detect 
differences in the central tendencies of two data sets (Dane, 1990, p.245) – to 
verify when a point of data saturation was reached for each of the sub-
samples.  The statistical procedures described below were then applied to 
each of the five sub-samples.  Firstly, participants in each sub-sample were 
arranged in a simple random order by making use of the Microsoft Office 
Excel 2007 software package.  Thereafter, a series of  -test analyses were 
used to compare the mean beliefs strength (  ) as well as the mean outcome 
evaluations (  ) of the first 30 randomly selected participants in a sub-sample 
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to that of all the participants in the given sub-sample.  In this manner,  -test 
comparisons of the mean beliefs strength (  ) and of the mean outcome 
evaluations (  ) were conducted for each of the 14 salient beliefs in the modal 
set.  Consequently, a series of 28  -tests were conducted for each of the sub-
samples in order to ensure that a point of data saturation was reached with 
respect to the evaluative aspects of all the salient beliefs across each of the 
five attitudinal categories.  Sampling thus continued until the  -test analysis 
confirmed that all five of the sub-samples (attitudinal categories) reached a 
point of complete data saturation. 
  
When the mean responses of 30 randomly chosen participants in each of the 
sub-samples were compared to that of all the participants in the given sub-
sample, the  -tests found no evidence that statistically significant differences 
in the central tendencies of any of the belief strength (  ) or outcome 
evaluation (  ) measures existed.  In other words, it was found that when the 
sample size for each of the five attitudinal categories (sub-samples) were 
increased beyond 30 participants, adding additional samples did not result in 
any changes in the central tendencies of the various belief strength (  ) 
measures or outcome evaluation (  ) measures.  Thus, it could be reasonably 
concluded that a point of data saturation was reached in the sample and that 
each of the five attitudinal categories towards hunting was, therefore, well 
represented amongst participants. 
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A short summary of the results of the  -test comparisons between the mean 
responses of the total sub-samples and that of 30 randomly selected 
participants from each sub-sample will now follow.  For the sub-sample that 
strongly approved of hunting (    ), the series of 28  -tests produced  -
values that ranged from    0.36 to    1.00 (with 86% of the  -tests 
indicating    0.50).  For the sub-sample that approved of hunting (   97), 
the series of 28  -tests produced  -values that ranged from    0.28 to    
0.97 (with 61% of the  -tests indicating    0.50).  For the sub-sample that 
neither approved nor disapproved of hunting (   52), the series of 28  -tests 
produced p-values that ranged from    0.28 to    0.93 (with 86% of the  -
tests indicating    0.50).  For the sub-sample that disapproved of hunting 
(   77), the series of 28  -tests produced  -values that ranged from    0.30 
to    0.98 (with 54% of the  -tests indicating    0.50).  For the sub-sample 
that strongly disapproved of hunting (   61), the series of 28  -tests 
produced  -values that ranged from    0.46 to    0.99 (with 89% of the  -
tests indicating    0.50).  In sum, the  -tests did not produce a single  -value 
which indicated that statistically significant differences occurred in the central 
tendencies of the data as the sample size of each sub-sample was increased.  
This provides strong evidence that the obtained sample sizes for each 
attitudinal category reached a point of data saturation.   
 
The researcher argues that this approach to selecting an adequate sample 
size for a non-probability sample is perhaps the most defendable, firstly 
because it has an explicit rationale and, secondly, because it ensures that a 
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sufficient sample size is chosen in a completely objective manner by 
eliminating the subjective judgements of the researcher.  Furthermore, the 
researcher discussed this procedure for selecting an adequate non-probability 
sample size with a statistician, who also confirmed that the researcher’s 
statistical application and reasoning is valid from a statistical point of view. 
 
3.4.5 Design of the primary survey’s research instrument 
 
It should be recalled that an electronic Web-based questionnaire was 
identified as a suitable research instrument for the primary survey.  The 
primary survey’s questionnaire was developed on the basis of the results of 
the initial formative research phase and was designed to measure the 
constructs in the theory of reasoned action’s attitude model (         ).  
According to Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.329), the construction of the primary 
survey questionnaire should follow a standard procedure based on the theory 
of reasoned action’s previously validated methods which ensures the validity 
and reliability of the survey questions.  Chambliss and Schutt (2010, p.169) 
are in favour of building on existing approaches that are known to provide 
reliable results, because it improves the design of one’s own survey 
instrument and adds credibility to the results that are obtained.  The 
questionnaire of the primary survey was therefore designed according to the 
standard procedures stipulated by the theory of reasoned action. 
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Schnetler, Stoker, Dixon, Herbst & Geldenhuys (1989, p.44) emphasise the 
importance of a well-designed questionnaire and explain that it determines the 
validity of the survey results.  The questionnaire of the primary survey appears 
in Annexure B.  The subsequent sub-sections focus specifically on 
discussing all the relevant aspects of the primary survey’s questionnaire 
design.  Specifically, the questionnaire design will firstly be discussed in terms 
of its question contents, question types, and wording of the questions.  
Thereafter, the questionnaire design will be discussed with specific reference 
to the question order, the format and layout of the questionnaire, and finally 
the length of the questionnaire. 
 
3.4.5.1 Question contents 
 
 As stated previously, the primary survey was designed to measure the 
constructs in the theory of reasoned action’s attitude model (         ).  
Since the primary survey questionnaire was developed on the basis of the 
results produced by the initial formative research, the specific question 
contents of the primary survey were largely determined by the formative 
research.  In particular, the list of 14 modal salient beliefs produced by the 
formative research was used to construct quantitative belief measures for 
every modal salient belief.  These quantitative belief measures were then 
incorporated into the primary survey to assess the strength of participants’ 
beliefs that hunting will produce the specified outcomes (  ) as well as their 
evaluations of those outcomes (  ) (see questions 23 to 36 and questions 9 to 
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22 of Annexure B, respectively).  Furthermore, the formative research 
produced a validated semantic differential scale item for obtaining a direct 
measure of attitude.  This validated direct attitude measure was included in 
the primary survey questionnaire to obtain a direct measure of participants’ 
attitudes towards hunting (  ) (see question 8 of Annexure B).  Moreover, 
based on the pilot data produced by the formative survey, the measures of the 
relevant background variables were refined and then incorporated into the 
primary survey questionnaire (see question 1 to 7 of Annexure B).  In this 
manner, the question contents of the primary survey were determined based 
on the results of the initial formative research. 
 
Leedy and Ormrod (2005, p.192) explain that it is essential to ensure that the 
content of every question in a questionnaire is in line with the goals of the 
particular survey and that it contributes to ultimately addressing the research 
questions.  This was confirmed by checking all questions for relevance in 
terms of the information that is sought to meet the purpose of the primary 
survey.  In addition, Oppenheim (1992, p.122) explains that every question 
should be linked with the conceptual framework of the study.  It was therefore 
necessary to check that all the questions were in line with the conceptual 
framework of the theory of reasoned action. 
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3.4.5.2 Question types and wording of the questions 
 
Two basic question types can be distinguished in survey research, namely 
open-ended questions and closed-ended questions (McBurney & White, 2010, 
p.246).  The nature of both of these question types was already described in 
section 3.3.5.2.  The theory of reasoned action’s standard procedure for 
designing the primary survey instrument prescribes the use of closed-ended 
questions of a quantitative nature.   
 
Oppenheim (1992, p.113) notes that closed-ended questions are generally 
used to collect information that is factual or attitudinal in nature.  Consistent 
with this view, the purpose of the primary survey was to obtain information of 
a factual nature as well as of an attitudinal nature from participants.  
Consequently, two types of closed-ended questions were included in the 
questionnaire.  Firstly, factual questions were employed to collect data on a 
number of background variables relevant to this study (questions 1 to 7 of 
Annexure B).  The second type of closed-ended questions used in the 
questionnaire was scale-type questions.  Scale-type questions were employed 
to obtain quantitative measures of participants’ attitudes towards hunting as 
well as of various aspects of participants’ salient beliefs.  More specifically, the 
semantic differential attitude scaling method was used to obtain a single direct 
measure of participants’ attitudes towards hunting (  ) (question 8 of 
Annexure B), while bipolar adjective scales were used to obtain measures of 
participants’ belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ) for each of the 14 
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modal salient beliefs (questions 23 to 36 and questions 9 to 22 of Annexure B, 
respectively).  The use of these two types of scale questions are in line with 
the standard procedure prescribed by the theory of reasoned action.   
 
Oppenheim (1992, p.113) explains that the response options a closed-ended 
question offers to respondents are very much part of the question because 
they guide the respondent’s answers.  It is therefore important to give due 
consideration to the response options offered by closed-ended questions.  
The researcher ensured that the response options for every question were 
adequate in the sense that it will account for all the possible responses that 
the questions may evoke.  It was also ensured that the response options were 
easily understandable and in context with the contents of the questions.  As 
far as the scale-type questions were concerned, it should be recalled from 
previous discussions that five-point scales are expected to produce the most 
accurate ratings within the South African setting (see paragraph 4 of section 
3.3.5.2).  Therefore, the response options of all the scale-type questions 
consisted of five-point bipolar scales.  Attitudes towards hunting (  ) was 
measured on a single five-point strongly approve to strongly disapprove 
semantic differential scale (scored +2 to –2).  As far as the belief measures 
are concerned, belief strength (  ) was assessed on a five-point extremely 
likely to extremely unlikely bipolar adjective scale as well as on a strongly 
agree to strongly disagree bipolar adjective scale (scored +2 to –2); outcome 
evaluation (  ), on the other hand, was assessed on a five-point extremely 
good to extremely bad bipolar adjective scale (also scored +2 to –2).   
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In order to measure participants’ belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations 
(  ), the researcher had to formulate belief statements based on the 14 modal 
salient beliefs produced by the initial formative research phase.  As far as 
wording of the questions is concerned, Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, pp.44) 
emphasise that it is important to ensure that the belief statements in the 
primary survey strictly conform to the principle of compatibility (see paragraph 
5 of section 2.4.6.2 in chapter 2).  Thus, in formulating the belief statements, 
the researcher had to make sure that the various belief statements were 
worded exactly as the modal salient beliefs were identified during the content 
analysis procedure of the formative research.  This was done to ensure that 
participants’ belief strengths (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) were assessed 
with respect to exactly the same modal salient beliefs than what was identified 
during the formative research (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, pp.105 – 106).  As far 
as the wording and design of the direct attitude measure (  ) is concerned, it 
should be recalled that it was previously validated during the initial formative 
research phase (see paragraph 7 of section 3.3.8).  To further ensure 
complete compatibility between the direct attitude measure (  ) and all 
measures of belief strengths (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ), the researcher 
decided to provide participants with a full definition of the term ‘hunting’ – with 
respect to the context, action, and target of the behaviour (legal hunting of 
wild animals) – at the very beginning of the primary survey questionnaire. 
 
In wording the questions of the primary survey, a number of general 
considerations were taken into account.  These general considerations 
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pertaining to question wording were very similar to that of the formative 
survey’s research instrument (see the very last paragraph of section 3.3.5.2) 
and will therefore not be repeated in this section. 
 
3.4.5.3 Question order 
  
Once the questions for the primary survey were formulated, the order in which 
the questions appeared in the questionnaire was carefully planned.  
Oppenheim (1992, p.112) explains that the selection of the best question 
order is often arbitrary because each survey produces its own problems as far 
as question-order effects are concerned.  In planning the most appropriate 
question order for the primary survey, the researcher was again guided by the 
general guidelines pertaining to question order that were discussed earlier in 
this chapter (see paragraph 1, 2 and 3 of section 3.3.5.3).  In addition to 
applying those general guidelines, the researcher also took two additional 
considerations into account in order to minimise any possible question-order 
effects in the primary survey’s questionnaire.  In the first place, the researcher 
intentionally asked participants to express their attitude towards hunting 
(question 8 of Annexure B) before they were presented with the various belief 
statements about hunting (questions 9 to 36 of Annexure B).  This was 
specifically done to avoid the risk of putting some ideas or beliefs into 
respondents’ minds that may influence their currently prevailing attitudes 
towards hunting.  The second consideration had to do with the order in which 
belief statements of the various belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation 
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(  ) measures were asked.  The researcher argued that the most reasonable 
approach would be to arrange the belief statements according to their 
frequency of emission during the elicitation procedure of the formative 
research phase (see Table 4.2).  Thus, those belief statements that reflect the 
most often emitted salient beliefs were presented to participants first, followed 
by the belief statements that reflect the less frequently emitted salient beliefs.        
  
3.4.5.4 Format and layout of the questionnaire 
  
In many ways, the basic format and layout of the primary survey’s 
questionnaire was very similar to that of the formative survey in the sense that 
both conformed to the general guidelines prescribed by Chambliss and Schutt 
(2010, pp.179 – 182) as well as Schnetler et al. (1989, p.86) for creating a 
Web-questionnaire with an effective format and layout.  These general 
guidelines were discussed previously in paragraph 1 and 2 of section 3.3.5.4 
of this chapter.  Furthermore, a format and layout approach similar to that of 
the formative survey’s questionnaire were used to provide participants with a 
definition of hunting and to ensure that they had an uniform understanding of 
the term hunting before answering the primary survey’s questionnaire (see 
paragraph 2 of section 3.3.5.4). 
 
 The primary survey’s questionnaire was divided into five sections, each 
comprised of questions that addresses a different theme (see Annexure B): 
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section A of the questionnaire contained questions about the demographical 
background of respondents; section B of the questionnaire was focused on 
collecting background information on respondents’ social ties and their 
previous direct exposure to hunting; section C of the questionnaire contained 
only a single question that obtained a direct measure of respondents’ attitudes 
towards hunting (  ); and, finally, section D and section E of the questionnaire 
contained the outcome evaluation (  ) measures and the belief strength (  ) 
measures, respectively, for all the modal salient beliefs.  Similar to the 
formative survey, the format and layout of the primary survey’s questionnaire 
was also designed to control the flow of the questions, to ensure that 
questions are answered in an identical order, and to make the questionnaire 
seem shorter (see paragraph 3 of section 3.3.5.4). 
  
3.4.5.5 Length of the questionnaire 
  
The researcher tried to keep the questionnaire as short as possible.  
However, the theory of reasoned action’s standard procedure for designing 
the primary survey questions required that two belief statements be 
constructed for every modal salient belief, one to measure respondents’ belief 
strength (  ) and the other one to measure respondents’ outcome evaluation 
(  ).  This resulted in a relatively large number of questions being included in 
the primary survey.  In total, 37 closed-ended questions were asked.  The 
Web-survey automatically recorded the amount of time it took respondents to 
complete the survey.  On average, it took respondents 14 minutes and 38 
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seconds to complete the primary survey.  Thus, it may be argued that the time 
it took to complete the primary survey questionnaire was acceptable. 
 
3.4.6 Pre-testing 
 
Prior to pre-testing, all aspects of the questionnaire design of the primary 
survey were checked to confirm that they strictly conform to the standard 
procedures prescribed by the theory of reasoned action.  Thereafter, the 
primary survey’s questionnaire was pre-tested both informally and formally.  
Similar to the pre-testing of the preceding formative survey’s questionnaire, 
the primary survey’s questionnaire was presented to the study’s promoter and 
statistician, as well as to the NMMU REC–H for criticism, for comments and 
inputs (see section 3.3.6).  The practical application of the primary survey’s 
questionnaire was put to the test by collecting some pilot data from a small 
number of selected respondents.  The researcher asked pilot respondents for 
their feedback on a number of aspects pertaining to the questionnaire design, 
the clarity of the instructions and questions, as well as the length of the 
questionnaire.  The pilot data was also analysed and checked for 
inconsistencies to make sure that all questionnaire items produced reliable 
results. 
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3.4.7 Administering the primary survey and the response 
 
The primary survey was administered as a Web-survey.  The aim was to 
solicit participation in the survey from members of the public with different 
attitudes towards hunting until a point of data saturation was reached for each 
of the five attitudinal sub-categories (namely: strongly approve; approve; 
neither approve nor disapprove; disapprove; and strongly disapprove).   
 
The primary survey was administered in essentially the same way as the 
formative survey (see paragraph 1 and 2 of section 3.3.7).  The electronic link 
to the Web-questionnaire was distributed by making use of a preamble letter 
that served the same function as that of the formative survey’s preamble 
letter.  However, unlike the formative survey, the primary survey’s preamble 
letter was distributed amongst members of the target population by making 
use of three different approaches.  Firstly, the students and staff members of 
NMMU were invited to participate in the primary survey by distributing the 
preamble letter via the so-called NMMU Communique service.  It was argued 
that students and staff members of NMMU were all members of the public of 
South Africa and were a convenient population to collect data from.  Secondly, 
the researcher personally approached members of the public at businesses 
and on the street to solicit their participation in the survey.  The researcher 
briefly explained the purpose of the research to potential participants, 
provided them with a preamble letter, and asked if they would be willing to 
participate in the Web-survey.  Willing participants were then requested to 
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provide their e-mail addresses to the researcher, after which the researcher e-
mailed the electronic link to the Web-survey to them on the very same day.  
The researcher found that most of the participants who verbally agreed to 
participate in the Web-survey lived up to their commitment and took part in the 
Web-survey.  This approach to distributing the Web-survey was limited to only 
Jeffreys Bay, Uitenhage, and Port Elizabeth.  The researcher acknowledges 
that both these methods of distributing the Web-survey are geographically 
limited.  Thus, in an attempt to improve the geographical distribution of the 
Web-survey, the researcher also made use of social media (Facebook, in 
particular) as a platform to distribute the Web-survey across different parts of 
South Africa.  In the case of all three of the abovementioned methods of 
distributing the Web-survey, the demographical information that were 
collected in section A of the questionnaire was used to confirm that all 
participants were 18 years of age or older (question 2 of Annexure B) and 
they were indeed South African citizens (question 5 of Annexure B). 
 
The researcher acknowledges that, compared to the research population 
(general public of South Africa that is 18 years of age and older), the total 
sample is geographically limited and likely to over-represent the higher socio-
economic classes.  However, these limitations were to a large degree 
unavoidable due to the practical constraints pertaining to sampling that was 
discussed previously (see paragraph 2 of section 3.4.3).  Nevertheless, as far 
as the over-representation of the higher socio-economic classes in the sample 
is concerned, the researcher is of opinion that this limitation is somewhat less 
critical to the validity of the study.  Recall that the ultimate aim of this study is 
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to provide guidelines for developing strategies to improve public acceptance 
of hunting.  The researcher argues that, because people from higher socio-
economic classes are generally the segment of the public that are most likely 
to be exposed to mass media and public communication outlets (news 
papers, television, internet, social media, etc.), it seems only logical that 
persuasive messages that are conveyed via these public communication 
channels would be most effective if it is directed at this very segment of the 
public.  Therefore, in the case of this study, an over-representation of the 
higher socio-economic classes in the research sample may, at least to some 
degree, be regarded as advantageous to the ultimate goal of the study. 
 
The primary survey was administered over a relatively short period of time 
and the data collection took place from 8 October 2013 to 1 November 2013.  
Data collection continued until it was confirmed that a point of data saturation 
was reached.  A total of 333 participants responded to the primary survey’s 
Web-questionnaire, of which exactly 327 participants fully completed the 
questionnaire and were included in the final sample of the primary survey. 
  
3.4.8 Capturing and processing of the primary survey’s data 
 
The data of the primary survey was captured by exporting the data from the 
Web-survey’s electronic database directly to Microsoft Office Excel 2007 
software package.  This procedure eliminates the possibility of any data entry 
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errors occurring.  The Institute for Statistical Consultation at Nelson Mandela 
Metropolitan University undertook the processing of the data.  The software 
package Statistica version 9.0 was used for the statistical analysis.  The data 
was analysed using inferential statistical procedures.  Dane (1990, p.245) 
agrees with this approach and explains that explanatory research often 
involves the use of inferential statistics (Dane, 1990, p.245).   
 
Following the theory of reasoned action, attitudes are comprised of people’s 
behavioural beliefs weighted by their outcome evaluations.  The primary 
survey data was used to calculate participants’ mean belief strength (  ) and 
outcome evaluation (  ) scores for each of the salient beliefs in the modal set.  
In addition, the mean belief-evaluation scores (    products) were also 
calculated for every modal salient belief by multiplying the belief statements’ 
perceived likelihood of occurrence (  ) by their outcome evaluations (  ).  
Using this data, the expectancy-value summation (     ) across all 
participants were then calculated.  Furthermore, the primary survey also 
contained data about participants’ attitudes towards hunting (  ).  The 
abovementioned results are displayed in Tables throughout chapter 4 (see 
Table 4.3 to Table 4.31 in chapter 4).  A noteworthy aspect of the results is 
that both the mean belief strength (  ) and mean outcome evaluation (  ) 
values of all the salient beliefs ranged from –2 to +2, while the     products 
of all the salient beliefs ranged from –4 to +4.  The direct attitude measure 
(  ), in turn, ranged from –2 to +2. 
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By making use of correlation analyses, the primary research phase allows one 
to make sure that attitudes are, as expected, related to the salient beliefs 
identified in the initial formative research phase (Fishbein & Ajzen, 2010, 
p.329).  This was done by correlating the mean     products of every 
individual salient belief with the direct measure of attitude (  ), as well as by 
correlating the expectancy-value model’s sum of belief-evaluation products 
(     ) across all the modal salient beliefs with the direct measure of attitude 
(  ).  Once it was established that participants’ attitudes towards hunting may 
be accurately inferred from the modal salient beliefs that were included in the 
primary survey, the data was subjected to further statistical analysis.  
Inferential statistics were used to detect where statistically significant 
differences existed between participants across a variety of variables as far as 
their mean belief strength measures (  ), mean outcome evaluations (  ) and 
mean     products are concerned.  In particular, Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) and  -test analyses were used to reveal where statistically 
significant differences existed between participants with different attitudes 
towards hunting and between participants from different backgrounds.  Dane 
(1990, p.245) explains that statistical procedures such as  -tests and ANOVAs 
are designed to detect differences in central tendencies (e.g., means and 
standard deviations) of data sets – that is, between different groups within the 
sample.  Dane (1990, p.245) also states that these analysis procedures are 
appropriate for analysing explanatory research data of a quantitative nature.  
While  -tests were used to detect statistically significant differences in the 
central tendencies of two groups, ANOVA tests were used to detect 
statistically significant differences in the central tendencies of more than two 
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groups.  In the cases where ANOVA tests detected statistically significant 
differences between more than two groups, Tukey’s post-hoc tests were used 
to reveal the particular between-group differences that exist.  It should be 
noted that, to maintain statistical integrity, a Tukey’s post-hoc test was only 
performed once an ANOVA test detected statistically significant differences 
between more than two groups.  The results of the statistical analysis 
procedures are displayed in Tables and statistically significant between-group 
differences are indicated with superscripts or asterisks symbols (see Table 4.3 
to Table 4.31 in chapter 4).  Furthermore, Cohen’s   effect size measures 
were calculated for every statistically significant between-group difference that 
was identified.  Cohen’s   effect size measures provide an indication of the 
extent to which between-group differences were large enough to be 
meaningful from a practical point of view.  The thresholds that were used to 
interpret Cohen’s   were as follows: a Cohen’s    0.50 represents a small 
effect size; a Cohen’s   ranging from 0.50 to 0.79 reflects a moderate effect 
size; and a Cohen’s     0.80 indicates a large effect size.  Because of space 
constraints, the Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences 
are not indicated in the Tables but, instead, are reported in the discussion of 
the results where it is of interpretive value.   
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3.4.9 Illustrating the logic of the theory of reasoned action at the level of individual 
salient beliefs 
 
Before discussing the overall research results in the next chapter, the 
researcher deemed it necessary to provide a practical example from the 
actual research results to demonstrate how every salient belief was analysed 
in a manner that corresponds to the logic of the theory of reasoned action.  
For this purpose, take for example the inherently positive salient belief that 
‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals’.  This belief was one 
of the modal salient beliefs identified by the formative research phase.  The 
belief was included in the primary survey and assessed in terms of the 
strength with which participants perceived it to be a likely outcome of hunting 
(  ) as well as the degree to which participants had positive or negative 
evaluations of this outcome of hunting (  ).  The     product for the 
particular salient belief was calculated.  
 
In Table 4.3 of chapter 4, it can be seen that the     product of this 
particular salient belief correlated strongly with a direct measure of attitudes 
towards hunting (  ) (   0.66 at    0.01) and, therefore, accounted for a 
considerable amount of variation in attitudes towards hunting (    0.44).  
This provides strong evidence that the particular belief discriminates 
significantly between participants with different attitudes towards hunting and 
that it is an important causal determinant which accounts for attitudinal 
differences.   
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For reasons discussed later in chapter 4, the research sample was divided 
into three broad attitudinal categories for the purposes of data analysis, 
namely supporters, moderates, and opposers of hunting.  The results in Table 
4.5 and Table 4.6 of chapter 4 displays the results of a comparison of the 
three attitudinal sub-groups in terms of their belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluation (  ) pertaining to this particular salient belief.  ANOVA tests 
revealed that participants from the three attitudinal sub-groups differed 
significantly with respect to both their belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluation (  ) of this particular belief (   64.78,    0.01 and    3.55,    
0.01).  Subsequent analysis with Tukey post-hoc tests found that supporters, 
moderates, and opposers all differed substantially from one another in the 
strength (  ) with which they believed that ‘hunting contributes to the 
conservation of wild animals’ (between-group differences significant at    
0.05, Cohen’s   ranged from 1.01 to 2.08   very large effect sizes).  It can be 
seen that the three attitudinal sub-groups were, however, much less divergent 
in terms of their outcome evaluations (  ) towards the notion of ‘conserving 
wild animals’, and was judged to be highly favourable by supporters, 
moderates, as well as opposers.  Tukey’s post-hoc analysis found that 
supporters had significantly more favourable evaluations towards ‘conserving 
wild animals’ than did moderates and opposers (between-group differences 
significant at    0.05, Cohen’s    0.61 and 0.55, respectively   moderate 
effect sizes).  However, no statistically meaningful difference were found to 
exist between the mean outcome evaluations (  ) of moderates and opposers 
with respect to this particular salient belief.   
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Closer inspection of the values shown in Table 4.4, Table 4.5, and Table 4.6 
provide more insight into the nature of these observed differences.  More 
specifically, supporters believed that hunting will be very likely to ‘contribute to 
the conservation of wild animals’ (    +1.55 on a scale ranging from –2 to +2) 
and judged it to be an extremely favourable outcome (    +1.93 on a scale 
ranging from –2 to +2).  When multiplied, the     product suggests that this 
particular belief had a very strong positive impact on the attitudes of 
supporters (    +3.00, with values ranging from –4 to +4).  Opposers of 
hunting, on the other hand, perceived it to be very unlikely that hunting will 
‘contribute to the conservation of wild animals’ (    –1.15 on a scale ranging 
from –2 to +2), and also judged the notion of ‘conserving wild animals’ to be 
very favourable (    +1.56 on a scale ranging from –2 to +2).  When 
multiplied, the     product may seem to suggest that this particular belief 
had a very strong negative impact on supporters’ attitudes towards hunting 
(    –2.13 values ranging from –4 to +4).  However, reflecting on the latter, 
one would come to realise that this negatively valued     product may be 
attributed to the fact that opposers believed that hunting does not result in the 
‘conservation of wild animals’.  Since people’s attitudes towards hunting are 
expected to be based specifically on the outcomes they believe follow from 
hunting, not on outcomes that they do not associate with hunting, it would thus 
be invalid and illogical to argue that this belief has had a negative impact on 
opposers’ attitudes towards hunting.  When people do not associate a 
particular outcome with hunting, it is essentially absent from the cognitive 
processes which ultimately determine their attitudes towards hunting.  
Therefore, in the case of the above example, it would be more appropriate to 
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interpret the negatively valued     product for this belief as having no impact 
on opposers’ attitudes towards hunting.  It is worth noting that this reasoning 
applies to all instances where participants believe that one or more of the 
listed salient beliefs are unlikely to be an outcome of hunting.  Returning to the 
results, it can be seen that participants with moderate attitudes towards 
hunting, in turn, had essentially neutral opinions about the ‘conservation of 
wild animals’ being a likely outcome of hunting (    +0.04 on a scale ranging 
from –2 to +2), and also had fairly strong positive evaluations towards 
‘conserving wild animals’ (    +1.54 on a scale ranging from –2 to +2).  When 
multiplied, however, the     product suggests that this particular belief 
essentially had an overall neutral impact on the attitudes of moderates (    
+0.12, with values ranging from –4 to +4).   
 
The results from the above mentioned example suggest that this particular 
belief holds very important implications for broadening the base of public 
acceptance of hunting.  This particular belief’s strong correlation with a direct 
measure of attitudes towards hunting indicates that this particular belief 
discriminates considerably between individuals with different attitudes towards 
hunting, and that changing this belief will very likely result in changes in 
attitudes.  To strengthen this particular belief’s overall positive impact on 
attitude towards hunting, a substantial positive shift in its     products needs 
to be effectuated.  This can, of course, be achieved by influencing either the 
strength of the belief (  ) or the evaluation of its outcome (  ).  Towards this 
aim, the results suggest that little can be done to further raise supporters’, 
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moderates’, or opposers’ already favourable outcome evaluations (  ) towards 
‘conserving wild animals’.  However, it is evident that there is ample room for 
increasing the perceived likelihood (  ) of moderates and opposers that 
‘hunting contributes towards the conservation of wild animals’.  However, 
since previous research has found that staunch opponents of hunting are 
often very resistant to changing their attitudes, it may be more sensible and 
effective to target the moderate attitudinal sub-group.  In sum then, it may be 
concluded that the most effective way of getting this particular belief to have a 
more powerful positive impact on attitudes towards hunting would be by 
convincing those with moderate attitudes that ‘hunting contributes to the 
conservation of wild animals’.  Fishbein and Ajzen (2010, p.334) explain that 
“it is important to realise that changing only one or two beliefs may not be 
sufficient to produce a change in the overall attitude.  Only, when there is a 
substantial shift in the summative belief index (     ) will a change in attitude 
occur”. 
 
The example discussed above demonstrates how the expectancy-value 
model facilitates the analyses of different attitudes towards hunting at the level 
of an individual salient belief.  However, in order to form a more complete 
understanding of the cognitive foundations underlying the attitudes of 
supporters, moderates, and opposers, it was necessary to consider the 
influences of all of the listed salient beliefs and their impact on attitudes 
towards hunting in a parallel fashion to that of the above example.  Note, 
however, that the focus of the discussions of the research results that follow in 
chapter 4 were directed towards outlining the broad overall findings that 
239 
emanated from such a detailed analysis of every salient belief, rather than to 
engage in meticulous discussions on findings pertaining to every individual 
salient belief in itself. 
 
3.5 SUMMARY 
 
 This chapter deals with the research design and methodology of the study.  
The chapter commenced with a broad outline of the study’s research design.  
Towards planning an appropriate research design, the nature of the required 
data was considered and it was found that data of both a primary nature and 
a secondary nature are needed to meet the objectives of the research.  It 
was explained that the secondary data is gathered through the study’s 
literature component, while the primary data is collected as part of the 
study’s empirical component.  The literature component of this study firstly 
establishes the cognitive foundation that is needed to conduct the study; 
secondly, it establishes a conceptual framework that serves as the very basis 
on which the empirical component of the study is designed; and thirdly, it 
offers useful perspectives on the methodological design of the study’s 
empirical component.  In short, the literature component of the study identified 
the theory of reasoned action as the most suitable conceptual framework for 
the study.  The empirical component of this study, on the other hand, was 
developed on the basis of the reasoned action approach and it is aimed at 
collecting the primary data needed to fully address the research purpose of 
the study.   
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It was explained that the study’s empirical component calls for a mixed-
method research design, containing elements of both qualitative and 
quantitative research approaches.  Consistent with the reasoned action 
approach, survey research methods were used for collecting the primary 
data.  It was explained that the empirical design of this study required that two 
separate – but interrelated – surveys be conducted, namely a formative 
survey and a primary survey.  The research population was identified as 
members of the general public of South Africa that is 18 years of age and 
older.  The discussion then turned to the particular purpose and 
methodological design of the formative survey, followed by that of the primary 
survey.   
 
It was explained that the formative survey was mainly of a qualitative nature, 
although some quantitative components were also included it its design.  The 
main purpose of the formative survey was to identify a set of salient 
behavioural beliefs about hunting that are commonly held by the public 
(through its qualitative component), as well as to collect pilot data to develop a 
valid direct measure of attitudes towards hunting (through its quantitative 
component).  It was pointed out that the formative survey served an 
exploratory purpose.  Various survey methods were studied and the most 
suitable methods for this study’s formative survey were selected.  It was 
decided to use an electronic Web-survey.  The design of a suitable 
questionnaire was discussed.  After the suitability of all the possible sampling 
designs were considered against the purpose and practical limitations of the 
formative survey, it was decided to make use of a combination of two non-
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probability sampling techniques, namely availability sampling and 
purposive sampling.  It was decided to adopt a sequential sampling 
approach which relied on the principle of data saturation to determine when 
a sufficiently large sample was obtained.  Before administering the Web-
questionnaire, it was pre-tested to ensure that all possible problems were 
eliminated.  After due consideration, the Web-survey was administered 
amongst the students and staff members of the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan 
University via e-mail.  It was explained that the electronic Web-survey was 
self-administered and the responses were discussed.  Finally an explanation 
of the capturing and processing of the data was provided.  The data was 
captured by exporting the data from the Web-survey’s electronic database 
directly to the Microsoft Office Excel 2007 software package.  It was explained 
that the qualitative data was subjected to content analysis and a list of 
behavioural beliefs about hunting was compiled.  Based on the results of the 
content analysis, a modal set of salient beliefs about hunting were 
identified.  The quantitative data, on the other hand, was analysed using 
statistical procedures.  It provided strong evidence that the direct attitude 
measure produces a valid and reliable measurement of members of the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting. 
 
Following the formative survey, the particular purpose and methodological 
design of the study’s primary survey was then discussed.  It was explained 
that the primary survey was quantitative in nature.  Based largely on the 
results produced by the preceding formative research, the primary survey 
assessed each of the modal salient beliefs that were identified and obtained 
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reliable measurements of participants’ attitudes towards hunting.  After 
considering the adequacy of various survey methods, it was again decided to 
use an electronic Web-survey as a data collection instrument.  The design of 
the primary survey’s questionnaire was discussed.  After the suitability of all 
the possible sampling designs were considered against the purpose and 
practical limitations of the primary survey, it was decided to make use of a 
non-probability sampling technique namely non-proportional quota 
sampling.  The objective with this sampling procedure was to ensure that all 
of the attitudinal categories pertaining to hunting were well accounted for in 
the research sample.  A sequential sampling approach which relied on the 
principle of data saturation was again identified as the most rational 
approach to determine when a large enough sample had been obtained.  The 
statistical procedure that was used to confirm that the sample reached a point 
of data saturation was briefly described.  Before the primary survey’s Web-
questionnaire was administered, it was pre-tested to ensure that all possible 
problems had been eliminated.  The administering of, and the response to, the 
Web-questionnaire were then discussed.  It was explained that the electronic 
Web-questionnaire was self-administered.  The researcher solicited 
participation in the Web-survey by approaching members of the public at 
businesses and on the street, as well as by distributing the Web-questionnaire 
via social media (Facebook) and the NMMU internal e-mail service.  The 
researcher then acknowledged some limitations pertaining to this approach to 
administering the Web-survey.  Finally an explanation of the capturing and 
processing of the data was provided.  The data was captured by exporting the 
data from the Web-survey’s electronic database directly to Microsoft Office 
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Excel 2007 software package.  The data was processed and analysed using 
inferential statistics.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 
PRIMARY INFORMATION ON ATTITUDES TOWARDS HUNTING AND ITS 
CAUSAL DETERMINANTS 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter, the empirical results of the formative survey and the primary 
survey are explained and discussed.  The formative survey and the primary 
survey were mainly aimed at solving the remainder of the sub-problems and the 
main research problem of this study.  The results from the two surveys will be 
discussed separately in this chapter.  Together, the results that emanated from 
the formative and primary survey will be used in chapter 5 to lay down guidelines 
and make recommendations with respect to improving the social legitimacy of 
hunting.   
 
4.2 FORMATIVE SURVEY RESULTS 
 
This section reports on the results and findings of the qualitative research 
component of the formative survey.  To elicit the salient behavioural beliefs 
that are present in the research population, a sample of the research 
population was asked about what they ‘like’ and ‘dislike’ about hunting and to 
think about the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ consequences (or the ‘advantages’ 
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and ‘disadvantages’) of hunting.  The content analysis grids that emanated 
from analysing the open-ended responses to these questions (see Appendix 1 
and 2) provided insightful information on the salient beliefs about hunting that 
are present within the research population.  The researcher realises that, 
since the formative survey relied on a non-probability sampling design, it is not 
possible to make any conclusive extrapolations or generalisations about the 
research population from the data; nevertheless the results of the formative 
survey do reveal some interesting phenomena that the researcher felt might 
be of interest to the study and is thus worth pointing out.     
 
In the first sub-section to follow, the mean number of positive and negative 
salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that were emitted by respondents in 
each of the attitudinal categories will be compared.  In the second sub-
section, the particular salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that appear to 
be most prominent in the research population is considered.   
 
4.2.1 Saliency of behavioural beliefs about hunting 
 
Table 4.1 displays the mean number of positive and negative salient 
behavioural beliefs about hunting that was emitted by respondents in each of 
the attitudinal categories.  On average, all the participants combined emitted 
2.6 positive salient beliefs and 3.3 negative salient beliefs about hunting.  This 
suggests that negative beliefs about hunting were more readily accessible or 
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salient amongst respondents than were positive beliefs about hunting.  Thus, 
generally speaking, participants seem to be more inclined to associate hunting 
with negative outcomes than with positive outcomes.  It is also noteworthy that 
participants from all five of the attitudinal categories mentioned both positive 
and negative beliefs about hunting.  Thus, participants who supported hunting, 
those with neutral attitudes towards hunting, and those who opposed hunting 
simultaneously associated hunting with a variety of positive and negative 
outcomes.  This suggests that participants are likely to be ambivalent in their 
attitudes towards hunting (see section 2.2.4 of chapter 2).  Consistent with this 
expectation, Muth and Jamison (2000, p.842) point out that the public is often 
ambivalent about issues pertaining to wildlife. 
 
TABLE 4.1. Mean number of positive and negative salient behavioural beliefs about 
hunting emitted. 
Attitudinal category 
Mean number of 
positive beliefs 
emitted 
Mean number of 
negative beliefs 
emitted 
Individual 
attitudinal 
category 
Main 
attitudinal 
category 
Individual 
attitudinal 
category 
Main 
attitudinal 
category 
Strongly approve (   ) 5.0 
3.5 
2.9 
3.5 
Approve (    ) 2.7 3.8 
Neither (    ) 2.1 2.1 2.6 2.6 
Disapprove (    ) 2.7 
2.3 
3.5 
3.7 
Strongly disapprove (   ) 1.4 4.1 
Total (    ) 2.6 2.6 3.3 3.3 
Note:  Because of rounding, some figures in the columns reflecting the main attitudinal 
categories may appear to be off by as much as 0.35. 
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Examination of the results in Table 4.1 indicates that, on average, participants 
with negative attitudes towards hunting hold substantially more negative 
salient beliefs (   3.7) than positive salient beliefs (   2.3) about hunting.  
Closer investigation of the results revealed the same tendency and shows that 
participants who disapproved and participants who strongly disapproved of 
hunting recognise considerably more negative outcomes (   3.5 and    4.1, 
respectively) than positive outcomes (   2.7 and    1.4, respectively) of 
hunting.  Furthermore, these results indicate that participants who strongly 
disapproved of hunting holds slightly more negative salient beliefs and 
considerably less positive salient beliefs about hunting than participants who 
disapproved of hunting.  This suggests that as the strength with which 
negative attitudes towards hunting are held increase, the number of negative 
outcomes associated with hunting also shows a marked increase while the 
number of positive outcomes associated with hunting decreases substantially. 
 
From the results in Table 4.1 it is evident that, on average, participants with 
positive attitudes towards hunting held approximately the same number of 
positive salient beliefs (   3.5) than negative salient beliefs (   3.5) about 
hunting.  Thus, compared to participants with negative attitudes towards 
hunting, it seems as if participants with positive attitudes towards hunting hold 
a much more balanced set of positive and negative salient beliefs about 
hunting.  Closer investigation of the results suggest that participants who 
strongly approved of hunting are, however, inclined to hold considerably more 
positive salient beliefs (   5.0) than negative salient beliefs (   2.9) about 
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hunting.  Thus, it seems as if participants with strong attitudes in favour of 
hunting based their attitudes on a set of salient beliefs that are predominantly 
comprised of positive salient beliefs about hunting.  In sharp contrast, 
however, it is evident that those participants who approved of hunting 
recognised more negative beliefs (   3.8) than positive beliefs (   2.7) 
about hunting.  Although they recognised more negative outcomes of hunting 
than positive outcomes, they still expressed their approval of hunting.  This 
suggests that the overall influence of their positive beliefs outweighed that of 
their negative beliefs about hunting.   
 
It is worth noting that the largest number of salient beliefs is present amongst 
participants who hold strong attitudes towards hunting (Table 4.1).  
Participants who strongly approved of hunting held an average of 5.0 positive 
salient beliefs about hunting and those who strongly disapproved of hunting 
held an average of 4.1 negative salient beliefs about hunting.  This finding is 
consistent with what is known about the psychology of strong attitudes.  Wang 
Erber, Hodges and Wilson (as cited in Perloff, 2010, pp.60 – 61) explain that 
people with strong attitudes towards an issue tend to seeks out information 
relevant to the topic, thereby reinforcing their strongly held attitudes and 
arming them with even more arguments with which to resist attempts to 
change their attitudes.  
 
Further examination of the results in Table 4.1 reveal that in comparison with 
participants who support and oppose hunting, participants with neutral 
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attitudes towards hunting held noticeably less positive and negative salient 
beliefs about hunting (   2.1 and    2.6, respectively).  A possible 
interpretation of this is that individuals who have impartial attitudes towards 
hunting are, in all likelihood, less interested and less knowledgeable about the 
topic of hunting or issues pertaining to wildlife; as a result, their attitude 
towards hunting is founded on substantially less salient beliefs.  It is also 
worth noting that there is little difference between the mean number of positive 
and negative salient beliefs that are held by participants with neutral attitudes 
towards hunting.  This finding suggests that individuals who hold impartial 
attitudes towards hunting seem to base their attitudes on a fairly balanced set 
of positive and negative salient beliefs. 
 
The above discussion suggests that, to some extent, the number of positive 
and negative salient beliefs about hunting that are held by participants seem 
to generally correspond with the degree to which they support or oppose 
hunting.  It should, however, be realised that a person’s attitude towards 
hunting is not a function of the number of positive and negative salient 
outcomes associated with hunting; instead, the strength with which these 
underlying salient beliefs are held and the degree to which the outcome of 
these salient beliefs are positively or negatively evaluated will ultimately 
determine a person’s attitude towards hunting.   
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4.2.2 Indentifying the salient behavioural beliefs that are the causal determinants of 
attitudes towards hunting 
 
In order to elicit the salient behavioural beliefs people often associate with 
hunting, participants in the formative survey were asked what they ‘like’ and 
‘dislike’ about hunting and to think about the ‘positive’ and ‘negative’ 
consequences (or the ‘advantages’ and ‘disadvantages’) of hunting.  Table 4.2 
provides a summary of the results that were obtained from analysing the 
content of participants’ open-ended responses to these questions (also see 
the content analysis grids in Appendix 1 and Appendix 2 that were 
constructed during the content analysis procedure).  Column 1 of Table 4.2 
represents the distinctive belief categories that emerged from the content 
analysis of the open-ended responses.  Each of these belief categories 
represents a salient behavioural belief that links hunting to a perceived 
positive or negative outcome.  Column 2, in turn, represents the frequency 
with which participants emitted each salient belief during their open-ended 
responses.  Although the information shown in Table 4.2 cannot be used to 
make any conclusive generalisations for the research population, the results 
do, however, confirm the presence of specific salient beliefs in the research 
population and also gives an indication of the prominence of those salient 
beliefs in the research population.   
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TABLE 4.2. Belief categories representing the frequency of emission of positive and 
negative behavioural beliefs about hunting for the entire research 
sample (   60). 
Belief categories representing the positive and negative  
salient behavioural beliefs about hunting 
Frequency of 
emission 
–  Hunting results in the endangerment or extinction of wild animal species. 58% 
+  Hunting is a way of managing the number of wild animals in an area to  
  prevent over-population. 
55% 
+  Hunting is a way for people to get fresh meat or meat products (e.g.,  
  biltong). 
53% 
+  Hunting holds economic benefits for the country (e.g., job creation,  
  tourism, income for farmers / communities, etc.). 
33% 
+  Hunting is a way for people to experience nature and the outdoors. 32% 
–  Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals. 28% 
–  Hunting leads to unethical hunting practices that do not give animals a  
  fair chance of survival. 
25% 
–  Hunters often kill animals unnecessarily without having a good reason or  
    useful purpose (e.g., to get meat) for doing so. 
22% 
–  Hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 22% 
–  Hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animals. 22% 
+  Hunting contributes towards the conservation of wild animals. 17% 
–  Hunting results in wild animals being wounded. 17% 
–  Hunting results in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. 15% 
–  Hunting causes pain and suffering to wild animals. 15% 
+  Hunting is an enjoyable experience (fun, exciting, relaxing) 13% 
–  Hunting leads to various illegal practices (such as poaching, traps, etc.). 12% 
–  People go hunting without possessing the necessary skills, experience  
  or training to make a clean kill. 
12% 
+  Hunting can promote environmental awareness by teaching people  
  about nature and by getting people interested in nature. 
10% 
+  Game meat is healthy. 10% 
+  Hunting is a challenging activity in the sense that it tests your skills and  
  abilities - provides a sense of accomplishment. 
8% 
–  Hunters behave themselves poorly while hunting. 7% 
–  Hunting promotes violence. 7% 
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–  Hunting makes me feel bad (e.g., upsetting, guilt, sadness, empathy). 7% 
–  Hunters are disrespectful towards animals. 7% 
+  Hunting is a way of socializing and bonding with friends and family. 5% 
+  Hunting is a humane way of harvesting food. 5% 
–  Hunting will expose me to the sight of blood and dead animals. 5% 
+  Hunting teaches valuable life lessons (e.g., responsibility, discipline). 3% 
+  Hunting is a way of controlling problem animals. 3% 
–  Hunters have barbaric rituals and hunting traditions. 3% 
–  Hunting is a dangerous activity. 3% 
–  Unclassified negative beliefs. 18% 
+  Unclassified positive beliefs. 13% 
–  Negative beliefs representing participants’ dislikes and perceived disadvantages or negative  
    consequences of hunting. 
+  Positive beliefs representing participants’ likes and perceived advantages or positive  
    consequences of hunting. 
 
Examination of the results in Table 4.2 indicates that in total 31 salient beliefs 
about hunting were emitted by the research sample, 18 of which linked 
hunting to negative outcomes and 13 of which linked hunting to positive 
outcomes.  Some noteworthy observations could be made from the results 
displayed in Table 4.2.  In the first place, those salient beliefs about hunting 
that were most readily emitted reflect the information on which participants 
often based their attitudes towards hunting.  Thus, an effective strategy to 
change attitudes towards hunting would be to influence those specific salient 
beliefs on which people readily base their attitudes towards hunting.  In the 
second place, the relatively low frequency at which many of the potentially 
influential positive beliefs were emitted suggests that a significant proportion 
of the participants are unaware of many of those positive outcomes of hunting.  
This suggests an opportunity to influence peoples’ attitudes towards hunting 
by raising their awareness of those particular positive beliefs about hunting. 
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Based on the salient beliefs that were identified by the qualitative component 
of the formative survey, a modal set of 14 salient beliefs about hunting was 
selected.  The entire selection procedure was governed by a predetermined 
decision rule that was specified earlier in chapter 3 (paragraph 6 of section 
3.3.8). The modal set of salient beliefs about hunting included the 14 most 
frequently emitted salient beliefs about hunting that are listed in Table 4.2.  It 
formed the basis on which the questionnaire of the primary survey was 
developed. 
 
4.3 PRIMARY SURVEY RESULTS 
  
The major purpose of the second phase of the empirical research, namely the 
primary research phase, is to further investigate the causal determinants on 
which attitudes towards hunting are based.  The results of the primary survey 
allow the researcher to verify that participants’ attitudes towards hunting are, 
as expected, related to the salient beliefs identified in the formative research 
phase.  Furthermore, the primary survey results are expected to enable the 
researcher to: examine and understand the most important salient beliefs that 
form the basis of different attitudes towards hunting; explain differences in the 
salient belief structure that ultimately forms the cognitive foundations on which 
different attitudes towards hunting are based; and explain the influence that 
demographical and social variables have on attitudes towards hunting and its 
underlying salient beliefs.  These results are expected to provide valuable 
insight into the cognitive foundation of attitudes towards hunting that may 
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guide the development of future strategies towards improving the social 
legitimacy of hunting. 
 
4.3.1 Empirical validation of the modal set of salient beliefs as the underlying causal 
determinants of attitudes towards hunting 
 
Based on the study’s prior formative research phase that involved belief 
elicitations, the researcher identified a modal set of 14 salient beliefs about 
hunting.  The salient beliefs that were included in the modal set are listed in 
Table 4.3 and formed a central part of the study’s primary survey.  From the 
perspective of the expectancy-value model, it is assumed that these readily 
accessible favourable and unfavourable outcomes represent the modal salient 
beliefs that underlie attitudes towards hunting amongst members of the public.  
For this assumption to be valid, the expectancy-value model’s composite 
measure of beliefs (     ) is expected to correlate with a direct measure of 
participants’ attitudes (  ).  To compute the       index, the primary survey 
obtained measures of the strength with which each of the 14 salient beliefs in 
the modal set is held (  ) and the degree to which the perceived outcome of 
each belief are positively or negatively evaluated (  ).  Belief strength (  ) was 
assessed on a five-point extremely likely to extremely unlikely scale as well as 
on a strongly agree to strongly disagree scale (scored +2 to –2), while 
outcome evaluation (  ) was assessed on a five-point extremely good to 
extremely bad scale (also scored +2 to –2).  The primary survey also obtained 
a direct measure of participants’ related attitude towards hunting (  ) by using 
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a single five-point semantic differential evaluative scale that was tested and 
validated beforehand during the initial formative research phase of this study 
(see paragraph 7 of section 3.3.8 in chapter 3).  The summed product of the 
belief strength and outcome evaluation scores (     ) of all 14 salient beliefs 
was found to have a significant correlation of    0.80 (  0.01) with the 
direct measure of attitude (  ).  Closer inspection of the last column of Table 
4.3 revealed that the mean     product of all of the individual beliefs also 
correlated significantly with the direct measure of attitude (  ), suggesting that 
they each accounted for a considerable amount of variation in participants’ 
attitudes towards hunting (  ranging from 0.39 to 0.71 at    0.01).  The 
magnitude of these correlations provides an indication of the relative influence 
of each individual belief on the sample’s overall attitudes towards hunting.  
Two of the salient beliefs listed in Table 4.3 were, however, found to have only 
moderate correlations with the sample’s overall attitude towards hunting (   
0.39 and    0.46 at    0.01).  Further analysis revealed that when these 
two salient beliefs were omitted from the expectancy-value       index, the 
model’s prediction of the direct measure of attitude (  ) improved slightly.  For 
this reason, the researcher decided to exclude those two particular salient 
beliefs from the study.  When the       index was based only on the 
remaining 12 salient beliefs, its correlation with the direct measure of attitudes 
towards hunting (  ) increased slightly to 0.82 (  0.01).  This provides 
strong evidence that participants’ attitudes towards hunting were, as 
expected, strongly related to the 12 salient beliefs in the modal set.  It 
confirms that these beliefs accurately account for participants’ attitudes 
towards hunting. 
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Having found that there is an extremely strong correlation between the 
expectancy-value       index and the direct attitude measure (  ) confirms, 
firstly, that the elicitation procedure did indeed identify relevant salient beliefs 
about hunting; secondly, that this modal set of salient beliefs accurately 
represent important causal determinants of the attitudes under consideration; 
thirdly, that together these salient beliefs accounted for a large amount of the 
variance in participants’ attitudes towards hunting (    0.67); and fourthly, 
that any modification of this set of salient beliefs are likely to have a significant 
impact on participants’ attitudes towards hunting.  Clearly, in itself, this finding 
already provides considerable insight into the causal determinants of the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting and the implications it holds for improving 
the social legitimacy of hunting.   
 
Having established that the modal set of 12 salient beliefs is strongly related 
to attitudes towards hunting, the results of the primary survey will now be 
progressively examined in greater detail.   
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TABLE 4.3. Behavioural beliefs about hunting: belief strength, outcome evaluation, belief-evaluation product, and correlations of     
belief-evaluation products with direct attitude measure for the entire research sample (   327). 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief  
Strength (  ) 
 Outcome 
evaluation (  ) 
     
Products 
 Correlation     
with attitude (  ) 
(     )  (     )  (     )  (     ) 
                 
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations. 0.37 (1.20)  -1.48 (0.69)  -0.70 (2.08)  0.71 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 1.30 (0.78)  -0.22 (1.16)  -0.33 (1.96)  0.70 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals. 0.00 (1.34)  1.59 (0.68)  0.05 (2.44)  0.66 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. 0.50 (1.23)  -1.78 (0.51)  -0.98 (2.28)  0.66 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices. 0.45 (1.27)  -1.70 (0.63)  -0.83 (2.39)  0.63 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals. 0.80 (1.16)  -1.63 (0.60)  -1.46 (2.11)  0.63 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors. 0.10 (1.39)  1.54 (0.76)  0.39 (2.46)  0.62 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily. 0.33 (1.25)  -1.65 (0.63)  -0.60 (2.28)  0.59 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species. 0.45 (1.28)  -1.76 (0.53)  -0.80 (2.44)  0.58 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population. 0.57 (1.12)  1.04 (0.86)  1.14 (1.57)  0.58 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country. 0.88 (1.06)  1.17 (0.72)  1.33 (1.65)  0.54 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing. 0.47 (1.17)  -0.82 (1.11)  -0.55 (1.90)  0.51 
+ Get fresh meat or meat products (e.g., biltong). 0.73 (1.01)  0.79 (0.97)  1.08 (1.44)  0.46 
– Results in wild animals being wounded. 0.91 (1.05)  -1.51 (0.70)  -1.43 (1.98)  0.39 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) based the 12 salient beliefs the modal set:  -3.34 (19.52)  0.82 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2, belief-evaluation products (   ) can range from -4 to +4, and the sum of belief-
evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48 when based on the 12 selected salient beliefs. 
All correlations are significant at        . 
Correlation between    and       based on the 12 selected salient beliefs = 0.82 (significant at        ). 
Correlation between    and       based on the 14 selected salient beliefs = 0.80 (significant at        ). 
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4.3.2 Broad outline of the primary survey’s research results for the entire research 
sample 
 
The data presented in Table 4.3 summarises the results of the primary survey 
for all the participants across the entire research sample (   327).  It can be 
seen that the modal set of salient beliefs listed in Table 4.3 links hunting to a 
variety of positive and negative outcomes.  Note that this set of salient beliefs 
suggests that, on average, the research sample essentially held neutral 
attitudes towards hunting.  That is, the mean expectancy-value summation 
(     ) across all participants, which could range from –48 to +48, was only –
3.34 (Table 4.3).  Consistent with this, the mean direct attitude score (  ) 
across the entire research sample (   327) also indicated that, on average, 
participants’ attitudes towards hunting were essentially neutral (    –0.07 on 
a strongly approve to strongly disapprove scale ranging from +2 to –2).  This 
may suggest that the overall sample contained a balanced set of attitudes and 
salient beliefs pertaining to hunting, thus enhancing the objectivity and 
adequacy of the sample for investigating the salient beliefs that inform 
peoples’ attitudes towards hunting.  It is also noteworthy that the standard 
deviations of both the summative belief composite (     ) and the direct 
attitude measure (  ) were both quite large (   19.52 and    1.33, 
respectively), indicating that there was considerable variation within 
participants’ attitudes and evaluative aspects of their beliefs towards hunting.  
This large amount of variation may be attributed to the fact that the sample 
consisted of individuals with divergent attitudes towards hunting.  The latter 
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finding provides further evidence that the sample would be able to provide 
valuable information regarding those causal determinants that discriminate 
between participants with different attitudes towards hunting. 
 
A further noteworthy aspect of the data has to do with the mean belief 
strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) that were obtained for the entire 
research sample.  Column 1 of Table 4.3 displays the means and, in 
parentheses, the standard deviations of the belief strength measures (  ) and, 
in column 2, the means and standard deviations of the outcome evaluations 
(  ) of all the respondents who participated in the primary survey.  Consider 
for a moment that the elicitation procedure that was used to identify salient 
beliefs about hunting typically encouraged a sample of the research 
population to express the outcomes or consequences they believed follow 
from hunting, not outcomes that they do not associate with hunting.  
Furthermore, because this study is concerned with uncovering the most 
prominent salient beliefs held by members of the public, the most frequently 
mentioned beliefs were selected for the modal set on which the primary 
survey was then based.  This implies that most members of the public should 
agree that the beliefs in the modal set are outcomes of hunting (Fishbein & 
Ajzen, 2010, p.122).  This expectation is, indeed, supported by the data in 
column 1 of Table 4.3 where it can be seen that, for each salient belief listed, 
the mean belief strength (  ) across all participants was on the positive side of 
the –2 to +2 scale (  for all the salient beliefs ranged from 0.00 to +1.30). 
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Closer inspection of the research sample’s mean belief strength (  ) values 
(column 1 of Table 4.3) show that by far the most strongly held salient belief in 
the sample associates hunting with ‘wild animals getting killed by hunters’ 
(    +1.30,    0.78).  The relatively low standard deviation associated with 
this particular belief also indicates that participants were largely in agreement 
that this is a very likely outcome of hunting.  This finding comes as no 
surprise, because ‘wild animals getting killed by hunters’ is arguably one of 
the most direct and logical consequences of hunting.  Other salient beliefs that 
were perceived to be somewhat likely outcomes of hunting were that hunting 
‘holds economic benefits for the country’ (    +0.88), and ‘causes pain and 
suffering of wild animals’ (    +0.80).  The results further show that, on 
average, participants in the entire sample held the remainder of the salient 
beliefs with noticeably less conviction or certainty.  The mean belief strength 
(  ) values suggest that participants in the sample were least likely to believe 
that hunting results in some positive outcomes, such as that it ‘contributes to 
the conservation of wild animals’ (    0.00,    1.34) and ‘is a way 
experiencing nature and the outdoors’ (    +0.10,    1.39).  These two 
positive beliefs also had comparatively high standard deviations, suggesting 
that there were considerable more variance with respect to how likely 
participants believed that hunting will result in these favourable outcomes.  
The fact that these potentially influential favourable beliefs are very weakly 
held and that participants were largely divergent in their opinions of how likely 
it is that hunting will result in these outcomes suggests that there may be 
ample room and opportunities for strengthening the perceived likelihood that 
hunting results in these favourable outcomes. 
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As far as outcome evaluations (  ) are concerned, it is worth noting that, on 
average, participants in the sample had relatively strong positive evaluations 
towards those beliefs that link hunting to favourable outcomes, and relatively 
strong negative evaluations towards those beliefs that link hunting to 
unfavourable outcomes (column 2 of Table 4.3).  Furthermore, the relatively 
small standard deviations associated with most of the mean outcome 
evaluations (  ) indicate that there was general consensus amongst 
participants regarding their positive and negative evaluations of each salient 
belief.  The only exceptions occurred with respect to participants’ mean 
evaluation of ‘hunters taking pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ 
(    –0.82,    1.11) and ‘hunters killing wild animals during a hunt’ (    –
0.22,    1.16), both of which were judged to be considerably less negative 
compared to the other unfavourable outcomes associated with hunting.  
Compared to the other beliefs, these particular beliefs also obtained relatively 
high standard deviations with respect to outcome evaluations (  ), suggesting 
that participants differed substantially in their positive and negative 
evaluations (  ) of these two outcomes.  Thus, it seems as if these two salient 
beliefs discriminated considerably amongst participants with different attitudes 
towards hunting as far as their outcome evaluations (  ) are concerned. 
 
It is evident from the results in Table 4.3 that, in broad terms, there were 
considerably more variance in participants’ mean belief strength (  ) than in 
their mean outcome evaluations (  ) (exceptions to this generalisation were 
already singled out in the preceding discussions).  Keeping in mind that the 
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sample is comprised of individuals with divergent attitudes towards hunting, it 
seems only logical that participants in the sample would differ substantially in 
the strength with which they associate the various salient beliefs with hunting.  
For example, it could be reasonably assumed that participants who approved 
of hunting would be more likely to believe that hunting results in favourable 
outcomes (e.g., ‘experiencing nature and the outdoors’, ‘hunting contributes to 
conservation’, etc.), while participants who disapproved of hunting would be 
much less inclined to associate hunting with favourable outcomes.  With 
respect to outcome evaluations (  ), on the other hand, it makes sense that 
most participants would tend to have similar positive and negative evaluations 
of the outcomes listed, irrespective of their attitudes towards hunting.  For 
example, most people – irrespective of whether they approve or disapprove of 
hunting – would agree that outcomes such as ‘endangering wild animals 
species and driving them to extinction’ or ‘causing pain and suffering to wild 
animals’ are extremely negative, while outcomes such as ‘contributing to 
conservation’ or ‘experiencing nature and the outdoors’ are very positive.   
 
The findings and discussion in the above paragraph holds very important 
implications for developing interventions aimed at improving public 
acceptance of hunting.  It should be recalled that attitudes could be influenced 
by modifying the existing beliefs on which the targeted attitude is based, and 
that this modification may take place either in the strength of a belief (  ) or in 
the evaluation of its outcome (  ) (see section 2.5.2.1 of chapter 2).  The fact 
that most participants largely agreed in their evaluations of the listed 
outcomes of hunting indicates that it would be extremely difficult to influence 
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public attitudes towards hunting by attempting to modify peoples’ outcome 
evaluations (  ) of the beliefs they associate with hunting.  To convince people 
to adopt positive evaluations, or even less negative evaluations, for inherently 
unfavourable outcomes (e.g., ‘endangering wild animals and drive them to 
extinction’, ‘disrupting and harm wild animals’, ‘causing pain and suffering to 
wild animals’, etc.) would be illogical and extremely difficult – if not impossible.  
Only with respect to some inherently positive beliefs may it be possible to 
further strengthen people’s positive evaluations of favourable outcomes 
associated with hunting – given that there is enough room for change to occur 
in a given belief’s positive evaluations.  To the contrary, participants in the 
sample showed considerable variance in the strength with which they 
perceived each belief to be a likely outcome of hunting (  ).  This suggests 
that communications to improve public acceptance of hunting would be more 
successful if it is directed at influencing the strength with which a particular 
belief is held (  ).  This can, of course, be done either by increasing peoples’ 
perception of the likelihood that hunting will result in positive outcomes (e.g., 
‘hunting contributes to conservation’, ‘hunting is a way to experience nature 
and the outdoors’, etc.), or by decreasing people’s perception that hunting will 
result in negative outcomes (e.g., ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild 
animal populations’, ‘hunting causes pain and suffering to wild animals’, etc.).  
Clearly then, the above discussion of the results suggest that it would be 
much more difficult to change the outcome evaluations (  ) of those salient 
beliefs that are associated with hunting than it would be to change the 
strength with which those salient beliefs are held (  ).  In further support of this 
finding, the magnitude of the values displayed in Table 4.3 indicate that 
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participants held their outcome evaluations (  ) with much greater conviction 
and certainty than their belief strength (  ).  This raises the expectation that 
the public would be fairly resistant to changing their outcome evaluations (  ).  
In conclusion then, communication strategies to improve public acceptance of 
hunting are expected to be most successful if it is focused primarily on 
influencing the strength with which various beliefs about hunting are held (  ). 
 
A further noteworthy aspects of the data has to do with the products of the 
belief strength measures and the outcome evaluations (   ) for each salient 
belief.  The impact of every salient belief on the sample’s overall attitude can 
be determined by examining its mean     products (column 4 of Table 3.4).  
It can be seen that, on average, the salient beliefs with the strongest positive 
impact on the sample’s overall attitudes towards hunting included the beliefs 
that ‘hunting holds economic benefits for the country’ and ‘hunting is a way of 
managing wild animals to prevent over-population’ (    +1.33 and     +1.14 
respectively, with values ranging from –4 to +4).  On the other hand, the 
single salient belief that had by far the strongest negative impact on the 
sample’s overall attitudes towards hunting was that ‘hunting causes pain and 
suffering to wild animals’ (    –1.46 with values ranging from –4 to +4).  A 
very noteworthy aspect of the mean     products has to do with the two 
positive beliefs that ‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals’, 
and that ‘hunting is a way of experiencing nature and the outdoors’ (    +0.05 
and     +0.39, respectively, with values ranging from –4 to +4).  Although 
participants regarded these salient beliefs as fairly positive outcomes of 
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hunting (  ), it can be seen that they essentially had a very small overall 
impact on participants’ attitudes towards hunting.  This can be explained by 
the fact that, on average, participants perceived these beliefs to be the least 
likely outcomes of hunting (  ).  This suggests a possible opportunity to 
influence public attitudes towards hunting by increasing the overall strength 
with which these particular salient beliefs (  ) are held, that is, by increasing 
the perceived likelihood that these positive outcomes will occur as a result of 
hunting. 
 
So far, the discussion of the results were largely focused on summarising the 
results of the primary survey across the overall sample; forming a broad 
understanding of what informs public attitudes towards hunting; pointing out 
some noteworthy aspects that emerged from the aggregated data set; and 
making basic inferences with respect to developing effective communication 
strategies aimed at improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  More detailed 
information could, however, be obtained by comparing the salient beliefs and 
all its evaluative aspects of participants who held different attitudes towards 
hunting.  Such an analysis now follows. 
 
4.3.3 Attitudes towards hunting and its causal determinants  
 
To fully understand why people support or oppose hunting and how to go 
about improving the social legitimacy of hunting, it is necessary to examine 
266 
the underlying salient beliefs that form the cognitive foundations on which 
different attitudes towards hunting are based.  To do this, the total research 
sample was divided into sub-groups based on participants’ attitudes towards 
hunting.  Five attitudinal sub-groups could be distinguished based on the 
study’s direct attitude measure (  ), namely participants who strongly 
approved; approved; neither approved nor disapproved; disapproved; and 
strongly disapproved of hunting.  Tables 4.29, Table 4.30 and Table 4.31 
presented in Appendix 3 provides a summary of the mean     products, 
belief strength measures (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ), respectively, for 
all five attitudinal sub-groups.  It contains detailed information on the salient 
beliefs underlying each of the five attitudinal sub-groups and contains detailed 
comparisons of between-group differences based on Tukey post-hoc analysis.  
Although such a detailed analysis of every individual attitudinal sub-group may 
be meaningful from a theoretical point of view, it does however seem to 
produce somewhat redundant information that is of little practical use.  
Consistent with the contemporary understanding of the psychology of strong 
attitudes (see section 2.2.5 of chapter 2), previous research has shown that 
staunch opponents to hunting are very resistant to changing their attitudes, 
and that those with moderate attitudes towards hunting represent the most 
promising audience for strengthening support for hunting (Campbell & 
MacKay, 2003; Herzog, 1993; Shaw, 1977).  Therefore, efforts to broaden the 
base of public acceptance of hunting should be directed at the segment of the 
public which is presently not strongly in favour of or against hunting.  
Consequently, from a practical point of view, communication efforts to improve 
public acceptance of hunting needs to resonate with the segment of the public 
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that holds moderate attitudes towards hunting.  Towards this aim, it was thus 
considered more meaningful to combine the three attitudinal sub-groups that 
were not strongly committed for or against hunting (namely, those who 
approved of hunting, neither approved nor disapproved of hunting, and 
disapproved of hunting) to form a sub-group that represents participants with 
moderate attitudes towards hunting.  Consequently, for the purposes of 
discussing the results, a distinction will only be made between three attitudinal 
sub-groups, namely participants who strongly approved of hunting, 
participants with moderate attitudes towards hunting, and participants who 
strongly disapproved of hunting.  In order to ease the flow of the discussions 
that follow, these three attitudinal sub-groups will be referred to as 
supporters, moderates, and opposers of hunting.  Table 4.4, Table 4.5, and 
Table 4.6 display the means and, in parentheses, the standard deviations of 
the     products, belief strength measures (  ), and outcome evaluations 
(  ) of every salient belief for each of three attitudinal sub-groups.  The results 
in these Tables served as a platform to examine and compare the various 
evaluative aspects of all the salient beliefs that underlie each of the three 
attitudinal sub-groups.   
 
Having divided participants into supporters, moderates, and opposers based 
on their respective attitudes towards hunting, the data was analysed using 
various inferential statistical procedures.  A series of Analysis of Variance 
(ANOVA) tests were used to reveal where statistically significant differences 
existed between the mean belief strength measures (  ), mean outcome 
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evaluations (  ) and mean     products of supporters, moderates, and 
opposers.  Further analysis with Tukey post-hoc tests then revealed 
differences between the three attitudinal sub-groups with respect to the 
various evaluative aspects of each salient belief.  The between-group 
differences for every salient belief are indicated in the relevant Tables by 
making use of superscripts.  Mean values that do not share a superscript were 
found to be significantly different, while there were no statistical differences 
between those mean values that share a superscript.  Where a statistically 
significant difference between any of the attitudinal sub-groups were 
identified, the Cohen’s   effect size measures were calculated to establish to 
what extent the between-group differences were large enough to be 
practically meaningful.  A final noteworthy aspect of the results is that both the 
mean belief strength (  ) and mean outcome evaluation (  ) values of all the 
salient beliefs ranged from –2 to +2, while the     products of all the salient 
belief ranged from –4 to +4.  The direct attitude measure (  ), in turn, ranged 
from –2 to +2. 
 
Earlier in this chapter, 12 salient beliefs were selected to form part of this 
study’s investigation into the causal determinants of attitudes towards hunting.  
Based on the empirical criterion of the expectancy-value model, it was 
established that, in summation, this set of modal salient beliefs accurately 
account for participants’ attitudes towards hunting.  It is now possible to 
further identify the underlying salient beliefs that, if changed, are likely to have 
the most significant impact on participants’ attitudes towards hunting.  The last 
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column of Table 4.3 facilitates this procedure and displays the correlation 
coefficients between every individual belief’s mean     product and the 
direct measure of attitudes towards hunting (  ).  It indicates the ability of 
every individual salient belief to account for variation in participants’ attitudes 
towards hunting.  It also provides an indication of each belief’s explanatory 
power and enables one to identify the particular salient beliefs that 
discriminate the most between individuals with different attitudes towards 
hunting.  The stronger the correlation, the more the salient belief in question 
discriminates between participants with different attitudes towards hunting and 
the more likely it is that changing the belief will result in corresponding 
changes in attitudes.  Note that the salient beliefs listed in Table 4.3 were 
arranged according to the magnitude of their correlations with participants’ 
overall attitudes towards hunting (  ).  Evidently, the two salient beliefs that 
‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’ and that ‘hunting 
results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ were most strongly related to 
participants’ attitudes (   0.71 and 0.70, respectively).  Other strongly related 
beliefs included the belief that hunting ‘contributes to conservation of wild 
animals’ (   0.66); ‘results in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild 
animals’ (   0.66); ‘leads to unethical hunting practices that do not give 
animals a fair chance of survival’ (   0.63); ‘causes pain and suffering to wild 
animals’ (   0.63); ‘is a way to experience nature and the outdoors’ (   
0.62); ‘leads to hunters killing animals unnecessarily’ (   0.59); ‘results in the 
endangerment and extinction of wild animal species’ (   0.58); ‘is a way of 
managing the number of wild animals in an area to prevent over-population’ 
(   0.58); ‘holds economic benefits for the country’ (   0.54); and that 
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‘hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing’ (   0.51).  This arrangement 
portrays which salient beliefs discriminate the most between participants with 
different attitudes towards hunting and, if changed, are most likely to have a 
strong impact on participants’ attitudes towards hunting. 
 
Having established the relative importance of each salient belief as far as 
understanding and changing attitudes towards hunting is concerned, it is 
meaningful to investigate the impact that every salient belief had on the 
attitudes of supporters, moderates, and opposers.  Towards this aim, the 
mean     products of every individual salient belief were compared between 
all three attitudinal sub-groups by making use of a series of Tukey post-hoc 
tests.  Such a comparative analysis enables one to identify differences in the 
relative impact that every individual salient belief had on the respective 
attitudes of supporters, moderates, and opposers.  The results of this 
investigation are displayed in Table 4.4.  Broadly speaking, the results 
indicate that there are large differences in the mean     products and, thus, 
in the overall impact that every salient belief had on the attitudes of 
supporters, moderates, and opposers.  As indicated in Table 4.4, detailed 
between-group analysis with Tukey post-hoc tests found statistically 
significant differences between supporters, moderates, and opposers with 
respect to every individual salient belief’s mean     product (all between-
group differences were significant at    0.05).  All of these between-group 
differences were also found to be of high practical significance, with Cohen’s 
  effect size measures ranging from 0.93 to 1.74 (very large effect size) 
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between supporters and moderates; from 0.58 to 1.56 (moderate to very large 
effect size) between opposers and moderates; and from 1.46 to 3.25 (very 
large to extremely large effect size) between supporters and opposers.  This 
suggests, firstly, that large differences exist between the cognitive foundations 
on which supporters, moderates, and opposers based their attitudes towards 
hunting; and secondly, that all 12 of the salient beliefs were responsible for 
fundamental differences in the cognitive foundations on which supporters, 
moderates, and opposers based their respective attitudes towards hunting. 
 
By examining the mean     products displayed in Table 4.4, it is possible to 
gain a somewhat deeper understanding of each belief’s contribution to the 
attitudes of supporters, moderates, and opposers.  It should, however, be 
noted that the     products of each belief should be viewed in conjunction 
with their respective belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) 
measures (Table 4.5 and Table 4.6, respectively) in order for it to be truly 
meaningful.  For this reason, most of the findings that may be deduced from 
the mean     products will be discussed in detail only once consideration 
has being given to the belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) which 
constitute the     products of the various salient beliefs.  Nevertheless, at 
this stage it may be worth noting that, generally speaking, most of the salient 
beliefs impacted strongly on the attitudes of both supporters and opposers, 
but much less on the attitudes of moderates (Table 4.4).  This suggests that 
moderates based their attitudes towards hunting on a much more neutral or 
impartial set of salient beliefs compared to that of supporters and opposers.  
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This expectation is also portrayed by the expectancy-value model’s belief-
based estimation (     ) of the attitudes of supporters, moderates, and 
opposers (Table 4.4).  It can be seen that the       index across all 12 salient 
beliefs, which could range from +48 to –48, amounted to +24.13 for 
supporters and to –24.74 for opposers, reflecting belief-based estimations of 
fairly strong positive and negative attitudes of similar magnitude for these two 
attitudinal sub-groups, respectively.  The       index for moderates, on the 
other hand, was only –2.42, reflecting a belief-based estimation of essentially 
neutral attitudes towards hunting.  Clearly then, the results suggest that the 
salient beliefs generally exerted a strong positive impact on the attitudes of 
supporters and a strong negative impact on the attitudes of opposers.  In 
contrast, the results suggest that the salient beliefs exerted a fairly impartial 
impact on the attitudes of moderates, thereby contributing to their attitudes in 
a much more neutral fashion.  This raises the expectation that not only would 
it be easier to influence and change the attitudes of moderates, but also that 
there would be considerably more opportunities to change the attitudes of 
moderates and fairly little opportunities to influence the attitudes of supporters 
and opposers.  This expectation will be explored in more detail later in this 
chapter. 
 
As noted in the beginning of the previous paragraph, to fully understand the 
reasons for the observed differences in the impact every salient belief had on 
the attitudes of supporters, moderates, and opposers, it is necessary to 
investigate the belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) that constitute 
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the mean     products of the salient beliefs.  Towards this aim, inspection of 
the data displayed in Table 4.5 and Table 4.6 reveal that the substantial 
differences in the mean     products between supporters, moderates, and 
opposers may be attributed largely to their divergent belief strength (  ) and, 
to a much lesser degree, to their outcome evaluations (  ).  It is evident that 
the three attitudinal sub-groups differed significantly in their belief strength (  ) 
with respect to virtually all of the salient beliefs listed (Table 4.5).  More 
importantly, it can be seen that the observed differences in belief strength (  ) 
were not only differences in degree, but most often also differences in 
direction – with most of the salient beliefs being regarded as a likely outcome 
of hunting by one attitudinal sub-group, but as an unlikely outcome of hunting 
by another attitudinal sub-group, and vice-versa.  The only exceptions to the 
latter were observed with respect to the salient beliefs that ‘hunting results in 
wild animals being killed by hunters’ and that ‘hunters take pleasure and 
enjoyment in killing wild animals’, in which case all three of the attitudinal sub-
groups regarded these two salient beliefs as likely outcomes of hunting and 
differed only in the degree of their belief strength (  ).  In sharp contrast to 
belief strength (  ), it is evident that all three of the attitudinal sub-groups were 
largely unanimous with respect to the direction of their favourable and 
unfavourable evaluations (  ) of the listed salient beliefs and mainly differed in 
the degree of their outcome evaluations (  ).  Thus, supporters, moderates, 
and opposers generally agreed in their positive and negative evaluations (  ) 
of the outcomes listed, irrespective of their attitudes towards hunting.  The 
only exceptions to the latter were, again, observed with respect to the beliefs 
that ‘hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ and that ‘hunters 
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take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’.  While supporters 
regarded these two salient beliefs as favourable outcomes of hunting, 
moderates and opposers regarded it as unfavourable outcomes.  The fact that 
most participants largely agreed in their evaluations (  ) of the listed outcomes 
of hunting suggest that these outcomes are inherently positive or negative – 
this again raises the expectation that it would be difficult to influence or 
change public attitudes towards hunting by attempting to modify people’s 
evaluations of the outcomes they associate with hunting (  ).  In sum then, the 
results indicate that supporters, moderates, and opposers differed largely in 
their perceived likelihoods that hunting will result in the various salient 
outcomes (  ), but that they were much more unanimous with respect to their 
evaluations of the various salient outcomes (  ).  This suggests that the 
substantial differences in the mean     products between supporters, 
moderates, and opposers may be attributed primarily to their divergent belief 
strength (  ) and, to a much lesser degree, to their outcome evaluations (  ).  
The differences between the three attitudinal sub-groups’ belief strength (  ) 
and the outcome evaluations (  ) of the various salient beliefs will now be 
investigated in more detail. 
 
Detailed comparative analysis were conducted with a series of Tukey post-
hoc tests to identify statistically significant differences between supporters, 
moderates, and opposers with respect to the belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluation (  ) of every individual salient belief.  The between-group 
differences that were identified with respect to the belief strength (  ) are 
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indicated in Table 4.5, while the between-group differences that were 
identified with respect to outcome evaluations (  ) are indicated in Table 4.6.  
All of the between-group differences that were identified were statistically 
significant at    0.05.  As far as belief strength (  ) is concerned, the results 
in Table 4.5 show that all three of the attitudinal sub-groups were found to 
differ greatly from one another with respect to nearly all of the salient beliefs 
listed.  Further analysis with Cohen’s   tests revealed that all of these 
between-group differences were large enough to be highly significant from a 
practical point of view: Cohen’s   effect size measures ranged from 0.98 to 
1.47 (large to very large effect size) for differences between supporters and 
moderates; from 0.82 to 1.32 (large to very large effect size) for differences 
between opposers and moderates; and from 1.89 to 3.76 (very large to 
extremely large effect size) for differences between supporters and opposers.  
The only exceptions occurred with respect to the salient beliefs that ‘hunting 
results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ and that ‘hunters take pleasure 
and enjoyment in killing wild animals’: in the case of the former belief, it can 
be seen that Tukey post-hoc test only found a statistically significant 
difference in belief strength (  ) between moderates and opposers, but found 
no difference between moderates and supporters as well as between 
supporters and opposers; in the case of the latter belief, no statistically 
significant difference in belief strength (  ) were found between supporters 
and moderates, but both of these groups were found to differ significantly from 
opposers.  In the case of both these exceptions, the between-group 
differences were found to be of only small to moderate practical significance 
(Cohen’s   range from 0.44 to 0.76   small to moderate effect size).  Overall 
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then, the results show that very large differences exist between supporters, 
moderates, and opposers as far as their belief strength (  ) of nearly all the 
salient beliefs are concerned.  With respect to outcome evaluations (  ), on 
the other hand, the result in Table 4.6 show that Tukey post-hoc tests found 
somewhat less statistically significant differences between the outcome 
evaluations (  ) of supporters, moderates, and opposers with respect to a 
number of the salient beliefs listed.  Furthermore, the statistically significant 
differences that were found to exist were in many cases of only small to 
moderate practical significance, with few between-group differences that were 
of large practical significance.  Overall then, the findings that was discussed in 
this paragraph provides further evidence for the expectation that the 
substantial differences in the mean     products between supporters, 
moderates, and opposers may be attributed primarily to their divergent belief 
strength (  ) and, to a much lesser degree, to their outcome evaluations (  ).  
The fact that little practically meaningful differences were found to exist 
between supporters’, moderates’ and opposers’ evaluations of the listed 
outcomes of hunting again raises the expectation that it would be difficult to 
influence or change public attitudes towards hunting by attempting to modify 
people’s evaluations of the outcomes they associate with hunting (  ).  In sum, 
these findings provides further strong support for the expectation that attempts 
to change attitudes towards hunting would be more successful if it is aimed at 
influencing people’s perceived likelihoods of the outcomes they associate with 
hunting (  ), rather than attempting to influence people’s favourable or 
unfavourable evaluations of the outcomes they associate with hunting (  ). 
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TABLE 4.4. Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between three attitudinal sub-groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
     products 
Strongly 
Approve 
 Moderates 
(Approve, Neither, Disapprove) 
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
(    )   (     )   (    ) 
                
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   1.70a (1.54)   -0.51b (1.71)    -2.97c (1.37) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.65a (1.58)   -0.09b (1.48)    -2.52c (1.80) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   3.00a (1.50)    0.12b (2.07)    -2.13c (2.01) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   1.53a (1.84)   -0.87b (2.03)    -3.02c (1.52) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   1.50a (1.97)   -0.68b (2.13)    -2.95c (1.76) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   0.75a (1.60)   -1.35b (1.94)    -3.31c (1.30) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   3.30a (1.04)    0.35b (2.18)    -1.33c (2.39) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   1.60a (1.98)   -0.50b (2.04)    -2.39c (1.88) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   1.40a (2.19)   -0.68b (2.24)    -2.72c (1.81) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   3.30a (1.14)    1.02b (1.34)     0.18c (1.32) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   3.30a (1.20)    1.23b (1.44)     0.38c (1.58) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   1.10a (1.61)   -0.46b (1.51)    -1.95c (2.35) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) 24.13
a (10.29)   -2.42b (15.34)    -24.74c (12.24) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation product (   ) scores can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.5. Mean belief strength for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between three attitudinal sub-groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
 Belief strength (  ) 
Strongly 
Approve 
 Moderates 
(Approve, Neither, Disapprove) 
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
(    )   (     )   (    ) 
                
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.15a (0.80)   0.31b (1.02)     1.57c (0.67) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.30a,b (0.69)   1.23a (0.77)     1.57b (0.83) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   1.55a (0.75)   0.04b (1.19)    -1.15c (1.08) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -0.85a (0.92)   0.46b (1.12)     1.52c (0.81) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -0.78a (1.05)   0.38b (1.16)     1.51c (0.87) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -0.58a (0.93)   0.79b (1.06)     1.74c (0.60) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   1.75a (0.44)   0.11b (1.25)    -1.00c (1.17) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -0.90a (1.06)   0.29b (1.15)     1.28c (0.93) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -0.75a (1.15)   0.42b (1.20)     1.36c (0.93) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   1.70a (0.52)   0.62b (0.95)    -0.39c (1.20) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.85a (0.36)   0.94b (0.91)     0.00c (1.22) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.15a (1.27)   0.37a (1.09)     1.08b (1.19) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.6. Mean outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between three attitudinal sub-groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
 Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Strongly    
Approve 
 Moderates 
(Approve, Neither, Disapprove) 
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
(    )   (     )   (    ) 
                
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   -1.30a (0.85)   -1.42a  (0.69)   -1.82b (0.39) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.    0.95a (0.99)      -0.10b (0.97)      -1.44c (0.83) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.    1.93a (0.27)   1.54b (0.67)       1.56b (0.83) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   -1.83 (0.50)      -1.73 (0.56)      -1.92 (0.28) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   -1.63a (0.84)      -1.64a (0.65)      -1.95b (0.22) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   -1.20a (0.72)      -1.63b (0.59)      -1.90c (0.30) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.    1.88a (0.33)   1.51b (0.74)       1.43b (0.96) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   -1.75a,b (0.44)      -1.57a (0.69)      -1.90b (0.35) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   -1.85a,b  (0.36)      -1.70a (0.59)      -1.93b (0.25) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.    1.93a (0.27)   1.05b     (0.77)       0.43c (0.94) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.    1.75a (0.49)   1.14b (0.65)       0.90c (0.89) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.    0.35a (1.19)      -0.78b (0.99)      -1.75c (0.57) 
Note:  Outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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So far, the discussions were focused on providing a broad overview of the 
results pertaining to the three attitudinal sub-groups.  In order to obtain a 
deeper understanding of the cognitive foundation on which supporters, 
moderates, and opposers based their attitudes towards hunting, it is 
necessary to conduct an integrated investigation into their belief strength (  ) 
and outcome evaluations (  ) that ultimately determined the impact (    
products) every salient belief had on their respective attitudes towards 
hunting.  The overall findings that emanated from such a detailed analysis of 
the mean     products, belief strength (  ), and outcome evaluation (  ) of 
supporters, moderates, and opposers will now be discussed (Table 4.4, Table 
4.5 and Table 4.6 respectively).  Note that, for the sake of simplicity, each of 
the three attitudinal sub-groups will be considered under separate headings.   
  
4.3.3.1 Supporters’ attitudes towards hunting and their causal determinants 
  
In order to understand the cognitive foundation on which supporters based 
their attitudes towards hunting, it is firstly necessary to establish which of the 
listed salient beliefs act as causal determinants of their attitudes.  It should be 
recalled that when people do not associate a particular outcome with hunting, 
it is essentially absent from their cognitive processes which ultimately 
determine their attitudes towards hunting.  With this in mind, the belief 
strength (  ) values in Table 4.5 show that supporters did not associate all the 
salient beliefs in the modal set with hunting.  Instead, supporters only believed 
it to be extremely likely that hunting ‘holds economic benefits for the country’ 
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(    +1.85), ‘is a way to experience nature and the outdoors’ (    +1.75), ‘is a 
way of managing the number of wild animals in an area to prevent over-
population’ (    +1.70), and that hunting ‘contributes to conservation of wild 
animals’ (    +1.55).  Evidently, the outcome evaluations (  ) displayed in 
Table 4.6 show that supporters judged all of these salient beliefs to be 
extremely favourable outcomes of hunting (  for the four beliefs ranged from 
+1.75 to +1.93).  When the belief strength measures (  ) and outcome 
evaluations (  ) for each of these four salient beliefs were multiplied, their 
respective     products (Table 4.4) showed that they each had a very 
positive impact on supporters’ attitudes towards hunting (  for the four salient 
beliefs’     products ranged from +3.00 to +3.30).  In addition to these four 
salient beliefs, it is evident that supporters also perceived it to be quite likely 
that ‘hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ (    +1.30) and 
only slightly likely that ‘hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild 
animals’ (    +0.15) (Table 4.5).  Supporters judged these two salient beliefs 
as somewhat favourable outcomes of hunting (    +0.95 and +0.35, 
respectively) (Table 4.6).  As a result, the mean     products (Table 4.4) for 
these two salient beliefs indicated that they also contributed to the attitudes of 
supporters in a positive manner (  for the two salient beliefs’     products 
amounted to +1.65 to +1.10, respectively).  Together, these six salient beliefs 
were the most significant causal determinants of supporters’ attitudes towards 
hunting.  The results in Table 4.5 further show that the remainder of the 
beliefs were all viewed as fairly unlikely outcomes of hunting by supporters, 
suggesting that those beliefs were essentially absent from the cognitive 
foundation on which supporters based their attitudes towards hunting.  As a 
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result, these beliefs did not seem to have played any role as causal 
determinants of supporters’ attitudes towards hunting. 
 
Overall then, the results suggest that supporters mainly associated hunting 
with outcomes they perceived to be favourable and, consequently, these 
positively valued salient beliefs accounted for the most fundamental causal 
determinants of their attitudes towards hunting.  Supporters were, however, 
fairly adamant that hunting did not result in any outcomes they regarded as 
unfavourable.  Consequently, little can be done to further strengthen 
supporters’ already favourable attitudes towards hunting. 
 
The results that were discussed above are assumed to portray the typical 
cognitive foundation on which supporters based their attitudes towards 
hunting and, thus, provide a benchmark against which the causal 
determinants that underlie the attitudes of moderates and opposers can be 
compared.  This assisted the researcher in identifying opportunities to 
influence attitudes towards hunting and broaden the base of public 
acceptance of hunting. 
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4.3.3.2 Opposers’ attitudes towards hunting and their causal determinants 
 
From the belief strength (  ) values displayed in Table 4.5, it is evident that 
opposers were very certain that hunting ‘causes pain and suffering to wild 
animal populations’ (    +1.74), ‘is disruptive and harmful to wild animal 
populations’ (    +1.57), ‘results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ (    
+1.57), ‘results in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals’ (    
+1.52), ‘leads to unethical hunting practices’ (    +1.51), ‘leads to the 
endangerment and extinction of wild animal species’ (    +1.36), and that 
‘hunters often kill animals unnecessarily without having a good reason or 
useful purpose for doing so’ (    +1.28).  In addition, opposers also believed 
that ‘hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ (    +1.08).  
Thus, according to the results these eight salient beliefs account for the most 
important causal determinants of opposers’ attitudes towards hunting, while 
the remainder of the listed beliefs were essentially absent from the cognitive 
foundation on which opposers based their attitudes towards hunting.  Looking 
at the outcome evaluations (  ) displayed in Table 4.6, it is evident that 
opposers believed that all eight of the salient beliefs on which they based their 
attitudes towards hunting result in extremely unfavourable outcomes (  for the 
four beliefs ranged from –1.44 to –1.95).  As a result, the mean     products 
(Table 4.4) for each of those eight salient beliefs indicate that they had a very 
negative impact on opposers’ attitudes towards hunting (  for the eight salient 
beliefs’     products ranged from –1.95 to –3.31).  Overall, these findings 
suggest that opposers mainly associated hunting with outcomes they 
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perceived to be unfavourable and that these negatively valued salient beliefs 
accounted for the most fundamental causal determinants of their attitudes 
towards hunting.  Generally speaking, it may be said that opposers perceived 
hunting to result in many inherently negative outcomes, but in little or no 
positive outcomes.   
 
With respect to influencing the attitudes of opposers, a number of noteworthy 
findings emerged from the abovementioned results.  It should be recalled that, 
according to the postulations of the theory of reasoned action, a desired 
change in a particular attitude could be brought about by either altering some 
of the existing salient beliefs on which the targeted attitude is based or by 
introducing new salient beliefs into the underlying belief structure (see section 
2.5.2 of chapter 2).  At first glance, it appears that there may be many 
opportunities to change opposers’ attitudes towards hunting by addressing the 
numerous existing negative salient beliefs on which their attitudes are based.  
To the contrary, however, the results show that opposers’ belief strength (  ) 
towards the negative salient beliefs deviated significantly from neutral, 
suggesting that they hold their negative valued salient beliefs with great 
conviction and certainty.  This raises the expectation that it would be 
extremely difficult to change such strongly held negative salient beliefs.  This 
expectation is also supported by the contemporary understanding of the 
psychology of strong attitudes (section 2.2.5 of chapter 2).  The results further 
show that opposers’ attitudes involved mostly negative salient beliefs and 
virtually no positive salient beliefs, suggesting that there were very little 
conflict or ambivalence in the cognitive foundation on which their attitudes 
285 
were based.  The literature on attitudinal ambivalence in section 2.2.4 of 
chapter 2 suggested that, compared to ambivalent attitudes, non-ambivalent 
attitudes are more resistant to persuasive appeals, are less likely to change 
over time, and are more likely to bias a person’s processing of attitude-
relevant information.  Therefore, this finding also suggests that it would be 
very difficult to influence or change the attitudes of opposers.  Cleary then, the 
results show that attempts to effectuate a positive change in the attitudes of 
opposers by changing some of the existing salient beliefs on which their 
attitudes are based would, in all likelihood, be ineffective. 
 
As far as changing opposers’ attitudes towards hunting by introducing new 
salient beliefs into the underlying belief structure is concerned, the results 
found that positive salient beliefs about hunting were largely absent from the 
cognitive foundation on which opposers based their attitudes.  Thus, it might 
appear that there may be many opportunities to change opposers’ attitudes by 
introducing positive salient beliefs about hunting into their underlying belief 
structure.  To the contrary, however, from the results it may be deduced that 
this approach will be largely ineffective for a number of reasons.  In the first 
place, the literature on the psychology of strong attitudes in section 2.2.5 of 
chapter 2 suggested that strong attitudes have a profound influence on how 
people process and evaluate attitude-relevant information.  This makes strong 
attitudes very difficult to influence and highly resistant to change.  Since 
opposers strongly disapprove of hunting, they would be very likely to process 
information about this issue in a biased manner by directing their attention to 
arguments that are consistent with their existing attitude, by automatically 
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rejecting the credibility of information that supports the need for hunting or 
point out the positive outcomes of hunting, and by accepting information 
consistent with their existing negative attitude towards hunting.  Consequently, 
opposers will not easily accept any information that aims to introduce new 
salient beliefs about the positive outcomes of hunting into their underlying 
belief structure. 
 
A second issue that may arise when attempting to change opposers’ attitudes 
towards hunting by introducing new positive salient beliefs into the underlying 
belief structure has to do with the phenomenon of cognitive dissonance (see 
section 2.2.6 of chapter 2).  When a persuasive message provides opposers 
with new information that is aimed at raising their awareness of the positive 
outcomes of hunting, it may cause some inconsistencies in their underlying 
salient beliefs structure and result in cognitive dissonance.  To name one 
example, if a persuasive message were to be successful at introducing the 
belief that ‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals’ into the 
belief structure of opposers, this belief is likely to be in dissonance with their 
existing and strongly held salient belief that ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful 
to wild animal populations’.  Since cognitive dissonance is psychologically 
uncomfortable and result in feelings of discord, opposers will be motivated to 
take steps to reduce their psychologically inconsistent cognitions.  They can 
do this by either changing those existing salient beliefs that are in conflict with 
their newly formed beliefs, or by rejecting the newly introduced information 
pertaining to the positive outcomes of hunting.  Since the results show that 
opposers hold their existing negative salient beliefs about hunting with great 
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conviction and certainty, it is very unlikely that they will change their existing 
beliefs in order to reduce cognitive dissonance.  Thus, instead, opposers will 
in all likelihood simply reject any information that is inconsistent with their 
existing strongly held negative salient beliefs.  From the latter discussion it 
could thus be inferred that even if persuasive messages were to be successful 
at getting opposers to form new positive salient beliefs about hunting, this 
newly formed positive salient belief will only persist if it is not in conflict with 
any of their existing negative beliefs about hunting. 
 
The results in Table 4.5 enable one to identify possible opportunities to 
introduce positive salient beliefs into opposers’ underlying belief structure.  It 
shows that opposers’ belief strength (  ) towards the positive beliefs that 
‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals’ (    –1.15) and that 
‘hunting is a way to experience nature and the outdoors’ (    –1.00) deviated 
significantly from neutral in a negative direction.  This suggests that opposers 
strongly believed that hunting does not result in these two positive outcomes. 
Consequently, it would be very difficult to convince opposers that hunting 
result in these two positive outcomes.  In contrast, the results further show 
that opposers’ belief strengths (  ) towards the two positive beliefs that 
‘hunting is a way of managing wild animals to prevent over-population’ (    –
0.39) and that ‘hunting holds economic benefits for the country’ (    0.00) 
were much closer to the neutral point.  Note, however, that opposers had only 
slightly favourable evaluations (  ) towards these two positive outcomes (    
+0.43 and +0.90, respectively) (Table 4.6).  Thus, even if these two positive 
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beliefs were to be successfully introduced into the salient beliefs structure of 
opposers, it will only have a relatively small positive impact on the attitudes of 
opposers (    products) and thus will result in little or no significant change 
in their attitudes towards hunting.  In addition, it is also important to realise 
that changing or adding one or two beliefs may not be sufficient to produce a 
change in attitude.  Only when there is a substantial shift in the summative 
indices of behavioural beliefs will it result in a change in attitude.   
 
Overall then, the results that were discussed in this section suggest that it 
would be extremely difficult to change opposers’ attitudes towards hunting.  
These findings are also consistent with previous research, which also found 
that staunch opponents to hunting are very resistant to changing their 
attitudes (Campbell & MacKay, 2003; Herzog, 1993; Shaw, 1977). 
 
4.3.3.3 Moderates’ attitudes towards hunting and their causal determinants 
 
In a similar fashion, it is possible to examine the cognitive foundation on which 
moderates based their attitudes towards hunting.  Again, Table 4.4, Table 4.5, 
and Table 4.6 facilitate the examination of the main causal determinants of 
moderates’ attitudes towards hunting.  The belief strength (  ) values in Table 
4.5 show that, on average, moderates associated hunting with virtually all of 
the salient beliefs listed in the modal set (  for all the salient beliefs ranged 
from +0.04 to +1.23).  Thus, all of those salient beliefs are causal 
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determinants of moderates’ attitudes towards hunting.  It is, however, worth 
noting that moderates’ belief strength (  ) towards the majority of the salient 
beliefs listed in Table 4.5 deviated relatively little from neutral in a positive 
direction, indicating that most of these salient beliefs were only weakly held by 
moderates.  Looking at the outcome evaluations (  ) displayed in Table 4.6, it 
is evident that moderates had favourable evaluations of the positive salient 
outcomes (  for the four positive salient beliefs ranged from +1.05 to +1.54) 
and unfavourable evaluations of the inherently negative salient outcomes (  
for the eight negative salient beliefs ranged from –0.10 to –1.73).  When the 
belief strength measures (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) for each individual 
salient belief were multiplied, their respective     products (Table 4.4) 
showed that the salient beliefs generally had relatively weak impacts on 
moderates’ attitudes towards hunting (  for all the salient beliefs’     
products ranged from –1.35 to +1.23).  This finding makes sense because it is 
reasonable to expect that the causal determinants of an impartial attitude 
would be based on salient beliefs that contribute to the attitude in a fairly 
moderate fashion.   
 
A number of noteworthy aspects that hold important implications for 
understanding and changing the attitudes of moderates may be inferred from 
the results presented in Table 4.5.  Firstly, it is clear that most of the beliefs 
strength (  ) values deviated relatively little from neutral, indicating that 
moderates did not hold their salient beliefs with great certainty or conviction.  
The fact that moderates’ salient beliefs about hunting are weakly held raises 
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the expectation that moderates would not be very resistant to persuasive 
interventions that targets their existing salient beliefs about hunting.  It also 
shows that there would be ample room for changes to occur in moderates’ 
belief strength (  ).  Furthermore, the standard deviations associated with the 
belief strength (  ) of moderates were in most instances relatively high 
compared to that of supporters and opposers (Table 4.5).  It suggests that 
moderates were largely divergent with respect to their perceived likelihoods 
that hunting will result in the various positive and negative salient outcomes.  
This finding provides further support for the expectation that it would be 
possible to change many of the salient beliefs on which moderates’ attitudes 
towards hunting are based.  The only obvious exception to the 
abovementioned generalisations has to do with moderates’ salient belief that 
‘hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters’.  The results show that 
moderates believed this particular salient belief to be a fairly likely outcome of 
hunting (    +1.23) and that there were relatively little variance amongst 
moderates with respect to how strongly they held this particular belief (   
+0.77).  This finding makes sense, because this particular salient belief is, in 
fact, the most direct and obvious outcome of hunting.  Thus, there would be 
no sense in trying to influence moderates’ perceived likelihoods with respect 
to this particular belief. 
 
In the second place, the results in Table 4.5 show that, in contrast to 
supporters and opposers (who’s attitudes were almost exclusively based on 
positive salient beliefs and negative salient beliefs, respectively), moderates’ 
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attitudes were simultaneously based on many positive and many negative 
salient beliefs.  This coexistence of positive and negative reactions to hunting 
suggests that moderates have fairly ambivalent attitudes towards hunting.  
The literature review on ambivalent attitudes (see section 2.2.5 of chapter 2) 
suggest that, compared to non-ambivalent attitudes, ambivalent attitudes are 
said to be more likely to change over time, to be less resistant to persuasive 
appeals, and to be less likely to bias processing of attitude-relevant 
information (Armitage & Conner, 2000, pp.1421 – 1430).  This further 
suggests that moderates would be fairly susceptible to persuasive messages 
that aim to change their attitudes towards hunting. 
 
By now it should be evident that efforts to strengthen public support for 
hunting would be most effective if they resonate with the segment of the public 
with moderate attitudes towards hunting.  The remainder of this section is thus 
aimed at investigating the implications that the results hold for improving the 
social legitimacy of hunting.  Towards this aim, the results pertaining to the 
belief strength (  ) of moderates hold important implications for effectuating a 
desired change in the existing salient beliefs on which moderates based their 
attitudes towards hunting.  One way of changing the existing salient beliefs on 
which moderates based their attitudes towards hunting is by raising their 
perceived likelihood in those positive salient outcomes they already associate 
with hunting.  In this regard, the results in Table 4.5 show that moderates’ 
belief strength (  ) were very close to being neutral for the two positive salient 
beliefs that ‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals’ (    
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+0.04) and that ‘hunting is a way to experience nature and the outdoors’ (    
+0.11).  In addition, moderates believed it to be only somewhat likely that 
‘hunting is a way of managing the number of wild animals in an area to 
prevent over-population’ (    +0.62) and that ‘hunting holds economic 
benefits for the country’ (    +0.94).  Evidently, these four positive salient 
beliefs about hunting are currently only weakly held by moderates.  This 
suggests that there is ample room for strengthening moderates’ perceived 
likelihoods that hunting results in these positive outcomes.  To establish which 
of these four salient beliefs hold the most promising potential for being 
strengthened further, supporters’ belief strength (  ) were used as a 
benchmark to compare that belief strengths (  ) of moderates against.  Tukey-
post hoc tests were used to identify statistically significant differences in the 
belief strength (  ) of supporters and moderates, while Cohen’s   effect size 
measures were used to establish the practical significance of those 
differences.  It was found that extremely meaningful differences existed 
between moderates and supporters with respect to their perceived likelihood 
that ‘hunting is a way to experience nature and the outdoors’ (   0.05; 
Cohen’s    1.40   very large effect size), that ‘hunting contributes to 
conservation of wild animals’ (   0.05; Cohen’s    1.33   very large effect 
size), that ‘hunting is a way of managing the number of wild animals in an 
area to prevent over-population’ (   0.05; Cohen’s    1.19   very large 
effect size) and that ‘hunting holds economic benefits for the country’ (   
0.05; Cohen’s    1.06   very large effect size).  Overall then, the results 
suggest that there is ample room and promising opportunities to strengthen 
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moderates’ perceived likelihood with respect to all four of these positive 
salient outcomes. 
 
Another way of changing the existing salient beliefs on which moderates 
based their attitudes towards hunting would be by decreasing moderates’ 
belief strength (  ) with respect to those negative salient outcomes they 
already associate with hunting.  To establish which of the negative salient 
beliefs in the modal set hold the most promising potential in this regard, the 
belief strength (  ) measures of supporters were used as a benchmark to 
compare moderates against.  Tukey-post hoc tests were used to identify 
statistically significant differences in the belief strength (  ) of supporters and 
moderates, while Cohen’s   effect size measures were used to establish how 
meaningful those differences are from a practical point of view.  The results 
are displayed in Table 4.5 and show that very meaningful differences existed 
between moderates and supporters with respect to their perceived likelihood 
that hunting ‘is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’ (   0.05; 
Cohen’s    1.47   very large effect size), ‘causes pain and suffering to wild 
animals’ (   0.05; Cohen’s    1.31   very large effect size), and that 
hunting ‘results in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals’ (   
0.05; Cohen’s    1.20   very large effect size).  Furthermore, very 
meaningful differences existed between moderates and supporters with 
respect to their perceived likelihood that ‘hunters often kill animals 
unnecessarily without having a good reason or useful purpose for doing so’ 
(   0.05; Cohen’s    1.05   large effect size), that ‘hunting leads to 
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unethical hunting practices’ (   0.05; Cohen’s    1.01   large effect size), 
and that ‘hunting leads to the endangerment and extinction of wild animal 
species’ (   0.05; Cohen’s    0.98   large effect size).  These findings 
suggest that the six negative beliefs mentioned above may hold very 
promising implications for improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  Looking 
at the average belief strength (  ) values for these six salient beliefs (Table 
4.5), it is evident that moderates believed it to be slightly likely that hunting 
would result in these particular outcomes (  for the six negative salient beliefs 
ranged from +0.29 to +0.79).  The results suggest that there is ample room 
and promising opportunities to decrease moderates’ perceived likelihood with 
respect to these six negative salient outcomes.  In contrast, however, the 
result in Table 4.5 further show that no significant differences were found to 
exist between moderates and supporters with respect to their perceived 
likelihood that ‘hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ (   
0.59) and that ‘hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ 
(   0.26).  This suggests that there is little room for decreasing moderates’ 
belief strength (  ) with respect to these two negative salient outcomes of 
hunting.  Overall then, while these two particular salient beliefs are of little 
value as far as changing attitudes towards hunting is concerned, there is 
ample room and promising opportunities to decrease moderates’ perceived 
likelihood with respect to the aforementioned six negative salient outcomes. 
 
In addition to changing attitudes by modifying the strength with which people 
associate hunting with various outcomes (  ), the theory of reasoned action 
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postulates that it may also be possible to effectuate a change in attitudes by 
modifying how people evaluate those outcomes they associate with hunting 
(  ).  In this regard, it should by now be clear that all indications suggest that it 
would be more difficult to change the outcome evaluations (  ) of a belief than 
to change the strength with which a belief is held (  ).  The results in Table 4.5 
and Table 4.6 again confirm this finding as far as the moderate attitudinal sub-
group is concerned.  From the standard deviations that accompany the belief 
strength (  ) and the outcome evaluations (  ) of moderates, it is evident that 
much less variance existed in their outcome evaluations (  ) than in their belief 
strength (  ).  This indicates that moderates agreed to a large extent in their 
positive and negative evaluations of the various outcomes, but that they had 
fairly divergent opinions with regards to how likely they thought it is that 
hunting results in the various outcomes.  Consistent with previous findings, 
this provides support for the expectation that it would be much more difficult to 
change moderates’ outcome evaluations (  ) than it would be to change the 
strength with which their beliefs are held (  ).  Nevertheless, the results 
displayed in Table 4.6 suggest that it may be possible to slightly improve the 
outcome evaluations (  ) of moderates with respect to a few of their positive 
salient beliefs.  In particular, the results show that moderates’ evaluations 
towards ‘managing wild animals to prevent over-population’ were much less 
favourable (    +1.05) than that of supporters (    +1.93) (   0.05; Cohen’s 
   1.21   very large effect size).  It suggests that moderates may be 
somewhat incognisant about the importance of managing wild animals to 
prevent over-population.  This points out that an opportunity exists to improve 
moderates’ attitudes towards hunting by making them aware of the 
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importance of managing wild animals to prevent over-population.  Similarly, 
compared to supporters (    +1.75), moderates were found to also have less 
favourable evaluations towards ‘hunting benefiting the economy of the 
country’ (    +1.14) (   0.05; Cohen’s    0.97   large effect size).  This 
suggests that a possibility may exist to raise moderates’ evaluations towards 
the economic contributions of hunting.  This could, perhaps, be achieved by 
emphasising the direct positive impacts that hunting have on the lives of 
people as a result of the contributions it makes to the country’s economy (e.g., 
job creation).  In addition, it was found that moderates had slightly less 
favourable evaluations towards the outcome of ‘contributing to the 
conservation of wild animals’ (    +1.54) than did supporters (    +1.93) (   
0.05; Cohen’s    0.61   moderate effect size).  It suggests that it may be 
possible to raise moderates’ awareness of the importance of contributing to 
the conservation of wild animals in order to further strengthen the positive 
impact that this salient belief has on their attitude towards hunting.  Lastly, 
moderates’ evaluations towards ‘experiencing nature and the outdoors’ (    
+1.51) were slightly less favourable than that of supporters (    +1.88) (   
0.05; Cohen’s    0.52   moderate effect size).  Thus, it may be possible to 
get moderates to adopt slightly more favourable evaluations towards 
experiencing nature and the outdoors.  This could perhaps be accomplished 
by exposing moderates to persuasive messages or experiences that 
highlights the enjoyable aspects of spending time in nature and the outdoors.  
Since moderates already hold fairly positive evaluations (  ) towards these 
four salient outcomes, there is reason to expect that moderates will easily 
accept information that is aimed at further raising their positive evaluations (  ) 
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towards those outcomes.  However, it should be realised that since their 
outcome evaluations (  ) of these salient beliefs are already fairly positive, 
there is only little room for further raising their positive evaluations of these 
outcomes.  Thus, although it would be possible to effectively raise the 
outcome evaluations (  ) of these four positive salient beliefs, it should be 
realised that it does not have the potential to result in any large or significant 
changes in the overall positive impact that these beliefs have on moderates’ 
attitudes towards hunting. 
 
In addition to effectuating a desired change in an attitude by changing some of 
the existing salient beliefs on which the targeted attitude is based, it is also 
possible to introduce new salient beliefs into the underlying salient belief 
structure.  Because moderates hold impartial attitudes towards hunting, they 
are expected to process new information about hunting in a fairly balanced 
manner.  Furthermore, because moderates’ existing salient beliefs about 
hunting are generally weakly held, there is little risk of causing cognitive 
dissonance (see section 2.2.6 of chapter 2) when introducing new beliefs 
about hunting into their cognitive foundations.  Overall then, all indications are 
that it may be very effective to change the attitudes of moderates by 
introducing new positive beliefs about hunting into their underlying salient 
belief structure.  To name a few examples, persuasive interventions could be 
designed to convey the message that game meat is healthy and that hunting 
is a way of obtaining game meat, that hunting is an enjoyable way of getting 
exercise and increasing your fitness and health, that hunting can promote 
environmental awareness by teaching people about nature and the outdoors, 
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that hunting is a way to connect and learn about wildlife and nature, that 
hunters have a sincere interest in conserving wild animals, etc. 
  
4.3.4 Influences of background factors on attitudes towards hunting and its 
underlying salient beliefs 
  
This section is aimed at solving sub-problem 1.3.5 of this study.  Towards this 
aim, this section provides an understanding of how various background 
factors (demographical and social differences) shape the way in which hunting 
is perceived by the public.  This was done by comparing the salient beliefs on 
which participants from various demographical and social backgrounds based 
their attitudes towards hunting and pointing out the fundamental differences in 
this regard.  It should be noted that the background factors will be discussed 
in order of importance, starting with those background factors that were found 
to have the largest influence on attitudes towards hunting, through to those 
background factors that had the smallest influence.   
 
4.3.4.1 The effect of direct exposure on attitudes towards hunting and its causal 
determinants 
 
Participants in the primary survey were asked to indicate how often they go 
hunting.  Based on their responses pertaining to their hunting behaviour, the 
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sample participants were divided into three groups (Table 4.7 to Table 4.10).  
The first group consisted of participants who have never gone hunting before 
(never).  The second group consisted of a combination of participants, ranging 
from those who have gone hunting only once before through to those 
participants who seldom go hunting (once in 2 years or less).  The third group 
consisted of participants who go hunting frequently (once a year or more).  
Note that since the objective of this section is to investigate the effect that 
direct exposure to hunting has on attitudes towards hunting and its causal 
determinants, it would be most logical and effective to compare the attitudes 
and salient beliefs of those participants in the first (non-hunting participants) 
and the third (hunting participants) groups.  Thus, the result pertaining to the 
second (seldom) group will not form part of this discussion, but for the sake of 
completeness it is nevertheless included in the Tables that will follow.  To 
enhance the flow of the discussions that follow, the first group will be referred 
to as non-hunting participants, while the third group will be referred to as 
hunting participants. 
  
To establish whether or not the direct exposure to hunting had any significant 
effect on attitudes towards hunting, the mean attitudes scores (  ) of non-
hunting and hunting participants were compared using  -test analysis.  It was 
found that these two groups differed significantly (   10.04,    0.01), with 
non-hunting participants showing slight disapproval of hunting (    –0.53) and 
hunting participants showing strong approval of hunting (    +1.49).  Further 
analysis with Cohen’s   test revealed that this observed difference in attitude 
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was very large and highly significant from a practical point of view (Cohen’s 
   1.84   extremely large effect size).  It is noteworthy that, of all the 
background factors that were included in this study, direct exposure to hunting 
was found to have by far the most significant influence on participants’ 
attitudes towards hunting. 
  
 To gain a better understanding of why non-hunting and hunting participants 
differed substantially with respect to their attitudes towards hunting, it is 
necessary to examine the fundamental differences that exist in the cognitive 
foundations on which they based their respective attitudes.  Towards this aim, 
the results in Table 4.7 show that in the case of non-hunting participants as 
well as hunting participants, the sum of their belief-evaluation products (     ) 
correlated strongly with their respective direct attitude scores (  ) (   0.75 
and    0.58, respectively, at    0.01).  This suggests that the modal set of 
salient beliefs accurately account for the attitudes of both groups.  Closer 
inspection of the correlations between the     products of each individual 
salient belief and the direct attitude measure (  ) reveal that all of the beliefs 
in the modal set were significantly related to non-hunting participants’ attitudes 
towards hunting (  ranged from 0.37 to 0.67 at    0.01).  In the case of 
hunting participants, however, the results show that not all of the salient 
beliefs accounted for their attitudes towards hunting, suggesting that only 
some of the beliefs in the modal set were important causal determinants of 
their attitudes towards hunting.  Specifically, only the beliefs that ‘hunting 
holds economic benefits for the country’, that ‘hunting is a way of experiencing 
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nature and the outdoors’, that ‘hunting is a way of managing wild animals to 
prevent over-population’, and that ‘hunting contributes to the conservation of 
wild animals’ were significantly related to hunting participants’ attitudes 
towards hunting (  ranged from 0.56 to 0.58 at    0.01).   
 
To further examine the fundamental differences in the cognitive foundations 
on which non-hunting and hunting participants based their respective 
attitudes, it is necessary to identify the particular salient beliefs with the 
biggest difference regarding their impact (    products) on the respective 
attitudes of the two behavioural groups.  Towards this aim, the mean     
products of every individual salient belief were compared across the three 
behavioural groups by making use of a series of Tukey post-hoc tests.  The 
results of this comparative analysis are displayed in Table 4.8 and indicate 
that statistically significant differences existed between non-hunting and 
hunting participants with respect to the     products of each salient belief.  
Further analysis with Cohen’s   tests revealed that all of these between-group 
differences were extremely large and thus very meaningful from a practical 
point of view (Cohen’s   ranged from 1.01 to 1.82   very large effect size).  
This finding suggests that the manner in which every salient belief impacted 
on attitudes towards hunting differed substantially between non-hunting and 
hunting participants.  In sum then, the results suggest that all of the salient 
beliefs in the modal set were implicated in the fundamental differences that 
exist in the cognitive foundations on which non-hunting and hunting 
participants based their respective attitudes towards hunting.  Therefore, it is 
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necessary to investigate all of the salient beliefs in the modal set in more 
depth. 
 
To fully understand the reason for the observed differences in the impact that 
every salient belief had on the attitudes of the two behavioural groups, it is 
necessary to compare the belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) 
that constitute the     products of every individual salient belief in the modal 
set.  Towards this aim, a series of Tukey post-hoc tests were used to identify 
between-group differences with respect to the belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluations (  ) of every salient belief in the modal set.  All of the statistically 
significant between-group differences that were identified are indicated in 
Table 4.9 and Table 10 respectively, and will be discussed throughout the 
remainder of this section.   
 
As far as belief strength (  ) is concerned, the results from the comparative 
analysis (Table 4.9) showed that non-hunting and hunting participants differed 
substantially with respect to nearly all of the salient beliefs in the modal set.  
The only exception occurred with respect to the salient belief that ‘hunting 
results in wild animals being killed by hunters’, in which case participants from 
both behavioural groups were unanimous in their perceived likelihood that 
hunting results in this particular outcome.  With respect to all of the remaining 
salient beliefs, statistically significant differences were found to exist between 
the belief strength (  ) of the non-hunting and the hunting participants.  
Further analysis with Cohen’s   tests found that nearly all of these differences 
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were very large and extremely meaningful from a practical point of view 
(Cohen’s   ranged from 0.51 to 1.89   moderate to very large effect size).  
Specifically, it was found that hunting participants strongly believed that 
‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals’ (    +1.69) while non-
hunting participants did not regard this as a likely outcome of hunting (    –
0.41) (   0.05, Cohen’s    1.83   very large effect size).  Similarly, hunting 
participants strongly believed that ‘hunting is a way to experience nature and 
the outdoors’ (    +1.74) while non-hunting participants regard this as an 
unlikely outcome of hunting (    –0.35) (   0.05, Cohen’s    1.77   very 
large effect size).  Conversely, hunting participants did not believe that 
‘hunting leads to unethical hunting practices’ (    –1.06), while non-hunting 
participants believed this to be an extremely likely outcome of hunting (    
+0.86) (   0.05, Cohen’s    1.89   very large effect size).  Similarly, 
hunting participants did not perceive hunting to ‘cause pain and suffering to 
wild animals’ (    –0.46) or that ‘hunters would kill animals unnecessarily’ 
(    –0.97), while non-hunting participants believed this to be quite likely (    
+1.14 and     +0.73 respectively) (   0.05, Cohen’s    1.65 and 1.65 
respectively   very large effect size).  In addition, hunting participants also did 
not believe that ‘hunting leads to the endangerment and extinction of wild 
animal species’ (    –1.00), that ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild 
animal population’ (    –0.89) or that ‘hunting results in the cruel and 
inhumane treatment of wild animals’ (    –0.66), while non-hunting 
participants believed this to be a somewhat likely outcome of hunting (    
+0.79,     +0.75 and     +0.84 respectively) (   0.05, Cohen’s    1.64, 
1.59 and 1.41 respectively   very large effect size).  Furthermore, compared 
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to hunting participants, non-hunting participants were much less likely to 
believe that ‘hunting is a way of managing wild animals to prevent over-
population’ (    +1.49 and     +0.34 respectively,    0.05, Cohen’s    
1.10   very large effect size); and that ‘hunting holds economic benefits for 
the country’ (    +1.74 and     +0.67 respectively,    0.05, Cohen’s    
1.08   very large effect size).  Moreover, compared to hunting participants, 
non-hunting participants were slightly more likely to believe that ‘hunters take 
pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ (    +0.03 and     +0.62 
respectively,    0.05, Cohen’s    0.51   moderate effect size).  Overall, 
these findings seem to suggest that hunting participants perceived it to be 
much more likely that hunting would result in favourable outcomes and much 
less likely that hunting would result in unfavourable outcomes. 
 
As far as outcome evaluations (  ) are concerned, the results in Table 4.10 
show that non-hunting and hunting participants differed in their judgements 
with respect to only some of the salient outcomes.  These statistically 
significant between-group differences are indicated in Table 10.  It should be 
noted, however, that not all of these statistically significant differences were 
large enough to be meaningful from a practical point of view and thus 
accounted for very little of the differences in the cognitive foundations on 
which the two behavioural groups based their respective attitudes towards 
hunting.  Only with respect to four of the salient outcomes in the modal set did 
practically meaningful differences exist between the outcome evaluations (  ) 
of non-hunting and hunting participants.  In the case of the first practically 
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meaningful difference, hunting participants had fairly positive evaluations 
towards ‘wild animals being killed by hunters’ (    +0.97), while non-hunting 
participants evaluated this outcome as slightly negative (    –0.57) (   0.05, 
Cohen’s    1.54   very large effect size).  Secondly, hunting participants 
had neutral to slightly positive evaluations towards ‘hunters taking pleasure 
and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ (    +0.14), while non-hunting 
participants evaluated this outcome as quite negative (    –1.16) (   0.05, 
Cohen’s    1.34   very large effect size).  With respect to the third 
practically meaningful difference, hunting participants had much more positive 
evaluations towards the ‘management of wild animal populations to prevent 
over-population’ (    +1.80) than did non-hunting participants (    +0.81) 
(   0.05, Cohen’s    1.19   very large effect size).  As far as the fourth and 
final practically meaningful difference is concerned, hunting participants had 
more positive evaluations towards ‘experiencing nature and the outdoors’ (    
+1.89) than did non-hunting participants (    +1.44) (   0.05, Cohen’s    
0.57   moderate effect size).  Since hunting participants were more inclined to 
have positive evaluations towards these four salient outcomes, it seems that 
hunting participants better understood what hunting is all about and what the 
role of hunting is. 
 
Overall the results suggest that direct exposure to hunting was the single 
variable in this study that had by far the most significant influence on attitudes 
towards hunting and its underlying causal determinants.  The findings suggest 
that the fundamental differences between the cognitions of the non-hunting 
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and hunting participants were largely the result of differences in their belief 
strength (  ) and, to a much lesser extent, differences in their outcome 
evaluations (  ).  Compared to participants who have never been directly 
exposed to hunting, participants who go hunting frequently were more likely to 
recognise the positive outcomes of hunting, and much less likely to associate 
hunting with negative outcomes.  It thus seems that non-hunting participants 
were fairly incognisant about matters pertaining to hunting.   
 
It is important to recognise that participants who have never gone hunting 
before would not have any personal experience about hunting and, as a 
result, it is unlikely that their attitudes towards hunting are based on 
observational beliefs.  Instead it could be assumed that their attitudes towards 
hunting are, in all likelihood, based on a combination of informational or 
inferential beliefs (see section 2.4.8.1 of chapter 2).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
307 
 
TABLE 4.7. Correlations of belief-evaluation product with direct attitude measure: differences between                   
frequencies of participation in hunting. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Correlation     with attitude (  ) 
Never  Once in 2 
years or less 
 Once a year 
or more 
(     )  (    )  (    ) 
        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  0.67**         0.60**        0.31 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  0.67**         0.62**        0.23 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  0.52**         0.69**        0.56** 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  0.60**         0.55**        0.27 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  0.55**         0.50**        0.22 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  0.57**         0.51**        0.26 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  0.41**         0.69**        0.57** 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  0.52**         0.44**        0.28 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  0.43**         0.57**        0.11 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.  0.44**         0.53**        0.57** 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.  0.37**         0.56**        0.58** 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  0.39**         0.56**        0.21 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )  0.75**  0.75**  0.58** 
Correlations significant at:  *       and **       ; all other correlations are not significant. 
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TABLE 4.8. Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between                    
frequencies of participation in hunting. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
Never  Once in 2 years 
or less 
 Once a year or 
more 
(     )  (    )  (    ) 
              
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.29a (1.87)   -0.07b (2.02)    1.43c (1.67) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.85a (1.79)    0.25b (1.96)    1.46c (1.44) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.68a (2.16)    0.64b (2.29)    3.09c (1.44) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.64a (1.96)   -0.23b (2.38)    1.31c (1.89) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.56a (2.06)   -0.10b (2.42)    1.83c (1.65) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -2.00a (1.85)   -0.96b (2.16)    0.71c (1.81) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.41a (2.23)    1.23b (2.24)    3.31c (1.08) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -1.28a (1.99)    0.22b (2.37)    1.60c (1.63) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.45a (2.12)   -0.37b (2.54)    2.11c (1.43) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.73a (1.31)    1.48b (1.64)    2.83c (1.54) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.97a (1.45)    1.57b (1.78)    2.94c (1.43) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -0.94a (1.91)   -0.16b (1.64)    0.94c (1.45) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )    -10.42
a (15.49)    3.49b (19.33)  23.57c (11.43) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation products (   ) can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences: means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.9. Mean belief strength for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between frequencies of                     
participation in hunting. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  ) 
Never  Once in 2 years 
or less 
 Once a year or 
more 
(     )  (    )  (    ) 
              
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   0.75a (1.04)   -0.10b (1.16)   -0.89c (0.96) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.34 (0.77)    1.22 (0.84)    1.29 (0.71) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.41a (1.21)    0.35b (1.24)    1.69c (0.63) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   0.84a (1.06)    0.11b (1.27)   -0.66c (1.08) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   0.86a (1.05)    0.04b (1.33)   -1.06c (0.76) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   1.14a (0.96)    0.46b (1.23)   -0.46c (1.01) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.35a (1.26)    0.58b (1.28)    1.74c (0.44) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   0.73a (1.06)   -0.17b (1.29)   -0.97c (0.82) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   0.79a (1.12)    0.20b (1.35)   -1.00c (0.87) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.34a (1.08)    0.77b (1.12)    1.49c (0.82) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.67a (1.05)    1.04b (1.08)    1.74c (0.51) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.62a (1.14)    0.30a,b (1.17)    0.03b (1.20) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.10. Mean outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between frequencies                       
of participation in hunting. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Never  Once in 2 years 
or less 
 Once a year or 
more 
(     )  (    )  (    ) 
              
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.54 (0.61)   -1.42 (0.80)   -1.31 (0.80) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.57a (1.03)    0.17b (1.16)    0.97c (0.79) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   1.54 (0.73)    1.64 (0.62)    1.80 (0.41) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.81 (0.46)   -1.75 (0.54)   -1.69 (0.72) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.73 (0.58)   -1.67 (0.61)   -1.57 (0.88) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -1.69a (0.54)   -1.54a,b (0.65)   -1.43b (0.74) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   1.44a (0.84)    1.65a,b (0.59)    1.89b (0.40) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -1.65 (0.62)   -1.68 (0.57)   -1.57 (0.78) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.80 (0.43)   -1.75 (0.49)   -1.57 (0.98) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.81a (0.88)    1.33b (0.69)    1.80c (0.41) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.44 (0.73)    1.31 (0.63)    1.60 (0.65) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -1.16a (0.94)   -0.36b (1.12)    0.14c (1.12) 
Note:  Outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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4.3.4.2 The effect of social ties on attitudes towards hunting and its causal 
determinants 
 
Participants in the primary survey were divided into two groups based on 
whether or not they have any close social ties with people who hunt regularly 
(e.g., family members, friends) (Table 4.11 to Table 4.13).  In order to improve 
the flow of the discussion that follow, these two groups will be referred to as 
social groups.  The mean attitudes scores (  ) of these two social groups 
were compared using  -test analysis.  Strong evidence was found that a 
statistically significant difference exists between the mean direct attitude 
measure (  ) of these two social groups (   7.48,    0.01).  Subsequent 
analysis with Cohen’s   tests further revealed that having close social ties 
with hunters had an overall large effect on participants’ attitudes towards 
hunting (Cohen’s    0.83   large effect size).  Based on the latter, it was 
evident that having close social ties with hunters was the background factor 
that had the second largest effect on participants’ attitudes towards hunting.  
Participants who have close social ties with hunters were much more inclined 
to approve of hunting (    +0.40) compared to participants who had no social 
ties with hunters (    –0.62).  This finding may be explained by the notion that 
attitudes and behavioural norms typically develop within social groups or 
subcultures.  Another possible explanation for this finding is that people with 
close social ties with hunters have, in all likelihood, been exposed to hunting 
in either a direct or indirect manner, resulting in them having a more accurate 
perception of what hunting is about. 
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Since it was found that having social ties with hunters had a large effect on 
participants’ attitudes towards hunting, one would expect there to be 
substantial differences in the salient beliefs on which the two social groups 
based their respective attitudes towards hunting.  To investigate this 
expectation, the salient beliefs on which the two social groups based their 
respective attitudes towards hunting were compared.  The results of this 
comparative analysis are displayed in Table 4.11, Table 4.12 and Table 4.13 
and will be discussed in the remainder of this section.   
 
Table 4.11 shows that the     products of each individual salient belief was 
strongly related to the direct attitude measure (  ) in the case of participants 
who have close social ties with hunters (  ranged from 0.57 to 0.71 at    
0.01) and weakly to strongly related in the case of participants who had no 
social ties with hunters (  ranged from 0.25 to 0.64 at    0.01).  Evidently, all 
the correlations were found to be highly significant (   0.01) and thus 
accounted for variation in the attitudes of both social groups.  This confirms 
that all the salient beliefs were related to the two social groups’ respective 
attitudes towards hunting.  The overall sum of the belief-evaluation products 
(     ) for each of the two social groups also correlate highly with their 
respective direct attitude scores (  ) (   0.82 and    0.70 respectively at 
   0.01).  This provides strong evidence that the total set of salient beliefs 
accurately account for the fundamental causal determinants on which both 
social groups based their respective attitudes towards hunting.  
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Having verified that the salient beliefs under investigation are significantly 
related to the attitudes of both social groups, it is possible to identify the 
particular salient beliefs that differ the most in their impact on the attitudes of 
the two social groups.  Towards this aim, the mean     products of every 
individual salient belief were compared between the two social groups by 
making use of a series of  -test analysis.  The results of this comparative 
analysis are displayed in Table 4.12.  Evidently, statistically significant 
differences exist between the two social groups with respect to the impact that 
every individual single salient belief had on their attitudes towards hunting 
(   0.01).  Analysis with Cohen’s   tests further revealed that all of these 
differences were large enough to be meaningful from a practical point of view 
(Cohen’s   ranged from 0.50 to 0.80   moderate to large effect size).  This 
suggests, firstly, meaningful differences exist between the cognitive 
foundations on which the two social groups based their attitudes towards 
hunting and, secondly, that all the salient beliefs in the modal set were 
implicated in these cognitive differences. 
 
Inspection of the belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) that 
constitute the     products of the salient beliefs provides further insight into 
the reason for the observed differences in the impact that the salient beliefs 
have on the attitudes of the two social groups (Table 4.13).  Using a series of 
 -tests to compare the two social groups, evidence was found that the two 
social groups differed significantly in both their belief strength (  ) and 
outcome evaluations (  ) with respect to many salient beliefs.  All of the 
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statistically significant differences are indicated in Table 4.13.  Note, however, 
that the observed differences were in some cases too small to be practically 
meaningful and thus accounted for very little of the differences in the cognitive 
foundations on which the two social groups based their respective attitudes 
towards hunting.  These findings are discussed in detail throughout the 
remainder of this section.   
 
With respect to belief strength (  ), statistically significant differences existed 
between the two social groups for nearly all of the salient beliefs (Table 4.13).  
Only a single exception to the latter occurred: both social groups’ perceived 
likelihoods that ‘hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters’ were 
essentially identical (   0.08,    0.93), with both groups believing that this is 
a very likely outcome of hunting (    +1.30 and     +1.31 respectively).  
However, the two social groups differed significantly in their belief strength (  ) 
with respect to all the remainder of the salient beliefs.  Cohen’s   tests found 
that nearly all of these differences were large enough to be meaningful from a 
practical point of view.  The only exception occurred with respect to the single 
salient belief that ‘hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’, 
in which case the difference between the belief strength (  ) of the two social 
groups were only significant from a statistical point of view, but not large 
enough to be practically meaningful (Cohen’s    0.21   very small effect 
size).  With this being the only exception, all of the other statistically significant 
differences in belief strength (  ) were large enough to be meaningful from a 
practical point of view (Cohen’s   ranged from 0.58 to 0.88   moderate to 
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large effect size).  Specifically, it was found that participants who have close 
social ties with hunters believed that ‘hunting is a way of experiencing nature 
and the outdoors’ (    +0.62) while participants who have no social ties with 
hunters did not regard this as a likely outcome of hunting (    –0.50) (   
7.91,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.88   moderate effect size).  Similarly, 
participants who have close social ties with hunters believed that ‘hunting 
contributes to the conservation of wild animals’ (    +0.46), while participants 
who have no social ties with hunters did not regard this as a likely outcome of 
hunting (    –0.55) (   7.30,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.81   moderate effect 
size).  Furthermore, compared to participants who have no social ties with 
hunters, participants who have close social ties with hunters were less likely to 
believe that ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’ (    
+0.87 and     –0.06 respectively,    7.63,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.85   
moderate effect size); that ‘hunting leads to unethical hunting practices’ (    
+0.91 and     +0.06 respectively,    6.47,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.72   
moderate effect size); that ‘hunting results in the endangerment and extinction 
of wild animal species’ (    +0.89 and     +0.08 respectively,    5.98,    
0.01, Cohen’s    0.66   moderate effect size); that ‘hunting causes pain and 
suffering to wild animals’ (    +1.18 and     +0.47 respectively,    5.74,    
0.01, Cohen’s    0.64   moderate effect size); that ‘hunters kill animals 
unnecessarily’ (    +0.71 and     0.00,    5.36,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.60 
  moderate effect size); and that ‘hunting results in the cruel and inhumane 
treatment of wild animals’ (    +0.87 and     +0.19,    5.20,    0.01, 
Cohen’s    0.58   moderate effect size).  Moreover, compared to 
participants who have no social ties with hunters, participants who have close 
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social ties with hunters were much more likely to believe that ‘hunting is a way 
of managing wild animals to prevent over-population’ (    +0.15 and     
+0.92 respectively,    6.49,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.72   moderate effect 
size); and that ‘hunting holds economic benefits for the country’ (    +0.55 
and     +1.16 respectively,    5.40,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.60   moderate 
effect size).  Overall, these findings seem to suggest that participants who 
have close social ties with hunters perceived it to be more likely that hunting 
would result in positive outcomes and less likely that hunting would result in 
negative outcomes. 
 
As far as outcome evaluations (  ) are concerned, the result in Table 4.13 
show that the two social groups differed only in some of their judgements of 
the salient outcomes.  Of those statistically significant differences that did, 
however, exist between the outcome evaluations (  ) of the two social groups, 
only three of these differences proved to be meaningful from a practical point 
of view.  In the case of the first practically meaningful difference, participants 
who have close social ties with hunters had much more favourable 
evaluations towards ‘managing wild animals to prevent over-population’ (    
+1.30) than did participants who have no social ties with hunters (    +0.74) 
(   6.61,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.68   moderate effect size).  As far as the 
second practically meaningful difference is concerned, participants who have 
close social ties with hunters had neutral to slightly positive evaluations 
towards ‘wild animals being killed by hunters’ (    +0.16), while participants 
who have no social ties with hunters evaluated this outcome as negative (    
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–0.67) (   6.91,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.77   moderate effect size).  With 
respect to the third practically meaningful difference, participants who have 
close social ties with hunters had much less negative evaluations towards 
‘hunters taking pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ (    –0.52) 
than did participants who have no social ties with hunters (    –1.18) (   
5.60,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.62   moderate effect size).  Overall, these 
findings seem to suggest that participants who have close social ties with 
hunters better understood the importance of managing wild animal 
populations, the role of hunting and what hunting is all about. 
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TABLE 4.11. Correlations of belief-evaluation product with direct attitude measure: differences                         
between social ties with hunters. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Correlation     with          
attitude (  ) 
Social ties  No Social ties 
(     )  (     ) 
     
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations. 0.68**          0.64** 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 0.71**          0.60** 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals. 0.67**          0.51** 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. 0.63**          0.61** 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices. 0.62**          0.51** 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals. 0.65**          0.49** 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors. 0.67**          0.41** 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily. 0.61**          0.46** 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species. 0.57**          0.45** 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population. 0.68**          0.25** 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country. 0.58**          0.32** 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing. 0.64**          0.26** 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )        0.83**          0.69** 
Correlations significant at:  *       and **       ; all other correlations are not significant. 
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TABLE 4.12.  Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between social ties                  
with hunters. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
Social ties  No social ties 
(     )  (     ) 
         
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.    0.00 (2.05)   -1.52** (1.80) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.    0.21 (1.91)   -0.97** (1.83) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.    0.88 (2.34)   -0.93** (2.18) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   -0.38 (2.44)   -1.68** (1.87) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   -0.14 (2.42)   -1.66** (2.07) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   -0.93 (2.19)   -2.08** (1.83) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.    1.21 (2.29)   -0.57** (2.31) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.    0.00 (2.26)   -1.31** (2.09) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   -0.10 (2.39)   -1.63** (2.22) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.    1.60 (1.65)    0.60** (1.27) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.    1.77 (1.71)    0.81** (1.40) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   -0.13 (1.73)   -1.04** (1.98) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )    4.86 (28.08)    -17.10** (21.41) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation product (   ) scores can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
 -test reveals differences significant at *        and **       ; all other means are not significantly different. 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.13. Mean belief strength and outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between social ties with 
hunters. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  )  Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Social ties  No social ties  Social ties  No social ties 
(     )  (     )  (     )  (     ) 
                   
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -0.06 (1.19)     0.87** (0.99)   -1.47 (0.71)   -1.50 (0.66) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.30 (0.76)     1.31 (0.81)    0.16 (1.14)   -0.67** (1.02) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   0.46 (1.27)    -0.55** (1.22)    1.69 (0.57)    1.47** (0.77) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   0.19 (1.27)     0.87** (1.06)   -1.84 (0.48)   -1.71* (0.55) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   0.06 (1.29)     0.91** (1.07)   -1.71 (0.64)   -1.68 (0.62) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   0.47 (1.21)     1.18** (0.98)   -1.64 (0.58)   -1.61 (0.62) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   0.62 (1.27)    -0.50** (1.27)    1.62 (0.70)     1.45* (0.82) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   0.00 (1.26)     0.71** (1.13)   -1.66 (0.58)   -1.64 (0.68) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   0.08 (1.27)     0.89** (1.16)   -1.76 (0.58)   -1.77 (0.47) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.92 (0.99)     0.15** (1.13)    1.30 (0.76)    0.74** (0.89) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.16 (0.93)     0.55** (1.11)    1.29 (0.70)    1.02** (0.72) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.36 (1.14)     0.61* (1.19)   -0.52 (1.15)   -1.18** (0.95) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
 -test reveals differences significant at *        and **       ; all other means are not significantly different. 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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4.3.4.3 The effect of gender differences on attitudes towards hunting and its causal 
determinants 
 
To establish whether or not the gender differences had any significant effect 
on attitudes towards hunting, the research sample was divided into male 
participants and female participants (Table 4.14 to Table 4.16) and their 
respective mean attitudes scores (  ) were compared using  -test analysis.  
The results of the primary survey found a significant difference between the 
mean direct attitude score (  ) of male and female participants (   5.41,    
0.01).  On average, male participants were more likely to support hunting than 
female participants (    +0.30 and –0.46, respectively).  Further analysis with 
Cohen’s   test revealed that, in practice, gender had only a moderate effect 
on participant’s attitudes towards hunting (Cohen’s    0.60   moderate 
effect size). 
 
To gain a better understanding of why male and female participants differed 
with respect to their attitudes towards hunting, it is necessary to examine the 
fundamental differences that exist in the cognitive foundations on which they 
based their respective attitudes.  Thus, to gain an understanding of why males 
were more likely to support hunting than females, it is necessary to identify the 
salient beliefs responsible for the observed differences in their respective 
attitudes towards hunting.  Towards this aim, Table 4.14 shows that the sum 
of the belief-evaluation products (     ) for both male and female participants 
correlated highly with their respective direct attitude scores (  ) (   0.83 and 
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   0.74, respectively, at    0.01).  This provides strong evidence that, in the 
case of both male and female participants, the modal set of listed salient 
beliefs accurately accounted for their respective attitudes towards hunting.  
Furthermore, the     products of each individual salient belief was strongly 
related to the direct attitude measure (  ) in the case of male participants (  
ranged from 0.53 to 0.71 at    0.01) and moderately to strongly related in the 
case of female respondents (  ranged from 0.43 to 0.67 at    0.01).  Thus, 
every individual salient belief accounted for considerable variation in the 
attitudes of male and female participants and may therefore provide 
meaningful insight into gender related differences in the cognitive foundation 
that underlie attitudes towards hunting.  It is worth pointing out, however, that 
compared to male respondents, the beliefs that ‘hunting is a way to 
experience nature and the outdoors’ and that ‘hunting is a way of managing 
wild animals to prevent over-population’ accounted for fairly little variance in 
the attitudes of female respondents.  This suggests that these two particular 
salient beliefs played a significantly less prominent role in determining female 
respondents’ attitudes towards hunting than it did in determining male 
respondents’ attitudes towards hunting.                                     
 
Having established that the salient beliefs are all significantly related to the 
attitudes of male and female participants, Table 4.15 facilitated a gender-
based comparison of the     products of the individual salient beliefs.  Such 
a comparative analysis enables one to identify differences in the impact every 
individual salient belief had on the attitude of male and female participants.  A 
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series of  -tests provided evidence of statistically significant gender 
differences in the mean     products of all 12 of the salient beliefs in the 
modal set, indicating that the manner in which all the salient beliefs impacted 
on attitudes towards hunting differed between male and female participants.  
Although gender differences in the     products of all the salient beliefs 
were found to be statistically significant, only a number of these differences 
were found to be large enough to be meaningful from a practical point of view.  
This included the salient beliefs that associated hunting with ‘experiencing 
nature and the outdoors’ (   5.21,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.58   moderate 
effect size) ‘hunters often killing animals unnecessarily’ (   4.57,    0.01, 
Cohen’s    0.51   moderate effect size), and ‘disrupting and harming wild 
animal populations’ (   4.41,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.50   moderate effect 
size).  Some other gender differences in     products that were of some 
noteworthy practical importance were also identified.  These included the 
salient beliefs that hunting ‘contributes to the conservation of wild animals’ 
(   4.35,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.48   small to moderate effect size), and 
‘leads to unethical hunting practices that do not give animals a fair chance of 
survival’ (   4.34,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.48   small to moderate effect 
size).  In sum then, the results suggest that these particular five salient beliefs 
accounted for the most fundamental differences in the cognitive foundations 
on which male and female participants based their respective attitudes 
towards hunting.  For this reason, these five salient beliefs were investigated 
further and will be referred to as the discriminating salient beliefs in the 
subsequent discussions on gender differences.  Inspection of the belief 
strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) that constitute the     products of 
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the five discriminating salient beliefs provides an explanation for the observed 
differences in the impact these beliefs had on the attitudes of male and female 
participants (Table 4.16).   
 
Evidently, the observed gender differences in the     products could be 
attributed to differences in both belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation 
(  ) in the case of those particular discriminating salient beliefs which 
associated hunting with ‘experiencing nature and the outdoors’, with 
‘disrupting and harming wild animal populations’, and with ‘unethical hunting 
practices that do not give animals a fair chance of survival’ (Table 4.16).  As 
far as the belief strength (  ) of these particular three discriminating salient 
beliefs are concerned, it was found that: female participants did not believe 
that hunting would result in the positive outcome of ‘experiencing nature and 
the outdoors’ (    –0.23), while male participants perceived it to be a likely 
outcome of hunting (    +0.41) (   5.66,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.63   
moderate effect size); female participants were much more likely to believe 
that hunting is ‘disruptive and harmful to wild animals’ (    +0.68) than were 
male participants (    +0.07) (   4.77,    0.01,  Cohen’s    0.53   
moderate effect size); and that female participants were more likely to 
associated hunting with ‘unethical hunting practices that do not give animals a 
fair chance of survival’ (    +0.76), than were male participants (    +0.16) 
(   4.40;    0.01; Cohen’s    0.49   small to moderate effect size).  
Although, the gender differences in the outcome evaluations (  ) of all three of 
these beliefs were also found to be significant from a statistical point of view 
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(   0.05), the differences were not practically meaningful (Cohen’s   ranged 
from 0.25 to 0.39   very small effect size) and thus accounted for very little of 
the observed gender differences in the     products of these three 
discriminating salient beliefs.   
 
In the case of the remaining two discriminating salient beliefs, namely that 
‘hunters often kill animals unnecessarily’ and that ‘hunting contributes to the 
conservation of wild animals’, the results in Table 4.16 suggest that the 
observed gender differences in their     products occurred as a result of 
meaningful differences in belief strength (  ) only.  No gender differences 
were found to exist in outcome evaluations (  ) in the case of these two 
discriminating salient beliefs.  Inspection of the belief strength (  ) of these two 
discriminating salient beliefs reveal that: female participants were much more 
likely to believe that ‘hunters often kill animals unnecessarily without having a 
good reason or useful purpose for doing so’ (    +0.65) than were male 
participants (    +0.02) (   4.69,    0.01,  Cohen’s    0.52   moderate 
effect size); and that female participants did not believe that hunting would 
result in the positive outcome of ‘contributing to the conservation of wild 
animals’ (    –0.33), while male participants perceived it to be a somewhat 
likely outcome of hunting (    +0.31) (   4.40;    0.01, Cohen’s    0.49   
small to moderate effect size).   
 
In sum then, the results of the primary survey suggest that male and female 
participants held significantly different attitudes towards hunting and that these 
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attitude differences may be attributed to differences that exist in the cognitive 
foundations on which their respective attitudes were based.  It is evident that 
all five of the abovementioned discriminating salient beliefs contained 
fundamental gender differences in their belief strength (  ), while differences 
in outcome evaluations (  ) existed much less frequently.  Overall, the results 
thus suggest that the belief strength (  ) of the five discriminating salient 
beliefs accounted for the most fundamental differences in the cognitive 
foundations on which male and female participants based their respective 
attitudes towards hunting. 
 
It is perhaps worth noting that the results in Table 4.16 also show some 
evidence of statistically significant gender differences in the belief strength (  ) 
and outcome evaluations (  ) of many salient beliefs other than the five most 
discriminating salient beliefs that have been discussed so far.  However, 
Cohen’s   tests found that nearly all of those gender differences were of very 
little practical significance.  The only exceptions occurred with respect to the 
two salient beliefs that ‘hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild 
animals’ and ‘hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters’, in which 
case practically meaningful gender differences occurred in the outcome 
evaluations (  ) of both of these beliefs (   5.29,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.59 
  moderate effect size; and    4.49,    0.01, Cohen’s    0.50   moderate 
effect size, respectively).  It can be seen that female participants had much 
more negative evaluations towards the outcomes of these two salient beliefs 
(    –1.15 and     –0.51, respectively) than did male participants (    –0.52 
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and     +0.05, respectively).  Neither of these two observed gender 
differences in outcome evaluations (  ) resulted in any practically meaningful 
difference in the overall impact (    products) that these two beliefs had on 
the attitude of male and female participants (Cohen’s    0.34 and 0.41   
small effect size).  Therefore, both of these salient beliefs account for little 
meaningful differences in the cognitive foundations on which male and female 
participants based their attitudes towards hunting. 
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TABLE 4.14. Correlations of belief-evaluation product with direct attitude measure:                               
differences between genders. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Correlation     with 
attitude (  ) 
Male  Female 
(     )  (     ) 
     
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations. 0.71**  0.67** 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 0.71**  0.65** 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals. 0.70**  0.56** 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. 0.66**  0.61** 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices. 0.67**  0.51** 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals. 0.62**  0.59** 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors. 0.70**  0.45** 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily. 0.59**  0.52** 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species. 0.56**  0.54** 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population. 0.64**  0.45** 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country. 0.55**  0.44** 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing. 0.53**  0.43** 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) 0.83**  0.74** 
Correlations significant at:  *       and **       ; all other correlations are not significant. 
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TABLE 4.15. Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between genders. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
Male  Female 
(     )  (     ) 
         
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations. -0.22 (2.09)   -1.21** (1.95) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 0.09 (2.00)   -0.78** (1.81) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals. 0.60 (2.48)   -0.54** (2.25) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. -0.51 (2.26)   -1.47** (2.21) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices. -0.30 (2.49)   -1.41** (2.13) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals. -1.06 (2.10)   -1.88** (2.04) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors. 0.93 (2.50)   -0.18** (2.30) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily. -0.06 (2.32)   -1.18** (2.09) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species. -0.32 (2.60)   -1.32** (2.13) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population. 1.35 (1.68)    0.92** (1.41) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country. 1.69 (1.75)    0.94** (1.45) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing. -0.24 (1.89)   -0.88** (1.86) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) 1.95  (20.16)      -8.99**  (17.17) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation product (   ) scores can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
 -test reveals differences significant at *        and **       ; all other means are not significantly different. 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.16. Mean belief strength and outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between genders.  
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  )  Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Male  Female  Male  Female 
(     )  (     )  (     )  (     ) 
                   
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations. 0.07 (1.24)    0.68** (1.07)  -1.40 (0.77)   -1.58* (0.58) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 1.28 (0.78)    1.32 (0.78)  0.05 (1.19)   -0.51** (1.06) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals. 0.31 (1.36)   -0.33** (1.24)  1.63 (0.64)    1.55 (0.72) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. 0.26 (1.25)    0.75** (1.14)  -1.72 (0.57)   -1.85* (0.44) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices. 0.20 (1.42)    0.89** (1.18)  -1.78 (0.54)   -1.87 (0.42) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals. 0.59 (1.20)    1.03** (1.07)  -1.50 (0.68)   -1.76** (0.46) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors. 0.41 (1.41)   -0.23** (1.29)  1.63 (0.63)    1.44* (0.87) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily. 0.02 (1.28)    0.65** (1.13)  -1.62 (0.66)   -1.69 (0.59) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species. 0.19 (1.35)    0.73** (1.14)  -1.73 (0.62)   -1.80 (0.40) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population. 0.68 (1.13)    0.44* (1.11)  1.22 (0.81)    0.85** (0.88) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country. 1.03 (1.05)    0.72** (1.05)  1.30 (0.74)    1.03** (0.67) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing. 0.40 (1.21)    0.56 (1.13)  -0.52 (1.19)   -1.15** (0.92) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
 -test reveals differences significant at *        and **       ; all other means are not significantly different. 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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4.3.4.4 The effect of ethnical differences on attitudes towards hunting and its causal 
determinants 
 
 To investigate the effect of ethnicity on attitudes towards hunting, participants 
in the primary surveys were divided into four sub-groups based on their 
ethnicity, namely blacks, coloureds, whites and, finally, Indians or Asians.  
Note, however, that due to the limited sample size of the Indian or Asian 
ethnic group (   9), this ethnic group was excluded from all comparative 
analysis of the various ethnic groups.  The attitudes of the remaining three 
ethnic groups were compared using an ANOVA test, which found evidence 
that statistically significant differences exist between the mean direct attitude 
measure (  ) for the various ethnic groups (   11.18,    0.01).  This 
suggests that the various ethnic groups differed in their attitudes towards 
hunting.  Between-group analysis with Tukey post-hoc tests found strong 
evidence that no statistically significant difference exist between black and 
coloured participants’ attitudes towards hunting (   0.94).  However, 
statistically significant differences were found to exist between black and white 
participants (   0.05) as well as between coloured and white participants 
(   0.05).  Specifically, the result showed that white participants had slightly 
more positive attitudes towards hunting (    +0.24) than both black and 
coloured participants (    –0.46 and     –0.44, respectively), with Cohen’s   
tests indicating that, in practice, these ethnic differences had a moderate 
effect on participant’s attitudes towards hunting (Cohen’s    0.53 and 0.53   
moderate effect size, respectively).  Consistent with this finding, further 
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investigations into the cognitive foundations underlying the attitudes of the 
various ethnic groups revealed that the salient beliefs which determined the 
attitudes of white participants were somewhat different from that of black and 
coloured participants.  The results of these comparative investigations are 
presented in Table 4.17, to Table 4.20 and will be briefly discussed below. 
 
The results displayed in Table 4.17 show that every individual salient belief in 
the modal set correlated significantly with the direct attitude measures (  ) in 
the case of black participants (  ranged from 0.25 to 0.59 at    0.05) and in 
the case of white participants (  ranged from 0.59 to 0.77 at    0.05), 
confirming that all the beliefs in the modal set accurately account for the 
attitudes of these two ethnic groups.  In the case of coloured participants, 
however, it can be seen that not all of the salient beliefs in the modal set 
correlated significantly with their direct attitude measures (  ).  In particular, 
no significant correlations was found to exist between their attitude towards 
hunting and the three particular salient beliefs that hunting ‘contributes 
towards the conservation of wild animals’, ‘is a way of experiencing nature 
and the outdoors’, and ‘leads to the endangerment and extinction of wild 
animal populations’.  This suggests that these three beliefs did not account for 
any variance in the attitudes of participants from the coloured ethnic group.  
The remaining nine salient beliefs were, nevertheless, found to correlate 
significantly with coloured participants’ attitudes towards hunting (  ranged 
from 0.31 to 0.59 at    0.05).  In totality, the results in Table 4.23 found that 
the overall sum of the belief-evaluation products (     ) of the black, coloured, 
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and white ethnic groups correlated highly with their respective direct attitude 
scores (  ) (   0.73,    0.65, and    0.84 respectively at    0.01).  This 
provides strong evidence that, in the case of all three ethnic groups, the modal 
set of salient beliefs account for the fundamental causal determinants on 
which their respective attitudes towards hunting are based. 
 
Having verified that the modal set of salient beliefs are significantly related to 
the attitudes of all three ethnic groups, it is possible to identify the particular 
salient beliefs that differ the most in their impact on the respective attitudes of 
black, coloured, and white participants.  Towards this aim, the     products 
of every individual salient belief were compared across all three ethnic groups.  
A series of Tukey post-hoc tests were employed to identify between-group 
differences with respect to the mean     products of each salient belief in 
the modal set.  The results of the comparative analysis are displayed in Table 
4.18 and indicate all the statistically significant between-group differences.  It 
shows that not a single statistically significant difference existed between 
black and coloured participants with respect to the impact that every individual 
salient belief had on their respective attitudes.  This is also reflected in their 
respective       indices, which shows that the set of salient beliefs had 
virtually an identical summative impact on the attitudes of black participants 
and coloured participants (       –9.94 and        –9.51 with extremely 
strong evidence of    0.87 that no between-group difference existed 
between black and coloured participants).  This suggests that there were no 
differences in the cognitive foundations on which black and coloured 
334 
participants based their respective attitudes towards hunting.  The results in 
Table 4.18 show that between-group differences did, however, exist between 
white and black participants and well as between white and coloured 
participants with respect to most of the salient beliefs listed.  While those 
between-group differences were all statistically significant, only a number of 
these differences proved large enough to be meaningful from a practical point 
of view.  This included the salient beliefs that hunting ‘is a way of managing 
wild animals to prevent over-population’ (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.82 and 
0.78, respectively   large effect size), ‘contributes to the conservation of wild 
animals’ (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.61 and Cohen’s    0.67, respectively   
moderate effect size), ‘results in the endangerment and extinction of wild 
animal species’ (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.70 and 0.56, respectively   
moderate effect size), ‘is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’ 
(   0.05, Cohen’s    0.60 and 0.53, respectively   moderate effect size) 
and the salient belief that hunting ‘is a way to experience nature and the 
outdoors’ (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.52 and 0.49, respectively   moderate 
effect size).  In sum then, the results show that these five salient beliefs 
accounted for the most fundamental differences in the cognitive foundations 
on which white participants based their attitudes towards hunting, when 
compared to that of black and coloured participants.  For this reason, these 
five salient beliefs were analysed further and will be referred to as the 
discriminating salient beliefs in the subsequent discussions on ethnic 
differences. 
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From the results displayed in Table 4.19 and Table 4.20, it is evident that the 
ethnic differences in the     products of the five discriminating salient beliefs 
may be attributed to differences in both belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluations (  ).  Although all the between-group differences were statistically 
significant, only some of these differences were large enough to be practically 
meaningful and will therefore form part of this discussion.  In the case of all 
five discriminating salient beliefs, the practically meaningful differences in 
belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) occurred only between white 
and black participants and between white and coloured participants.  With 
respect to the first discriminating salient belief, the results showed that white 
participants believed that ‘hunting is a way of managing wild animals to 
prevent over-population’ (    0.96), whereas both black participants (    –
0.14) and coloured participants (    0.35) were much less likely to believe 
that this is the case (   0.05, Cohen’s    1.09 and 0.66, respectively   
large and moderate effect size).  In addition, the outcome of ‘managing wild 
animals to prevent over-population’ was judged to be very favourable by white 
participants (    1.27), but much less favourable by both black participants 
(    0.67) and coloured participants (    0.88) (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.73 
and 0.52, respectively   moderate effect size).  In the case of the second 
discriminating salient belief, it was found that white participants believed it to 
be somewhat likely that ‘hunting contributes to the conservation of wild 
animals’ (    0.38), whereas both black participants (    –0.49) and coloured 
participants (    –0.56) did not perceive this to be a likely outcome of hunting 
(   0.05, Cohen’s    0.67 and 0.72, respectively   moderate effect size).  
Also, the outcome of ‘contributing to the conservation wild animals’ was 
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evaluated far more favourably by white participants (    1.77) in comparison 
with the evaluations of black participants (    1.25) and that of coloured 
participants (    1.40) (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.79 and 0.72, respectively   
moderate effect size).  As far as the third discriminating salient belief is 
concerned, the results showed that white participants perceived it to be much 
less likely that ‘hunting will result in the endangerment and extinction of wild 
animal species’ (    0.08) compared to both black participants (    1.00) and 
coloured participants (    0.84), who thought this to be a very likely 
consequence of hunting (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.74 and 0.61, respectively   
moderate effect size).  White participants had slightly more negative 
evaluations of ‘endangering wild animals and driving them to extinction’ (    –
1.87) than did both black participants (    –1.56) and coloured participants 
(    –1.63) (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.59 and 0.55, respectively   moderate 
effect size).  In the case of the fourth discriminating salient belief, white 
participants were much less likely to believe that ‘hunting is disruptive and 
harmful to wild animal populations’ (    0.02) compared to both black 
participants (    0.82) and coloured participants (    0.81), who thought this 
to be a very likely consequence of hunting (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.69 and 
0.69, respectively   moderate effect size).  With respect to the fifth and final 
discriminating salient belief, it was found that white participants perceived 
hunting to be ‘a way of experiencing and enjoying nature and the outdoors’ 
(    0.43), while both black participants (    –0.39) and coloured participants 
(    –0.12) did not perceive this to be the case (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.60 
and 0.50, respectively   moderate effect size).  In sum then, it is evident that 
all five of the discriminating salient beliefs contained fundamental ethnic 
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differences in their belief strength (  ) and that only three of the discriminating 
salient beliefs contained differences in their outcome evaluations (  ).  
Furthermore, these differences existed primarily between white and black 
participants as well as between white and coloured participants.  Together, 
the five discriminating salient beliefs accounted for the most fundamental 
differences in the cognitive foundations on which these ethnic groups based 
their respective attitudes towards hunting. 
 
It is perhaps worth pointing out that the results in Table 4.21 and Table 4.22 
also indicates that statistically significant ethnic differences existed in the 
belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) of a number of salient beliefs 
other than the five most discriminating salient beliefs that have been 
discussed so far.  Many of these ethnic differences were, however, found to 
be of very little practical significance.  The only instances where these 
differences were large enough to be practically meaningful will be briefly 
pointed out.  As far white and black participants were concerned, practically 
meaningful differences also existed between their perceived likelihoods (  ) 
that hunting ‘holds economic benefits for the country’ and ‘leads to unethical 
hunting practices’ (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.63 and 0.55, respectively   
moderate effect size); as well as between their outcome evaluations (  ) 
regarding ‘the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals’ and ‘wild animals 
being killed by hunters’ (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.68 and 0.54, respectively   
moderate effect size).  In the case of white and coloured participants, 
however, practically meaningful differences also existed between their 
338 
perceived likelihoods (  ) that ‘hunting leads to unethical hunting practices’, 
‘hunters kill animals unnecessarily’ and ‘hunting results in wild animals being 
killed by hunters’ (   0.01, Cohen’s    0.59, 0.54 and 0.50, respectively   
moderate effect size); as well as between their outcome evaluations (  ) 
regarding ‘wild animals being killed by hunters’ (   0.01, Cohen’s    0.50   
moderate effect size).  Despite all the practically significant differences 
mentioned in this paragraph, none of these differences were ultimately 
substantial enough to cause any significant shift in the overall impact (    
products) that these beliefs had on the attitude of the various ethnic groups.  
Therefore, these salient beliefs account for little meaningful differences in the 
cognitive foundations on which the various ethnic groups based their attitudes 
towards hunting. 
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TABLE 4.17. Correlations of belief-evaluation product with direct attitude measure: differences                          
between various ethnic groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Correlation     with attitude (  ) 
Black  Coloured  White 
(     )  (    )  (     ) 
        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.      0.57**      0.58**  0.74** 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.      0.59**      0.39**  0.77** 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.      0.53**      0.25  0.71** 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.      0.56**      0.56**  0.68** 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.      0.53**      0.59**  0.65** 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.      0.46**      0.57**  0.69** 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.      0.55**      0.29  0.64** 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.      0.41**      0.51**  0.66** 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.      0.46**      0.28  0.61** 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.      0.29**      0.40**  0.65** 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.      0.38**      0.31*  0.59** 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.      0.25*      0.44**  0.68** 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )  0.73**  0.65**  0.84** 
Correlations significant at:  *       and **       ; all other correlations are not significant. 
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TABLE 4.18. Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various                
ethnic groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
Black  Coloured  White 
(     )  (    )  (     ) 
              
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.41a (1.86)   -1.26a (1.50)   -0.17b (2.16) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.69a (1.85)   -0.74a,b (1.66)   -0.02b (2.02) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.76a (2.09)   -0.91a (1.49)    0.71b (2.56) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.41a (2.12)   -1.49a,b (1.78)   -0.61b (2.42) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.39a (2.29)   -1.49a (1.87)   -0.38b (2.46) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -2.05a (2.11)   -1.40a,b (1.66)   -1.17b (2.18) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.29a (2.12)   -0.05a (1.76)    0.92b (2.59) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -0.82a,b (2.16)   -1.21a (1.85)   -0.28b (2.37) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.80a (2.17)   -1.47a (1.93)   -0.13b (2.47) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.39a (1.46)    0.49a (1.08)    1.63b (1.54) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.88a (1.71)    0.98a (1.28)    1.66b (1.62) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -0.58 (2.08)   -0.98 (1.79)   -0.40 (1.76) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )   -9.94
a  (15.41)    -9.51a (13.08)    1.73b  (20.98) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation products (   ) can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences: means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.19. Mean belief strength for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various ethnic                 
groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  ) 
Black  Coloured  White 
(     )  (    )  (     ) 
              
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   0.82a (1.11)    0.81a (0.88)   0.02b (1.19) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.12a (0.89)    1.07a (0.83)   1.43b (0.70) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.49a (1.20)   -0.56a (1.03)   0.38b (1.35) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   0.79a (1.23)    0.79a (0.94)   0.27b (1.26) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   0.84a (1.21)    0.88a (0.98)   0.15b (1.28) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   1.15a (1.14)    0.95a,b (0.90)   0.58b (1.20) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.39a (1.29)   -0.12a (1.05)   0.43b (1.41) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   0.51a (1.27)    0.77a (1.00)   0.11b (1.26) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   1.00a (1.18)    0.84a (1.07)   0.08b (1.27) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.  -0.14a (1.18)    0.35b (0.95)   0.96c (0.92) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.47a (1.17)    0.77a,b (0.90)   1.12b (0.97) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.45 (1.30)    0.67 (1.08)   0.42 (1.11) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.20. Mean outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various ethnic           
groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Black  Coloured  White 
(     )  (    )  (     ) 
              
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.31a (0.71)   -1.42a,b (0.63)   -1.57b (0.68) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.58a (1.12)   -0.53a (1.03)    0.04b (1.15) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   1.25a (0.91)    1.40a (0.54)    1.77b (0.51) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.54a (0.68)   -1.74a,b (0.49)   -1.88b (0.39) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.46a (0.82)   -1.67a,b (0.47)   -1.79b (0.54) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -1.64 (0.59)   -1.47 (0.59)   -1.65 (0.60) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   1.36a (0.80)    1.33a (0.92)    1.65b (0.70) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -1.41a (0.85)   -1.49a (0.63)   -1.78b (0.46) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.56a (0.70)   -1.63a (0.49)   -1.87b (0.42) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.67a (0.97)    0.88a (0.73)    1.27b (0.75) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.15 (0.84)    1.21 (0.56)    1.16 (0.71) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -1.01a (1.04)   -1.02a,b (1.06)   -0.66b (1.13) 
Note:  Outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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4.3.4.5 The effect of educational differences on attitudes towards hunting and its 
causal determinants 
 
To investigate the effects of education on attitudes towards hunting, 
participants were divided into four sub-groups based on their level of 
academic qualification, namely participants with grade 12 or less, a national 
diploma, a degree and, finally, participants with a post-graduate qualification.  
An ANOVA test was used to compare the mean direct attitude (  ) scores of 
the four education groups and found insufficient evidence to conclude with 
certainty that there was any significant difference between the attitude of the 
various education groups (   2.51,    0.06).  The mean direct attitude 
measure (  ) also indicated that participants with grade 12 or less (    –
0.25), a national diploma (    0.28), a degree (    –0.02), and a post-
graduate qualification (    –0.13) all held fairly neutral attitudes towards 
hunting.  Therefore, it seems that participants at different levels of academic 
qualification had fairly similar attitudes towards hunting.  As a consequence, 
further investigations into the cognitive foundations underlying the attitudes of 
the various education groups also showed very little differences in the salient 
beliefs that determine their attitudes.  The results of this investigation are 
presented in Table 4.21 to Table 4.24 and will be discussed below. 
 
The results displayed in Table 4.21 shows that every individual salient belief 
accounted for a considerable amount of variation in the attitudes of all four 
education groups (  ranged from 0.36 to 0.79 across all education groups).  In 
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addition, the overall sum of the belief-evaluation products (     ) in the case 
of the grade 12 or less, the national diploma, the degree, and the post-
graduate education groups all correlated highly with their respective direct 
attitude scores (  ) (   0.77,    0.82,    0.86 and    0.84 at    0.01, 
respectively).  Overall, these results provide strong evidence that, in its 
totality, the set of salient beliefs accurately account for the fundamental salient 
beliefs on which the different education groups based their attitudes towards 
hunting and that every individual salient belief was an important causal 
determinant of their attitudes. 
 
Table 4.22 displays the     products of every individual salient belief for 
each of the four educational groups and indicates the relative influence that 
every salient belief had on the attitudes of the various groups.  Statistical 
analysis with a series of Tukey post-hoc tests found evidence of significant 
differences between some of the educational groups with respect to their 
mean     products for only five of the 12 salient beliefs in the modal set.  
The between-group differences for these five salient beliefs are indicated in 
Table 4.22.  However, only in the case of the two salient beliefs that ‘hunting 
holds economic benefits for the country’ and that ‘hunters kill animals 
unnecessarily’ were the between-group differences large enough to be 
practically meaningful (   0.05; Cohen’s    0.52 to 0.50 respectively   
moderate effect size).  In the case of the first mentioned salient belief, it can 
be seen that differences in     products existed only between participants 
with grade 12 or less and participants with post-graduate qualifications.  In the 
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case of the salient belief mentioned secondly, differences were found only 
between participants with national diplomas and participants with degrees.  
The impact that each of these two salient beliefs exerted on the attitudes of 
the implicated education groups can be seen in Table 4.22.   
 
Further investigations revealed that, in the case of both of the 
abovementioned salient beliefs, the observed educational differences in their 
    products were a result of differences in their belief strength (  ), while no 
practically meaningful differences in their outcome evaluations (  ) were found 
to exist (Table 4.23 and Table 4.24 respectively).  The results show that 
participants with post-graduate qualifications were slightly more likely to 
believe that hunting ‘benefits the economy of the country’ (    1.12) than 
were participants with grade 12 or less (    0.70) (   0.05; Cohen’s    0.50 
  moderate effect size); and that participants with degrees were slightly more 
likely to believe that ‘hunters kill animals unnecessarily’ (    0.66) than were 
participants with national diplomas (    0.01) (   0.05; Cohen’s    0.53   
moderate effect size).  The results suggest that this was the only practically 
meaningful differences that existed in the cognitive foundations on which the 
various educational groups base their attitudes towards hunting.  Although the 
results in Table 4.23 and Table 4.24 also found evidence that statistically 
significant differences exist in the belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations 
(  ) of some of the other salient beliefs in the modal set, those differences 
were found to be small and of very little practical significance (Cohen’s   
ranged from 0.39 to 0.45   small effect size).   
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In sum then, the results suggest that participants at different levels of 
education essentially based their attitudes towards hunting on a very similar 
set of salient beliefs and that there were only slight differences in the cognitive 
foundations underlying their respective attitudes towards hunting.  Only with 
respect to participants’ perceived likelihood that ‘hunting benefits the economy 
of the country’ and that ‘hunters kill animals unnecessarily’ were meaningful 
differences found between only some of the educational groups.  These 
differences were, however, not substantial enough to result in any decisive 
differences in the attitudes of the various education groups. 
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TABLE 4.21. Correlations of belief-evaluation product with direct attitude measure: differences between various              
levels of education. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Correlation     with attitude (  ) 
Grade 12 
or less 
 National 
diploma 
 Degree  Post-
graduate 
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
           
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.      0.68**      0.72**      0.74**  0.75** 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.      0.60**      0.72**      0.79**  0.78** 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.      0.57**      0.68**      0.74**  0.76** 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.      0.59**      0.71**      0.68**  0.69** 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.      0.60**      0.63**      0.69**  0.67** 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.      0.54**      0.65**      0.64**  0.75** 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.      0.61**      0.62**      0.61**  0.65** 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.      0.49**      0.69**      0.57**  0.73** 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.      0.50**      0.73**      0.67**  0.50** 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.      0.62**      0.51**      0.60**  0.56** 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.      0.47**      0.62**      0.49**  0.56** 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.      0.36**      0.63**      0.53**  0.58** 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )  0.77**   0.82**   0.86**  0.84** 
Correlations significant at:  *       and **       ; all other correlations are not significant. 
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 TABLE 4.22. Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various levels of education. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
Grade 12 or 
less 
 National 
diploma 
 Degree  Post-graduate  
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                   
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -0.85 (1.86)   -0.47 (2.37)   -0.91 (2.15)   -0.48 (2.11) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.50 (1.69)   -0.22 (2.06)   -0.36 (2.21)   -0.12 (2.11) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.23 (2.17)    0.33 (2.53)   -0.38 (2.71)    0.64 (2.49) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.11 (2.15)   -0.51 (2.48)   -1.48 (2.25)   -0.81 (2.28) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -0.86 (2.31)   -0.56 (2.54)   -1.41 (2.31)   -0.61 (2.40) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -1.55a,b (1.98)   -0.92a (2.38)   -1.98b (1.99)   -1.42a,b (2.05) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.09a (2.36)    0.65a,b (2.50)    0.50a,b (2.53)    0.96b (2.45) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -0.51a,b (2.14)   -0.10a (2.52)   -1.30b (2.24)   -0.72a,b (2.18) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -0.96 (2.33)   -0.72 (2.69)   -1.09 (2.33)   -0.36 (2.43) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.75a (1.55)    1.31a,b (1.74)    1.45b (1.57)    1.45b (1.28) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.95a (1.62)    1.54a,b (1.75)    1.34a,b (1.67)    1.81b (1.44) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -0.71 (1.82)   -0.22 (2.00)   -0.52 (2.06)   -0.61 (1.80) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )  -5.66 (17.17)    0.38  (22.31)   -6.14   (19.68)   -0.55  (19.91) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation products (   ) can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences: means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.23.   Mean belief strength for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various levels of education. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  ) 
Grade 12 or 
less 
 National 
diploma 
 Degree  Post-graduate  
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                   
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   0.51 (1.13)    0.25 (1.34)    0.43 (1.19)    0.17 (1.16) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.12a (0.85)    1.28a,b (0.65)    1.55b (0.63)    1.46b (0.80) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.18a (1.28)    0.14a,b (1.40)   -0.18a,b (1.40)    0.35b (1.29) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   0.55 (1.21)    0.33 (1.33)    0.73 (1.18)    0.39 (1.17) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   0.50 (1.26)    0.32 (1.34)    0.71 (1.19)    0.28 (1.25) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   0.88a,b (1.10)    0.50a (1.32)    1.04b (1.04)    0.75a,b (1.13) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.14a (1.33)    0.26a,b (1.41)    0.05a,b (1.48)    0.43b (1.31) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   0.36a,b (1.19)    0.01a (1.39)    0.66b (1.20)    0.32a,b (1.18) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   0.55 (1.25)    0.39 (1.42)    0.63 (1.20)    0.17 (1.24) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.29a (1.16)    0.67a,b (1.14)    0.75b (1.19)    0.83b (0.86) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.70a (1.09)    1.04a,b (1.08)    0.79a,b (1.16)    1.12b (0.85) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.46 (1.16)    0.64 (1.14)    0.38 (1.27)    0.41 (1.14) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.24.   Mean outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various levels of education. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Grade 12 or 
less 
 National 
diploma 
 Degree  Post-graduate  
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                   
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.38 (0.69)   -1.49 (0.71)   -1.55 (0.71)   -1.62 (0.62) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.45 (1.07)   -0.01 (1.26)   -0.23 (1.16)   -0.01 (1.16) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   1.38a (0.79)    1.60a,b (0.64)    1.80b (0.48)    1.80b (0.50) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.70a (0.55)   -1.67a (0.69)   -1.93b (0.26)   -1.93b (0.26) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.62 (0.67)   -1.65 (0.73)   -1.80 (0.55)   -1.80 (0.44) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -1.55 (0.68)   -1.61 (0.62)   -1.75 (0.48)   -1.70 (0.46) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   1.56 (0.70)    1.54 (0.75)    1.34 (0.96)    1.67 (0.68) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -1.56 (0.74)   -1.67 (0.61)   -1.79 (0.49)   -1.70 (0.49) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.69 (0.53)   -1.74 (0.60)   -1.88 (0.33)   -1.83 (0.57) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.86 (0.87)    1.17 (0.87)    1.14 (0.80)    1.17 (0.86) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.12 (0.65)    1.40 (0.64)    1.00 (0.93)    1.14 (0.69) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -0.98a (1.05)   -0.50b (1.23)   -0.93a,b (1.04)   -0.78a,b (1.10) 
Note:  Outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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4.3.4.6 The effect of age differences on attitudes towards hunting and its causal 
determinants 
 
To investigate the effects of age on attitudes towards hunting, participants in 
the primary survey were divided into five broad sub-groups based on their 
age.  The age groups consisted of participants ranging from 18 to 24 years of 
age; from 25 to 34 years of age, 35 to 44 years of age, and 45 to 54 years of 
age; and, finally, participants ranging from 55 years of age and older.  
Statistical analysis with an ANOVA test found no evidence of differences 
between the mean direct attitude measure (  ) of the various age groups (   
1.83,    0.12), suggesting that participants from the various age groups held 
essentially similar attitudes towards hunting.  The mean direct attitude 
measure (  ) also indicated that participants in the 18 to 24 year age group 
(    –0.25), the 25 to 34 year age group (    0.13), the 35 to 44 year age 
group (    0.24), the 45 to 54 years age group (    0.14), and the 55 years 
and older age group (    –0.18) all held fairly neutral attitudes towards 
hunting.  Because age did not seem to have any significant effect on attitudes 
towards hunting, one would therefore expect the various age groups to also 
have very similar cognitive foundations on which their attitudes are based.  
The results of the primary survey supported this expectation and found only a 
few small differences in the salient beliefs that underlie the attitudes of the 
various age groups.  The results of the comparative analysis are displayed in 
Table 4.25 to Table 4.28 and will be discussed briefly below.   
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The results displayed in Table 4.25 shows that the     products for nearly all 
of the individual salient beliefs correlated strongly with the direct attitude 
measure (  ) in the case of every age group.  With the exception of only two 
salient beliefs (see Table 4.25), the results provide strong evidence that 
virtually all of the salient beliefs in the modal set played a significant role in 
determining the attitudes of the various age groups (  ranged from 0.36 to 
0.81 at    0.05 across all the age groups).  As can be seen, the sum of the 
belief-evaluation products (     ) pertaining to each of the five age groups 
correlated highly with their respective direct attitude scores (  ) (  ranged 
from 0.74 to 0.85 at    0.01 across the five age groups).  This provides 
strong evidence that, in the case of all five age groups, the set of modal 
salient beliefs accurately accounted for the fundamental causal determinants 
of their respective attitudes towards hunting. 
 
Table 4.26 displays the results of an investigation into the impact (    
products) that every individual salient belief had on the respective attitudes of 
the various age groups.  Overall, the results suggest that the cognitive 
foundation on which the various age groups based their attitudes towards 
hunting is essentially very similar.  A series of ANOVA tests did not find any 
evidence of differences based on age in the mean     products for 10 of the 
12 salient beliefs listed, indicating that there were little differences with respect 
to the manner in which the various salient beliefs impacted on the attitudes of 
the various age groups.  The only two exceptions occurred with respect to the 
salient beliefs that ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal 
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populations’ (   5.98,    0.01) and that ‘hunting contributes to the 
conservation of wild animals’ (   3.43,    0.01).  These two salient beliefs 
were found to exert significantly different impacts on the attitudes of the 
various age groups.  The observed differences in the mean     products for 
each of the two beliefs will now be discussed separately. 
 
As shown in Table 4.26, Tukey post-hoc tests revealed multiple between-
group differences in the mean     products with respect to the salient belief 
that ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’ (   0.05, 
Cohen’s   ranged from 0.52 to 0.62 for between-group differences   
moderate effect size).  Overall, this belief seemed to have had a fairly 
negative impact on the attitudes of participants in both the youngest (    –
1.18) and the oldest (    –1.11) age groups, but an essentially neutral impact 
on the attitudes of all the age groups in-between (  ranging from –0.11 to 
0.03).  The results displayed in Table 4.27 and Table 4.28, provides insight 
into the belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) which constituted the 
    products of this particular salient belief.  Tukey post-hoc tests found no 
evidence of differences in the outcome evaluation (  ) of this particular salient 
belief for the different age groups, but did find some meaningful differences in 
belief strength (  ) between the various age groups (   0.05; Cohen’s   
ranged from 0.56 to 0.61 for between group differences   moderate effect 
size).  The results show that participants in both the youngest (    0.66) and 
the oldest (    0.68) age groups believed that ‘hunting is disruptive and 
harmful to wild animal populations’, while the other age groups were much 
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less likely to believe that this is the case (  ranging from –0.03 to 0.00).  
Clearly then, the age differences in the     products of this particular salient 
belief may be attributed to differences in the belief strength (  ) of the various 
age groups.   
 
As far as the mean     products of the salient belief that ‘hunting contributes 
to the conservation of wild animals’ is concerned, Tukey post-hoc tests found 
a meaningful difference between the 18 to 24 year old age group and the 45 
to 54 year old age group (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.56   moderate effect size) 
(Table 4.26).  Overall, this particular salient belief seemed to have had a 
slightly negative impact on the attitudes of participants in the 18 to 24 year old 
age group (    –0.41), but a fairly positive impact on the attitudes of the 45 to 
54 year old age group (    0.94).  Looking at the belief strength (  ) and 
outcome evaluations (  ) that constitute the     products of this particular 
salient belief (Table 4.27 and Table 4.28, respectively), it is evident that the 
observed differences between the two age groups is a result of differences in 
their belief strength (  ) only (   0.05, Cohen’s    0.58   moderate effect 
size).  The results show that while participants from the 18 to 24 year old age 
group perceived it to be slightly unlikely that ‘hunting contributes to the 
conservation of wild animals’ (    –0.27), participants from the 45 to 54 year 
old age group perceived this to be a somewhat likely outcome of hunting (    
0.50).  
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Looking at the results in Table 4.27 and Table 4.28, it is evident that Tukey 
post-hoc tests also found evidence of age differences in belief strength (  ) 
with respect to the salient beliefs that ‘hunting results in the cruel and 
inhumane treatment of wild animals’ and that ‘hunters take pleasure and 
enjoyment in killing wild animals’, as well as in the outcome evaluations (  ) 
with respect to the ‘killing of wild animals by hunters’.  However, in both 
instances, the observed differences between the age groups were not large 
enough to create a substantive shift in the impact that their respective     
products exerted on their attitudes.  As a result, these two salient beliefs were 
not responsible for any meaningful differences in the cognitive foundations on 
which the various age groups based their attitudes towards hunting.   
 
In sum then, the results of the primary survey suggest that age differences did 
not have any significant influence on participants’ attitudes towards hunting 
and that participants in all five of the age groups based their attitudes towards 
hunting on a fairly uniform cognitive foundation.  The few age-related 
differences in the underlying salient beliefs that were, however, observed, was 
not sufficient to produce any substantial shift in the summative indices of 
behavioural beliefs (     ) and therefore did not result in any observable 
attitude differences between the various age groups. 
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TABLE 4.25. Correlations of belief-evaluation product with direct attitude measure: differences between various age groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
 Correlation     with attitude (  ) 
 18 – 24    
years 
 25 – 34 
years 
 35 – 44  
years 
 45 – 54  
years 
 55 years 
& older 
 (     )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
               
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  0.71**     0.73**     0.61**      0.80**     0.56** 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  0.71**     0.63**     0.61**      0.74**     0.83** 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  0.67**     0.66**     0.56**      0.77**     0.54** 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  0.71**     0.50**     0.37*      0.70**     0.81** 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  0.68**     0.57**     0.46**      0.56**     0.65** 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  0.66**     0.49**     0.57**      0.71**     0.62** 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  0.61**     0.65**     0.44**      0.74**     0.54** 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  0.61**     0.49**     0.42*      0.77**     0.74** 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  0.68**     0.43**     0.36*      0.66**     0.31 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.  0.54**     0.56**     0.58**      0.68**     0.69** 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.  0.51**     0.58**     0.55**      0.61**     0.46** 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  0.48**     0.59**     0.54**      0.30     0.69** 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )  0.84**     0.75**     0.74**      0.85**     0.78** 
Correlations significant at:  *       and **       ; all other correlations are not significant. 
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TABLE 4.26.  Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various age groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
18 – 24    
years 
 25 – 34    
years 
 35 – 44     
years 
 45 – 54     
years 
 55 years & 
older 
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.18a (2.01)   -0.10b (2.16)    0.03b (1.61)   -0.11b (2.11)   -1.11a (2.06) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.58 (1.97)    0.15 (1.90)   -0.09 (1.42)   -0.53 (2.14)   -0.21 (2.20) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.41a (2.49)    0.38a,b (2.39)    0.58a,b (2.03)    0.94b (2.10)    0.07a,b (2.64) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.39 (2.33)   -0.61 (2.22)   -0.27 (2.13)   -0.39 (2.21)   -1.18 (2.06) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.18 (2.43)   -0.49 (2.45)   -0.52 (2.22)   -0.50 (2.18)   -0.61 (2.30) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -1.74 (2.17)   -1.14 (2.22)   -1.03 (1.55)   -0.92 (2.12)   -1.86 (1.82) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   0.12 (2.48)    0.60 (2.41)    0.79 (2.15)    0.86 (2.59)    0.36 (2.67) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -0.74 (2.26)   -0.60 (2.42)   -0.21 (2.15)   -0.25 (2.17)   -0.71 (2.31) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.23 (2.41)   -0.43 (2.53)   -0.33 (2.10)   -0.31 (2.52)   -0.57 (2.35) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.99 (1.69)    1.19 (1.51)    1.58 (1.44)    1.31 (1.49)    1.14 (1.24) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.18 (1.75)    1.35 (1.44)    1.48 (1.79)    1.67 (1.59)    1.50 (1.48) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -0.66 (2.05)   -0.49 (1.85)   -0.36 (1.67)   -0.17 (1.65)   -0.79 (1.69) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     )  -6.83 (19.85)   -0.18 (19.46)    1.64 (14.89)    1.61 (19.75)   -3.96 (19.69) 
Note:  Note:  Belief-evaluation product (   ) scores can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences: means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
 
 
 
358 
 
TABLE 4.27.  Mean belief strength for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various age groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  ) 
18 – 24    
years 
 25 – 34      
years 
 35 – 44     
years 
 45 – 54    
years 
 55 years & 
older 
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   0.66a (1.17)   -0.03b (1.22)   -0.03b (0.92)    0.00b (1.20)    0.68a (1.09) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.35 (0.72)    1.22 (0.88)    1.12 (0.70)    1.28 (0.81)    1.46 (0.88) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.  -0.27a (1.36)    0.19a,b (1.32)    0.30a,b (1.19)    0.50b (1.23)    0.00a,b (1.36) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   0.73a (1.26)    0.29a,b (1.20)    0.09b (1.10)    0.17a,b (1.16)    0.64a,b (1.06) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   0.64 (1.29)    0.24 (1.31)    0.30 (1.13)    0.25 (1.18)    0.36 (1.19) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   0.96 (1.17)    0.65 (1.21)    0.58 (0.87)    0.42 (1.25)    1.00 (0.98) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.  -0.09 (1.41)    0.24 (1.34)    0.36 (1.27)    0.44 (1.40)    0.11 (1.40) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.   0.39 (1.28)    0.31 (1.30)    0.15 (1.12)    0.17 (1.18)    0.43 (1.20) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   0.65 (1.26)    0.32 (1.33)    0.18 (1.18)    0.11 (1.30)    0.39 (1.26) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.37 (1.23)    0.63 (1.12)    0.91 (0.88)    0.75 (0.97)    0.86 (0.71) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   0.75 (1.13)    1.04 (0.93)    0.85 (1.25)    1.00 (0.89)    1.07 (0.90) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.59a (1.19)    0.58a,b (1.14)    0.36a,b (1.06)   -0.06b (1.19)    0.32a,b (1.06) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.28. Mean outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between various age groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Outcome evaluation (  ) 
18 – 24    
years 
 25 – 34   
years 
 35 – 44    
years 
 45 – 54      
years 
 55 years & 
older 
(     )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.42 (0.73)   -1.44 (0.71)   -1.55 (0.56)   -1.61 (0.60)   -1.71 (0.53) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.  -0.41a (1.19)    0.10b (1.08)    0.00a,b (0.94)   -0.17a,b (1.21)   -0.32a,b (1.22) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   1.51 (0.80)    1.72 (0.45)    1.61 (0.56)    1.50 (0.70)    1.82 (0.39) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -1.72 (0.59)   -1.81 (0.49)   -1.88 (0.33)   -1.81 (0.47)   -1.93 (0.26) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -1.63 (0.74)   -1.71 (0.54)   -1.88 (0.33)   -1.69 (0.58)   -1.82 (0.39) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -1.66 (0.59)   -1.56 (0.65)   -1.61 (0.56)   -1.56 (0.65)   -1.71 (0.46) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   1.53 (0.81)    1.56 (0.71)    1.39 (0.86)    1.56 (0.69)    1.75 (0.52) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessarily.  -1.57 (0.73)   -1.69 (0.60)   -1.82 (0.39)   -1.67 (0.48)   -1.79 (0.42) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -1.76 (0.56)   -1.75 (0.60)   -1.76 (0.44)   -1.81 (0.40)   -1.75 (0.44) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   0.94 (0.93)    1.04 (0.86)    1.39 (0.66)    1.17 (0.77)    1.04 (0.69) 
+ Hold economic benefits for the country.   1.15 (0.80)    1.11 (0.59)    1.33 (0.69)    1.17 (0.74)    1.21 (0.57) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.  -0.89 (1.11)   -0.64 (1.15)   -0.82 (0.88)   -0.67 (1.12)   -1.11 (1.20) 
Note:  Outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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4.4 SUMMARY 
  
In this chapter the results of both the formative survey and the primary survey 
were discussed.   
 
 The formative survey identified the salient behavioural beliefs about hunting 
that are readily held by members of the public.  In total, 31 salient beliefs 
about hunting were emitted by the research sample, 18 of which linked 
hunting to negative outcomes and 13 of which linked hunting to positive 
outcomes (Table 4.2).  A modal set of salient beliefs about hunting for 
members of the public were then selected based on a pre-determined 
decision rule that gave preference to the most frequently emitted salient 
beliefs.  This resulted in a modal set of 14 salient beliefs about hunting being 
identified.   
  
The subsequent primary survey verified that 12 of the formerly identified 14 
salient beliefs contribute strongly to the expectancy-value model’s (     ) 
accurate prediction of the direct attitude measure (  ) (0.82 at   0.01).  This 
verified that the modal set of 12 salient beliefs accurately reflect the 
information on which participants based their attitudes towards hunting.  
Consequently, these salient beliefs were used for the purposes of 
investigating the causal determinants of participants’ attitudes towards 
hunting. 
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After verifying that the set of 12 salient beliefs accurately accounts for the 
causal determinants of attitudes towards hunting, the primary survey’s results 
for the entire research sample was discussed.  The result confirmed that the 
sample consisted not only of a divergent range of attitudes and salient beliefs 
pertaining to hunting, but also that the sample contained a balanced set of 
attitudes and salient beliefs pertaining to hunting.  These characteristics of the 
research sample enhanced the objectivity and adequacy of the sample for 
investigating the salient beliefs that inform people’s attitudes towards hunting.  
The results for the entire research sample also produced compelling evidence 
that strategies to improve public acceptance of hunting would, in all likelihood, 
be most effective if it is focused primarily on influencing the strength with 
which various beliefs about hunting are held (  ), rather than on influencing 
people’s outcome evaluations (  ).   
 
Following the broad discussion of the results that emerged from the entire 
aggregated research sample, a more detailed analyses and discussion of the 
results then followed by dividing the research sample into three broad 
attitudinal sub-groups, namely supporters, moderates, and opposers.  A 
detailed understanding of the salient beliefs that form the cognitive 
foundations on which the different attitudes towards hunting are based 
emerged from the analyses.  It was found that large, fundamental differences 
exist between the cognitive foundations on which supporters, moderates, and 
opposers based their attitudes towards hunting and that all 12 of the salient 
beliefs were responsible for these differences.  Some beliefs were found to be 
more influential than others as far as changing attitudes towards hunting is 
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concerned.  The results also provided further support for the expectation that 
attempts to change attitudes towards hunting would be more successful if it is 
aimed at influencing people’s perceived likelihoods of the outcomes they 
associate with hunting (  ), rather than attempting to influence their favourable 
or unfavourable evaluations of those perceived outcomes (  ).   
 
Following the broad overview of the differences between the attitudinal sub-
groups, the results pertaining to each of the three attitudinal sub-groups were 
then discussed.  As far as supporters are concerned, the results showed that 
little can be done to further strengthen supporters’ already favourable attitudes 
towards hunting.  Opposers, on the other hand, associated hunting with 
extremely unfavourable outcomes and held these beliefs with great conviction 
and certainty.  The results further produced compelling evidence that attempts 
to effectuate a positive change in the attitudes of people who are strongly 
opposed to hunting would, in all likelihood, be unsuccessful simply because of 
the inherent nature and cognitive characteristics of strong attitudes.  Detailed 
investigations into the cognitive foundation on which moderates based their 
attitudes towards hunting were also undertaken.  Overall, the results found 
that strategies to broaden the base of public acceptance of hunting would be 
most effective if it is directed at the segment of the public with moderate 
attitudes towards hunting.  The results further provided detailed information on 
how the existing salient beliefs of moderates should be targeted in order to 
improve public acceptance of hunting.  In addition, the results suggested that 
moderates would be fairly receptive to new information about hunting and that 
a desired change in attitude may thus be effectuated by introducing new 
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positive beliefs about hunting into the cognitive foundations on which 
moderate attitudes are based.   
 
The focus of this chapter then turned to consider how the various background 
factors (demographical and social differences) shape the way in which hunting 
is perceived by the public.  The results showed that being acquainted with 
hunting – either through hunting participation or having social relationships 
with hunters – have the most profound influence on people’s attitudes towards 
hunting and the cognitive foundations on which their attitudes are based.  
Demographical variables were, however, found to have a much less 
significant influence on members of the public’s attitudes towards hunting. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
  
 This study investigated the causal determinants of different attitudes towards 
hunting amongst the public in South Africa and considered the influences of a 
number of social and demographical background factors.  This information 
may provide a basis for inferring how the go about broadening the base of 
public acceptance of hunting. 
 
In this chapter, the most important aspects of every chapter of this study are 
summarised in broad terms.  Thereafter, an exposition of the conclusions and 
recommendations that may be drawn from the research findings is provided.  
The conclusions and recommendations section focuses on drawing 
conclusions regarding the implications that the research findings hold for 
improving the social legitimacy of hunting, as well as on making 
recommendations that may guide the future development of effective 
strategies to improve the social legitimacy of hunting.  This addresses the last 
sub-problem of the study.   
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5.2 SUMMARY OF THE RESEARCH 
 
In this section, the most important aspects of each chapter are summarised.  
The summary deals firstly with the introductory chapter of the study, secondly 
with the literature study on the psychology of attitudes, thirdly with the theory 
of reasoned action as a conceptual framework for this study, fourthly with the 
study’s research design and methodology, and lastly with the main research 
findings of this study. 
 
5.2.1 Introduction and problem statement 
 
The first chapter of the study focused on setting the scene and explaining the 
main problem and sub-problems of the study. 
 
It was explained that hunting is the primary economic driving force behind the 
game industry.  The game and hunting industry contributes significantly to the 
country’s economy, as well as to the conservation and effective management 
of wildlife.  Despite the importance of the hunting industry, government 
remains concerned with what is socially acceptable to its citizens and what is 
not.   
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A number of broad shifts across society at large and lobbying against hunting 
by animal-rights movements have given rise to legitimate concerns regarding 
the social acceptability of hunting.  It is increasingly being recognised that the 
organised hunting industry needs to take steps to actively maintain the social 
legitimacy of hunting.  In order to formulate concrete persuasive rationales 
and strategies to maintain the social legitimacy of hunting in the future, an 
essential first step would be to attain an understanding of the basis of the 
public’s various attitudes towards hunting and to formulate future strategies 
accordingly.  Towards this aim, the main objectives of this study were to attain 
a clear understanding of the causal determinants of different attitudes towards 
hunting and to explore the implications it holds for improving the social 
legitimacy of hunting.  This required the development of a suitable conceptual 
framework for the study, and the identification and investigation of the main 
causal determinants of different attitudes.  The research findings can then be 
used as a basis to draw inferences that may guide the future development of 
strategies to improve the social legitimacy of hunting. 
 
5.2.2 Literature study on the psychology of attitudes 
  
A literature study was undertaken to introduce and explain some general 
concepts in contemporary social psychology that are of relevance to this 
particular study.  More specifically, the literature study commenced by defining 
the term attitude and by providing a broad overview pertaining to the 
measurement of attitudes in contemporary social psychology.  In short, it was 
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explained that attitudes are evaluative in nature and that it reflects the degree 
of favourableness or unfavourableness with which a person responds to a 
certain object or behaviour. 
 
The literature indicated that the structure of attitude is important because it 
explains how the attitude is formed and it holds important implications for 
changing the attitude.  Attitude structure has to do with the way in which the 
major cognitive components of attitudes are organised.  The literature 
revealed that beliefs are commonly regarded as the causal determinants or 
the primary cognitive components of attitudes.  The expectancy-value model 
was introduced as the most popular and influential model of attitude formation 
and structure.  The expectancy-value approach to attitude structure provides 
an explanation of how beliefs are combined to form attitudes.  Simply put, the 
expectancy-value model postulates that a person’s attitude towards a certain 
behaviour is a combination of what a person believes the consequences or 
outcomes of the behaviour are and how that person feels about those 
outcomes.  The expectancy-value model is able to provide insight about the 
underlying structure and cognitive foundation of peoples’ attitudes.  
 
It was explained that attitudes are based on any combination of instrumental 
and experiential beliefs.  While instrumental beliefs capture the cognitive 
aspects of an attitude, the experiential beliefs capture the affective aspect of 
an attitude.  Together, a person’s instrumental and experiential beliefs about a 
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behaviour form a general positive or negative evaluative summary which 
reflects the person’s attitude towards the behaviour. 
 
A single attitude may simultaneously be based on many positive and many 
negative beliefs.  This coexistence of positive and negative beliefs about an 
object or behaviour is known as attitudinal ambivalence.  Attitudinal 
ambivalence is thus a state of conflict that exists when an individual 
simultaneously possess positive and negative evaluations of a single attitude 
object or behaviour.  The literature revealed that attitudinal ambivalence is an 
important property of attitudes as far as influencing and changing attitudes are 
concerned.  Ambivalent attitudes are more likely to change over time, are less 
resistant to persuasive appeals, are less likely to bias processing of attitude-
relevant information, and are less likely to influence or guide behaviour. 
 
The literature review then focused on the psychology of strong attitudes and 
its implications for attitude change.  Strong attitudes are generally held with 
great conviction or certainty.  A variety of characteristics of strong attitudes 
were discussed and a number of elements that differentiate strong attitudes 
from weak ones were pointed out.  Overall, the literature showed that strong 
attitudes possess a number of properties that make it very enduring and 
particularly resistant to change.  Furthermore, people with strong attitudes will 
tend to process new information in a way that is consistent with their existing 
strong attitudes.  This makes it extremely difficult to influence strong attitudes. 
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The phenomenon of cognitive dissonance was introduced and its relevance to 
this study was explained.  It was pointed out that cognitive dissonance is a 
negative, unpleasant state that occurs whenever a person holds two 
cognitions (or beliefs) that are psychologically inconsistent.  Cognitive 
dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable and results in feelings of discord.  
This, in turn, motivates people to take steps to reduce their psychologically 
inconsistent cognitions – often by either adopting new attitudes or by rejecting 
the information that are in dissonance with their existing cognitions.  The 
stronger a person’s existing cognitions are held, the more likely it is that they 
would simply reject any new information that is in conflict with their existing 
cognitions.  This has important implications for formulating persuasive 
messages or strategies to change attitudes towards hunting. 
 
After discussing the general concepts pertaining to the psychology of 
attitudes, the suitability of standard attitude scales for investigating attitudes 
and their causal determinants were considered.  It was found that while 
standard attitude scaling techniques may provide reliable indicators of an 
attitude, they cannot provide a valid basis for investigating the underlying 
belief structure that forms the cognitive foundation on which an attitude is 
based.  Therefore, the literature study focused on identifying a systematic and 
empirically valid approach for conducting this study.  After carefully 
considering all the possible approaches, the theory of reasoned action was 
finally identified as the most valid and adequate approach to conduct this 
study. 
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5.2.3 The theory of reasoned action as a conceptual framework 
 
Fishbein and Ajzen’s theory of reasoned action was deemed to be a 
particularly suitable approach to conduct this study, firstly because it was 
completely in line with the research purpose of this study; secondly because it 
is the most frequently applied and widely recognised attitude theory in the 
area of human dimensions of wildlife and natural resources; thirdly because 
its methods are described clearly; and fourthly because it is well tested and 
supported by empirical evidence across a broad variety of attitudinal and 
behavioural domains, including that of human dimensions of wildlife and 
natural resources. 
 
After providing a broad outline of the theory of reasoned action, the theory 
was aligned with the particular research purpose of this study.  The attitudinal 
construct of the theory of reasoned action – which relied on the expectancy-
value model – provided a suitable conceptual model for the study.  According 
to this model, a person’s overall attitude towards a behaviour is determined by 
the person’s salient behavioural beliefs about the behaviour, where each 
belief links the behaviour with certain positive and negative outcomes.  It is 
possible to distinguish between behavioural beliefs of two kinds: beliefs about 
the positive and negative consequences of the behaviour (instrumental 
beliefs); and beliefs about positive or negative feelings and affect derived from 
the behaviour (experiential beliefs).  According to the expectancy-value 
model, the perceived probability that a behaviour will produce certain 
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instrumental or experiential outcomes (the strength of the belief) contributes to 
a person’s overall attitude in direct proportion to their evaluation of each 
outcome (the outcome evaluation).  The basic structure of the model was 
expressed algebraically by the equation displayed below, where   is the 
attitude towards performing behaviour  ;    is the strength of the belief that 
performing behaviour   leads to outcome  ;    is the evaluation of outcome  ; 
and   is the number of salient or accessible outcomes.   
         
 
   
   
 
The theory of reasoned action prescribes standard procedures that need to be 
followed during any application of the reasoned action approach.  In order to 
ensure that strict compatibility amongst the attitude and belief measures are 
maintained, as well as to make sure that there is an uniform understanding 
amongst participants of the behaviour under investigation, the reasoned 
action approach firstly requires that the behaviour of interest be clearly 
defined.  Consistent with the prescribed procedures, the behaviour of interest 
in this study was defined as the ‘legal hunting of wild animals’, where the term 
‘legal’ is the context element, ‘hunting’ the action element, and ‘wild animals’ 
the target element of the behaviour of interest.  Following this, it is necessary 
to identify salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that are commonly held by 
members of the research population.  To achieve this, the theory of reasoned 
action prescribes the use of open-ended questions which elicit participants’ 
perceived positive and negative consequences (or advantages and 
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disadvantages) they believe will occur as a result of performing the behaviour 
in question.  By applying content analysis to the open-ended responses, a set 
of salient beliefs must then be selected that reflect the most readily held 
salient beliefs in the research population (a set of modal salient beliefs).  
Based on the chosen modal set of salient beliefs, a series of quantitative 
beliefs measures are then formulated.  These belief measures are used to 
obtain measures of the various components of the expectancy-value model’s 
attitude construct (        ) – namely a measure of attitude towards the 
behaviour (  ), as well as a measure of belief strength (  ) and outcome 
evaluation (  ) for each of the salient beliefs in the modal set.  The reasoned 
action model offers a simple model to explain the causal determinants of any 
attitude and to understand the relationship between an attitude and its 
underlying salient beliefs. 
 
The psychological processes whereby beliefs are formed were then reviewed.  
In short, the beliefs people hold originate from information people acquire from 
a variety of sources, whether it be on the basis of direct observation 
(observational beliefs), by accepting information which is provided by outside 
sources (informational beliefs), or through inference processes that relies on 
other beliefs (inferential beliefs).  A multitude of social, demographical and 
individual differences influence the experiences people have, the sources of 
information which they are exposed to, and also the way in which they 
interpret and remember information.  From the perspective of the theory of 
reasoned action, these differences are recognised as background factors.  By 
including background factors during an application of the reasoned action 
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model, the researcher may gain insight about the influences that various 
background factors have on the underlying belief structure that serve as the 
cognitive foundation for an attitude.   
 
 The theory of reasoned action offers an effective and appealing approach to 
changing attitudes.  Its central idea is that peoples’ salient beliefs provide the 
informational foundation for their attitudes.  Therefore, if people are exposed 
to new information – and this new information is accepted – then existing 
beliefs may change or new beliefs may be formed, resulting in corresponding 
changes in their attitudes.  A vast body of research provides strong evidence 
that persuasive interventions designed on the reasoned action approach are 
indeed capable of effectuating a desired change in beliefs and to have 
corresponding effects on attitudes.  Thus, the reasoned action approach offers 
a good basis for developing persuasive communications and interventions to 
effectuate a desired change in people’s attitudes.  It not only provides 
guidance with regards to the particular existing salient beliefs that need to be 
changed in order to effectuate a desired change in an attitude, but it also 
identifies potential opportunities to introduce new salient beliefs to peoples’ 
underlying belief structure that would result in a desired change in an attitude.   
 
It was noted that the main reasons why persuasive communications or 
attitude change interventions fail to produce a desired change in a targeted 
attitude, is because often they do not address appropriate beliefs.  The 
reasoned action model provides guidance with regards to identifying the 
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underlying beliefs that, if changed, are most likely to have the desired impact 
on the attitude of interest.  It shows which beliefs discriminate the most 
between individuals with different attitudes towards a certain behaviour; the 
stronger the association between the belief and attitude, the more likely it is 
that changing the particular belief will result in corresponding changes in the 
given attitude.  It also shows which salient beliefs have the most room for 
change to occur and whether this change should occur in the particular 
belief’s strength (  ), its outcome evaluation (  ), or in both aspects of a belief 
to produce the desired change.  In addition, the reasoned action model not 
only provides guidance with regards to changing some of the existing beliefs, 
but it also provides a good basis for discerning the absence of potentially 
influential beliefs amongst a significant proportion of the research population.  
This assists in identifying opportunities to change attitudes by establish new 
beliefs.   
 
A number of general considerations that should be kept in mind when 
selecting beliefs to target in an attempt to change attitudes were discussed.  
In the first place, it was also pointed out that beliefs based on personal 
experience (observational beliefs) are often much more difficult to change 
than beliefs that are based on second-hand information (informational beliefs) 
or beliefs inferred from other available information (inferential beliefs).  In this 
regard, selecting salient beliefs to change would involve subjective 
judgements as to the extent to which it will be feasible to change a particular 
belief under consideration.  Secondly, attitude change interventions are most 
effective if it is designed to change multiple beliefs rather than only one or two 
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beliefs.  Only when there is a substantial shift in the summative indices of 
behavioural beliefs (     ) will a meaningful change occur in the targeted 
attitude.  Finally, one should remember that by changing an existing salient 
belief or by making a new belief salient, unintended changes in other salient 
beliefs may occur or new unintended beliefs could become salient (impact 
effects) that could counteract the effects of any changes in the targeted belief.   
 
5.2.4 Research design and methodology 
  
Following the literature review and the outline of the study’s conceptual 
framework, the most suitable research design and methodologies for 
conducting the research was identified and discussed in detail. 
 
The research design of this study was twofold and consisted of a literature 
component and an empirical component.  The literature component consisted 
of a literature study to firstly build a theoretical base for the study, to secondly 
establish a conceptual framework for conducting the study’s empirical 
research, and lastly to offer useful perspectives on methodological issues 
related to the empirical component of the study.  A number of background 
variables that influence attitudes towards hunting were identified in the 
literature and incorporated into the empirical component of the study, namely 
gender, age, ethnicity, education, exposure to hunting and social ties.  The 
empirical component, on the other hand, provided the primary information that 
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was required to investigate the different attitudes towards hunting and their 
causal determinants within the conceptual framework of the theory of 
reasoned action. 
 
The methodological design of the study’s empirical component was based on 
the standard procedures prescribed by the theory of reasoned action.  Two 
consecutive Web-surveys – which were methodologically interrelated – were 
used to collect the primary information amongst a sample of the public, 
namely a formative survey and a primary survey.  The formative survey was 
used to elicit salient behavioural beliefs about hunting that are readily held by 
members of the public, as well as to validate the study’s direct attitude 
measure.  Based on the modal set of salient beliefs about hunting that were 
identified, a series of quantitative beliefs measures were constructed and 
included in the primary survey of the study.  The validated direct attitude 
measure was also incorporated into the primary survey of the study.  The 
primary survey was administered to a sample of the general public and 
obtained measures of belief strength (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ) for 
each of the indentified salient beliefs, a valid direct measure of participants’ 
related attitude towards hunting (  ), as well as information regarding a 
number of relevant background variables.  The primary survey produced the 
primary information that was needed to investigate the causal determinants of 
different attitudes towards hunting and the influences of various background 
factors.  The research findings of the study were then used as the basis for 
making conclusions and recommendations that may guide the development of 
future strategies to improving the social legitimacy of hunting. 
377 
5.2.5 Main research findings 
  
 The most important findings that may guide the development of future 
strategies to improve the social legitimacy of hunting are summarised in this 
section.  The summary of the research results is divided into two sections, 
dealing firstly with the main findings of the formative survey and secondly with 
the main findings of the primary survey. 
  
5.2.5.1 Main research findings of the formative survey 
 
 During the formative survey phase of the research, a list of 31 salient beliefs 
that link hunting to a variety of positive and negative outcomes were emitted 
at different frequencies by a sample of members of the public.  It is noteworthy 
that participants who supported hunting, those with neutral attitudes towards 
hunting, and those who opposed hunting simultaneously held positive and 
negative salient beliefs about hunting, which suggest that the public may be 
somewhat ambivalent about hunting.  Closer inspection showed that the 
degree to which participants supported or opposed hunting generally 
corresponded with the frequency with which they emitted positive and 
negative salient beliefs about hunting.  Participants who strongly approved of 
hunting emitted a greater number of positive beliefs and relatively little 
negative beliefs, while those who strongly disapproved of hunting emitted a 
greater number of negative beliefs and fairly little positive beliefs.  Participants 
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with neutral attitudes towards hunting, in turn, not only emitted the smallest 
number of positive and negative beliefs about hunting, but they associated 
hunting with practically an equal number of positive and negative beliefs.  
These results suggested, firstly, that people with strongly held attitudes are 
armed with more arguments with which to resist attempts to change their 
attitudes; secondly, that neutral attitudes towards hunting are based on a 
much more impartial set of positive and negative salient beliefs; and thirdly, 
that those who are not strongly in favour of or opposed to hunting have the 
most ambivalent attitudes towards hunting.  
 
 The 31 salient beliefs identified by the formative research was then used as a 
basis to identify a set of salient beliefs that reflects the most readily held 
beliefs on which attitudes towards hunting are primarily based (modal set of 
salient beliefs).  A total of 14 modal salient beliefs were identified which are 
assumed to portray the primary causal determinants of attitudes towards 
hunting.  Following techniques prescribed by the theory of reasoned action, 
these modal salient beliefs were then used to develop a series of quantitative 
beliefs measures that formed part of the primary survey of the study.   
 
5.2.5.2 Main research findings of the primary survey 
 
According to the theory of reasoned action, behavioural beliefs provide the 
basis for attitudes.  The expectancy-value model (        ) produced 
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compelling empirical evidence that at least 12 of the salient beliefs in the 
modal set were strongly related to members of the public’s attitudes towards 
hunting and that the salient belief composite (     ) accurately predicted the 
direct measure of participants’ attitudes towards hunting (  ) (   0.82 at 
  0.01).  Thus, the set of 12 salient beliefs accurately reflected the 
informational foundation on which members of the public base their attitudes 
towards hunting and are therefore able to provide considerable insight into the 
primary causal determinants of the public’s attitudes towards hunting.  It also 
suggests that any modification to this set of salient beliefs is likely to have a 
significant impact on attitudes towards hunting. 
 
Having demonstrated a strong relation between the expectancy-value model’s 
salient belief composite (     ) and the direct attitude measure (  ), the ability 
of every individual salient belief to account for variation in participants’ 
attitudes towards hunting were investigated by examining the correlation 
coefficients between every individual belief’s mean     product and the 
direct measure of attitudes towards hunting (  ).  The stronger the correlation, 
the more the salient belief in question discriminates between participants with 
different attitudes towards hunting and the more likely it is that changing the 
belief will result in corresponding changes in attitudes.  It was found that each 
of the 12 salient beliefs accounted for a large amount of variation in attitudes 
towards hunting.  The salient beliefs were arranged according to the 
magnitude of their correlations with attitudes towards hunting (  ) in order to 
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reflect which beliefs are expected to be most influential as far as changing 
attitudes towards hunting is concerned (see Table 4.3 in chapter 4).   
 
Having considered which beliefs discriminate the most between individuals 
with different attitudes towards hunting, a more detailed investigation of the 
individual beliefs that underlie the attitudes of supporters, moderates, and 
opposers were undertaken.  The results showed that, as expected, large 
fundamental differences existed in the cognitive foundations on which 
supporters, moderates, and opposers based their attitudes towards hunting.  
Specifically, the three attitudinal sub-groups differed mainly in the strength 
with which they associated hunting with various outcomes (  ), but generally 
agreed with respect to their positive and negative evaluations (  ) of the 
outcomes associated with hunting.  Clearly then, attitudinal differences 
towards hunting are primarily a result of fundamental differences in belief 
strength (  ) – that is, the perceived likelihood that hunting result in various 
positive or negative outcomes.  This provided further support for the 
expectation that strategies to change attitudes towards hunting would be most 
successful if it is aimed at influencing people’s perceived likelihoods of the 
outcomes they associate with hunting (  ), rather than attempting to influence 
their favourable or unfavourable evaluations of those outcomes (  ).   
 
Further investigations into the cognitive foundations on which the three 
attitudinal sub-groups based their attitudes towards hunting were conducted.  
It was found that supporters believed it to be extremely likely that hunting 
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leads to very positive outcomes and that they were fairly adamant that hunting 
did not result in any negative outcomes.  The results showed that little could 
be done to further strengthen supporters’ already favourable attitudes towards 
hunting.  Conversely, opposers believed it to be extremely likely that hunting 
leads to very negative outcomes and they were quite certain that hunting did 
not result in any positive outcomes.  The results revealed that attempts to 
change some of the existing negatively valued salient beliefs on which their 
negative attitudes are based would, in all likelihood, be ineffective, firstly 
because opposers hold their existing salient beliefs with great conviction and 
certainty; and secondly because there were very little ambivalence in the 
cognitive foundation on which their negative attitudes are based.  On the other 
hand, the possibility of changing the attitudes of opposers by introducing new 
salient beliefs into their underlying belief structure was also investigated.  The 
results revealed that this too would be an ineffective approach to changing the 
attitudes of opposers, mainly because strong attitudes have a profound 
influence on how people process attitude-relevant information.  It was 
explained that, because opposers have strongly held negative attitudes 
towards hunting, they are likely to process any new information about hunting 
in a biased manner, firstly, by directing their attention to arguments that are 
consistent with their existing attitude; secondly, by automatically rejecting the 
credibility of information that supports the need for hunting or point out the 
positive outcomes of hunting; and thirdly by only accepting information that is 
consistent with their existing negative attitudes towards hunting.  The results 
also suggested that if opposers are presented with new information about the 
positive outcomes of hunting, it would in all likelihood cause some 
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inconsistencies in their underlying salient beliefs structure and result in 
cognitive dissonance.  In sum, the results produced compelling evidence that 
attempts to effectuate a positive change in the attitudes of people who are 
strongly opposed to hunting would, in all likelihood, be unsuccessful because 
of the inherent nature and cognitive characteristics of strong attitudes. 
 
In contrast to supporters and opposers, the segment of the public who is not 
strongly in favour of or against hunting (e.g., those with moderate attitudes 
towards hunting) based their attitudes on a fairly impartial set of salient beliefs 
which associate hunting with both positive and negative outcomes.  It was 
found that moderate attitudes are generally fairly ambivalent; that moderates 
do not hold their salient beliefs with great certainty or conviction; and that 
moderates varied considerably with respect to how likely they believed it is 
that hunting results in various positive and negative outcomes.  These findings 
suggested that moderates are less resistant to persuasive appeals, more 
likely to change their attitudes over time, more likely to process attitude-
relevant information in an impartial manner, and more likely to accommodate 
new information about hunting into their cognitions.  Together, these results 
suggested that there is promising potential for strengthening support for 
hunting amongst those with moderate attitudes towards hunting.  Overall, the 
findings suggest that strategies to broaden the base of public acceptance of 
hunting would be most effective if it is directed at the segment of the public 
with moderate attitudes towards hunting. 
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Having found that attitude change interventions would be most effective if it 
targets the segment of the public with moderate attitudes towards hunting, a 
detailed investigation of the cognitive foundation underlying moderate 
attitudes towards hunting was undertaken.  Generally speaking, the results 
showed that moderates perceived most of the beliefs to be only slightly likely 
outcomes of hunting (  ) and judged it to result in either highly favourable or 
highly unfavourable outcomes (  ).  Furthermore, moderates differed 
substantially in their perceptions that hunting will result in the listed outcomes 
(  ), but largely agreed in their positive and negative evaluations of the various 
outcomes (  ).  Together, these findings raised the expectation that, in 
general, it would be much more effective to change the strength with which 
moderates hold their beliefs (  ) than it would be to change their outcome 
evaluations (  ).  Every individual belief was then examined with the aim of 
identifying the particular primary beliefs that must be changed in order to 
effectuate the desired change in moderates’ attitudes as well as to determine 
whether this change should be effectuated in the particular belief’s strength 
(  ), its outcome evaluation (  ), or perhaps in both components in order to 
produce the desired results.  The results showed that the attitudes of 
moderates may be successfully influenced through a variety of beliefs.  
Specifically, the results showed that decreasing the perceived likelihoods (  ) 
that ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’; that ‘hunting 
causes pain and suffering to wild animals’; that ‘hunting results in the cruel 
and inhumane treatment of wild animals’; that ‘hunters often kill animals 
unnecessary without having a good reason or useful purpose for doing so’; 
that ‘hunting leads to unethical hunting practices’; and that ‘hunting leads to 
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the endangerment and extinction of wild animal species’ would substantially 
reduce the negative impact these beliefs have on the attitudes of moderates.  
The results also showed that increasing the perceived likelihoods (  ) that 
‘hunting leads to the conservation of wild animals’; that ‘hunting is a way to 
experience nature and the outdoors’; that ‘hunting is a way of managing the 
number of wild animals in an area to prevent over-population’; and that 
‘hunting holds economical benefits for the country’ would result in these 
beliefs having an extremely strong positive impact on the attitudes of 
moderates.  Furthermore, although it was found that it would be less effective 
to influence people’s outcome evaluations (  ), the results, nevertheless, 
revealed that some opportunities – albeit less promising – also exist to slightly 
raise moderates’ already favourable evaluations towards ‘managing wild 
animals to prevent over-population’; ‘hunting benefiting the economy of the 
country’; ‘conserving wild animals’; and ‘experiencing nature and the 
outdoors’.  It should, however, be noted that there is only limited room to 
further raise moderates’ positive evaluations of these four beliefs and, 
therefore, raising the outcome evaluations (  ) of these beliefs would only 
have a relatively small impact on the attitudes of moderates.    
 
In addition to influencing some of the existing salient beliefs on which 
moderates base their attitudes towards hunting, the results also suggest that it 
might be fairly effective to change the attitudes of moderates by introducing 
new beliefs about hunting into their cognitions.  It was found that moderates 
would be fairly receptive to new information for a number of reasons.  In the 
first place, since moderates hold impartial attitudes towards hunting, they are 
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expected to process new information about hunting in a rational and fairly 
balanced manner.  In the second place, since moderates’ existing salient 
beliefs about hunting are generally weakly held, there is little risk of causing 
cognitive dissonance by introducing new beliefs about hunting into their 
cognitive foundations. 
 
Finally, the focus of this chapter then turned to consider how the various 
background factors (social and demographical differences) influences 
attitudes towards hunting and shape the way in which hunting is perceived by 
the public.  The results produced strong evidence that participation in hunting 
(direct exposure to hunting) and having social relationships with hunters 
(indirect exposure to hunting) have by far the most significant influence on 
members of the public’s attitudes towards hunting.  It was found that hunters 
themselves and people who have close social relationships with hunters 
generally favour hunting, whereas people who have no hunting acquaintances 
are generally opposed to hunting.  Consistent with this finding, the results also 
showed that being acquainted with hunting – either through hunting 
participation or having social relationships with hunters – have the most 
profound influence on peoples’ informational base and cognitions that underlie 
their attitudes towards hunting.  The results showed that demographical 
variables, however, have a much less significant influence on members of the 
public’s attitudes towards hunting.  In short, while gender and ethnical 
differences were found to have some meaningful influence on participants’ 
attitudes and underlying cognitions, educational and age differences seemed 
to have virtually no meaningful influence. 
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5.3 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
Conclusions are drawn and recommendations are made on a number of 
aspects, ranging from the suitability and effectiveness of the theory of 
reasoned action for understanding attitudes towards hunting, to conclusions 
and recommendations that arise from the research findings.  Thereafter, a 
number of general remarks that are relevant to the study are made by the 
researcher. 
 
5.3.1 Theory of reasoned action as a conceptual framework 
 
 Overall, the empirical results of this investigation strongly support the 
effectiveness of the theory of reasoned action as a conceptual framework for 
investigating and understanding attitudes towards wildlife-related activities 
such as hunting.  In accordance with the theory of reasoned action, 
behavioural beliefs about hunting (beliefs about the consequences of hunting) 
were significant determinants of attitudes towards hunting.  In fact, the strong 
correlation between the direct measure of attitude (  ) and its belief-based 
aggregates (     ) provides compelling empirical evidence in support of the 
theory’s central assumption that behavioural beliefs form the informational 
foundation on which attitudes are based.   
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Overall, the present research demonstrated that the theory of reasoned action 
offers considerable power in understanding attitudes towards hunting.  This 
successful application of the theory of reasoned action is consistent with other 
research in which the theory effectively predicted attitudes and behaviours 
towards a variety of wildlife-related activities.      
 
5.3.2 The findings of the study 
 
The findings of this study add to the understanding of the relationship between 
behavioural beliefs and attitudes towards hunting by uncovering the 
informational foundation of those attitudes and by explaining how various 
background factors influence attitudes towards hunting indirectly through their 
influences on behavioural beliefs.  The study identified 12 behavioural beliefs 
that play a key role in determining attitudes towards hunting and provide 
compelling evidence that these beliefs provide a valid basis on which 
strategies to broaden the base of public acceptance of hunting may be 
developed. 
 
Detailed investigations of the cognitive foundations on which different attitudes 
are based revealed that members of the public who are strongly opposed to 
hunting (opposers) are sincere in their commitment to what they perceive as 
the welfare and conservation of wild animals.  This is reflected in the fact that 
they seem to be primarily concerned that hunting ‘causes pain and suffering to 
388 
wild animals’, ‘result in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals’, ‘is 
disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’, and that hunting ‘leads to 
the endangerment and extinction of wild animal species’.  However, these 
beliefs also suggest that opposers are often misguided and incognisant about 
hunting and wildlife.  They are also seemingly unaware of all the positive 
outcomes of hunting.  Overall, the findings in this study suggest that opposers’ 
attitudes towards hunting are often based on selective and inaccurate 
information that fail to correspond to reality.  The study produced compelling 
evidence that opposers’ attitudes towards hunting are extremely resistant to 
change.  This finding is consistent with existing research and literature on the 
psychology of strong attitudes. 
 
Attitudinal differences towards hunting are primarily a result of large 
fundamental differences that exist in members of the public’s belief strength 
(  ) – that is, their perceived likelihood that hunting results in various positive 
or negative outcomes.  Consequently, strategies to change attitudes towards 
hunting would be most successful if it is aimed at influencing peoples’ 
perceived likelihoods of the outcomes they associate with hunting (  ), rather 
than attempting to influence their favourable or unfavourable evaluations of 
those outcomes (  ).   
 
Members of the public – in particular those who are not strongly in favour of or 
against hunting – are generally incognisant about hunting and matters 
affecting wildlife.  This is reflected in the findings that moderate attitudes are 
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generally fairly ambivalent; that moderates do not hold their salient beliefs with 
great certainty or conviction; and that moderates varied considerably with 
respect to how likely they believed it is that hunting results in various positive 
and negative outcomes.  The results showed that strategies to broaden the 
base of public acceptance of hunting would be most effective if it is directed at 
the segment of the public that is not strongly opposed to hunting.  
Consequently, persuasive messages or interventions would be most effective 
if it is designed to resonate with the segment of the public with moderate 
attitudes towards hunting.   
 
The findings of the study provides guidance with regards to the content of 
persuasive messages in that it specifies the particular primary beliefs that 
must be addressed by a persuasive message in order to successfully change 
attitudes.  A short summary of the specific primary beliefs that must be 
addressed by persuasive strategies to broaden the base of public acceptance 
of hunting are provided in paragraph 6 of section 5.2.5.2 of this chapter.  The 
results suggest that persuasive messages communicating information 
pertaining to those beliefs are likely to resonate with the moderate segment of 
the public.  Closer inspection of these primary beliefs suggests that two major 
types of behavioural beliefs are important in determining moderate attitudes 
towards hunting, namely beliefs about hunting and beliefs that has more to 
do with the conduct of hunters than with hunting itself.  Both these types of 
beliefs are explored further in the paragraphs that follow below. 
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As far as beliefs about hunting are concerned, the findings of the study 
suggest that the segment of the public with moderate attitudes towards 
hunting should be educated on a number of aspects.  Essentially, these 
public education programmes should be developed to, firstly, decrease the 
perceived likelihoods (  ) that hunting is detrimental to the welfare of 
individual wild animals and leads to animal cruelty (reflected by beliefs 
such as ‘hunting results in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals’ 
and ‘hunting causes pain and suffering to wild animals’); and secondly, to 
decrease the perceived likelihoods (  ) that hunting has a negative impact on 
the overall conservation and wellbeing of wildlife (reflected by beliefs such 
as ‘hunting leads to the endangerment and extinction of wild animal species’ 
and ‘hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations’).  In addition, 
it is also imperative that these public education programmes are designed to: 
enlighten the moderate segment of the public about the contributions that 
hunting makes to the conservation of wild animals; make them aware of 
not only the importance of managing wild animals, but also explain how 
hunting contributes to the effective management of wild animals; 
convince them that hunting is a way to experience nature and the 
outdoors; and finally to make them more aware of the contribution hunting 
makes to the country’s economy. 
 
 As far as beliefs about the conduct of hunters are concerned, the findings 
of the study suggest that a negative image of hunters pervades even the 
impartial segment of the public.  This negative image of hunters are reflected 
in moderates’ beliefs that ‘hunters engage in unethical hunting practices that 
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do not give animals a fair chance of survival’, that ‘hunters take pleasure and 
enjoyment in the killing of wild animals’, and that ‘hunters kill animals 
unnecessary without having a good reason or useful purpose – such as to get 
meat – for doing so’.  These beliefs about the conduct of hunters seem to 
portray an image of hunters as almost sadistic individuals who engage in 
unethical hunting practices and the senseless killing of wild animals for their 
own pleasure.  It suggests that hunters have no appreciation for wildlife and 
that they do not value wildlife.  It also implies that hunters are not concerned 
about the welfare, conservation, or wellbeing of wildlife.  The findings of the 
study clearly show that, in addition to educating the public about hunting and 
wildlife, it is also imperative that action be taken to improve the image of 
hunters and the hunting fraternity.  To do this, the organised hunting industry 
should actively engage in public relations campaigns (image building). 
 
An important finding of the study is that hunters and people who have close 
social relationships with hunters generally support hunting, whereas people 
who have no hunting acquaintances are generally opposed to hunting.  This 
suggests that hunters, working at the community level, must be an 
integral component of an effective strategy to improve not only the image 
of hunters, but also the social legitimacy of hunting.  Hunter education 
programmes must be put in place to make hunters fully aware of the 
profound influence their behaviour have on the social acceptability of hunting, 
as well as of the cardinal importance of maintaining the social legitimacy of 
hunting.  Hunters must realise that they are a minority group in a society that 
is increasingly concerned with animal welfare and the conservation of wildlife.  
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Hunter education programmes must also empower hunters with the 
necessary knowledge to play an active role at community level to 
improve the image of hunters.  Through their behaviour and interactions 
with all members of the public, hunters should demonstrate a sincere 
appreciation for wildlife, that they have the welfare and conservation of wildlife 
at heart, and that their primary motivation for hunting is not to take pleasure in 
killing, but rather to enjoy the total hunting experience (e.g. being in nature, 
the thrill, excitement and challenge of the chase, getting away from the 
pressures of everyday life, seeing game animals and socialising with friends).  
In addition, the organised hunting industry needs to encourage hunters to 
interact with people who have moderate attitudes towards hunting and 
introduce programmes to create opportunities for members of the youth who 
are not strongly in favour of or against hunting to personally experience 
hunting.  It is, however, important to realise that exposing those with moderate 
attitudes to hunting would result in them forming lasting observational beliefs 
(beliefs based on personal experience) that will have a profound influence on 
their attitudes towards hunting (see section 2.4.8.1 of chapter 2).  Therefore, it 
is imperative that such strategies or interventions be carefully designed to 
address the specific primary beliefs that need to be changed in order to 
effectuate a positive change in attitudes towards hunting.  Exposing members 
of the youth who have moderate attitudes towards hunting to hunting 
experiences that are carefully designed to reinforce positive outcomes of 
hunting and counteract negative beliefs about hunting, would in all likelihood 
have a profound and lasting positive impact on their attitudes towards hunting.  
This is because beliefs based on a person’s own observations are much more 
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powerful and lasting than beliefs based on information that is provided to 
people through communications (see section 2.4.8.1 of chapter 2).   
 
The researcher is of the opinion that the hunting fraternity will be able to 
broaden the base of public acceptance of hunting only from a position 
of respectability.  If hunters are not respected by the majority of the public, 
even the best public education programs will not be successful at ultimately 
improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  Only once the majority of the 
public is convinced that hunters share their basic values of animal welfare and 
wildlife conservation will hunters gain the respect of the majority of the public.  
The results of the study show that in order for hunters to be respected by 
members of the public, the public must be convinced that the hunting fraternity 
truly has the welfare, wellbeing and best interest of wildlife at heart; that they 
condemn any unethical hunting practices or acts of animal cruelty; that their 
actions lead to the effective management and conservation of wildlife; and 
that hunters’ primary motivation for hunting is not to take pleasure in killing, 
but rather to experience and enjoy nature and the outdoors (a motivation that 
society would, in all likelihood, be better able to relate to; and a motivation that 
implies that hunters have an appreciation for nature).  To merely advocate the 
latter about the hunting fraternity during public relations and public 
education campaigns alone will not be effective.  If the public sense any 
discord between the information that is conveyed to them about hunters and 
the way in which hunters actually behave, the public will simply question the 
credibility of the information and reject it.  Therefore, the involvement and 
cooperation of hunters are vital to the success of any strategy to improve the 
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image of hunters and, ultimately, the social acceptability of hunting.  For this 
reason, hunter education programmes are also vital to the success of 
strategies to improve the social legitimacy of hunting.  In addition, the 
researcher believes that the organised hunting industry must strive to 
establish a strong culture amongst the hunting fraternity that condemns 
unethical hunting practices, acts of animal cruelty, improper hunter conduct, or 
any act that may damage the image of hunters.  In other words, there needs 
to be a strong culture within the hunting fraternity to actively protect their own 
image, firstly, by condemning those behaviours of fellow hunters that are 
damaging to the image of hunters and, secondly, by encouraging behaviours 
that contribute to positive image-building.  Once such a culture is strong 
enough, more and more individual hunters will be discouraged from engaging 
in activities that may damage the image of hunters.  The organised hunting 
industry must find ways to establish a strong prevailing culture of image-
building amongst the hunting fraternity. 
 
5.3.3 General remarks 
  
The hunting fraternity often has to defend hunting against the emotional 
onslaught, accusations and half-truths of those who oppose hunting.  
Although many of the traditional arguments provide legitimate defences of 
hunting, having to argue form a defensive position puts hunting proponents at 
a disadvantage.  The researcher theorises that the future of hunting in a 
society that is becoming increasingly concerned with the welfare of wildlife 
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depends not so much on developing effective pro-hunting defensive 
strategies, but rather on developing effective strategies to actively improve the 
social acceptability of hunting.  To convince a majority of our society that 
hunting is a good thing would be extremely difficult.  Thus, instead of seeking 
the public’s support for hunting, the organised hunting industry should rather 
seek the public’s understanding and acceptance.  If the organised hunting 
industry does not find ways of broadening its base of public acceptance, 
the defence of hunting will continue to demand increasingly more time 
and resources that could be better utilised in other projects. 
 
Hunters’ primary motivations for hunting seem to play a role in the social 
acceptability of hunting.  Previous research suggest that people are much 
more likely to accept hunting if it is performed in an ecological context or for 
subsistence purposes than when it is performed in the context of recreation or 
sport (trophy hunting).  This suggests that the hunting fraternity must attempt 
to frame their motivation for hunting into a socially acceptable context.  The 
findings of this study provide some clues in this regard.  The findings suggest 
that the public believe that hunters are much more likely to ‘take pleasure and 
enjoyment in killing wild animals’ (which provoke very negative evaluations) 
than to ‘experience nature and the outdoors’ (which provoke very positive 
evaluations).  Clearly, these findings suggest that hunting opposition might be 
significantly decreased if the public could be convinced that hunters’ primary 
motivation for hunting is to experience nature and the outdoors, and not to 
take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals.  Thus, one possible way 
of putting hunters’ primary reason for hunting into a socially acceptable 
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context is for the hunting fraternity to portray hunting as a lasting ecological 
experience whereby one could truly connect with nature and become better 
acquainted with wildlife (experience nature and the outdoors).  The research 
suggests that the public would be more accepting and understanding of this 
primary motivation for hunting.  This primary motivation for hunting would also 
reflect hunters’ appreciation for wildlife and perhaps convince a significant 
proportion of the public that hunters share their basic values of appreciating 
wildlife.  This, in turn, may also put the hunting fraternity in a better position to 
gain the respect of the majority of the public.  Thus, hunting opposition may be 
significantly decreased if the hunting fraternity’s primary motivation for hunting 
was put into the context of experiencing nature and the outdoors (ecological 
experience). 
 
Since members of the non-hunting public are often incognisant about hunting, 
they often fail to form an accurate understanding of hunters’ principle 
motivations for hunting.  For example, the results showed that members of the 
public often believe that hunters’ direct motivations for hunting lies in ‘taking 
pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals’ – a perceived motivation that is 
regarded as socially unacceptable.  However, if the hunting fraternity openly 
admits to enjoying the total hunting experience and carefully frame their direct 
motivation for hunting into a socially acceptable context, the likelihood that 
members of the public will resort to their own biased perceptions to rationalise 
hunters’ motivations for hunting may be significantly reduced. 
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As a final remark, in face of the social threats facing the organised hunting 
industry, the minority rights of hunters in a liberal democracy could be 
protected, firstly, by demonstrating that the management of wildlife through 
hunting is sound and that hunting does not negatively affect wildlife; secondly, 
by emphasizing the contributions that hunting makes to the various aspects of 
the economy; thirdly, by continuing to take credit for positive wildlife 
management efforts and conservation successes; fourthly, by stressing that 
the latter is in the interest of all members of the public who cares about 
wildlife; and, finally, by calling for proof of any direct or tangible harm that 
hunting causes to society or, specifically, to those who oppose hunting. 
  
5.4 SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
  
 The need for more theory-based research in the discipline of human 
dimensions of wildlife and natural resources are widely recognised in the 
existing literature (see chapter 2.3.1 in chapter 2).  The researcher is of the 
opinion that future research in this area should preferably be based on 
theoretical approaches, rather than on descriptive approaches.  This will help 
to integrate research findings and to build a cumulative body of knowledge on 
people’s attitudes towards wildlife and hunting, which, in turn, will provide a 
better foundation for investigating peoples’ wildlife-related attitudes and 
behaviours. 
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Very little research regarding attitudes towards hunting has previously been 
done in South Africa.  As a result, many opportunities for further research flow 
from this study.  Some suggestions about future research pertaining to 
attitudes towards hunting and improving the social legitimacy of hunting are 
put forward for consideration. 
 
 Future research could build on the findings of this study by developing and 
testing persuasive communication strategies, public education campaigns, 
and public relations campaigns that are aimed at improving the social 
legitimacy of hunting. 
 Studies could be undertaken to find ways for the organised hunting industry 
to establish a strong culture amongst the hunting fraternity that would, over 
the long term, improve the negative image that the public has about 
hunters.  
 An important finding of this study is that members of the public need to be 
acquainted with hunting in order to improve the social legitimacy of hunting, 
and that hunters working at the community level could play an important 
role in this regard.  Further researcher could therefore be done to establish 
the most effective way to achieve this goal. 
 A possible limitation of this study lies in the fact that this research was 
based on a non-probability sample and cannot be seen as representative of 
any particular segment of the public of South Africa.  Therefore, a more 
extensive study based on a probability sample for a specific geographical 
area of interest (e.g., city, metropolitan areas, provinces) or for a specific 
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segment of the public (e.g., urban or rural societies) could be undertaken.  
This could further expand and refine the current understanding of public 
attitudes towards hunting and how to improve the social legitimacy of 
hunting amongst a specific target group of interest. 
 A study of a similar nature could be undertaken that focuses specifically on 
investigating attitudes towards hunting amongst those policy makers and 
legislators that determine the legal environment in which the organised 
hunting industry must operate.  Research of this nature may yield 
information that would be of considerable strategic value to the organised 
hunting industry in the sense that it would assist them in maintaining a 
favourable legislative environment for the hunting industry. 
 Little evidence-based information regarding the social legitimacy of hunting 
in South Africa is available.  Studies could be undertaken to assess the 
social legitimacy of hunting in South Africa in order to provide an indication 
of the current state of affairs. 
 Factors related to hunting participation, hunter recruitment, as well as 
hunter retention could be studied.  It is recommended that the theory of 
reasoned action is applied to research of this nature, because it is a 
reputable theoretical approach to understanding and changing behaviour. 
 Studies to identify the fundamental wildlife-related values of the public 
(particular the moderate segment of the public) may be investigated.  This 
will further expand the current understanding of the social environment in 
which the hunting must maintain its social legitimacy. 
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 While this study was focused on the attitudes towards hunting, future 
studies could also investigate the role that normative influences play in 
determining the social acceptability of hunting. 
 
5.5 SUMMARY 
 
This chapter concludes the research report.  The main aims of this study 
were, firstly, to attain a clear understanding of the causal determinants of 
different attitudes towards hunting and, secondly, to explore the implications 
that the research findings hold for improving the social legitimacy of hunting.  
To achieve these goals, a detailed literature study was firstly undertaken to 
establish a sound knowledge base on the psychology of attitudes.  Thereafter, 
the theory of reasoned action was identified as a suitable conceptual 
framework for the study.  The reasoned action approach offered a systematic 
an empirically valid theoretical approach to investigate the underlying causal 
determinants of different attitudes towards hunting amongst members of the 
public.  The logic of the reasoned action’s conceptual model was reviewed, as 
well as various methodological considerations that must be considered during 
any application of the model.  Essentially, the theory of reasoned action 
suggests that a person’s salient behavioural beliefs form the informational 
foundation on which their attitudes are based.  Data was collected during an 
initial formative survey with a view to identify the behavioural beliefs about 
hunting that are most readily salient amongst members of the public.  A total 
of 12 salient behavioural beliefs about hunting were found to be readily held 
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by members of the public.  Data was then collected on each of these 
behavioural beliefs during a primary survey in a manner that is consistent with 
the prescribed procedures of the theory of reasoned action.  The reasoned 
action model provided strong empirical evidence that the identified 
behavioural beliefs accurately reflected the primary causal determinants on 
which members of the public base their attitudes towards hunting.  Further 
investigations of these behavioural beliefs provided a clear understanding of 
the informational foundation on which different attitudes towards hunting are 
based.  Attitudinal differences were also explained by comparing the 
behavioural beliefs that formed the cognitive foundations on which different 
attitudes were based.  Furthermore, the influences of various background 
factors were investigated with the view to understand how these variables 
influence attitudes towards hunting and its causal determinants.  The study 
was concluded by providing specific guidelines and recommendations 
regarding the development of future strategies to improve the social legitimacy 
of hunting. 
 
It is believed that the study successfully addressed its main research question 
and sub-questions.  In the final instance it can be said that this study puts 
forward information that may increase the organised hunting industry’s 
understanding of the social environment in which it operates.  An increased 
understanding of why members of the public hold specific attitudes towards 
hunting is vital in order to maintain the social legitimacy of hunting. 
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ANNEXURE A:   
Formative survey preamble letter and questionnaire 
 
Dear NMMU Student / Staff member 
  
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  My name is Wentzel 
Coetzer, and I am an NMMU Agriculture & Game Management DTech student.  I am 
conducting research on people’s attitudes towards the legal hunting of wild animals.  
The purpose of this survey is to collect information about your attitudes, opinions, 
and beliefs about hunting.  This information will be used to construct questions for 
my study’s primary survey. 
  
You are not obliged to take part in any research.  You may withdraw from the survey 
at any time (by simply closing the web-survey) without any fear of reprisal.  Your 
participation is completely voluntary and your identity and personal information will 
be kept completely confidential at all times.  However, the results of the research 
study may be presented at scientific conferences and/or in specialist publications.  
 
By clicking on the electronic link below, you agree to participate in the survey.  
Note, however, that you must be at least 18 years of age or older to participate 
in the survey.  No person younger than the age of 18 years should participate 
in the survey.   
  
*Link to online survey:  
http://www.eSurveysPro.com/Survey.aspx?id=d84df610-de05-47a5-8214-
29a565b52c82 
 
Data use:   Forms part of Wentzel Coetzer’s DTech in Agriculture thesis. 
  
The ethical integrity of the study has been approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee for Humans (REC-H) of the university.  The REC-H consists of a group of 
independent experts that has the responsibility to ensure that the rights and welfare 
of participants in research are protected and that studies are conducted in an ethical 
manner.  Research studies that involve human participants cannot be conducted 
without REC-H’s approval.  
  
Research Ethics clearance number:  (H13-SCI-AGRI-003) 
 
You have the right to query concerns regarding the study at any time:  The contact 
details of the researcher are provided below.  
 
Kind Regards 
  
Wentzel Coetzer 
(Principal investigator of study) 
Contact: 0725345914 
Email: s20411675@nmmu.ac.za 
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Attitudes towards the legal hunting of wild animals 
 
PLEASE NOTE:   
Throughout this questionnaire, the term “hunting” refers to the “legal 
hunting of wild animals” and it does not refer to any illegal practices 
such as poaching. 
(Poaching refers to the illegal hunting of game or wild animals that is not one’s own or is under official protection). 
 
There are 20 questions in this questionnaire that will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
 Tick the box to proceed with the survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey 
430 
SECTION A: Demographical Information 
Instructions: Please select the option that best describes your demographical characteristics for each question 
below or write your answer in the space provided (where applicable). 
1. Please indicate your gender. 
 Male 
 Female 
 
2. Please indicate your age. 
 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity. 
 Black African 
 Coloured 
 White 
 Indian or Asian 
 Other (Please specify)   
 
 
4. Please indicate your level of academic qualification. 
 Less than Grade 12 
 Grade 12 Certificate (Matric) 
 National Diploma 
 Degree 
 Postgraduate qualification 
 
5. Are you a South African citizen? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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SECTION B: Background Information 
Instructions: Please select the option that best describes your situation for each question below. 
6. Have you ever been on a hunt before? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
7. Do you have any close social ties with people (e.g., family members, friends) who 
hunt regularly? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
8. Do you have contacts or ties with farmers or people in rural areas? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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SECTION C: Thoughts and feelings about hunting 
Instructions: In response to the questions that follow, please write down ALL your thoughts that come 
immediately to mind.  Some of the questions may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different 
issues. 
9. What do you like about hunting? 
 
 
 
 
10. What do you dislike about hunting? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
11. What do you think would be the advantages or positive consequences of 
hunting? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12. What do you think would be the disadvantages or negative consequences of 
hunting? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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SECTION D: Attitudes and opinions pertaining to hunting 
Below are some statements representing different opinions that people might have about 
hunting.  We are interested in knowing your opinions about hunting.  Some of the statements 
may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different issues. 
Instructions: Please select the option that best represents your opinion for each question below. 
13. In general, I think that hunting is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
14. The idea that wild animals are hunted makes me feel: 
 Extremely Happy 
 Happy 
 Neither 
 Sad 
 Extremely Sad 
 
15. In my opinion, hunting is generally: 
 Extremely Beneficial 
 Beneficial 
 Neither 
 Harmful 
 Extremely Harmful 
 
16. To what degree do you like or dislike hunting? 
 Like a Lot 
 Like 
 Neither 
 Dislike 
 Dislike a Lot 
 
17. In general, I think that hunting is: 
 Extremely Positive 
 Positive 
 Neither 
 Negative 
 Extremely Negative 
 
18. The idea that wild animals are hunted is: 
 Extremely Pleasant 
 Pleasant 
 Neither 
 Disturbing 
 Extremely Disturbing 
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19. Please indicate to what degree do you approve or disapprove of hunting. 
 Strongly Approve 
 Approve 
 Neither 
 Disapprove 
 Strongly Disapprove 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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20. If you wish to receive feedback on the results of this survey, please type your 
email address in the space provided below. 
  
 
 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finished Exit Survey Back 
436 
ANNEXURE B:   
Primary survey preamble letter and questionnaire 
 
Dear NMMU Student / Staff member 
You are being asked to participate in a research study.  My name is Wentzel 
Coetzer, and I am an NMMU Agriculture & Game Management DTech student.  I am 
conducting research on people’s attitudes towards the legal hunting of wild animals.  
The purpose of this survey is to measure your attitudes, opinions, and beliefs about 
hunting.  Your participation will be appreciated. 
  
You are not obliged to take part in any research.  You may withdraw from the survey 
at any time (by simply closing the web-survey) without any fear of reprisal.  Your 
participation is completely voluntary and your identity and personal information will 
be kept completely confidential at all times.  However, the results of the research 
study may be presented at scientific conferences and/or in specialist publications.  
 
By clicking on the electronic link below, you agree to participate in the survey.  
Note, however, that you must be at least 18 years of age or older to participate 
in the survey.  No person younger than the age of 18 years should participate 
in the survey. 
  
*Link to online survey:  
http://www.eSurveysPro.com/Survey.aspx?id=d84df610-de05-47a5-8214-
29a565b52c823 
 
Data use:   Forms part of Wentzel Coetzer’s DTech in Agriculture thesis. 
  
The ethical integrity of the study has been approved by the Research Ethics 
Committee for Humans (REC-H) of the university.  The REC-H consists of a group of 
independent experts that has the responsibility to ensure that the rights and welfare 
of participants in research are protected and that studies are conducted in an ethical 
manner.  Research studies that involve human participants cannot be conducted 
without REC-H’s approval.  
  
Research Ethics clearance number:  (H13-SCI-AGRI-003) 
 
You have the right to query concerns regarding the study at any time:  The contact 
details of the researcher are provided below.  
 
Kind Regards 
  
Wentzel Coetzer 
(Principal investigator of study) 
Contact: 0725345914 
Email: s20411675@nmmu.ac.za 
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Attitudes towards the legal hunting of wild animals 
 
PLEASE NOTE:   
Throughout this questionnaire, the term “hunting” refers to the “legal 
hunting of wild animals” and it does not refer to any illegal practices 
such as poaching. 
(Poaching refers to the illegal hunting of game or wild animals that is not one’s own or is under official protection). 
 
There are 37 questions in this questionnaire that will take approximately 15 minutes to complete. 
 
 Tick the box to proceed with the survey 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey 
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SECTION A: Demographical Information 
Instructions: Please select the option that best describes your demographical characteristics for each question 
below or write your answer in the space provided (where applicable). 
1. Please indicate your gender. 
 Male 
 Female 
 
2. Please indicate your age. 
 
 
3. Please indicate your ethnicity. 
 Black African 
 Coloured 
 White 
 Indian or Asian 
 Other (Please specify) 
 
 
4. Please indicate your level of academic qualification. 
 Less than Grade 12 
 Grade 12 Certificate (Matric) 
 National Diploma 
 Degree 
 Postgraduate qualification 
 
5. Are you a South African citizen? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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SECTION B: Background Information 
Instructions: Please select the option that best describes your situation for each question below. 
6. Do you have any close social ties with people (e.g., family members, friends) who 
hunt regularly? 
 Yes 
 No 
 
7. Which one of the following statements best describes your behaviour? 
 I have never gone hunting before 
 I have gone hunting once before 
 I have gone hunting a couple of times before, but not on a regular basis 
 I go hunting less than once in every 2 years 
 I go hunting once in every 2 years 
 I go hunting once a year 
 I go hunting more than once a year 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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SECTION C: Attitudes towards hunting 
Instructions: Please select the category that best describes your attitude towards hunting. 
8. Please indicate to what degree do you approve or disapprove of hunting. 
 Strongly Approve 
 Approve 
 Neither 
 Disapprove 
 Strongly Disapprove 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Next Exit Survey Back 
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SECTION D: Attitudes towards general issues pertaining to wildlife 
The following statements represent some consequences people might associate hunting with.  Some 
of the statements may appear to be similar, but they do address somewhat different issues. 
If hunting would have the following consequences, how good or bad do you think it 
is? 
Instructions: Please select the opinion that best represents your opinion for each question below. 
9. Doing things that will endanger wild animals species and drive them to extinction 
is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
10. Managing the number of wild animals in an area to prevent over-population is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
11. To get fresh meat or meat products (such as biltong) is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
12. Doing something that will benefit the economy of the country is generally: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
13. To experience nature and the outdoors is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
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14. For hunters to take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
15. Unethical hunting practices that do not give wild animals a fair chance of survival 
is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
16. If hunters kill animals unnecessary without having a good reason or useful 
purpose (e.g., to get meat) for doing so, it is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
17. For hunters to kill wild animals during a hunt is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
18. Disrupting and harming wild animal populations is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
19. Conserving wild animals is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
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20. To wound wild animals during a hunt is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
21. The cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
 
22. To cause pain and suffering to wild animals that are hunted is: 
 Extremely Good 
 Good 
 Neither 
 Bad 
 Extremely Bad 
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SECTION E: Opinions about general issues pertaining to wildlife 
Below are some statements representing different views that people might have about hunting or the 
consequences of hunting.  Some of the statements may appear to be similar, but they do address 
somewhat different issues. 
How likely or unlikely do you think it is that hunting has the following consequences? 
OR 
How strongly do you agree or disagree with the following views? 
Instructions: Please select the option that best represents your opinion for each question below. 
23. Hunting results in the endangerment and extinction of wild animal species. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
 
24. Hunting is a way of managing the number of wild animals in an area to prevent 
over-population. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
25. Hunting is a way to get fresh meat or meat products (such as biltong). 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
26. Hunting holds some economical benefits for our country (such as job creation, 
tourism, income for farmers, etc.). 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
27. Hunting is a way to experience nature and the outdoors. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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28. Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing wild animals. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
29. Hunting leads unethical hunting practices that do not give wild animals a fair 
chance of survival. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
 
30. Hunters often kill animals unnecessary without having a good reason or useful 
purpose (e.g., to get meat) for doing so. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
 
31. Hunting results in wild animals being killed by hunters. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
 
32. Hunting is disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
 
33. Hunting contributes to the conservation of wild animals. 
 Strongly Agree 
 Agree 
 Neither 
 Disagree 
 Strongly Disagree 
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34. Hunting results in wild animals being wounded. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
 
35. Hunting results in the cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
 
36. Hunting causes pain and suffering to wild animals. 
 Extremely Likely 
 Likely 
 Neither 
 Unlikely 
 Extremely Unlikely 
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37. If you wish to receive feedback on the results of this survey, please type your 
email address in the space provided below. 
  
 
 
 
Thank you for your willingness to participate in the survey. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Finished Exit Survey Back 
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APPENDIX 1:  Content analysis grids of participants’ emitted likes and positive consequences of hunting. 
(Note: to ease reading of the information in Appendix 1, please refer to the electronic copy of the thesis on the CD disc). 
 
Hunting is a way of managing 
the number of w ild animals in 
an area to prevent over-
population.
Hunting is a way for people to 
get meat or meat products 
(such as biltong).
Hunting holds some 
economical benefits for our 
country (such as job creation, 
tourism, income for farmers / 
communities, etc.).
Hunting is a way for people to 
experience nature and the 
outdoors.
Hunting is an exciting 
experience (fun, pleasure, 
adventure, sport)  
Hunting contributes towards 
the conservation of w ild 
animals.
Hunting can promote 
environmental awareness by 
teaching people about nature 
and by getting people 
interested in nature.
Game meat is healthy Hunting is a challenging 
activity in the sence that it 
tests your skills and abilities
Hunting is a way of socializing 
and bonding with friends or 
family. 
Hunting is a humane way of 
harvesting animals for food.
Hunting teaches valuable life 
lessons (such as 
responsibility, discipline).
Hunting is a way of controlling 
problem animals.
Unclasified
1
Strongly     
Approve
The protection of the habitat that 
the animals live in.
x
It has the potential to generate 
income for the surrounding 
communities
As much as it is about the f inal 
shot, the actual enjoyment is being 
out in the veld and having the 
sense / feeling of being closer to 
nature, smelling the fresh air in the 
morning or the dust in the late 
afternoon.
x
The species that are hunted create 
a f inancial incentive for people to 
conserve them
x x
I enjoy the diff iculty of the stalk Sitting around a f ire w ith friends 
and family at night, talking, having 
fun or even just staring into the 
f ire. x x x x
2
Strongly        
Approve
x
The meat is healthy The money from hunting contribute 
to the economy.
I like to be in the bushveld...
x
Hunting allow s the game farmer to 
increase his capital and purchase 
other animals that he may not 
necesarily use for hunting but are 
good for view ing on game drives 
and so animals are conserved and 
protected in this w ay; Farmers are 
buying tracts of lands to turn into 
game farms and this is conserving 
the land as they w ill maintain it and 
protect it as it is their livelyhood.
It gets people into the outdoors and 
interested in nature
The meat is healthy
x x
...hunting is a very humane w ay to 
harvest food.  The animals is in the 
bush, its had a natural life w ithout 
being injected w ith hormones and 
anitbioting such as animals in 
feeding lots, it does not have the 
stress of being herded into an 
abattoir and heard its fellow  
animals being slaughtered.
x x x
3
Strongly        
Approve
Management of specif ic game 
species numbers x
Economic benefits to farm ow ner. The time in nature, observing birds, 
plants, and other animals. x
Conservation of species
x x x x x x x x
4
Strongly        
Approve
Game control or limiting sort of 
culling x x x
the experience and excitement of 
stalking and hunting x x x x x x x x x
5
Strongly          
Approve
Regulate animal populations that 
are becoming to big for the area 
they inhibit; Reduces the numbers 
of an animal species that 
endangers another species in the 
habitat.
x
Bring in foreign money into the 
country.
x
It provides pleasure
x
A enjoyable w ay to learn about 
nature.
x x x x x x x
6
Strongly           
Approve
It promotes the conservation of 
game in the sense that game is 
sensibly managed and hunted to 
control numbers effectively.
Good quality meat.  Variety of 
products w hich can be made from 
venison, such as biltong, dry 
w ors, mince, roasts, etc.
Hunting generates a large revenue 
each year from overseas and local 
hunters
Being in nature...
x
It promotes the conservation of 
game in the sense that game is 
sensibly managed and hunted to 
control numbers effectively.
x
Meat that is hormone free and very 
lean - low  in cholestrol levels.
Hunting skills and having to read 
the veld and animals in order to 
hunt an animal.  Walking and 
stalking
Good times spend w ith friends 
during hunting trips.
x x x x
7
Strongly         
Approve
x
It provides a source of food.
x
Experience nature
x x x
Good and healthy protein source.
x x x x x
Perpetuates ecosystems only if  
done sustainably.
8 Approve x
A w ay to utilize an important 
natural resource some can count 
on to make a living.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
9 Approve
When animals are overcrow ded in 
a certain habitat, it can relieve the 
preassure or competition amongst 
the animals.
x
People w ho practice legal hunting 
creates jobs to a certain extent.
x x x x x x x x
In hunting there are rules, and it 
teaches and re-inforces 
responsibility and discipline 
amongst children as w ell as 
adults.
x
Young adults are introduced to a 
hobby other than computer games
10 Approve x x x
You are outside in nature and are 
surrounded by trees, plant, and 
bushes.
x x
Helps people to learn and be 
aw are about the creatures in 
nature
x x x x x x x
11 Approve x x Tourisms Experience nature, veld, w ildlife. x x x x x x x x x x
12 Approve x Meat x x x x x x x x x Teaches valuable life lessons. x x
13 Approve
Population control
x x
Being outdoors and the feeling of 
being in nature. x x
Promotes aw areness of 
conservation issues x x x x x x x
14 Approve x
The meat products (meat, biltong, 
dry w ors)
x
Time spend outdoors reconnecting 
w ith nature;  Allow s city people to 
remember w hat life is all about and 
help them reconnect w ith nature
The thrill of the stalk Aids conservation of w ildlife.  
Without hunters protecting animals 
many species w ould already have 
being hunted out.
x x x x x x x x
15 Approve
Animal numbers are contained.  
x
Money of legal hunting is also 
being used to help w ith 
conservation.
x x
Money of legal hunting is also 
being used to help w ith 
conservation;  It w ill have a 
positive outcome on increasing 
w ildlife habitat as w ell as the 
animal population and survival
x x x x x x x x
16 Approve
Reducing populations so sustain 
carrying capacity of land (culling)
Providing fresh venison w hich is 
more healthy than beef, pork, lamb, 
etc.
Job creation
x x x
Hunting can promote environmental 
aw areness and conservation
Providing healthy source of protein 
w hich is more healthy than beef, 
pork, lamb, etc.
x x x x x x
17 Approve x
The meat.
x x x
Adding monetary value to animals, 
thereby encouraging conservation x x x x x x x x
18 Approve x
If controlled correctly, it is a 
sustainable w ay of harvesting 
meat
If controlled correctly, it is good 
source of income for the country;  
Hunting is a profitable venture...
x x
Protection of threatened species 
through w ell regulated hunting.  
Hunting is a profitable venture and 
therefore hunting can fund the 
protection of threatened species.
x x x x x x x x
19 Approve
I know  that it is used to control the 
amount of animals an area can 
carry
x
In many cases hunting provides an 
added income for farmers x x x x x x x x x x x
20 Approve
Can be useful for population 
control
Provides food resources for 
people x x x x x x x x x x x x
21 Neither Less possibility of over-crow ding x x x x x x x x x x x x x
22 Neither
It prevents overpopulation of 
animals taking place
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
23 Neither
Can be used as a form of 
regulating animal species 
populations.
It provides us w ith meat products
x x x x x x x x x x x x
24 Neither Culling and control of numbers x x Being in the outdoors x x x x x x x x x x
25 Neither
Culling of animals to limit their 
numbers x x x
The thrill of the hunt
x x x x x x x x x
26 Neither x
I like the idea that people hunt to 
get food; Food gathering.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
27 Neither
Control animal numbers Provides food Attract tourists; Provide a source 
of income
x x x x x x x x x x x
28 Neither Animal control x x It is fun to be outdoors x x x x x x x x x x
29 Neither x Food x x x x x x Improves and test your skills x x x x x
30 Neither x
Game meat is lovely to eat.  Provide an icome
x x
Farmers w ho breed animals for 
the purpose of hunting keeps the 
animal numbers of populations high 
rather than depleating them.  
Because of hunting w e w ill still 
have w ild animals running around 
in the w ild for our children one 
day.
x
Healthy, lean, nutrition rich meat
x x x x x x
31 Neither
A w ay to control the over 
abundant species.  Hunting could 
be used to curb the population of 
the over abundant species in a 
controlled w ay.
x x
It could be relaxing and enjoyable 
to be in nature.
x x x x x x x x x x
32 Neither
Hunting can be a w ay to decrease 
the amount of animals on a farm.
To supply food.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
33 Neither x Biltong x x x x x x x x x x x x
34 Neither
Over populated species can be 
managed x x x
Adventure
x x x x x x x x x
35 Neither
Culling of animals w hen there is an 
ecological imbalance x
Economic reasons - sustaining of 
a person, group of people, or 
community
x x x x x x x x x x x
36 Neither Culling excess animals It gets people food Economic advantages x x x x x x x x x x x
37 Neither
Help to keep the animal numbers in 
control;  Keep the numbers of 
certain species dow n
Wild meat tastes good, and biltong 
is good x x x x x x x x x x x
Feed hungry people
38 Neither x Free meat x x x x x x x x x x x x
39 Neither
It keeps numbers of some animals 
low  and helps in their management
It is a w ay to get food
x
It is a w ay of relaxing in nature
x x x x x x x x x x
40 Neither
Population sizes needs to be 
controlled since natural predators 
are mostly out of the picture x x x x x x x x x x x x
I like seeing the animals in their 
natural habitat, doing w hat they 
w ere intended to do and not being 
caged as in zoos
41 Disapprove x
Hunting is an ancient culture of 
Africans to get food.   /   It is a 
source of food. x x x x x x x x x x x
Hunting is an ancient culture of 
Africans to get food.  So as an 
African I like hunting because it 
reminds me back in days of my 
ancestors.
42 Disapprove
Control of animals.
x x
The air, the sun, and being in 
nature. x x x x x x x x x x
43 Disapprove x x
It provides meet to eat
x
As it is seen as a sport by some 
people, I gess it can be exciting. x x x x x x x x
Some hunting is good for the 
environment
44 Disapprove x x
Economically, hunting provides a 
steady source of income to 
ow ners of game farms... and it 
boosts the tourism industry.
x x x x x x x x x x x
45 Disapprove
Hunting serves a purpose in culling 
the animals and keeping their 
numbers under control; Keep 
consumer populations below  
carrying capacity.
Provides food, venison, and 
biltong.
Economic reasons.
x x x x x x x x x x x
46 Disapprove x
Biltong
x
Being out in the open, aw ay from 
the city
Some people enjoys it as a sport
x x x x x x x x x
47 Disapprove x
To get fresh meat
x
To see the beauty of nature.
x x
To get more know ledge about the 
animals.
x x x x x
Sometimes hunting is used to get 
rid of problematic animals on 
farms, so hunting helps maintain 
that.
x
48 Disapprove
Culling Contributes to food production Economic grow th (many tourists 
come to SA to hunt and they pay a 
lot more than market price to hunt 
on our farms)
Like being outdoors in the nature
x x x x x
The social aspect of bonding 
x x x x
49 Disapprove x
Food - I like the idea of a man 
hunting for his meal.
It encourages tourism
x x x x x
The skill of hunting
x
I like the spiritual rituals that go 
along w ith hunting rather than just 
sending it along a production line at 
a slaughter house.
x x
I like the spiritual connection w ith 
animals
50 Disapprove x x x
It is a nice experience to spend 
time in nature looking for animals
x x x x x x x x x x
51 Disapprove x x x x x x x
The meat are hormone and anti-
biotic free.  The meat is low  in fat 
and more healthy to eat
x x
The animals are free ranging.  
They do not have to be 
transported and killed in an abitoir.
x x x
52 Disapprove
When hunting is used to keep 
animal populations in control x x x x x x x x x x x x
Research
53 Disapprove
I think it is sometimes necessary to 
cull a herd.  Culling w hen 
necessary keeps the veld in a 
better condition
I do enjoy the meat, e.g. Kudu 
biltong.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
54
Strongly 
Disapprove
x
Hunting is acceptable if  people are 
in need of food. x x x x x x x x x x x x
55
Strongly 
Disapprove
Control animal numbers to prevent 
over population
The amount of meat obtained 
through hunting makes it 
w orthw hile.
x
I enjoy the outdoor activity aspect 
of it, in that one goes to different 
areas and get to see different 
parts of the bushlife.  Many of the 
time w hen hunting, one comes 
accross many different species of 
animals and plants. 
x x x x x x x x
Control problem animals
x
56
Strongly 
Disapprove
x x x x x
Conservation and hunting go 
together x x x x x x x x
57
Strongly 
Disapprove
Maintaining numbers of animals in 
ratio to grazing areas capacity.
Meat in the pot
x x x x x x
Open air challenge of putting one's 
ability against the animal's in a 
natural environment.
x x x x x
58
Strongly 
Disapprove
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
59
Strongly 
Disapprove
x
It is an advantage for some people 
because it feeds them.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
60
Strongly 
Disapprove
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
SALIENT BELIEF CATEGORIES
POSITIVE SALIENT BELIEFS ABOUT HUNTING
N
U
M
B
E
R
 O
F
  
  
  
  
 
R
E
S
P
O
N
D
E
N
T
S
A
T
T
IT
U
D
IN
A
L
  
  
  
  
  
  
C
A
T
E
G
O
R
Y
 
449 
APPENDIX 2:  Content analysis grids of participants’ emitted dislikes and negative consequences of hunting. 
(Note: to ease reading of the information in Appendix 2, please refer to the electronic copy of the thesis on the CD disc) 
 
Hunting results in 
the endangerment 
or extinction of wild 
animal species.
Hunters takes 
pleasure and 
enjoyment in killing 
wild animals.
Hunting leads to 
unethical hunting 
practices that do not 
give wild animals a 
fair chance of 
survival.
Hunters often kill 
animals 
unnecessary 
without having a 
good reason or 
useful purpose 
(e.g., to get meat) 
for doing so. 
Hunting results in 
wild animals being 
killed by hunters.
Hunting results in 
wild animals being 
wounded.
Hunting results in 
the cruel and 
inhumane treatment 
of wild animals.
Hunting is 
disruptive and 
harmful to wild 
animal populations.
Hunting causes pain 
and suffering to wild 
animals.
Hunting leads to 
various illegal 
practices (such as 
poaching, traps, 
etc.).
People go hunting 
without possessing 
the necessary skills, 
experience or 
training to make a 
clean kill
Hunters behave 
themselves poorly 
while hunting
Hunting promotes 
violence
Hunting makes me 
feel bad (such as 
upsetting, guilt, 
sadness, or 
empathy)
Hunters are 
disrespectful 
towards animals
Hunting expose one 
to the sight of blood 
and dead animals
Hunters have 
barbaric rituals and 
hunting traditions
Hunting is a 
dangerous activity
Unclassified
1
Strongly        
Approve
Over hunting (poor 
management) could have 
serious impacts on a species.
x
Hunters w ho acts rutheless 
and unethical and gives the 
sport of fair chase and ethical 
hunting a bad name
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
2
Strongly        
Approve
that people hunt animals that 
w e should be conserving; 
Hunting of animals that w e 
should protect.
x
That people hunt unethically 
and drug certain animals; 
...people w ho hunt unethically 
and drug animals or keep 
them in confined areas or 
hunt more than the legal bag 
limit.  /  People w ho go about 
hunting unethically.
Some people use hunting as 
an excuse to kill anything that 
moves; People w ho w ant to 
hunt unnecessary animals 
such as duiker and jackal, as 
this show s the need to kill, 
not to harvest sustainably; 
hunting of species labeled as 
vermin w hen farmers are 
ignorant of their breeding and 
social structures.
x
That peope w ith inadequate 
experience are allow ed to 
hunt and this results in 
w ounded animals that are 
sometimes not found and put 
out of their misery; ...people 
w ho cause distress by 
chasing animals or w ounding 
them...
x
...people w ho cause distress 
by chasing animals...
x
Illegal hunting w ith dogs... That peope w ith inadequate 
experience are allow ed to 
hunt and this results in 
w ounded animals that are 
sometimes not found and put 
out of their misery
x x x x x x x x
3
Strongly        
Approve
Over hunting of a species on 
a farm
x x x x
Wounding an animal
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
4
Strongly        
Approve
x x
Shooting animals at w ater 
holes, shooting from a vehicle x x
Injuring animals
x x x
Traps for animals 
x x x x x x x x
Makes animals vehicle shy
5
Strongly        
Approve
If  there is no control in 
species hunted, it may result 
in certain species becoming 
extinct.
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
6
Strongly        
Approve
x x
Unethical hunting practices. Killing animals w hich can not 
be consumed or otherw ise 
used.  Killing big cats as part 
of a sport has never ever 
made any sort of sence to 
me; Shooting more animals 
than one needs.
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
7
Strongly        
Approve
The possibility of endangering 
species; Too much hunting 
could endanger species. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
8 Approve
Animals extinction. Unnecessary killing of animals 
for fun or distraction 
purposes
x
Unnecessary killing of animals 
for fun or distraction 
purposes
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
9 Approve
If  the hunters are not 
responsible, some animals 
can become extinct.
x x x x
I don't like w hen animals are 
suffering because of an 
uninformed or uneducated 
hunter. 
x x
I don't like w hen animals are 
suffering because of an 
uninformed or uneducated 
hunter. 
x
I don't like w hen animals are 
suffering because of an 
uninformed or uneducated 
hunter. 
x x x x x x x x
10 Approve x x x x x x x
Can interfere w ith ecological 
integrity if  done poorly
x x x x x x x x x x
To strenuous and laborious
11 Approve x x x x x x
Hunting could condone animal 
cruelty if  not done properly 
x x x x x
Could encourage gun training 
in people w ho are not 
emotionally and mentally 
mature enough to handle that 
responsibility. 
The feeling of empathy for 
dead animal
x
To see dead animals
x x x
12 Approve x x
Hunting that is unethical.
x x x x x x x
Individuals w ho hunt w ithout 
the necessary skill
x x x x x x x x
13 Approve x x
In most cases the outf itter is 
unethical - animals are not 
given a fair chance.  The 
hunter should be on foot 
w here the hunter does not 
have any advantage over the 
animal.  
x x x x x x x x
Some hunters get to big for 
their boots and w ant to show  
off - this often leads to 
accidents; Some hunters 
provoke animals into 
unnatural circumstances.
x x
People think they are better 
than the animals
x x x x
14 Approve
Hunting cause the exploitation 
of w ildlife, w hich may lead to 
certain species being at risk 
of becoming over hunted.
x x x
It is relatively upsetting seeing 
a beautiful animal die at the 
hands of a hunter. x x
Harming environment
x x x
Hunters destroy natural areas 
and make fires w here they 
shouldn't for fun x x x
The blood aspect I do not 
enjoy.
x x x
15 Approve
Lead to potential extinction of 
species.
Hunting for pleasure. Canned hunts.  Animals 
having no access to escape 
routes. 
Killing for the sake of killing.
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
16 Approve x
To take a life for fun is just 
w rong.
x x x x x x x
Hunting encourages illegal 
hunting and poaching
x
Hunters sometimes trespass
x x x x x x
Complicates f irearm control
17 Approve x
Hunting as a sport
x
Killing for the sake of killing
x
Wounding animals in stead of 
instantaneous killing animal x
Putting animals under stress
x x x x x x x x x x x
18 Approve
Exploitation and extinction of 
species
x x
Hunting animals that are not 
an ideal source of food
x x x
Poor hunting practices 
(harming animals)
x
Poaching syndicates
x x x x x x x x
Farmers getting rich w hile the 
community suffers
19 Approve x x
I don't have a problem w ith 
people hunting to survive, but 
HOW they do it creates an 
ethical problem for me.  When 
thing start revolving about 
money people change and 
they start justifying doing 
things that are not right.  The 
fact that in many instances 
the animal is not given a fair 
chance of survival.  Men sit 
on chairs on the back of a 
bakkie or are taken to a place 
w here they w ait for animals 
to be chased in their direction 
and all they have to do is pull 
the trigger.
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
The w hole thing about the 
rituals.  I know  of a young 
boy of ten w ho w as forced 
to shoot his f irst impala and 
then eat the liver and smear 
himself w ith its blood.  He 
w as tramatized for w eeks.  
Come on!  Are w e living in the 
dark ages?
x x
20 Approve
If  over done, it could end the 
survival of a type of animal x
I dislike the manner in w hich 
some hunters hunt
Hunting just for the sake of 
killing and not for a useful 
purpose
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
21 Neither
Extinction or endangerment of 
animals. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
22 Neither
Sometimes to many of a 
specif ic type of animal is 
hunted, w hich drastically 
decreases their numbers.
x x x x x x x x x x x x
The guilt or feeling bad / sad 
for the poor animal beign 
hunted x x x x x
23 Neither
Extinction of our animals
x
The ruthelessness of the 
practice / method of killing in 
many cases. x x x x x x x x x x x
Treatment of the animal after 
the kill, e.g. Throw ing/dumping 
animal in truck x x x x
24 Neither x x
Leads to unethical hunting 
practices
Unneccessary killing of 
animals
x x x x
The pain the animal feels Leads to unauthorised 
hunting
x x x x x x x x x
25 Neither
If  it is not regulated the 
animals might become extinct; 
Extinction or eradication of 
certain species
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
26 Neither x
When hunting is done as a 
sport x x x x
Animal cruelty.
x x x x x x x x x x x
It is labour intensive.
27 Neither Depletion of animal numbers x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
28 Neither Risk of extinction of animals. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x It is dangerous. x
29 Neither Extinction of w ild animals x x x Killing of animals x x x x x x x x Feeling of guilt x x x x x
30 Neither x
The pleasure that some 
hunters feel w hen killing a 
living being.  
x x x
Wounding of animals
x x
The pain that the animal has 
to go through; Suffering of 
animals
x
Hunters' inability to make a 
clean kill x x x x x x x x
31 Neither
Certain kind of animals can be 
extinct; Certain types of 
w ildlife can get extinct. x x x x x x x
Animals that are suffering.  
The hunter is perhaps not a 
good hunter; Poor hunters 
can result in animals 
suffering.
x
Animals that are suffering.  
The hunter is perhaps not a 
good hunter. x x x x x x x x
32 Neither x x x x x x x x x x
When there are amateurs that 
hunt x x x x x x x x
33 Neither Endangering species x x x Killing of animals x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
34 Neither x x x x
The thought of killing an 
animal is upsetting
x x
If not under strict control, 
hunting may intervere w ith 
gene pools or have an effect 
on the biological diversity or 
ecological balance
x x x x x
The thought of killing an 
animal is upsetting
x x x x x
35 Neither x Hunters are killing for a sport x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
36 Neither
Over use of animals
x x x x x x
Over use may damage 
ecology
x x x x x x x x x x x
37 Neither x x x x
Killing a beautify creature of 
God is bad
Wounding an animal and not 
f inding it afterw ards so that it 
suffers
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
38 Neither x x x x
Death of animals
x x x x x x x x x x x x
Risk involved, hunting is 
dangerous
It takes a lot of energy and is 
tiring
39 Neither
It endangers some of our 
species and it can also lead 
to an extinction of some of 
our species if not controlled
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
It takes a vast amount of your 
time
40 Neither x x x
There are some people w ho 
are "cow boys" and just w ant 
to go on a shooting rampage 
at everything that moves.  
These same people w ill often 
shoot mothers and babies 
alike, w hich is unacceptable.
x x
I do not like seeing the animals 
suffer unnecessary - the 
killing must be as humane as 
possible.
Chasing animals and getting 
them scared/frightened by 
beaters or people w ho chase 
them on so that hunters can 
shoot them; Because there is 
money involved, farmers w ill 
often stock animals that are 
profitable as opposed to 
necesarry for a balanced 
ecology, having a negative 
impact on the vegetation and 
bringing animals into areas 
that they are ill suited for.  
x
Because there is money 
involved, it does attract bad 
elements - such as poachers
x x x x x x x x x
41 Disapprove
The only negative 
consequence of hunting is 
over exploiting of animals 
populations.  
x x x
I don't like the killing of 
animals.  I believe they 
deserve life just like us people x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
42 Disapprove x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
The sight of blood
x x
Hunting sometimes leads to 
the w rong animal being killed.
43 Disapprove
Killing endangered species 
could lead to extinction.
x x x
The fact that you actually 
have to kill a living animal.
x
I see it as cruel.
x x x x x
It gives people the freedom to 
act violently.
x x x x x x
44 Disapprove x
Hunting leads to people 
enjoying to kill animals in very 
harsh w ays
x
Unnecessary killing of animals 
that w e can not eat, such as 
rhino, leopard, lion.
x x
Hunting leads to people 
enjoying to kill animals in very 
harsh w ays
x x x x x x x
Hunters have no respect or 
appreciation for animals. x x x x
45 Disapprove Extinction of certain species. x x x Killing of the animals x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
46 Disapprove
Endangering of animals
x x x
Killing of animals
x
It not the most humane w ay 
of killing animals for food x
Pain and stress to animals if  
not killed correctly x
Killing of animals, often by 
people w ithout sound training 
in using w eapons.
x x x x x x x
Expense to country of 
regulating legal hunting
47 Disapprove
I think the more w ild animals 
are hunted, the more they are 
driven to extinction.  Future 
generations w ill only be 
show n pictures of animals 
that use to exist but don't 
anymore due to them being 
hunted dow n.
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
48 Disapprove x
The fact that hunters 
consider it a sport.  I don't 
think that people should take 
pleasure in the killing of 
animals; Enjoyment should not 
be taken in killing.  It seems 
sadistic.
x x
The fact that w ild animals 
have to be killed
x x x x x x x x x x x x x
teaching boys to hunt from a 
young age might have the 
w rong psychological effect 
on them
49 Disapprove
Hunting leads to the 
exploitation of animal; Hunting 
endangered animals is 
terrible. 
I think hunting for pleasure is 
sickening
I don't like hunting w here the 
animal is in a very small 
environment and doesn't have 
a chance of getting aw ay.
Hunting animals that cannot 
be eaten is terrible; Hunting 
leads to the killing of other 
beings unnecessary.
x x x x x x x x x x
I hate how  hunters think that 
they have pow er over 
animals and hunters that do 
not give any thanks or 
recognition for the animals 
life. 
x x x x
50 Disapprove
The hunted animals can 
become extinct. x x x x x
The killing method is brutal
x
The killing method is brutal
x x x x x x x x x x
51 Disapprove
Hunting of endangered 
species
x
Canned hunting and unethical 
hunting in general
x x
Sometimes the animals can be 
shot badly and have to be 
chased injured for long 
distances before being f inally 
killed.
x
Only animals w hich are better 
for hunting w ill be supported 
in game farms but others, e.g. 
Predators w ill be seen as 
competition or disregarded as 
important in the environment 
and mismanaged. 
Sometimes the animals can be 
shot badly and have to be 
chased injured for long 
distances before being f inally 
killed.
x x x x x x x x x x
52 Disapprove x
When it is done as a game or 
sport - for enjoyment
x x x x x x x x x x
I feel that hunting promote 
violence
x x x x x x
53 Disapprove
...heading the w ay of 
endanging species; Some 
animals can be heading 
tow ards endangerment 
because they didn't have time 
to mate and give offspring.
Many people hunt for fun - 
that I do not like.  Hunting is 
considered a sport by some, 
but should it be? x x x x x
Takes aw ay predators' food; 
It w ill disrupt their habitat
x x x
Hunters leave dead animals in 
veld 
x x x x x x x
54
Strongly 
Disapprove
There is extinction of animals 
in the w orld.  This killing of 
animals in the name of hunting 
w ould cause an extinction of 
certain animals.
x x x
The killing of animals
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
55
Strongly 
Disapprove
In the long run, animals w ould 
become extinct.
Animals are killed for 
entertainment purposes. x
Animals are killed for no 
reason. x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
56
Strongly 
Disapprove
x
I hate the fact that people 
think it is fun to kill 
defenseless animals.  /  I don't 
like the fact that people kill 
animals for sport.
x x x x x x It is painful to the animal x x x
Being exposed to the act of 
killing could possibly create or 
reinforce violent behaviour or 
questionable moral values in 
people.
x x x x x x
57
Strongly 
Disapprove
When one looks at the past, 
many animal species suffered 
and w ent extinct because of 
mindless and merciless 
hunting practices.  Hunting 
should be abolished.
It is an unnecessary practice.  
It should be made illegal.  
What is the purpose of 
shooting another living being 
for sport?
x
It is an unnecessary practice.  
It should be made illegal.  
What is the purpose of 
shooting another living being 
for sport?
x x x x x x x x x x x x x x x
58
Strongly 
Disapprove
Animal species become 
extinct.
It is a disgrace to hunt animals 
for sport or recreation.  
Nearly all hunting done today 
is for recreational purposes 
and hunters f ind it fun to 
shoot animals for their ow n 
pure enjoyment.  It has 
become a sort of method to 
kill animals for fun.
Animals are placed in nature 
researves so that it is easier 
for hunters to track and kill 
animals.
x x x
Hunting often leads to 
barbaric acts such as cutting 
off rhino horns w hile the 
animal is still alive
Hunting leads to many animals 
being taken aw ay from their 
natural habitats; Hunting takes 
aw ay food resources from 
w ild predators; Disturbing 
natures natural order. x
Hunting encourages 
poaching; Hunting often leads 
to barbaric acts such as 
cutting off rhino horns w hile 
the animal is still alive
x x x x x x x x
Teach children that it is OK to 
shoot animals for sport.
59
Strongly 
Disapprove
x x x x
For hunters to shoot w ild 
animals is appalling, 
especially if  the are w ounded 
and not killed immediately.
People w ho profess to be 
good shots and w ould w ound 
animals x
It causes untold fear.  Have 
you w atched the fear kudus 
experience w hen the hunting 
season starts and guns 
starts to go off
Wounded animals are not 
alw ays found, so they are 
left to die in pain x x x x x x x x x x
60
Strongly 
Disapprove
x
The fact that humans make a 
sport out of killing and 
disrupting an entire herd of 
animals
The animals don't stand a 
chance against the 
technology used and it is not 
fair chase.
x x
I also w orry that animals 
might be w ounded and not 
found.
Cruelty to animals; I know  
hunting is sometimes used to 
cull a herd, but I am sure 
there must be a more humane 
w ay of doing it
Disrupting an entire herd; The 
fact that humans make a 
sport out of killing and 
disrupting an entire herd of 
animals
x x x x x x x x
Some of the traditions 
practiced amongst hunters 
are barbaric and revolting, like 
eating the raw  liver of the 
animal right on the spot.
x x
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APPENDIX 3: 
Summary of the mean     products, belief strength measures (  ) and outcome evaluations (  ), for all five attitudinal sub-groups. 
TABLE 4.29. Mean belief-evaluation product for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between all five attitudinal sub-groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
    products 
Strongly 
Approve 
  
Approve 
  
Neither 
  
Disapprove 
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
(    )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   1.70a (1.54)    0.45b (1.61)   -0.83c (1.25)   -1.51c (1.44)   -2.97d (1.37) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.65a (1.58)    0.74b (1.16)   -0.04c (0.86)   -1.18d (1.49)   -2.52e (1.80) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   3.00a (1.50)    1.24b (1.74)   -0.29c (1.72)   -1.01c (1.97)   -2.13d (2.01) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   1.53a (1.84)    0.21b (1.98)   -1.08c (1.62)   -2.09d (1.56)   -3.02e (1.52) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   1.50a (1.97)    0.48b (1.97)   -1.10c (1.79)   -1.86c (1.77)   -2.95d (1.76) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   0.75a (1.60)   -0.46b (1.92)   -1.42c (1.41)   -2.40d (1.73)   -3.31e (1.30) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   3.30a (1.04)    1.59b (1.75)   -0.12c (2.17)   -0.91c,d (1.84)   -1.33d (2.39) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessary.   1.60a (1.98)    0.54b (1.77)   -0.73c (1.79)   -1.66d (1.84)   -2.39d (1.88) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   1.40a (2.19)    0.43a (2.16)   -1.02b (1.81)   -1.84b,c (1.93)   -2.72c (1.81) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   3.30a (1.14)    1.64b (1.36)    0.71c (1.04)    0.44c (1.15)    0.18c (1.32) 
+ Hold economical benefits for the country.   3.30a (1.20)    1.84b (1.34)    1.13c (1.41)    0.55c,d (1.25)    0.38d (1.58) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   1.10a (1.61)    0.16b (1.01)   -0.63c (1.40)   -1.13c (1.79)   -1.95d (2.35) 
Sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) 24.13
a (10.29)    8.86b (12.27)   -5.40c (9.57)   -14.61d (11.21)   -24.74e (12.24) 
Note:  Belief-evaluation product (   ) scores can range from -4 to +4, while the sum of belief-evaluation products (     ) can range from -48 to +48. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.30. Mean belief strength for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between all five attitudinal sub-groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Belief strength (  ) 
Strongly 
Approve 
  
Approve 
  
Neither 
  
Disapprove 
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
(    )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.  -1.15a (0.80)   -0.30b (0.97)    0.50c (0.75)    0.95d (0.78)    1.57e (0.67) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.   1.30a,b (0.69)    1.22b,c (0.71)    1.00b (0.86)    1.40a,c (0.75)    1.57a (0.83) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.   1.55a (0.75)    0.71b (0.96)   -0.17c (1.06)   -0.68d (1.08)   -1.15d (1.08) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.  -0.85a (0.92)   -0.07b (1.11)    0.48c (0.98)    1.12d (0.83)    1.52d (0.81) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.  -0.78a (1.05)   -0.30a (1.10)    0.71b (0.91)    1.01b (0.92)    1.51c (0.87) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.  -0.58a (0.93)    0.29b (1.10)    0.85c (0.78)    1.38d (0.86)    1.74d (0.60) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.   1.75a (0.44)    0.89b (0.95)   -0.13c (1.24)   -0.70d (1.01)   -1.00d (1.17) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessary.  -0.90a (1.06)   -0.37b (1.02)    0.52c (0.96)    0.96c,d (0.95)    1.28d (0.93) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.  -0.75a (1.15)   -0.18b (1.16)    0.63c (0.99)    1.01c,d (1.02)    1.36d (0.93) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.   1.70a (0.52)    1.08b (0.72)    0.56c (0.75)    0.09d (1.05)   -0.39e (1.20) 
+ Hold economical benefits for the country.   1.85a (0.36)    1.35b (0.66)    0.85c (0.92)    0.49c (0.97)    0.00d (1.22) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.   0.15a (1.27)    0.06a (1.06)    0.38a,b (1.11)    0.74b,c (1.02)    1.08c (1.19) 
Note:  Belief strength (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
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TABLE 4.31. Mean outcome evaluation for behavioural beliefs about hunting: differences between all five attitudinal sub-groups. 
Behavioural beliefs 
(Abbreviated) 
Outcome evaluation (  ) 
Strongly     
Approve 
  
Approve 
  
Neither 
  
Disapprove 
 Strongly 
Disapprove 
(    )  (    )  (    )  (    )  (    ) 
                        
– Disruptive and harmful to wild animal populations.   -1.30a (0.85)   -1.38a (0.71)   -1.40a (0.72)   -1.49a (0.64)   -1.82b (0.39) 
– Results in wild animals being killed by hunters.    0.95a (0.99)    0.52b (0.78)   -0.17c (0.65)   -0.83d (0.83)   -1.44e (0.83) 
+ Contributes to conservation of wild animals.    1.93a (0.27)    1.59a,b (0.64)    1.40b (0.72)    1.57a,b (0.68)    1.56a,b (0.83) 
– Cruel and inhumane treatment of wild animals.   -1.83 (0.50)   -1.73 (0.57)   -1.71 (0.54)   -1.75 (0.57)   -1.92 (0.28) 
– Leads to unethical hunting practices.   -1.63a,b (0.84)   -1.65a (0.65)   -1.50a (0.80)   -1.73a,b (0.50)   -1.95b (0.22) 
– Causes pain and suffering to wild animals.   -1.20a (0.72)   -1.56b (0.63)   -1.62b,c (0.60)   -1.73b,c (0.53)   -1.90c (0.30) 
+ Experience nature and the outdoors.    1.88a (0.33)    1.63a,b (0.63)    1.54a,b (0.54)    1.35b (0.94)    1.43b (0.96) 
– Hunters kill animals unnecessary.   -1.75a,b,c (0.44)   -1.51a,b (0.74)   -1.42a (0.82)   -1.74b,c (0.47)   -1.90c (0.35) 
– Endangerment and extinction of wild animal species.   -1.85a,b (0.36)   -1.70a,b (0.69)   -1.62a (0.57)   -1.75a,b (0.46)   -1.93b (0.25) 
+ Managing wild animals to prevent over-population.    1.93a (0.27)    1.37b (0.58)    0.98c (0.75)    0.70c,d (0.83)    0.43d (0.94) 
+ Hold economical benefits for the country.    1.75a (0.49)    1.29b (0.54)    1.13b,c (0.69)    0.95c (0.71)    0.90c (0.89) 
– Hunters take pleasure and enjoyment in killing.    0.35a (1.19)   -0.24b (0.91)   -0.88c (0.88)   -1.39d (0.75)   -1.75d (0.57) 
Note:  Outcome evaluation (  ) scores can range from -2 to +2. 
Tukey post-hoc test reveals between-group differences – means that do not share a superscript are significantly different at       . 
Cohen’s   effect size measures for between-group differences are reported in the discussion where of interpretive value. 
 
